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The thesis sets out to rework aspects of the Marxist state debate of the 1970's in the
context of the contemporary development of the British state. The argument is
conceptual and empirical. The thesis analyses the crisis of Keynesianism and the rise
of monetarism during the 1970's and the pursuit of monetarist policies during the
1980's. The development of the state is seen as being determined by social conflict,
the most fundamental form of which is the money power of capital: the money power of
capital constituted at the level of the world market and mediated through the state. The
thesis contends that the single most important event for the development of the state
has been the break-down of Bretton Woods in 1971 and 1973. The global power of
money impinges on the state in the form of financial difficulties which restrict the
integration of labour into the capital relation on the basis of social reform.
Following an analysis of the crisis of capitalist accumulation and the constitution of
this crisis in the form of a global pyramid of debt, the thesis analyses the politics of
the social contract and the development of the state under the Thatcher governments.
The thesis comes to the conclusion that monetarist policies did not involve a frontal
attack on the working class but, rather, an attempt to recompose class relations on the
basis of the categories of property owner and citizen. The thesis shows that monetarist
policies failed to resolve the crisis of capitalist accumulation. The class struggle over
the political integration of labour involved the political reproduction of the
contradictions of capital. The political significance of monetarism lies in its attempt
to subordinate political criteria to the money power of capital. Monetarist policies
entailed, fundamentally, an attempt to recompose the form of the state as the
concentrated force of the money power of capital. The thesis shows that the
recomposition of the form of the state is fraught with contradictions. The
subordination of political criteria to the money power of capital has led to the
recomposition of labour as the antagonistic subject of debt.
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In December 1974, the Economist announced the end of the post-war boom. It
painted a threatening scenario of heavy unemployment ahead in a global slump of
economic activity which could carry in its wake the disintegration of the social
structure of democracies. During the 1970's, high inflation and high unemployment
(stagflation) came to the fore as major political problems. Domestically and
internationally, governments came to reject the Keynesian guarantee of full
employment growth policies. Instead of Keynesian demand management, the new
policy paradigm was to regain control over public finances by deflating the money
supply. The shift from expansionary to restrictive monetary policies is associated
with 'monetarism'. Deflationary policies, according to monetarism, would deliver
inevitably (sustained) economic recovery, while Keynesian demand management was
said to be responsible for inflation and unemployment. Deflationary policies were
associated with the rejection of Keynesian interventionist policies which were held
to be responsible for the disruption of the allegedly self-regulating capacity of the
market. Trade union power was seen not only as causing unemployment as trade
unions priced people out of work (see Hayek 1986;Minford 1986), but also as
forcing the state to undertake inflationary policies, discriminating against the
self-regulating capacities of the market. Trade union power over the state, as
institutionalised in the UK in the social contract, and over capital, as
institutionalised in the system of industrial relations ('payment for change':
Holloway 1987), had to be undermined. The welfare state had to be restructured, if
not destroyed, so as to 'liberate' those dependent on social services from state
sponsored unproductive existence. These objectives had to be delivered if the
self-regulating capacity of the market was to unfold its rule. Failure in achieving
these objectives would lead on to, and reinforce, the 'road to serfdom' (Hayek 1986;
Brittan 1977). In the UK, Labour, in the 1970's, continued to attach importance to
social reform while deflationary policies, especially cuts in public expenditure and
regressive income policies, came to the fore as an attempt to restore financial
confidence. The 'unbelieving monetarists' (Brittan 1977) within the Labour
stration sought to implement deflationary policies within the institutional
framework of a Keynesian class compromise (social contract). The tension between
deflationary policies within a framework of class collaboration erupted in the winter
of discontent, paving the way for the election of the Thatcher government in 1979.
In the last fifteen years, Keynesian inspired policies of full employment have been
abandoned; the welfare state has been under constant attack, while the number of
unemployed and claimants has increased dramatically; the political role of trade
unions has been challenged, while their bargaining position has been threatened
through mass unemployment and closure of plants; the institutional structure of the
state has been tightened and the ideology of the market has been brought to the centre
of policy preoccupation. The debate between monetarists and Keynesians was not just
an academic one but, more fundamentally, fought on the political stage. The failure of
Keynesianism to achieve the miraculous cure of economic recovery, proved, in the
event, the practical truth of the monetarist prescription of how best to tackle
economic slump.
My thesis attempts to theorise the development of the British state since the mid
1970's and, in particular, the 1980's. The development of the state will be
conceptualised within a particular Marxist debate. This debate can be broadly
characterised as 'open Marxism' (1). The thesis aims at reworking the debate on
open Marxism in the context of the contemporary development of the British state.
Important authors in the contemporary debate on open Marxism are Agnoli, Clarke,
Gunn and Holloway. Lists of such kind are always problematic and not all the authors
mentioned would evaluate their work as 'open' Marxism. Nonetheless, the authors
supply a common background. This background is the conceptual and practical
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understanding of the class struggle as the constituting force of capitalist society. The
notion of the primacy of class antagonism disclaims a Marxism of conceptual closure,
i.e. a Marxism construed as a theory of determinism, structure and uncritical
acceptance of social development (Bonefeld/Gunn/Psychopedis 1990). Open
Marxism refers to the openness of the Marxist categories themselves. The openness
of categories obtains as a reflexive critique of social phenomena which, for their
part, exist as moments of the historically asserted forms of class struggle. An
understanding of the primacy of class implies a constant change of social 'reality' and
a constant change in the form of the class struggle. In turn, the understanding of
social reality as constantly moving implies the incompleteness of categories as the
social development appears in various forms and within changing empirical
circumstances. Instead of the theoretical certainty of a Marxism of conceptual
closure, open Marxism reclaims the incompleteness of the process of thinking and
readopts the unpredictability of the 'legitimation of chance' (cf. Marx 1973, p.
109), i.e. the unpredictability of the movement of class struggle. Such an approach
rejects a Marxism of conceptual closure or, in other words, a Marxism of purely
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contemplative knowledge (see Agnoli 1980). Instead, of the theoretical suppression
of class struggle in 'closed' Marxism (see Holloway 1990d), open Marxism sees its
categories as both conceptual and practical and, as a consequence, as categories which
are open to, and connote, the movement of class struggle itself. "This openness
appears in, for instance, a dialectic of subject and object, of form and content, of
theory and practice, of the constitution and reconstitution of categories in and
through the development, always crisis-ridden, of a social world. Crisis refers to
contradiction, and to contradiction's movement... . Rather than coming forward
simply as a theory of domination - 'domination' reporting something inert, as it
were a heavy fixed and given weight - open Marxism offers to conceptualise the
contradictions internal to domination itself" (Bonefeld/Gunn/Psychopedis 1990, ms.
p. 3-4). The development of the contradictions of domination is determined by class
struggle. Open Marxism's starting point is the class antagonism between capital and
labour. The assertion of the primacy of class antagonism entails an understanding of
the class struggle as an open-ended and unpredictable process. In the debate on open
Marxism, openness refers to "categories first and to empirical continuation second;
it is the openness of theory which construes itself as the critical self-understanding
of a contradictory world" (ibid. ms. p. 4). The debate of open Marxism seeks to
overcome the perennial controversy within Marxism concerning the relation
between structure and class struggle. In opposition to structuralist approaches that
look at the causal relation between e.g. the economic and the political, the debate
stresses the internal relation between different social phenomena. This internal
relation is seen as being constituted by the social relations of production, i.e. the
class antagonism between capital and labour. What other Marxist approaches see as a
causal relation between social phenomena, is conceptualised as a contradictory unity,
the movement of which is determined by the class struggle. However, the conceptual,
and practical, emphasis on the primacy of the class struggle involves a problem. This
problem concerns, contrary to the downplay of the class struggle in structuralist
approaches, a possible overemphasis on the class struggle, leading to an
essentialisation of class as existing merely against capital. The essentialisation of
class entails, in turn, an externalisation of structure and class struggle because
class struggle is understood as the causal nexus of capitalist development, i.e.
working class insurrection and capitalist deconstruction of revolutionary
subjectivity (Negri 1990). The essentialisation of class disregards the forms in and
through which the working class exists in capitalist society. Essentialism and
structuralism are different sides of the same problem as both externalise structure
arid struggle. I hope to avoid such an externalisation of structure and struggle by
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stressing that labour exists in and against capital, permitting an understanding of the
class struggle as existing in a dialectical continuum of reproduction and
transcendence. The notion of labour as existing in and against capital will be
conceptualised in chapter II. In chapter VII, I shall, on the basis of the analysis of the
development of the British state, drive home some implications of my approach.
How does the open Marxist debate conceptualise the capitalist state? For open
Marxism, the state is a distinct moment of the category of value. The state exists in a
relation of unity-in-separation to the economic. This understanding raises the
question of form. By 'form' I understand 'mode of existence' of the social relations of
production. From this perspective, the economic form does not determine the
political, nor vice versa: instead, the separation-in-unity of the two is constituted
in and through class antagonism itself. The question for Marx was how to understand
the diversity of multiple determinations of social reality as interrelated phenomena
which exist only in and through each other and whose social existence exists only
through the relation which constitutes them. I shall call this constituting relation the
'substantive abstraction' of social reality as a whole. This substantive abstraction
exists only as concrete reality in and through social conflict in and against the forms
of social reality. The substantive abstraction of bourgeois society is the social
relation of capital and labour. Chapter II outlines my understanding of open
Marxism, social form, and the state.
The aim of the thesis is to rework the Marxist debate just sketched in the context of
the rise of monetarism. This rise of monetarism is seen as being precipitated by the
failure of Keynesianism to contain the working class within the limits of the state
and capital. What, however, is to be understood by Keynesianism? Within the
framework of open Marxism, Keynesianism is seen as premised on a particular
institutional strategy to contain the class struggle on the basis of full-employment
growth policies and institutionalised forms of redistribution of wealth (material
concessions in form of welfare spending). Keynesianism sought to contain the class
struggle through demand management and policies of social reform, permitting a
form of social control on the basis of the transformation of protest into demand. In
turn, the Keynesian attempt to transform protest into demand filled the deflationary
gap between mass production and market realisation of commodities through fiscal
redistribution and deficit demand management. Material and political concessions
comprised a quid pro quo for social peace. These 'integration costs' (Agnoli 1968)
could be absorbed by capital and the state as long as productivity rose even faster
c
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than the integration costs (M. Davies 1978) and as long as the realisation of surplus
value made possible the expansive reproduction of capital.
Massive working class unrest at the beginning of the century (e.g. October
Revolution; revolutionary insurrection in Germany after world war l;General Strike
in Britain in 1926), followed by the dramatic recession in the 1930's, signposted
first by the Black Friday in October 1929, compelled a reconstruction of the role of
the state vis-ci-vis capital and the working class. The balance of class forces had
changed and with it the forms with which the state and capital sought to contain the
social conflict within the forms of bourgeois social relations (i.e. the imposition of
the wage relation through the guarantee of full-employment, material concessions,
prosperity and social reform). The recomposition of order that fitted the situation of
the class conflict (see Negri 1988a, p. 20), implied that the working class could no
longer be contained within the liberal variables of political and economic
equilibrium, defined by laissez-faire. "The central feature of Keynesianism was the
acknowledgement of the organisational strength of the working class. Keynesianism
made explicit in institutional form the dependence of capital upon labour, the
strength of the presence of labour in-and-against capital" (Holloway 1990, p. 1).
The political stability of post-war accumulation rested on the successful integration
of the working class in and through full-employment growth policies which became
the means to legitimise the Keynesian-inspired disorganisation and demobilisation of
social conflict. Political stability depended on the systematic social and political
integration of the working class, the condition of which was domestic prosperity
within the context of sustained accumulation on a global scale (see Clarke 1990b).
The Keynesian attempt to contain the class struggle depended on the ability of the
state to finance the integration costs that the pacification of the working class on the
basis of social reform commanded. The Keynesian mode of integration of labour
implied an inflationary expansion of money as the Keynesian integration of labour
involved the pacing of accumulation through deficit demand management which was
underpinned by international agreement of currency exchange relations, based on the
Bretton Woods agreement of 1944, and the reconstruction of capitalism in Europe
through the Marshall Plan (see Clarke 1988a;Armstrong et.al. 1984). The
Keynesian conception of the interventionist state entailed not only the imposition of
social conditions in and through which the process of value can unfold; it entailed also
the political guarantee of economic growth itself. The pacification and integration of
the working class depended on sustained 'economic growth'; the peacekeeping
guarantees of material concessions and social reform are premised on a
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'state-of-liquidity'. The political organisation of economic growth (industrial
policies,state deficit financing of demand, fiscal redistribution) came to the fore as
political means with which the state sought to influence the pace of accumulation in a
socially controlled way. The Keynesian guarantee for sustained economic growth
implied the affirmation of the conception of the interventionist state, premised on
the ideology of a politically supervised promotion of economic growth through
monetary and fiscal means. The peacekeeping objective of full-employment growth
and social reforms implied that the state took over forms of social planning,
integrating the social much more directly into the ambit of the state. The role of the
state vis-ct-vis capital and the working class is thus to be seen as being specified by
the political guarantee of profitability and prosperity, a guarantee upon which, in
turn, the normalisation and domestication of the social conflict rested. Negri
(1988a, p. 21) interprets the Keynesian commitment to recomposing the role of the
state vis-ci-vis capital and the working class as a destruction "of the object of
economic science, insofar as political economy was premised-structurally-on the
theory of economic equilibrium, on an integrated and functional symbiosis of
elements allowing an infinite, free access to the world of wealth". The ideology of the
Keynesian welfare state is one of planned economic growth and prosperity. The
synthesis between capitalist domination and its legitimating discourse depended on
the ability of the state to influence the pace of accumulation in a way which allowed
the integration of the working class through material concessions.
The systematic development of the Keynesian welfare state after world war II
rested upon the acknowledgment of the organisational strength of labour. At the same
time, this acknowledgment is repressive in form as it entailed the disorganisation of
class on the basis of the category of consumer and citizen (Holloway 1990;Negri
1988a). In the face of intense class struggle before and after the second world war
(for the UK after the second world war see Pelling 1963;Pritt 1963;Miliband
1973), the Keynesian acknowledgement of the organisational strength of labour
found an institutional expression in the generalisation of industrial relations and the
incorporation of the trade union movement into forms of political interest-
intermediation with government (and employers). Rising living standards and
full-employment growth guarantees, while manifesting a political programme to
impose work, constituted the quid pro quo for the organised labour movement to
participate in the formalising of policies. The political quid pro quo for the class
collaboration with the trade unions was their recognition of national values over
those of their members and, as such, their ability to discipline their members,
confining their aspiration to the limits of capital (Panitch 1986). The
institutionalisation of the trade union movement implied their 'responsibilisation' to
the limits of capital and the state. For example, during the Atlee government, the
annual reports of the TUC General Council "began to read like the records of some
special government department, responsible for coordinating policy in the social and
industrial sphere" (Pelling 1963, p. 215). The acceptance of political influence
over national policies, as distinct from class policies, implied trade union
recognition of exploitation and political domination. The Keynesian welfare state
involved thus a (preemptive) stabilisation of social peace in and through a degree of
trade union identification with government policies, an identification that encouraged
them to tailor their own objectives accordingly. Trade unions are torn between, on
the one hand, maintaining and improving their institutional recognition and, on the
other hand, articulating discontent so as not to lose the vital link with their
membership (see Hyman 1985a). The possible direction this contradiction might
take depends on the actual social conflict. The conflicting pressures that pertain
within the trade unions, intensified in the late 1960's, contributing to the fall of the
then Wilson government, and the winter of discontent that broke Callaghan's neck in
the late 1970's.
The contention that the rise of monetarism is precipitated by the failure of
Keynesianism to contain the class struggle raises the question of the significance of
monetarism for an understanding of the development of the state. What is to be
understood by monetarism? In the strictest sense, 'monetarism' rejects a policy of
state intervention because it suppresses the capacity of the market to regulate
demand and supply. Erratic credit and fiscal policies are held to be responsible for
inflation and economic slump. Monetarism presupposes the self-regulating power of
the market. The efficiency of capitalism is understood by monetarists in a dynamic
sense, in that the market rewards entrepreneurship and so maintains a spur to
economic progress. Disequilibrium is the essence of competitive capitalism, as the
entrepreneur innovates and so upsets the previous equilibrium. The sticks and
carrots of market success and failure will so structure expectations as to guarantee a
tendency to equilibrium. The basic condition of the tendency to equilibrium is a
capitalist society based on monetary exchange. The reconstruction of the market is
thus identical with the reimposition of the power of money in that a predictable
growth in money supply underpins a general level of prices. Price stability is seen
as being dependent on the predictable growth of the money supply. A predictable
growth of the money supply allows, in turn, every agent to be alert to the messages
of the market and to respond accordingly. The power of money is thus conceived of as
a general impulse giver, providing information and incentives for the acting
individual. Any defects of the system derive from the failure of the monetary
authorities to regulate the supply of money according to its function as impulse
giver. In order to secure the efficiency of capitalism, monetarism rejects the
Keynesian conception of the interventionist state as it undermines the discipline of
the market and so stunts enterprise. Monetary policies need at least to aim at a
predictable growth of the money supply (see Clarke 1982,1987;Deutschmann
1973;Reiche 1976). In this narrow understanding of monetarism, the state is to
reduce the money supply so that the proper relation between goods and money can
unfold.
However, this technical understanding is to take a much too narrow view of
monetarism. Indeed, monetarism as an economic policy has been utterly discredited
(see the crash in 1987) while the targeting of the money supply was abandoned after
only a short period of time (see Thompson 1986;Tomlinson 1986). The importance
of monetarism was the rejection of the conception of the interventionist state in
favour of the subordination of the state to the power of money and the subordination
of the conditions of life to the centrality of scarce money. The massive attempt by
monetarism to bring back the ideology of the market to the centre of the political
stage involved, fundamentally, the subordination of the working class to the
reimposition of so-called economic freedom. The reconstitution of social relations on
the basis of economic freedom implies the destruction of the welfare state, i.e. the
destruction of the way in which the power of labour in and against capital was
officially acknowledged and repressed during the post-war boom (see Holloway
1990;Negri 1988a). As with any other market agent, the proprietors of labour
power have to conform their expectation to the impulses given by money, without the
state meddling in the market through policies designed to guarantee employment and
income. Unemployment is self-inflicted as wage expectations are uncompetitive,
mainly because of trade union power. The reconstruction of the power of the market
forces entails thus the monetary destruction of the existing relationship between
public expenditure and (direct and indirect) wages, a relation which expresses the
class struggle over Keynesian integration costs (i.e. the Keynesian attempt to
transform protest into demand). The reimposition of the power of money entails the
destruction of institutional forms that underpin the political strength of labour. In
other words, the reconstruction of the market entails the monetary decomposition of
the collective power of labour to command a living standard 'incompatible' with the
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limits of the market.
The monetary decomposition of the working class thus involves not only the
redistribution of wealth in favour of capital, but, more fundamentally, the
recomposition of the role of the state vis-£-vis capital and the working class. Rather
than committing itself to a policy of corporatist forms of pacification and
normalisation of the class conflict, the reassertion of the power of money involves
the tightening of the ring of those who have access to even a semblance of power. Such
a recomposition of the hierarchical composition of domination involves, in turn, the
fragmentation and polarisation of the working class, characterised by the imposition
of poverty that punishes unproductive existence and the rewarding of those whose
enterprising activities conform to the messages of the market. Instead of income
guarantees, people are asked to price themselves into jobs, instead of
full-employment guarantees, unemployment is seen as 'natural', instead of welfare
guarantees, the monetarist attempt to reconstitute social relation on the basis of the
market involves the repressive use of public expenditure as a means to encourage
enterprise (poverty wages). In order to combat inflation, the deflation of the money
supply involves the subordination of the social to the power of money, i.e. the
regaining of financial stability through the enforcement of debt over the working
class. While the social contract depended on the successful responsibilisation of
labour, expressed in institutional form by corporatist strategies, monetarist
reconstruction of the market depended on the responsibilisation of the social to the
lurid face of economic freedom and equality: the reimposition of the power of money
in and through political force.
The Keynesian attempt to contain the class struggle involved the conceding of social
reforms through the combination of the free and equal exchange on the market with
the provision of collective resources. The role of the state attained an existence as an
enabling power to secure the capacity of people to advance their position on the
market. The monetarist attempt to impose the rule of the market involved thus an
attack on the form of the state as an enabling power. The role of the state is to secure
the economic freedom of the equal exchange on the market in opposition to the
so-called coercion of the market forces through the collective provision of
resources. The attempt to destroy the Keynesian relation between public expenditure
and wages involves thus the imposition of the rule of the market, i.e. the imposition
of inequality on the basis of the equal and free exchange of property owners on the
market.
The monetarist conception of social reproduction is incompatible with trade unions
since they are seen as forcing employers to concede inflationary wage rises and the
erratic credit and fiscal policies by the state undermining the unfettered operation of
the market forces. Trade unions enforce wage demands without regard to the effects
they are said to have on employment. Trade unions, according to monetarist ideology,
violate the free play of the market, paralyse the presupposed flexibility of the
labour market and coerce government to create inflation and to promote a society
dependent on welfare services instead of work. The task for the state is not to impose
barriers to the unfettered operation of the market forces, but to remove those that
exist. Hence, the state is seen as a force of coercion undermining and removing
barriers to the free play of the market and of ensuring the supervision of social
acceptance of tight monetary constraint. Monetarist policies do not just involve a
particular set of economic policies. Monetarism involves the attempt to contain
labour within the limits of capital and the state by subordinating the conditions of
life to the centrality of money, by undermining those institutional forms of the state
which are connected with integrating the working class through material
concessions, and by restructuring the welfare state in terms of repression and
efficiency. The form of reasserting social domination peculiar to the monetarist
reconstruction of the state is that of financial law-and-order control:
money-in-command. The imposition of money-in-command over the conditions of
life involved not just a shift in the balance of class forces but, more fundamentally,
the attempt to recompose the role of the state vis-a-vis capital and the working
class. The imposition of money-in-command involved the destruction of institutional
guarantees of full-employment growth policies, income and social reform. This
broader conception of monetarism provides a fruitful understanding of monetarism.
What, however, underlies the crisis of Keynesianism and the rise of monetarism?
On this score, the thesis contends that the crisis of Keynesianism and the rise of
monetarism were the result of neither political or ideological changes, or economic
crisis. The shift in the institutional strategy of the state reflects the
self-contradictory form of the state as a mode of existence of labour in capitalism. It
is the crisis of capitalist domination over labour for the purpose of exploitation to
which the monetarist institutional strategy responded. My starting point is the
argument that the driving force of accumulation is the tendency for capital to develop
the productive forces of labour without limits. However, the development of social
production confronts the limits of its capitalist form as production of profit. The
contradiction between social reproduction and its capitalist form entails, and is
premised on, the constant class struggle over the imposition of work. Most
fundamentally, the class struggle involves the struggle over the capitalist tendency
to limit necessary labour against labour's tendency to limit the provision of labour.
The class struggle over the organisation of life around imposed work involves, in
turn, the imposition of the capitalist form of social reproduction: i.e. the
measurement of all things and all social relations in terms of money. On this score,
the class struggle over capitalist exploitation of labour entails the imposition of
work through the imposition of the commodity form (exchange value), i.e. the
imposition of free and equal exchange on the market (see chapter II). In the face of
the capitalist tendency to unfettered accumulation, the unity-in-separation of
production and exchange makes itself felt through their separation, i.e. the monetary
constraint to the realisation of surplus value in the form of profit. In turn, this
separation is constituted in the form of a contradiction between functioning capital
and the credit system. The thesis's starting point is the argument that the crisis of
capitalist domination over labour resulted in a tension between productive and
money capital. This tension had reached a point of no return in the early 1970's,
signposted by the break-down of Bretton Woods and the deregulation of international
money and credit markets. "What gave monetarism its practical importance, ..., was
not its coherence as a doctrine nor its academic credentials nor even its conquest of
the financial pressure. What was decisive was the break down of the regime of fixed
exchange rates in 1971/3" (Gamble 1988, p. 39).
The thesis contends that the crisis of domination over labour manifested itself to
the state in the form of a disruption between productive and monetary accumulation.
The tension between the different forms of capital is expressed in the
self-contradictory centrality of money as form of social command. The open Marxist
debate sees money as the supreme social power through which social reproduction is
subordinated to the reproduction of capital. The crisis-ridden development of
accumulation manifested itself to the state in and through the money power of capital.
The centrality of money for its part exists through the presence of labour, this latter
being the source of the crisis of capital to which the state responds. On this score, the
thesis contends that the state can only reproduce the contradictions of capital in a
political form. I shall argue that monetarism as an economic policy failed, while, in
its broader sense, it proved to be pivotal for recomposing social command over
labour for the Right and Left ('New Realism') alike. Lastly, I shall argue that the
monetarist institutional strategy did not resolve the crisis of social reproduction as
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domination. Indeed, the presence of labour in and against capital led, by 1982, to a
renewed integration of production and exchange on the basis of credit expansion. This
expansion gave accumulation an increasingly speculative dimension. The
monetarist-inspired recomposition of the state is understood as a moment of the
crisis of social reproduction in the form of capital. The significance of monetarism,
as I shall argue, lies in its attempt to decompose the class relations through a
ruthless impartiality of legal and monetary intervention into the conditions of life
(see Clarke 1988a).
The political stability of monetarism, as was the case with that of Keynesianism,
depends on the sustained accumulation of capital. The recovery of sustained
accumulation had to be promoted politically, if the new consensus of social existence
in its relation to money was to succeed. The credit-sustained accumulation of capital
in the 1980's is the most powerful expression of the current fragility of capitalism.
This inflation is the expression of the non-resolution of the crisis of
overaccumulation. Seeing labour as the source of the crisis to which monetarism
responds, the inflation of credit will be discussed as, following CSE-Edinburgh
(1989, p. 33), an expression "of the power of the working class (even in moments
of defeat) and at the same time a response to that power which is repressive in form:
credit expansion is a response to the power of labour which both individualises and
oppresses, through debt". On this score, the thesis contends that the monetarist
attempt to decompose the class relations on the basis of monetary intervention
reasserted the power of labour as the antagonistic subject of debt.
It would be nonsensical to speak about Keynesian and/or monetarist policies in
general terms. The historical concrete form of the capitalist state and specific
attempts by the state to sustain domination over labour differs from one country to
the other. The class struggle can be understood only with regard to the concrete
existence of the state and to the concrete reproductive form of capital in different
nation states, as well as the different ways in which they are integrated on the world
market (see Clarke 1988c). The international crisis of accumulation triggered an
international crisis of Keynesian forms of domination and made possible the rise of
monetarism, internationally and domestically. This international phenomenon,
however, exists only in the context of persistent national developments of the class
struggle in and against capital and hence in a form of national difference (see
Kastendiek/Kastendiek 1985 on the difference in Conservative policies between
West-Germany and the UK). My thesis attempts to rework the open Marxist debate in
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the context of the development of the British state. On this score, I shall refer to
'Thatcherism' in a descriptive way, indicating the specific character of the
institutional strategy of the state under the Thatcher governments.
II Marxist Approaches to 'Thatcherism'
In what follows I introduce, and discuss the limits and insights of, different
Marxist approaches to the contemporary development of the state. My own approach
relies heavily on the approaches put forward by Clarke and Holloway (see below).
The discussion of Clarke and Holloway attempts to clarify my own approach in an
affirmative, nonetheless critical, way.
I My conceptual understanding rejects a discussion of the rise of Thatcherism
simply in terms of the failure of the Left during the 1970's, a failure that is said to
have opened up the way for the ideology of the New Right (see S.Hall/Jacques 1983).
The popular demand for freedom and less state interference is said to have fostered
the claim of the New Right that it would draw back the tyranny of the state (see S.
Hall 1982,1988 on authoritarian populism). The relation between the state and the
economy is in this view seen as one of statecraft and the crisis of Labour is seen as
merely reflecting political and ideological changes. It is suggested that the New
Right's reconstruction of the state is merely a consequence of the ideological appeal of
its discourses and that, if Labour were able to arrest this appeal, history would be
once again one of Labour's making (see S.Hall 1984,1988;S.Hall/Jacques 1983;
Hobsbawm 1981,1989).
In this approach there is no consideration of the global dimension of the crisis of
Keynesianism during the 1970's. While social democratic governments introduced
monetarist policies under the banner of realism within a Keynesian framework,
conservative governments proclaimed the power of the monetarist prescription as
one of moral principle, rejecting the Keynesian conception of the interventionist
state and demanding the destruction of Keynesian forms of class compromise. Surely,
differences obtain between social democratic policies of (monetarist) realism and
conservative policies of (monetarist) moral principle. However, the underlying
pattern cannot be ignored if the monetarist reconstruction of the state is to be
understood. To simply regard the development of the state as resulting from
ideological crisis is to misunderstand the dialectical development of class conflict as
merely an act of will fostered by the conviction of a particular party leadership. This
act of will remains difficult to comprehend as it seems to be merely a plan of sinister
powers. The 'emergence' of 'Thatcherism' was not simply a reflection of political and
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ideological changes, as this approach suggests. Capital does not aim at 'Thatcherism',
but at profit. Capital is indifferent to the way in which the working class is
politically processed as long as its command over labour can be sustained within the
concept of profit. Thatcher's 'peasants' revolt' (cf. Campbell 1987) may have been
contingent; the change from Keynesian to monetarist policies in the mid 1970's was
not. Why not? The answers provided by this approach are at best descriptive and
suggestive.
The merit of this approach lies in its emphasis on the ideological form of the crisis
of Keynesianism. However, the crisis of 'legitimacy' is not seen in the context of the
crisis of domination over labour. My thesis contends that the crisis of domination
involved a crisis of domination's legitimating discourse. A political problem of the
failure of Keynesianism to contain the class struggle was the problem of establishing
consensus (see Agnoli 1977)(2). The thesis contends that the class struggle over the
state under the Thatcher government involved the attempt to impose a new consensus,
i.e. the attempt to establish a new synthesis between domination and its legitimating
discourse. The New Right responded to the crisis of the Keynesian legitimation of
political domination by articulating the subordination of the state, capital and the
working class to the power of money much more directly compared with Labour in
the 1970's. The New Right sought to impose a new synthesis between domination and
its legitimating discourse on the basis of the self-determining market individual.
II Another way of conceptualising the contemporary development of the state
which I shall criticise is the Regulation Approach (see Aglietta 1979; for comment:
Clarke 1988b;Hubner/Mahnkopf 1988;Mahnkopf (ed.) 1988;Psychopedis 1990).
This approach sees the Keynesian welfare state (i.e. the Fordist state) as an
appropriate functional form of capitalist reproduction based on Fordist methods of
production. The Fordist state is discussed as providing functionally required
regulative forms that integrate a regime of accumulation (3). Class conflict is seen
as being regulated by the state in a way which sustains capitalist accumulation
within a systemic mode of corresponding economic and political forms (e.g. (post-)
Fordism). Such an integrative relation between the political and economic is
discussed as a mode of articulation which sustains social reproduction without
entering crisis. The crisis of Fordism is seen as a crisis of Fordist production and the
subsequent crisis of the regulative functions of the state that are based on this mode
of production. The crisis of Fordism is seen as a period of disintegration, i.e. the
disintegration of a regime of accumulation and its political forms of regulation. A
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period of disintegration is founded on the disproportionate development between
different departments of production. The social mechanisms that ensure
proportionality are in disarray because of the exhaustion of the productive potential
of a given method of production and because of the subsequent break down of
regulative forms which act upon it. The period of disintegration is seen as a period of
transition from one mode of systemic integration (Fordism) to another mode of
integration (post-Fordism). Monetarism is, by implication, seen as an emerging
new form of political regulation based on a post-Fordist regime of accumulation. The
crisis-ridden process of transition is one of class struggle. However, the class
struggle remains subordinated to the unfolding of objective laws of capitalist
development (Clarke 1988b). This can be criticised as a structuralist-functionalist
understanding of social development (see Clarke 1988b;Psychopedis 1990).
The structuralist-functionalist understanding of society perceives the power of
money not as a power in and through which labour exists in capitalist society, but,
rather, as a regulative form that is functionally integrative within the structure of a
regime of accumulation. The function of money is historically specified through its
institutional form of existence and not as a mode of existence of the contradictions of
capital (see Clarke 1988a). Instead of conceptualising the social character of money,
the treatment of money is descriptive in reference to the function it fulfils. This
function is, in turn, perceived as a regulative form within a regime of accumulation.
The disintegration of a mode of integration causes monetary disturbances which are,
in turn, overcome with the reconstitution of a new regime of accumulation; money
serves once again as a regulative form 'subordinated to the institutional form of the
regime of accumulation' (Clarke 1988a). In this approach the reconstitution of a
new regime of accumulation (post-Fordism) is seen as being ultimately achieved
through the state. The state is understood as generating a functional integration of a
regime of accumulation. As with money, the state is not seen as a mode of existence of
the class antagonism between capital and labour but as a field that stands above the
class struggle. The state is conceived in. terms of the regulative functions it fulfils. In
the relation of structure and struggle, it is the former which determines the latter
(see Bonefeld 1987b).
The merit of the regulation approach lies in its attempt to combine the development
of the economic and the political and to draw attention to the systematic character of
social reproduction after World War II. However, the theoretical and empirical
exposition remains confused and unclear and the periodisation of capitalist
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development into typologies of structural dominance of a (post-)Fordist kind lacks
historical anchorage (see Clarke 1988a,b,1990a;Psychopedis 1990). The proposed
understanding of capitalist development remains descriptive and suggestive. Further,
the focus on objectively given patterns of development, patterns which simply
emerge, reads too much coherence into the stability of a mode of integration and, as
implied by the teieologist concept of (post-Fordist) transition (Bonefeld 1987b),
equates capitalist projects of social reproduction with their social implementation.
Ill The regulation approach is taken up in the reformulation of state theory (see
Bonefeld 1987b;see also Hirsch 1990;Jessop 1988a;Holloway 1988a)(4). The
debate on the (post-)Fordist state concentrates on theorising the systematic
character of regulative forms of the state with regard to specific regimes of
accumulation. Hirsch (1983a), one of the advocates of the 'reformulation', does not
reject the state derivation debate (see later), but criticises it for its limitations
while insisting on its fundamental importance as a starting-point for the study of the
state. The key question of the reformulation is to subsume the state derivation debate
into less abstract, more historic terms. The fundamental issue is the question
between logic and history, between structure and struggle, between objective laws
and subjective forces - the perennial themes of Marxist controversy.
The term (post-)Fordism is used by Hirsch/Jessop as an integral concept,
comprising the reorganisation of accumulation and form of socialisation. The
reconstitution of a new structure of accumulation is said to require a modified
relation between the political and economic. The development of a new integrative
structure of accumulation is seen as following the unfolding of objectively given
laws, but also the class struggle (Hirsch 1983a). Within this relation the class
struggle is subordinated to the unfolding of objective laws of capitalist development.
The recomposition of the state follows the patterns of a new mode of production which
is defined by the technological nature of production. This seems to me to be a
technological determinist approach (Pelaez/Holloway 1990). Thatcherism, by
implication, is seen as a political expression of the emergence of such a new
integrative structure based on the introduction of new technology. This understanding
attributes too much coherence to Thatcherism. The state is, by implication, not seen
as a self-contradictory form in and through class struggle, but as a functional entity
which articulates the project of capital politically. The main weakness of this
approach is the disarticulation of structure and struggle (Bonefeld 1987b).
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Jessop's (1983) (5) understanding of the 'dialectic between structure and
process' and Hirsch's (1978a) understanding of the state proved to be influential for
the post-Fordist analysis of contemporary developments of the state. Hirsch's
derivation of the state aimed at understanding the state from the capitalist relations
of production. What, according to Hirsch (1978a;see also Holloway/Picciotto 1977,
1978;Holloway 1980) constitutes the state as a capitalist phenomenon is the
separation of the collective social organisation from society itself, an abstraction
which posits the state as an external force of society, subjugating rulers and ruled
alike to a form of domination and social organisation independent from them. This
separation is understood in his contribution to the state derivation debate as a mode
of existence, and a mode of motion, of social relations; the state is understood as a
form of the social relations of production.
Although Hirsch's (1978a) reasoning implies that the relation between structure
and class struggle is not externally related but an historical process (a dialectic
relation) between object (historical result of class struggle) and subject (class
struggle conditioned by and transcending its own historical premise: Lukacs 1971),
he failed to follow through this inner relation between structure and struggle. The
potentiality of Hirsch's emphasis on the importance of class struggle in the
historical development of the state remained underdeveloped: "The course of
capitalist development is not determined mechanically or by some kind of law of
nature. Within the framework of its general laws, capitalist development is
determined rather by the the actions of acting subjects and classes, the resulting
concrete conditions of crisis and their political consequences" (Hirsch 1978a, p.
74-5). The tension between objective law and struggle lies in the term 'in the
framework' (see Holloway/Picciotto 1978). Objectivity (objective laws of
capitalist development) is juxtaposed to cfass struggle and the disarticulation of
class struggle from objective laws ('in the framework of) subordinates class
struggle as a motor of history to a predetermined, objectively given, development of
capitalism. Hirsch's structuralist approach to the state is mucl} more clearly
expressed in his conceptualisation of political power. Hirsch emphasised that the
state is a field of power relations determined by the balance of class forces within
objectively given patterns of development. This view is reminiscent of Poulantzas
(1974) (6).
Jessop's (1983,1985,1986a,1988a,b) contribution to the 'dialectic between
structure and process' attempts to build on, and to develop, Poulantzas's approach in
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response to its critics by arguing for a 'conjunctural' (or 'relational') approach to
the relation between the political and the economic, equating, in its most extreme
version, not only struggle with strategy, but class struggle with capital strategies
(see ibids.). This understanding fosters an understanding of Thatcherism as an
hegemonic project that breaks with the past by developing towards post-Fordism
(see Jessop 1986b). Thatcher is said 'to have known instinctively that there could
be no way back to the old Keynesian welfare state' (see Jessop 1986b, p. 8). This
personalised understanding of the development of the state disclaims an
understanding of the state as a political form - complementary to the economic form
- of class struggle because complex historical phenomena "are best analysed as a
complex resultant of multiple determinations" (Jessop et.al. 1988, p. 53). Once
social 'form' is not understood as 'mode of existence' of the social relations of
production (Marx 1973,1983), one is left with the understanding of social
relations as economic relations, while the political relations have to be theorised in
relation to the economic as relatively, if not radically, autonomous from the
economic (see Jessop 1986a)(7). The constitution of social reality, in Jessop,
follows the "independent logics of political and ideological domains", forcing the
scientific mind to follow, in descriptive terms, the strategic line of capital in the
face of "various dilemmas, risks, uncertainties and complexities", emergent
strategies, trial and error techniques etc. (Jessop et.al. 1988, p. 8). Jessop sees
Thatcherism as an interplay of 'trial-and-error policies which coincide with
relative autonomous forces of the market' (Jessop 1986b, p. 8), an interplay which
is seen as having put Thatcherism into the direction of post-Fordism (ibid.). Class
relations are reduced to one (strategic) mechanism/ cause amongst others (social
relations of production as comprising economic relations) so that the material world
of capitalism emerges as a systematic cause of capitalist struggle. Jessop claims thai
the interplay of objective laws of capitalist development and the hegemonic struggle
of different capital 'logics' provide mechanisms that melt different social systems
together in terms of a corresponding social cohesion of ideological, political and
economic patterns, patterns of a systematic kind, objectively unfolding and framed in
a voluntarist fashion (Bonefeld 1987b;Clarke 1983). These logics derive from
different allocation interests and exist independently from class (see Psychopedis
1 990).
Hostile to form analysis, while proclaiming in its favour, this approach
acknowledges contradictions merely in terms of 'structures'. The constituting power
of labour is thereby dismissed. The understanding of contradiction internal to
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domination is pushed into oblivion. The consequence of Jessop's equation of capitalist
strategies with class struggle is the dismissal of an understanding of history as an
history of class struggle. Instead one has to embark on an individualistic analysis of
effect and result, the conceptual depth of which is "the theoretical capacity to
penetrate beneath the actual course of events of more fundamental mechanisms and
causal powers which generate these events in specific circumstances" (Jessop et.al.
1988, p. 28; see also Bhaskar 1989, p. 2). Consequently, Thatcherism can be
approached best by a 'polytheist' approach, because there are many multiple causes
and effects and 'hence many Thatcherisms' (Jessop et. al. 1988, p. 9). Such a
conceptualisation of social reality carries within it the danger that it is in the end
tautological: first of all the outward appearance of reality is taken for granted
(multiple causes), and then it is in the light of this outward appearance of reality
that social development is assessed (see Gunn 1989,1990). To take the outward
appearance of reality as the conceptual starting point without insisting on the social
relations that constitute social reality runs the danger of finishing conceptually
where the theorising of the critique of political economy starts.
The merit of the debate on the (post-)Fordist state is that it aims at providing a
materialist account of the changes that have taken place within the state and the
economy and that it aims at discussing these changes as ones within social reality as a
whole. Further, the (post-)Fordist debate signals the development of important
t
political and social trends which are, however, generalised into a sociological model
whose pure form is said to be progressively disclosed by history (see Bonefeld
1987b). The disarticulation of structure and process dilutes the value of the at times
rich insights into the contemporary development of the state. In the event, the
post-Fordist approach to the development of the state is at best descriptive and
suggestive (see Bonefeld 1987b;Gerstenberger 1989;Bonefeld/Holloway 1990).
IV Another explanation of the rise of monetarism that looks at the economic crisis
and that sees monetarism as a capitalist response to this crisis, is put forward by,
inter alia. Ingham (1984) and van der Pijl (1984)(see also S. Polkri 1982).
Their general line of argument is to identify Keynesian inspired regulation of
capitalist reproduction as being in the interest of industrial capital (demand
management, budget deficit financing of the realisation of profit and subsidies to
industry) and opposed to the interest of financial capital. Monetarism, on the other
side, is identified as a regulation of capitalist reproduction that serves the interest of
financial capital, discriminating against industrial capital. The rise of monetarism is
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discussed as an outcome of confrontation between distinct capital fractions (i.e.
industry versus finance). Monetarism is seen as reflecting the 'structural
dominance' (cf. van der Pijl 1984) of financial capital over productive capital, a
dominance which sparked off the crisis in the 1970's and which undermined
Keynesian industrial policies. Although the crisis of accumulation took the form of a
financial crisis (see chapter III) whose resolution (policies of deflation) sacrificed,
to a large extent, productive activities 'on the altar of money' (cf. Clarke 1988a),
the model of fractional confrontation is too simple. Further, this approach sees the
divide between financial and industrial capital as one which marks the
exceptionalism of post-war Britain: i.e. the City as an international centre of money
capital opposed to the interest of British based industrial capital (see Ingham 1984;
S.PoikrIi1982)(8). The problem seems to be the incompleteness of the organisation
of capital in Britain (see Anderson 1987). The global crisis of accumulation is
disregarded and reformulated as a problem of the British national economy, while the
international mode of existence of capital is dismissed by seeing capital in purely
national terms and by seeing the international character of capital as a combination
of domestic capitals (for critique of such a view see v. Braunmuhl 1978).
The fractionalist approach assumes an independence of different capitals, whose
difference, however, exists only in and through the specific role they perform
within the circuit of 'social capital' (cf. Marx 1978), i.e. the way in which they
relate to surplus value production (see Clarke 1978). The separation-in-unity of
the different forms of capital in their relation to labour is negated to a mere
separation. The separation mentioned is discussed in institutional terms. The
structural dominance of financial capital is equated with the powers of the banks that
starved out British industrial capital from financial investment. To discuss the
power of money as the power of banks is to lose sight of labour as the substance of
capital to which money relates in a self-contradictory, but, nevertheless, immediate
way (money as incarnation of wealth in the form of the abstract category of labour).
Industrial and money capital are different moments of the social reality of value.
Industrial and money capital share the same interest, i.e. profit. Profit, however,
exists only as a mediated form of exploitation in production. Additionally, financial
institutions achieve the bulk of their profit from concentrating savings which are, in
turn, made available for commercial or productive purposes through credit (see
Altvater et.al. 1975). I shall argue that the "conflict between finance and industry is
not so much a conflict between fractional interest as an expression of the
contradiction inherent in the capitalist mode of production between the tendency for
capital to develop the forces of production without limit, and the need to confine
production within the limits of capital" (Clarke 1988c, p. 3). Lastly, the
systematisation of different capital fractions seems to be empirically misleading in
the face of a growing interlocking between industrial and money capital (stock
holdings and the engagement of industrial capital in financial activities)(9).
The monetarist attempt to regain control over the money supply is not just a policy
in the interests of money capital, but in the interest of capital in general because it
aims at maintaining the existence of value in its most abstract form. The destruction
of the credit system would lead not only to a rupture of monetary accumulation, but
to a severe rupture of social reproduction as a whole. The fundamental question is not
that of the financial interest of the City, but that of the expansion of the
self-contradictory circuit of (social) capital on the world market (v. Braunmuhl
1978). The fundamental question is not that of the dominance of money capital, but
that of the explanation of this dominance. The fundamental question is not that of the
supposed exceptionalism of Britain, as discussed in this approach to the rise of
monetarism in Britain, but that of the integration of the British economy into the
world market (Clarke 1988c).
Regarding the state, its existence is reduced, by the approach just discussed, to an
entity external to the economy. If it is the case that the monetarist reconstruction of
the state has undermined productive activity by subordinating industrial capital to
the power of money in a way which mitigated against national interest (erosion of
productive base), and which subordinated the state to the power of the banks (see S.
Pollard 1982;lngham 1984), why then was it impossible for the state to
subordinate money capital to the interest of the national economy and to the
regulative power of the state? The answer provided by this approach is reminiscent
of Miliband's (1969) conspiracy theory and Poulantzas's (1974) structuralist
reasoning, both of which stress different aspects of the same fundamental treatment
of the state: the state is merely seen as a field that reflects the structurally dominant
capital interest, a field capital has to occupy to structure particular state functions
required for the processing of its interest. The state is not seen as mode of existence
of the social relations of production.
The merit of this approach is to focus attention on the financial form of the crisis
and the (self-contradictory) constitution of the crisis in the form of a tension
between monetary and productive accumulation within the circuit of social capital.
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The autonomisation (Verselbstandigunql of monetary accumulation is, as I shall
argue in Chapter III, a mediated form of the crisis of capitalist overaccumulation. I
shall argue that the state's response to the crisis of social reproduction in the form
of capital is mediated through monetary pressure on the state. In turn, I shall argue
that the money power of capital is mediated through the state. The money power of
capital manifests the fundamental level of the class struggle over domination.
V The profit squeeze approach (see Glyn/Sutcliffe 1972;Glyn/Harrison 1980;
Armstrong et.al. 1984 (10);and for a discussion of the state in relation to the profit
squeeze see O'Connor 1973, 1984;Gough 1985;see also Hirsch 1978b) discusses
the crisis of accumulation in terms of the confrontation between capital as a whole
and the working class. The working class is said to have achieved a growth in wages
that outstripped the rise in productivity. Additionally, the achievement of the
working class in realising its aspiration towards a growing living standard, as
institutionalised in the Keynesian guarantee of welfare and full employment, is said
to have coincided, by the end of the 1960's, with an intensified competition between
capitalist nations. As a result, increases in wages could no longer be compensated for
by increasing prices of commodities, if the British economy was to maintain its
integration into the world market. Inflationary pressure made it no longer tenable
for capital and the state to allow labour further gains in living standards. The crisis
of accumulation is seen as one of profit. In order to restore profitability, capital is
said to have been forced to undermine the bargaining position of the working class
through rising unemployment.
The merit of this approach is that, in contrast to the other approaches mentioned
above, it se.es the development of the economic and the state as one based upon the
class struggle between capital and labour. However, the class struggle between
capital and labour is mainly discussed as a distribution struggle (Altvater et.al.
1974;Yaffe 1973). It remains open to question to what extent the growth of wages
offset capitalist accumulation since the late 1960's. This is of particular importance
for the British working class which, despite its strong bargaining position and
industrial militancy at the shop floor, experienced low wage rates relative to other
western countries. Further, as discussed by Marx (1983), a rise in wages that
outstrips productivity increases, can be regulated by the development of
accumulation without triggering a crisis as deep and persistent as the crisis since
the 1960's. In the event, the profit squeeze approach puts forward a 'Ricardian'
(Altvater et.al. 1974) analysis because capital's crisis is seen as consequent upon
the distribution struggle between capital and labour over the division of the social
product between them (Altvater et.al. 1974;Yaffe 1973). Contrary to the simplistic
view of the profit squeeze, the crisis of accumulation is best approached by seeing it
as a crisis of surplus value production, in the course of which the unfettered
accumulation of capital reaches its barrier to self-valorisation (overaccumulation
of capital). Competitive pressure forces each individual capital to seek constantly to
revolutionise the productive forces of labour, a pressure that intensifies in a period
of overaccumulation. The class struggle since the late 1960's has focused on the
recomposition of control over labour as capital, in order to avoid devaluation and
bankruptcy, seeks to break the resistance of the working class in opposition to
intensified exploitation and to a policy of state austerity. The profit squeeze sees this
recomposition as a general attack on the working class. Contrary to the profit squeeze
approach, monetarism did not simply involve a frontal attack on the working class,
but, rather, a political reinforcement and exploitation of the division within the
working class (Clarke 1988a).
In their approach to the state, O'Connor and Gough concentrate on the political
economy of state expenditure. "According to O'Connor the growth of state expenditure
is both the cause and effect of growing monopolisation as the state increasingly takes
on the costs of 'social investment' and 'social consumption' on behalf of the
monopolies, reinforcing the socialisation and monopolisation of production" (Clarke
1990b, ms. p. 13). O'Connor adds to the political stabilisation of capitalist
accumulation the political function of generating political legitimation of
accumulation. The legitimating role of the state is associated with the maintenance of
accumulation, integrating the working class through full-employment and income
guarantees. The contradictory character of the state derives from the financial
constraints and the class struggle over the distribution of wealth. The legitimation of
accumulation through material concessions is seen as having come up against its
historical barrier as the crisis of profitability eroded the tax base of the state. This
erosion put the state under immense monetary pressure as growing pressure on state
expenditure exceeds the state's revenue. The erosion of the tax base made it more and
more difficult for the state to uphold its integrative mechanisms. Hence O'Connor's
use of the term 'fiscal crisis of the state'.
In this approach, the state's economic and legitimating policies are seen as
resulting from the distributive struggle between capital and labour, and the
legitimating functions of the state are mainly derived from its economic function. The
state is not seen as a self-contradictory mode of existence of the class antagonism
between capital and labour. In general terms, the state is largely understood in an
economic-reductionist fashion. The state is seen as being severely constrained by the
functional requirements of productive accumulation. At the same time, the state is
determined by the class struggle (see Clarke 1990b). The struggle, however, is
conceived of as a distribution struggle. The merit of this approach is to focus on the
monetary constraint over the state. My thesis contends that the crisis of
Keynesianism is partly a financial one, but only insofar as this financial crisis is
seen as a manifestation of the contradiction between the unfettered expansion of
social reproduction and its subordination to the reproduction of capital.
In what follows I discuss Clarke's and Holloway's contribution to the contemporary
development of the state.
VI Clarke (1988a) sees the rise of monetarism neither as a political triumph of a
specific capital fraction nor as simply reflecting political and ideological changes or
economic crisis. The rise of monetarist policies is seen as a culmination of well-
established developments of the class struggle since the 1960's. The fundamental
level of the class struggle is the money power of capital. The money power of capital
is seen as being mediated through the state. The state, as Clarke sees it, was forced to
adopt monetarist policies through monetary pressure. This pressure is seen as the
power of money in and through which the crisis of overaccumulation of capital makes
itself felt to the state. Money is seen as power arising from its social constitution as
the most abstract form of private property and as the supreme social power through
which social reproduction is subordinated to the reproduction of capital. The crisis of
accumulation involves the state in a mediated way, mediation of the crisis of
overaccumulation in the form of the power of money, because the state is directly
integrated into the circuit of money capital through its role as central banker. The
state, rather than providing policies which resolve the crisis of accumulation,
reproduces the contradictions of capital in a political form. Keynesianism and
monetarism implement contradictory policies that seek to regulate the crisis from
one or the other pole of the self-contradictory unity of monetary and productive
accumulation. Clarke discusses the monetarist reconstruction of the state as an
intensely contradictory process. However, this contradictory process is seen as
having at its heart the recomposition of the role of the state vis-a-vis capital and the
working class. This recomposition is said to involve the subordination of the working
class to the centrality of the power of money over the conditions of life.
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The state is seen as being determined not by the 'subordination of the state to
interests that arise in civil society, but by the radical separation of the state from
civil society and the formal character of state power that is the essential
characteristic of the capitalist state form'. The subordination of the state to the
money power of capital is seen as imposing limits to the achievement of social
reform through the state. The process of the state is seen as one of class struggle, in
the historical development of which the working class is seen as being politically
processed not on the basis of class, but of citizenship. The monetarist-led
reconstruction of social relations on the basis of the market is seen as a process of
reasserting domination through the monetary decomposition of class relationships on
the basis of citizenship.
Clarke's 'intimidatingly good analysis' (Holloway 1989) of the form of capitalist
society as process of class struggle, and his analysis of the crisis of Keynesianism,
contains some weaknesses. The reference to the struggle over capitalist domination
over the production process remains somewhat underdeveloped. This has
implications for the treatment of money as social process of domination and for the
analysis of the class struggle. The downplay of the relations within production leads
to a discussion of money, as the form of value's most elementary and abstract
existence, which lacks conceptual anchorage because the substance of value, of which
money is only a form of existence, is not sufficiently discussed. This is a weakness
because Clarke sees the direction given to the development of the state as one
'deriving' from monetary pressure. The neglect of the production process leaves, by
implication, the working class in a somewhat shadowy position vis-a-vis capital and
the state. Although Clarke stresses that the state is always the object of the constant
force of class, the historically changing composition of the working class remains
unclear. Clarke argues that the labour movement was defeated in Britain, as well as
internationally, by the early 1980's. At the same time, however, he argues that the
crisis of capitalist accumulation has intensified during the 1980's. This argument
involves a paradox because his argument contends that capital is a social relation and
hence the historical development of capital and the state a movement of contradiction
in and through labour. Hence he seems to agree that it is the power of labour which is
the other face of the capitalist crisis of domination. On the one hand we have capital's
crisis that has not been overcome because of labour and on the other hand we have
labour that has been defeated in the early 1980's. How then is it possible that capital
is still in deep crisis while labour has been defeated? Is capital in crisis with itself;
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independent from labour, as capitalist logic approaches seem to suggest (11)? A
possible answer to this paradox may be that Clarke is not clear enough in his
conceptualisation of the development of the self-contradictory form of the state.
Clarke emphasises that the state is a form of the capital relation - complementing
the economic form - and that the form of the state is an historically specific form of
struggle and domination. However, it is not clear whether the state is conceived of as
a self-contradictory form of the 'presence of labour in and against capital' (see
chapter II). I would suggest that Clarke puts too little emphasis on this aspect,
resulting in an inadequate discussion of the class struggle over capitalist domination
over labour for the purpose of exploitation.
The merit of Clarke's approach is that class is seen as primary for understanding
the movement of the self-contradictory mode of existence of capital and the state. I
intend to pick up on Clarke's understanding of the development of the state as a
form-determined self-contradictory process of class struggle while stressing,
however, the existence of the state as a historically specific form of domination in
and through labour. However, I discuss this struggle predominantly in conceptual
terms, concentrating on the movement of the contradiction of capital as one
constituted by the presence of labour in and against capital. I shall assess Clarke's
conceptualisation of the relation between capital and labour in my conclusion
(chapter VII).
VII In his review of Clarke, Holloway (1989) claims that the 'key to
understanding the development of the state is the struggles around production'.
Holloway contends that the 'crude, but basically correct discussion' in his article on
Nissan (Holloway 1987) is of vital importance here. Holloway's (1980;Holloway/
Picciotto 1978) contribution to Marxist state theory discusses the state as the
political mode of existence of the class antagonism between capital and labour. The
emphasis on the class relation involves an understanding of the state as an
historically specific form of struggle and domination (Holloway 1979/1990,
1980), the determination of which is seen as rooted in the rule of value. Value is
understood as class relation. The capitalist state is conceptualised as the political
form of the rule of value, that is social reproduction in the form of capitalist
domination (12). Holloway/Picciotto sought to go beyond the prevailing
functionalism and structuralism in state theory (Hirsch/Jessop) by emphasising
that the development of capitalism and the state does not follow pre-given objective
laws of capitalist development; rather these laws are themselves understood as forms
which class struggle assumes under capitalism. Contrary to Negri (1987a), the
state is not seen as a guise assumed by capital, a machine through which the
collective will of capital is imposed on the working class, but as a self-contradictory
mode of (political) domination in and through labour. The key to understanding the
state is to see it as separated-in-unity from the economic and to conceptualise the
relation between the two as the class struggle of capital and labour. Hence the state is
seen as a distinct moment of class struggle and not as an entity external to struggle.
This understanding rejects seeing the state as a structure that is functionally
required to regulate accumulation. Instead, the separation of the state from society is
seen as a process of class struggle, rather than as an accomplished fact (Holloway
1980). The class struggle is seen as constantly challenging and undermining the
composition of the form of the state within the limits of its own form-determined
mode of existence. The composition of the state expresses the historical limits the
class struggle imposed upon the state and capital. This understanding of the state has
the merit of going beyond the functionalism and structuralism of Poulantzas (for
critique see also Clarke 1977) and the state derivation debate, and of rejecting
economic reductionism of capital logic approaches to the state (see Altvater 1972,
1 977).
My approach to the state relies, to a large extent, on Holloway's contribution to
Marxist state theory. Holloway's (1979/1990,1980) weakness lies in his
differentiation between the form of the state (as social relation) and the state
apparatus (i.e. the state's content as an institutional expression of the balance of
class forces, a content designed to disorganise class on the basis of the individual). In
my thesis I will make no such differentiation; the form and content of the state will
be discussed as comprising a dialectical unity. I shall assess the problematic
differentiation between form and apparatus in my concluding chapter.
In his recent writing, Holloway (1987,1988b) reduces the complex and
contradictory relation between the economic and political to a unity. The striking
parallels that Holloway sees between changes in the managerial strategy and changes
in the character of the state, remain unexplored to the extent that the struggle
around production informs in immediate terms changes in state policy. This unity
(or immediacy; for critique see Gunn 1989) appears to reject the idea of the
self-contradictory form of existence of the state and the separation-in-unity of the
state vis-a-vis the economic. While Clarke concentrates on the mediation of the
crisis of domination in production in the form of the development of the most
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elementary existence of value in the form of money, discriminating against the
conceptualisation of crisis of domination in production, Holloway stresses the other
side of the coin, without this consideration allowing for an understanding of the role
of money in this development. In the event, Holloway's recent understanding of the
relation between the political and the economic tends to repeat, from a different angle
(unity as unmediated existence of struggle), the shortcomings of the debate on
(post-)Fordism which stresses the aspect of unity as one of structural integration
on the basis of the unfolding of objective laws of capitalist development.
Holloway concludes that the change-in the managerial strategy from Edwardes to
Day at British Leyland, i.e. the change from attack on the working class to 'working
with pride', is associated with a changing tide at 'the political level' towards a more
human face of state policy with or without Thatcher (Holloway 1987, p. 161). Does
this particular change in managerial strategy, a particular managerial strategy
amongst others not all of which were characterised by 'macho management' (see
Hyman 1985b), indicate an immediate reflection in state policy?; and is, by
implication, the reconstruction of the state under Thatcher resolved, making it
possible to impose capitalist domination in and through the state in a human face?
Holloway's answer is no (see Pelaez/Holloway 1990). If not, why not? Holloway
seems to me to avoid an answer by reverting into an essentialist understanding of
class struggle (Gunn 1989, p. 114, fn. 4). In Holloway (1987,1988b), the
conceptual understanding of society retreats to an unmediated totality of class
struggle. Holloway's insistence on the 'immediacy' of class struggle establishes a
dualism between class struggle and the forms assumed by class struggle. By arguing
that class struggle is immediately opposed to capital, Holloway separates class from
the forms in and through which the class antagonism exists. To deny the aspect of
separation, as Holloway seems to do in his Nissan article, is to advocate an
essentialist reading of class struggle.
The way in which I want to pick up on Holloway's contribution to the contemporary
development of the state is by proposing a different reading of Holloway's Nissan
article, a different reading hidden between the lines of his argument. As it seems to
me, Holloway seeks to utilise aspects of the (post-)Fordist discussion, which stress
that the crisis of accumulation is a crisis of social reality as a whole. Contrary to the
structuralism and functionalism (see Holloway 1988a) of the debate on (post-)
Fordism, Holloway seeks to take issue with the notion of unity of the class struggle:
the state and management are distinct moments of the same class struggle. This unity,
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I agree with Holloway, needs to be theorised in order to understand the connection
between struggles in production and the recomposition of the form of the state. The
breaking of resistance of the main strongholds of working class power was of crucial
importance to the development of the state. Reading Holloway in this way is fruitful
because the theoretical problem is posed of how to understand the unity between
distinct forms of struggle, distinct forms which, however, existed only in a
dialectical process of discontinuity and continuity, or, to put it differently, in a
unity-in-separation.
Ill Summary
The aim of the thesis is not to provide an empirical study of policy formation and
implementation but, rather to theorise in an abstract manner the historical
development of the changing relation between the state, capital and the working class
and the recomposition of the role of the state within this relation since the mid
1970's. The analysis will be in conceptual terms first and empirical terms second.
The aim of the thesis is to rework the open Marxist debate in the context of the
contemporary development of the British state. The thesis does not aim at providing
an assessment of, or contribution to, existing Marxist approaches to 'Thatcherism'.
Rather, the aim is to rework the development of the state over the last fifteen years,
and in particular since the Conservative shift to power, through an understanding of
the state as a mode of existence of the contradictory unity of surplus value
production. The crisis of Keynesianism and the rise of monetarism, according to my
understanding of the capitalist state, was not a reflection of political and ideological
changes (S.Hall;Hobsbawm), nor merely the result of economic crisis (profit
squeeze;fractionalist approach), nor a consequence of the interplay of economic
crisis and the disintegration of the regulative structure of the post-war period
(regulation approach;(post-)Fordism), but a process of the self-contradictory form
of the capitalist state in the face of a global crisis of accumulation. The contradictory
existence of the state is constituted by the class antagonism, the movement of which
is being determined by the outcome of the class struggle. The relation between
structure and process will be discussed as an internal one. This understanding of the
state as social form and process of class struggle is based on aspects of the state
debates in the 1970's (13).
The attempt to understand the development of the state as a form-determined social
process is made difficult by the lack of literature that tackles the contemporary
development of the state as one of a form-determined process of class struggle. This
lack of literature poses questions concerning the use of literature.
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Literature will be used because it provides a pool of empirical data, interpreted in
a somewhat Marxist fashion. Further, I shall use the insights (merits) of the
approaches as discussed above. These insights, however, will be reformulated within
my own theoretical approach. As I see it, ail the approaches introduced, except the
ones by Clarke and Holloway which provide, in my view, a rich understanding of the
development of the state, concentrate on particular (real) phenomena. These
phenomena are, however, discussed in disconnection from the social contradictions of
surplus value production. While all these approaches do relate to different aspects in
which the crisis of social reproduction expresses itself, they downplay the
displacement and constitution of class antagonism within the proper movement of the
contradictions of surplus value production. The insights of this literature will hence
be reformulated in terms of the social form of the class antagonism of capital and
labour. I shall take issue with this literature in an immanently critical way.
However, this discussion will be restricted to footnoting and the concluding chapter.
The literature will hence be used in a two-fold way: as a resource of empirical
studies and as a resource of Marxist interpretations of historical developments. The
underlying assumption of the thesis is that a Marxist inspired analysis of the
development of the state has to treat the development of the state as one of class
conflict. This understanding is related to the work of, inter alia, Agnoli, Clarke,
Holloway and Gunn. The use of this literature provides a point of reference and a
challenge as regards clarifying my own argument.
IV FORM OF PRESENTATION
Chapter II outlines my conceptualisation of the form of the state. The term
'presence of labour in and against capital' will be introduced as a concept that
stresses the internal relation of structure and process, a relation which is
substantially determined by the social relations of production. Further, the chapter
introduces the following concepts: class,value, crisis, world market, money, credit.
Particular attention is given to the relation between productive and money capital
and the relation between money and the state. All these phenomena are understood as
existing in a self-contradictory way, the contradiction being constituted by the
power of labour that pertains in these phenomena in a mode of being denied. The
movement of the contradiction is determined by the class struggle (14).
Chapter III looks at the crisis of accumulation, the (real) expression of which is
mass unemployment and the self-contradictory autonomisation of monetary from
productive accumulation. In a first section, the analysis focuses on the constitution
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of the crisis in the form of a tension between functioning capital and the
credit-system. Particular attention is given to the development of international
money markets. In its second section, the chapter shows the way in which the money
power of capital reasserted itself over the state and looks at the way in which the
British state is integrated into the world market. Particular attention focuses on the
break-down of Bretton Woods, the debtor crisis and the crash in 1987. It will be
shown that monetarism is a moment of the monetary expression of the crisis, an
expression which is real as. the abstract existence of value in action:
money-in-command.
Chapter IV gives a brief account of the development of the class struggle over the
form of the state during the 1970's. This chapter is largely descriptive because the
focus of the thesis is the development of the state under Thatcher. The 1970's are of
importance in order to understand the development of the state during the 1980's and
to understand the continuous/ discontinuous line of recomposition which did not just
start with Thatcher taking office. I shall show that the rise of monetarism is
precipitated by the failure of Keynesianism to contain the class struggle. Further, I
shall argue that the main features of the development of the state during the 1980's
were already present during the 1970's.
Chapter V engages with the development of the state during the 1980's. Attention
focuses on the recomposition of the role of the state vis-a-vis capital and the
working class. I look at the economic policy of the Thatcher government in the early
1980's, trade union policy, training schemes, and the restructuring of the welfare
state. The main conclusion will be that the development of the state did indeed reflect
the crisis of accumulation, but that it did so in a self- contradictory way, the
contradiction being determined by class struggle. I conclude that the monetarist
institutional strategy involved the monetary decomposition of the working class and
its recomposition on the basis of the categories of property owner and citizen.
However, I shall show that monetarism's practice contradicted its results.
Chapter VI summarises the argument of my thesis and suggests conclusions.
Chapter VII reworks the Marxist debates introduced above, looks, in the context of




1: On Open Marxism and on an assessment on 'closed' Marxism see Agnoli 1980;Bonefeld
1987a;and the introduction in Bonefeld/Gunn/Psychopedis (eds.) 1990.
2: Offe's (1972,1984) and Habermas's (1973) discussion on the 'legitimation crisis' of
'late capitalism' reflects the problem discussed by Agnoli.
3: Crudely speaking, a regime of accumulation refers to the "systematic mode of
distribution and reallocation of the social product" based on a particular kind of use of
technology in production and a long-run "correspondence between the changing conditions of
production (...) and the changing conditions of final consumption" (Lipietz 1985a, p. xvi).
The term ' mode of regulation' refers to institutional forms, networks and implicit and
explicit norms which ensure the reproducibility of a regime of accumulation: actual pattern
of social relation corresponding to the systemic character of a regime of accumulation (see
Lipietz 1985a,b).
4: See also the collection of papers edited by Bonefeld/Holloway 1990
5: Some of the following arguments are published in Bonefeld 1990a
6: In Poulantzas (1980), the discussion moves into the direction of the state derivation
debate without, however, overcoming the problem at issue in structuralism.
7: Jessop conceives of the law of value as a mechanism of distributing available labour
power between the various branches of production which, in turn, exercise functions in the
production process (for a similar view see Althusser 1975, p. 167;1977, p. 87). This
understanding of the law of value as a law of the social distribution of labour tells us
nothing about the particular social forms assumed by labour. 'Such a method can only
identify static structures, and is forced to pose a qualitative change as a sudden
discontinuity, a quantum leap between structures; and not as a process, a qualitatively
changing continuum' (Elson 1979, p. 141). Jessop's understanding of the law of value is
formal (causal relations) and lacks explanatory power. We are left with a technicist reading
of the law of value.
8; Van der Pijl (1984) applies his analysis globally, rejecting, thereby, the identification of
an international phenomenon with a supposedly national problem of incomplete capitalist
rule.
9; The first major study of this development was undertaken by Hilferding (1910/1981).
10: On the difference between Glyn/Sutcliffe (1972) and Glyn/Harrison (1980), see B.
Fine 1981.
11: By a capital-logic approach I understand a one-sided emphasis on capital "as the
'dominant subject'" (Elson 1979, p. 174,fn. 9). Taking capital as a one-sided abstraction
falls into the illusion of conceiving social reality as a product of a dominant logic (capital)
that is (relatively) unchallenged by the substance which constitutes this 'logic': living
labour as the substance of value, and hence of capital.
12: Some of the following arguments are taken from the introduction in Bonefeld/Holloway
1990.
13: On the state debate see the volumes edited, with important introductions by,
Holloway/Picciotto 1978 and Clarke 1990b.
14: Parts of this chapter have been published in Bonefeid 1990a.
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CHAPTER II
FORM AND CONTENT OF THE CAPITALIST STATE
This chapter introduces my conceptualisation of the form of the capitalist state. The
capitalist state will be discussed as determined by its social form (class antagonism
of capital and labour) and as historical process of class struggle. Instead of the
apparent 'autonomy of the state' (however relative it may be; and however much it
seems to justify a particular degree of 'relatively')(1), the political and economic
will be discussed as constituting a contradictory unity. This unity does not exist as a
monolithic bloc but as a movement of contradiction. The development of the
contradiction is determined by class struggle. The chapter is divided into three
sections. The first section looks at the constitution of social reproduction in
capitalism. There then follows a section on the form of the capitalist state. The
concluding sections looks at the relation between the state and the money power of
capital.
I Social Form and Differ ence-ln-Unity of the Political and the Economic
Following Marx (1973), the social phenomena (e.g. economy and state) around us
have manifold determinations. The task is to trace out "the inner connexion" (Marx
1983, p. 28) between social phenomena, so as to establish the 'inner nature' (cf.
Marx) of their relation. To trace out the inner connection between social phenomena
is to search for the substantive abstraction (see below) which constitutes their
social reality as interconnected, as complex forms different from, but united to, each
other. In order to theorise this interconnection, the theoretical approach has to
specify the historical process which constitutes the common element that makes
social phenomena different from each other in unity. The attempt to understand the
'inner nature' of social existence relates to a way of thinking which moves within the
object (social-historical form of human relations) of its thinking. Dialectics does
not proceed to its object from outside but from inside as it attempts to appropriate
conceptually social reality in its proper motion (Negt 1984). Dialectical thinking
conceptualises itself within, and as a moment of, its object (Lukacs 1971;Gunn
1987a,1989,1990). Such a conceptualisation of social existence seeks an
understanding of the apparently isolated facts of life as comprising a mode of
existence of social relations. "While in the completed bourgeois system every
economic relation presupposes every other in its bourgeois economic form, and
everything posited is thus also a presupposition, this is the case with every organic
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system. The organic system itself, as a totality, has its presuppositions, and its
development to its totality consists precisely in subordinating all development to
itself, or in creating out of it the organs which it still lacks. This is historically how
it becomes a totality. This process of becoming this totality forms a moment of its
process, of its development" (Marx 1973, p. 278). Such a reasoning implies an
internal relation between conceptual and historical analysis.
Every phenomenon exists only in relation to other phenomena, or, in other words,
exists only in and through other phenomena. Every phenomenon exists only as a
movement of contradiction, that is as a movement of its own historical constitution.
Hence the question of determinate negation or social form of human relations: what
constitutes the relation which makes it possible for phenomena to exist side by side
in an apparently independent manner but nevertheless through each other?. What is
the historical determination which constitutes them as in a relation of mutual
dependence and determinate negation, a relation which makes an independent
existence for each impossible? Hence the economic and the political, although
seemingly existing independently from each other, stand to each other as moments of
one process. This understanding raises the question of the social relation which
suffuses their existence qua contradiction within their respective forms and in
relation to each other. According to this argument, diverse phenomena, such as the
state and the economy, do not exist as externally related entities one of which is
determining and/or dominating the other, but as forms of existence of the relation
which constitutes them. The question arising here concerns the substantive
abstraction that makes particular forms (e.g. the political and economic) different
from each other and which, at the same time, unites them and hence relates them to
each other as complementary forms of social existence. Substantive abstraction is
thus the inner nature of social phenomena themselves; their constitution and
process. In Marx, the substantive relation which constitutes the relation between
things as a contradictory relation of historical specificity and which bathes all social
phenomena in a certain historical form of existence in bourgeois society is the social
relations of production, that is the class antagonism between capital and labour.
Social phenomena are thus constituted as modes of existence/motion in and through
which class antagonism exists. This argument will be taken up in less abstract terms
below.
Marx's starting point is the social determination of labour. Labour was seen by
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Marx (1973, p. 361) as the "living, form-giving fire; it is transitoriness of
things, their temporality, as their formation by living time". The constituting power
of social existence is labour. The general determination of labour needs to be
specified in its historically concrete form. By conceptualising from the indifferent
(labour as fluidity) to the determined (social form of the fluidity of labour) and
from the formless (general fluidity of labour) to the formal (historical and social
specific form of fluidity) (see Elson 1979, p. 129-130), Marx understood labour,
in capitalist society, as specified by abstract labour (universal ability and capacity
to work, homogeneous labour). In capitalism, the category of abstract labour exists
in and through the exchange of commodities. The historical specificity of the
constituting power of labour in capitalism concerns the (contradictory) unity of
exchange and production, that is, the exchange of commodities through which private
labours are reduced to their common substance as abstract labour. The substance of
value is living labour commanded by capital for the purpose of exploitation. The
appropriation of somebody else's labour involves, in turn, the measurement of the
product of labour in terms of money. It is through the social power of money that
social reproduction is subordinated to the reproduction of capital. "The capitalist
mode of production is not distinguished by the existence of surplus labour, or of
abstract labour or the value form, but by the integration of the value form with
abstract labour as the substance of value, and of the labour process with the
valorisation of capital, as the appropriation and distribution of surplus labour is
achieved through the exchange of commodities" in the form of money (Clarke 1989,
p. 136;see also Clarke 1980;EIson 1979;Himmelweit/Mohun 1978).
Money attains generality as the most elementary form of the capitalist imposition
of the value form over the conditions of life and as the supreme power in and through
which social reproduction is subordinated to the integration of the value form with
abstract labour, i.e. the reproduction of capital. Hence the treatment of money as
presupposition, premise and result of the social process of value, integrating value
and money theory as moments which presuppose and which are the result of each
other (Backhaus 1974,1986)(2). In the social process of value, productive,
commodity and money capital are forms taken by capital-value in its
self-contradictory process of self-valorisation. Capital "circulates in the shape of a
constant change of form, its existence is process, it is the unity of its form, it is the
constant change between the form of generality and the form of particularity, of
money and of commodity" (Reichelt 1978, p. 48)7The foundation of this process is
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living labour as substance of value that assumes social existence in and through the
circuit of social capital. The category of abstract labour attains generality in
capitalist society as command over labour within the circuit of capital as a whole.
The social mediation of this contradiction between abstract labour and the value form
constitutes a form of social reality in which the class antagonism between capital and
labour is displaced in the shape of market relations (i.e. the imposition of work
through the commodity form). This organisation of labour entails a constitution of
labour in the form of 'wage labour', defined primarily by the source of its income
and as an equal and free exchange relation on the market (Marx 1983, Ch. 19;Marx
1966, Ch. 48). Labour assumes an existence in terms of wage labour, an existence
upon which exploitation rests (i.e. value form as formal free and equal exchange of
commodities) while it, at the same time, 'eliminates' (Marx 1966, p. 814) the
specific character of surplus value production (exploitation). The relations of
exploitation are the content of (market) equality expressed in 'money' as the form
through which the contradiction, as between equality and exploitation, moves.
Monetary equivalence in circulation denies a content which is a content of inequality,
a content of social reproduction as domination (exploitation). The constituting power
of labour appears as a property of capital to set labour in motion through formally
free and equal market relations (see Marx 1973 on capital as being productive). The
constituting power of labour inverts into power of capital in so far as capital is able
to contain labour as moment of its own social existence. However, the constituting
power of capital exists only in and through labour as the 'form-giving fire' of social
life. Capital has thus to contain the constituting power of labour so as to reproduce
its own form of existence through the confinement of labour to abstract labour and
the harnessing of labour as substance of value. The class struggle over the
containment of labour as wage labour entails the disorganisation of labour's existence
as class, harnessing living labour as a moment of capital. The disorganisation of the
class-relationships involves the organisation of labour on the basis of formal
exchange equality, i.e. the imposition of work on the basis of formally free and equal
exchange of commodities on the market. The integration of abstract labour with the
value form is mediated through money. As such, money capital is the "ultimate
expression of value"; that is an expression of "capital's ability to impose work
(abstract labour) through the commodity form (exchange value)" (Marazzi 1976,
p. 92), i.e. through the abstract equality of money as command to work. Rather then
being an accomplished fact, the displacement of class to wage labour is a process of
contradiction in and through the class struggle itself. Displacement and constitution
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need to be seen as moments of one process, in which each moment presupposes the
other, while each moment is, at the same time, the result of the other - unity as
contradiction.
The social antagonism of capital and labour is a relation of classes, and, as a
relation of classes, a relation in and against domination and exploitation, or, in other
words, a relation in and against the subordination of social reproduction to a
reproduction of capital, which, itself, is the suppression of social reproduction for
human needs and aspirations. The inversion of social reproduction as reproduction of
capital is the commanding power of capital that brings together, and sets in motion,
means of production and labour power-a commanding power based on capital's ability
to contain labour as a moment of capital's own existence: self-valorisation of value
through expanded surplus value production. The relation of classes manifests itself
as a contradictory movement between objectification (however alienated in form as
social reality of reproduction) and revolutionary separation (as relation between
ruled and rulers). This contradiction is expressed in the term 'antagonism' as a
mutual dependence of opposing classes (social form of reproduction and
objectification in and through exploitation and domination). The contradictory
character of oppression, as indicated by the unity of the production process as labour
and valorisation process (see Marx 1983), is a substantive one as capital exists
only in and through labour. Hence, objectivity (social reproduction) as domination
(imposition of work as valorisation of capital). There is no movement outside social
antagonism. Social existence is constituted as a movement of contradiction in and
through the presence of labour in and against capital. It is the historical development
of the contradictory unity of the relation between social reproduction as domination
in and through class which constitutes society in terms of a continuous displacement
and reconstitution of the 'enchanted and perverted world' of capitalism (Marx 1966,
p. 830).
The social relation which constitutes the historically concrete form of labour in
capitalist society is the relation between necessary labour and surplus labour, that
is, the class antagonism of capital and labour which constitutes the (social) working
day. Capital's imposition of necessary labour is fraught with contradictions. "The
value of every commodity ... is determined not by the ne^^ssary labour-time
contained in it, but by the social labour-time required for its reproduction" (Marx
1966, p. 141). Capitalist command over labour is thus characterised by the
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continuous compulsion to compress necessary labour, i.e. to revolutionise the
relation between necessary and surplus labour in order to increase the latter. This
compulsion makes itself felt by individual capitals through competition. However,
surplus labour exists only in antithesis to necessary labour. It is here that capital's
self-contradictory mode of existence becomes manifest in its most intense terms:
capital depends entirely on living labour as substance of value, and hence surplus
value. The working through of this antagonistic tendency compels capital towards the
elimination of necessary labour which undermines the existence of capital as
existing only in and through labour. Capital cannot autonomise itself from living
labour; the only autonomisation possible is on labour's side. Capital's domination is a
crisis-ridden development of its own self-contradictory mode of existence. The
working class, for its part, is a moment of this same process of contradiction. The
working class exists in and against capital, while capital, however, exists only in and
through labour. The contradictory existence of the working class is manifest in its
antithesis to capital's command and in its existence as a moment of social
reproduction in the form of capital: labour as opposite to capital and as a moment of
the latter's existence. Class is not a group of people to whom sociologists assign
particular characteristics which, in turn, allows social pigeonholing in terms of
ascribed class character. Rather, class needs to be approached as a relation of
struggle (Gunn 1987b) in and against domination that denies social self-
determination. As a relation of struggle, class, as substantive abstraction of social
reality in action, attains a contradictory existence as the movement of transcendence
(revolution as process in and against capital in terms of working class self-
determination) and integration (reformism in terms of labour as a moment of social
reproduction in the form of capital). Transcendence and integration do not exist
separately, but as the movement of one process - extreme poles of a dialectical
continuum that social practice represents (Negt/Kluge 1971). As extreme poles of a
dialectical continuum, transcendence and integration constitute a contradictory
process that is open to the process of struggle itself and as such open to the social
composition of class (Negri). The class struggle involves, fundamentally, the
struggle over the containment of labour's disruptive power to resist the confinement
of the living within the forms of capitalist domination. The class struggle involves
also the struggle over the containment of labour's productive power that capital
seeks to harness as substance of surplus value on the basis of the integration of the
labour with the valorisation process.
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Understanding class antagonism as a movement of contradiction between dependence
and separation and conceptualising social phenomena as a mode of existence and mode
of motion of class antagonism, it follows that the contradiction inherent in 'social
form' is, at the same time, a contradiction within social phenomena, as e.g. the
self-contradictory form of the state; and between social phenomena, as e.g. between
the economic and political. It is for this reason that Marxism is neither a theory of
oppression/domination nor an economic theory, but a theory of the contradictions of
social reality and, as such, a theory of the historical movement of the contradiction
of domination. I shall refer to the social relations of production in terms of the
presence of labour in and against capital because the latter expresses the meaning of
the former in an explicit way. The term in and against seeks to overcome the danger
of essentialism inherent in the Marxist tradition reworked in my thesis. The
essentialism is contained in the understanding of labour as the constituting power
that can autonomise itself from capital. The emphasis on autonomisation involves
debates concentrating on the 'revolutionary subjectivity' (Negri 1984) of labour
neglecting the forms in and through which labour exists in capitalism. Thereby,
labour is taken as a one-sided abstraction. The understanding of labour as merely
existing 'against' capital conceives the class struggle against capital as an inevitably
unfolding event. Contrary to seeing the relation between capital and labour as a social
relation qua contradiction in and through the forms constituted by this relation
itself, the insistence of labour as merely 'against' capital dismisses dialectics as a
concept that moves within, and is a moment of, its object. The essentialisation of the
class struggle involves a dualist view of class antagonism because the internal
relation between capital and labour is reduced to a relation of mere opposition. In
turn, the understanding of labour as existing against capital involves a
conceptualisation of capital as a machine like entity. Capital becomes a logic, defined
by certain laws whose irrationality provides oppositional space for autonomist
insurrection. It is the pressure of the working class which forces capital into crisis
(Negri 1979a). The contradictory unity of surplus value production is thus
conceived of as a relation of cause and effect: i.e. the disruptive and revolutionary
power of the working class causes disruption and crisis to which, in turn, capital
responds by reimposing its domination over labour. The notion of the presence of
labour in and against capital effectively says that labour does not exist outside
capital. The class struggle does not simply resolve around the issue of working class
deconstruction of capitalist command and capitalist reconstruction of its command
over labour (Negri 1979b). The class struggle exists only in and against the forms
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in and though which the constituting power of labour exists qua contradiction. Of
course in a sense the class struggle exists in the form of revolutionary separation,
but it exists so only as one extreme pole of the dialectical continuum of rupture and
reproduction, the development of which is open to the class struggle itself.
On the other hand, approaches that stress that labour exists merely 'in' capital
dismiss the antagonistic character of capitalism, neglecting the contradictory
relation between transcendence and reproduction. Instead, capital is conceived of as
an one-sided abstraction. Such an understanding leads to a structuralist and
functional conception of social reality because what really counts are the inescapable
lines of tendency and direction established by capital's projects. Labour no longer
exists in opposition to capital but is, rather, a part of its own project. In turn,
structuralism asserts the subjective in the form of a voluntarist conception of class,
i.e. the subjective response to options provided by structural development.
Voluntarism and structuralism are theoretically complementary (Clarke 1977,
1978). The thesis of the primacy of the constituting power of labour rejects
structuralist and essentialist arguments because they do not see different aspects as
modes of existence of the social relation that constitutes them qua contradiction. The
notion of the primacy of class antagonism effectively says that structures do not
exist. They only exist as modes of motion of class antagonism and hence as social
process, and not only as social process but as historical results of the working of
class antagonism and hence as historical premises for the class struggle. Of course in
a sense structures da exist, but they exist only as modes of motion of class struggle
which for its part exists in and through them in the mode of being denied. As such,
structures exist as things qua reification of human relations (Holloway 1990b).
In sum, both approaches separate what belongs fundamentally together, that is the
internal relation between materiality (constituting power of labour) and form
(social reproduction in the form of domination). The problem of essentialism and/or
structuralism arises from a conceptualisation that sees labour as existing either
merely against capital (essentialism) or merely [n capital (structuralism). The
notion of labour as existing in and against capital does not provide simply a middle
way out of the problem (i.e. the understanding of objective laws but also class
struggle). Rather, it stresses the internal relation between the constituting power of
labour and the forms in and against which it exists (i.e. the capitalist form). The use
of the term in and against seeks to go beyond essentialist and structuralist
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conceptions of class by stressing the internal relation between materiality and social
form. The presence of labour in and against capital is understood as labour's
constituting power that exists in a mode of being denied in the capitalist form of
social reproduction. The notion 'mode of being denied' stresses the subjective
constitution of what asserts itself over the conditions of life as mere thinghood; a
contradictory unity in and through the presence of labour which is also a presence in
and against capital. Capitalist social reproduction exists only in and through labour's
constituting power: hence labour is productive. Labour's power is, however, not
just productive but disruptive. Labour's power is disruptive because of its
(eruptive) potential for resistance to capital's domination of its productive potential
for work. The conflict over the control of the labour process lies at the heart of the
development of industrial relations (Braverman 1974;Burawoy 1985;Hyman
1989a;Parker/Slaughter 1990). In English, the concept of 'power' encompasses
quite different meanings which are expressed separately in other languages: potentia
versus potestas or Vermogen versus Macht. The difference is important as it signals
a dialectical continuum of different extremes: While potentia (or Vermogen) is
constituting social activity, potestas (or Macht) connotes the social making of
history founded on a particular fixed dimension of social reality (Negri 1989, p.
49). As such, when speaking about the 'power' of labour one has to bear in mind its
power as a constituting social activity in and against capital, a power which, although
connected as an extreme pole of a dialectical continuum, is separate from the power
of making history. The notion of labour as existing in and against capital makes it
possible to understand the contradictory mode of existence of social phenomena and to
conceive the movement of this contradiction as one of class struggle.
In order to understand the internal relation between materiality and form, the
notion of the 'substantive abstraction' needs to be characterised more strongly. I
argued above that every social phenomenon is placed as a presupposition and premise
to each other as a mode of existence and mode of motion of the historical process of
the presence of labour in and against capital. Substantive abstraction seeks an
understanding of the society's concrete existence and development. 'Substantive
abstraction' is not to be understood as the empirical abstraction criticised by Marx
(1983, p. 352, fn. 2) as 'abstract materialism': "It is, in reality, much easier to
discover by analysis the earthly core of the misty creations of religion, than,
conversely, it is, to develop from the actual relations of life the corresponding
celestialised forms of these relations. The latter method is the only materialist, and
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therefore, the only scientific one. The weak points in the abstract materialism of
natural science, a materialism which excludes history and its process, are at once
evident from the abstract and ideological conceptions of its spokesmen, whenever
they venture beyond the bounds of their own speciality". Contrary to empirical
abstraction, to abstract substantially is to trace out the inner connection of social
phenomena, an inner connection which constitutes social phenomena and their
relation to each other as modes of existence of this very inner connection: the
presence of labour in and against capital. Whereas empiricist abstraction aims at
grounding things by identifying their common essence, substantive abstraction
attempts to understand essence as the interrelation between things which is
constitutive of those things themselves. Substantive abstraction, unlike empiricist
abstraction, exists in and through practice (as the inner form of social relations)
and not just in the theory by which the abstraction is made. Hence, the working of
substantive abstraction constitutes an abstraction of and in (3), as opposed to an
abstraction from, social reality - an abstraction which exists as concrete and in
practice, through, in and as social reality and as its process. Social form has no
existence separate from concrete historical development. The notion of substantive
abstraction of society comprises an understanding of the specific historical form in
and against which the constituting power of labour exists qua contradiction.
For Marx (1983, p. 106), social antagonism can by itself have no existence.
Antagonistic relations express themselves always in forms (value form, money
form, form of the state). Form is seen here as the modus vivendi of antagonistic
relations and, as such, form is "generally the way in which contradictions are
reconciled" (Marx 1983, p. 106). The term 'mediation' (see Gunn 1987c,1989;
Psychopedis 1988;Bonefeld 1987c) is of vital importance here since it connotes the
mode of existence of a dynamic relation of antagonism which allows antagonistic
relations to "exist side by side" (Marx 1983, p. 106). The existence of social
antagonism in forms "does not seep away" (ibid.) the inconsistencies of antagonistic
relations; rather, these forms constitute the existence of this relation, a constitution
which exists historically and has to be analysed in an historical fashion. "The point of
the mediation of abstract and concrete is to show that the abstract category of labour
presupposes capitalist society (i.e. the abstract element in the notion of labour
presupposes the real abstraction of labour sans phrase in this society)"
(Psychopedis 1988, p. 75-6). Hence, the interrelation of the logical and historical:
"As a rule, the most general abstractions arise only in the midst of the richest
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possible concrete development, where one thing appears as common to many, to all.
Then it ceases to be thinkable in a particular form alone" (Marx 1973, p. 104).
Substantive abstraction is a "methodic assertion that one cannot found the categories
beginning naively with the 'real' or the 'concrete', but only on the basis of the
development of a 'process of synthesis' of the givens of intuition and representation"
(Negri 1984, p. 47). This method of theorising works within the proper motion of
its object which it has to keep "in mind as the presupposition" (Marx 1973, p.
102). Conceptualising social reality in this way opens up the idea of the world as
"nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated
into forms of thought" (Marx 1983, p. 29). Substantive abstraction seeks an
understanding of the constitution and movement of a (self-contradictory) social
world in which human relations take on the form of things. The critique of fetishism
comprises an understanding of the constituting power of labour as existing in a form
in which the presupposition of social existence (labour) is seemingly eliminated
(i.e. the thinghood of abstract wealth). The point of the mediation of abstract and
concrete is thus to show the way in which labour exists in e.g. the money power of
capital as in a mode of being denied, i.e. the subjective constitution of the power of
money in and through its reification as a mere thing. The notion of substantive
abstraction stresses the constitution of social phenomena as existing qua
contradiction, i.e. contradiction internal to domination.
Class antagonism is a logical and, at the same time, an historical presupposition.
The social relation between capital and labour is an historical presupposition
because the foundation of this relation is the historical struggle which led to the
separation of the mass of the population from the means of production and
subsistence during the process of primitive accumulation (see Marx 1983). The
separation of the labourers from the means of production had to be accomplished
historically before capital could constitute itself as the social form determining the
conditions of life. The capitalist mode of exploitation and mode of domination rests on
this historical presupposition. At the same time, the historical presupposition of the
separation of the mass of the population from the means of production and
subsistence has to be reproduced during the development of capitalism as the 'sine
qua non of the existence of capital' (Marx 1983, p. 536;see also Bonefeld 1988).
The historical result of class struggle during primitive accumulation inverts into
historical presupposition and serves as premise and precondition for the historical
existence of the class antagonism between capital and labour, a premise which has to
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be reproduced in the motion of capitalist reproduction if the social form of capitalist
domination is to continue. From the standpoint of accomplished capitalism, the
conceptual approach is bound up with the historical reality of the process of
capitalist social-historical existence within its proper motion. This process is
determined by the substantive abstraction that illuminates social reality as a mode of
existence of the class antagonism of capital and labour. In turn, this class antagonism
was itself the result of the historical processes which led to the capitalist form of
social reproduction. Hence, the result (capitalist social relations) presupposes its
historical generation which, in turn, has to be continually reproduced through the
operation of the historical process of capitalism. The latter serves now not as
historical result but as conceptual and historical presupposition. This historical
presupposition attains generality, from the standpoint of accomplished capitalism, in
an inverted form: it would be wrong to let the conceptualisation of forms follow one
another "in the same sequence as that in which they were historically decisive. This
sequence is determined, rather, by their relation to one another in the mode of
bourgeois society, which is precisely the opposite of that which seems to be their
natural order or which corresponds to historical development" (Marx 1973, p.
107). The presence of labour in and against capital as the historical result of
primitive accumulation inverts into the historical and conceptual presupposition of
the social reality of capitalism. The political, as will be discussed below, inverts
from historical process of bourgeois revolution to an historical form determined by
the class struggle over the integration of the value form with the category of abstract
labour - social form of reproduction as domination.
In sum, the foundation of the social relations of capital and labour, as argued by
Clarke (1978,1982), lies outside the economic and the state simpliciter. Or, more
precisely, the foundation lies not just outside of the economic and the state, but
rather "it suffuses the circuit" (Clarke 1980, p. 10) of capital as social reality.
Having said this, it follows that "it is the concept of class relation as being prior to
the political, economic and ideological forms taken by those relations (even though
class relations have no existence independently of those forms) that makes it
possible for a Marxist analysis to conceptualise the complexity of the relation
between economic and political, their interconnections as complementary forms of
the fundamental class relation, without abandoning the theory for a pragmatic
pluralism" (Clarke 1978, p. 42). It follows that political and economic relations
imply different modes of motion of the fundamental class antagonism of capital and
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labour. The political relations do not primarily correspond to, or reproduce,
economic relations (the so-called functions of the state for capitalist accumulation).
Rather, the political complements the economic as, together, different forms of the
same fundamental class antagonism. However, the political complements the
economic only in a mediated form as a moment moving within the proper motion of
class antagonism. The state is not a state in capitalist society, but rather a moment of
the class antagonism of capital and labour (Holloway/Picciotto 1977). The under¬
standing of the political is thus an analysis of the unity-in-separation of different
forms assumed by the class antagonism. Lastly, as reality of class antagonism,
bourgeois society exists only as a movement of contradiction, the development of the
contradiction being determined by the outcome of the class struggle.
What is the social context within which the category of abstract labour attains
generality as social reproduction in the form of capital? Capitalist social
reproduction is social reproduction in inverted form: private production in a social
context. Since the sociality of private production is not a matter of the conscious
decision of society, and since the latter exists only in the inverted form of private
fragmentation (commodity production), the sociality of private production confronts
individual producers as an external and independent thing, which, as argued by Marx
(1974, p. 909), is their condition of existing as private individuals in a social
context. Hence, labour as substance of human existence in a specific social form. The
'most general abstraction' attains practically existing generality as production of
abstract labour, i.e. value. Capitalist production is not use-value production, but
value production which, in turn, is surplus-value production (Negri 1984), and not
only surplus-value but the social reproduction of the social relations of production
(Clarke 1982). In the social process of value, productive, commodity and money
capital are forms taken by capital-value in its self-contradictory process of
self-valorisation. The existence of labour as homogeneous and quantitative ability to
work attains social form as abstract labour within the circuit of social capital. The
circuit of social capital exists only as a mediation of the restless appropriation of
labour. "If we take all three forms [money,commodity, productive capital] together,
then all the premises of the process appear as its result, as premises produced by
the process itself. Each moment appears as a point of departure, of transit, and of
return. The total process presents itself as the unity of the process of production and
the process of circulation; the production process is the mediator of the circulation
process, and vice versa" (Marx 1978, p. 180). Thus, the movement of every
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particular capital is itself only a particular moment of the generality of its form.
Value can only be grasped as a movement, and not as a static thing. Considering the
movement of value as a mere abstraction is to "forget that the movement of industrial
capital is this abstraction in action" (Marx 1978, p. 185). The different forms of
value relate differently to labour as the substance of value in and through
exploitation. The motion of value exists therefore in the form of a dialectical
continuum as production sans phrase (objectification of capital in machinery and
hence as immobilised) and, at the same time, as mobility sans phrase (value in the
form of money as social incarnation of abstract wealth). This dialectical continuum
exists as a process of contradiction within which different forms of value coexist and
within which particular capitals transform in a successive movement from one to
the other value form. Seeing productive, commodity, and money capital as forms that
value assumes in its restless process of expansion, their distinctiveness exists only
as unity-in-difference, and hence as a contradictory movement full of
inconsistencies.
The transformation of value from one form to the other integrates production and
circulation as different moments of one process. Each moment is a result and a
presupposition of the other in and through the exploitation of labour. Circulation and
production are opposite in unity tearing down the barriers to restless capitalist
intercourse, the common interest of which is the "valorization of value as the
determining purpose, the driving motive" (Marx 1978, p. 180). The social
validation of appropriated labour in circulation implies the social comparison
(Vergleichunal of particular capitals in terms of their worth to the dynamic limits
of socially necessary labour-time expressed in money (realisation of an average rate
of profit). Capital exists as individual capital only within the historically dynamic
and changing composition of the social process of value - appropriation of labour in
terms of social labour. Particular capitals are only moments of this process, the
mobility of which is imposed on each particular capital in and through the fluidity of
money capital. The circuit of money capital is, according to Marx (1978, p. 140),
the "most striking and characteristic form of appearance of the circuit of industrial
capital". Social capital, as the movement of the social totality of value, achieves a
real existence in and through the circuit of money capital. The latter is the "form in
which the social character is manifested to particular capitals" (Clarke 1978, p.
65).
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Money capital is the rational expression of equality, productivity, repression and
thinghood (Dinglichkeit) that characterises the determination of wealth as social
process of abstract labour. "The general interest is precisely the generality of self-
seeking interests. Therefore, when the economic form, exchange, posits the all-sided
equality of its subjects, then the content, the individual as well as the objective
material which strives towards the exchange, is freedom. Equality and freedom are
thus not only respected in exchange based on exchange values, but, also, the exchange
of exchange values is the productive, real basis of ail equality and freedom" (Marx
1973, p. 245). As an expression of equality, money serves as a moment of exchange
that constitutes labour in terms of wage labour. However, the exchange between
capital and labour is not just a simple economic exchange on the market. Rather, the
wage is not the price of labour as such but of labour power, the ability to work. The
realisation of this potential is a process which occurs outside the limits of the
market. Hence Marx's vital distinction between labour and labour power. The
separation-in-unity of labour and labour power indicates the contradictory power of
money, expressing equality as a mode of existence of domination. The concept of
money, displaced from the contradictions of surplus value production and, at the
same time, the ultimate expression of these contradictions, is a concrete
representation of the social reality of class antagonism. Money posits the exclusive
form of the self-contradictory existence of the category of abstract labour. "Money
has the advantage of presenting me immediately the lurid face of social relations of
value; it shows me value right away as exchange, commanded and organised for
exploitation" (Negri 1984, p. 23). As a relation of formal equality, money signals
the inequality of property relations and represents formal equality as a relation of
domination; money expresses the abstract average of capitalist domination. Whether
money serves as measure, medium of exchange or capital (see De Brunhoff 1976), it
realises and represents the social process of value whose existence appears to be
constituted by the property of capital and not by the property of labour as the
'living, form giving fire'. The money power of capital is the most fundamental level
of the class struggle. The power of money is collective and abstract. It is collective
because of the generality of its form. It is abstract because it is meaningless and, at
the same time, the most elementary form of abstract category of labour, its
incarnation and its (self-contradictory) negation. Money as form of value measures
capital's capacity to impose work in a repressive and oppressive, nevertheless
contradictory, way. In the circuit of money capital, as a distinct moment of the
circuit of social capital, capital assumes a reality which disregards labour as
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concrete labour (use-value aspect of commodities) inasmuch as the social usefulness
of labour is eliminated. Money capital, contrary to the immobility of productive
capital in the form of means of production, expresses the contradiction between
use-value and the value form in the most developed form. The inauguration of value
production is, to the point of distinction, disconnected from the production of
use-value. "With the development of large-scale industry money-capital, so far as it
appears on the market, is not represented by some capitalists, not the owner of one
or another fraction of the capitalist in the market, but assumes the nature of a
concentrated, organised mass, which, quite different from actual production, is
subject to the control of the bankers, i.e. the representatives of social capital"
(Marx 1966, p. 368). Labour assumes- a mode of existence in the meaningless, but
elementary, form of money capital. Labour's constituting power pertains in money
capital as 'the' form of property. Capital asserts itself in the form of money as the
incarnation of abstract wealth, i.e. the imposition of work through the commodity
form (formal freedom and equality). Money capital is capital in its general and
elementary form (Clarke 1978). "Capital in general, as distinct from the particular
real capitals, is itself a real existence. ... For example, capital in this general form,
although belonging to individual capitalists, in its elementary form as capital, forms
the capital which accumulates in the banks or is distributed through them, and, as
Ricardo says, so admirably distributes in accordance with the needs of production"
(Marx 1973, p. 449). The self-contradictory social process of value comprises
different moments of capital which exist only as distinct-in-unity, i.e. the
continuum of forms of abstract labour in action. Hence an 'internal but necessary'
differentiation of one process: social reality of class antagonism.
It follows that a crisis of social reproduction appears as a monetary crisis. The
unity-in-separation of production and circulation entails the possibility of crisis as
the two interrelated processes contain the possible separation in time of purchase
and sale. The disruption of production and circulation comprises, from a formal point
of view, the possibility of crisis which, from a materialist point of view, exists as
the abstract form in which the unity of different moments manifests itself through
disunity. The disruption of the continuity of social reproduction manifests the unity
of circulation and production and, as unity, their difference, or their separated
existence. The contradictory unity of surplus value production manifests itself in the
form of a tension between different value forms of the one process of social capital.
The tension makesTtself felt in the form of disunity of production and circulation. As
50
different moments of one process, their inner connection makes itself felt in their
separation. To explain, however, the crisis of social reproduction in and through the
way in which crisis manifests itself explains crisis through crisis itself, hence
tautology. Disunity of production and circulation is explained through disunity.
Incongruence of selling and purchasing constitutes the possibility of the deference
of selling and purchase through the constitution of money in the form of credit and
means of payment. Credit frees the transformation of value from the barriers of
realisation. Credit exists as a lever for expanded reproduction as it realises the
internal relation of production and circulation without this internal relation having
been performed in real terms. Accumulation can be sustained by the extension of
credit as it expands the limits of the market through the issue of a claim on future
settlement. The credit system reduces the time reproductive capital spends in
circulation; accelerates the turn-over of reproductive capital; mediates day-to-day
difficulties through the issue of bills of exchange; postpones the depreciation of
capital; redistributes surplus value for accumulation; absorbs disproportionalities;
and sustains expanded reproduction. Credit-sustained accumulation rather than
eliminating the contradictory unity of surplus value production, constitutes a mode
of existence in and through which this contradiction can temporarily move without,
however, sweeping away the contradiction. Credit-expansion defers the
manifestation of crisis and overaccumulation only by stimulating greater
overaccumulation as profits are realised on an increasingly inflationary (or
fictitious) basis. Further credit expansion constitutes the contradictory unity of
surplus production in the form of a conflict between productive (or functioning)
capital and money capital (in the form of credit). In money capital the difference of
the material existence of value is obliterated. Money capital expresses the
'undifferentiated, homogeneous form of value' (Clarke 1978). Hence, money capital
is the ultimate expression of the 'abstraction in action' of labour in capitalism. This
'abstraction in action' achieves its most elementary form of existence in the circuit
of money capital (M...M'), a form which reduces capital "to a meaningless
condensation" (Marx 1966, p. 391) without, however, dissolving the existence of
particular capitals. Rather, it imposes upon them the social character of their own
existence, while 'eliminating the relation to labour' (Marx 1976, p. 456).
However, money capital exists only in and through labour (M...P...M'). The value of
money capital is not determined through the value it represents in relation to
commodities, but through the surplus value which it produces for its owner (see
ibid.). Hence the contradiction between labour as substance of value and its
obscuration in the circuit of money capital - the incarnation of the process of
abstract wealth appearing in money capital's apparently self-valorising capacity.
The constituting power of labour exists in and against the form of money qua
contradiction. The contradictory unity of surplus value production in terms of money
represents the power of labour as constituents of social form.
With the increase of productive activity, outside financing of capitalist command
over labour becomes a viable lever of accumulation so as to finance the growing cost
that the exploitation of labour's productive power commands. By bringing together
huge amounts of money, banks (as well as joint stock companies) provide the credit
that underpins expanded reproductive accumulation. The antagonistic tendency at
work here comprises the manifestation of money capital as incarnation of abstract
wealth. Outside financing entails the possibility of the development of money capital
relatively independent from productive capital. Since reproductive accumulation
exists as immobilised capital, money capital, in the form of credit, provides a lever
of accumulation, thus permitting the accumulation of capital on the basis of the
autonomisation of money capital independent from its parent stock (see Altvater
1985;Marx 1966). Capital assumes an apparent independent existence in the form
of interest as form of profit. With the advance of credit-sustained accumulation the
difference between the various circuits of social capital are obliterated within the
cycle of money capital, reducing the reproductive capitalist to mere manager of the
production process; the manager of production representing functioning capital (see
the tentative discussion in Marx 1966). "The antithetical character of capital
assumes an independent form" in money capital (Marx 1966, p. 382). In turn, this
process involves the splitting of profit into enterprise profit and interest "as though
they generate from essentially different sources" (Marx 1966, p. 375). In these
two forms of profit, the relation to surplus value is eliminated since they are
concepts relating to each other as opposites. At the same time, however, they exist
only as forms of surplus value placed in the proper motion of its social reality. The
differentiation between enterprise profit and interest mystifies profit as property of
capita! as such, a profit which would have been yielded even if capital had not been
applied productively. The choice to invest reproductively or in monetary terms is,
however, dependent on labour as substance of value, the contradiction between
productive and financial engagement being determined by the class struggle over
capitalist command in production.
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The creation of a 'credit-superstructure' (cf. Marx 1966) that constitutes the
circuit of social capital, extends beyond the barriers of abstract wealth while it, at
the same time, accelerates overaccumulation and crisis through the expansion of a
claim on future surplus value. The loan to reproductive capital exists as a claim for
the lender disconnected from the use-value (means of production) which it
represents for the borrowing capitalist. The claim exists thus as claim on a portion
of future surplus value. The illusion of credit-sustained accumulation comes to the
fore as soon as the claim on surplus value breaks down. In the crisis, the credit-
system transforms from a lever of accumulation to a lever of devaluation
jeopardising not only productive activity but the abstract existence of wealth as a
whole, domestically and internationally. The displacement of the contradictory unity
of surplus value production is complete as the relation to labour is seemingly
eliminated in the form of credit and as in order to preserve the credit-system all
other forms of capital and labour have to be sacrificed (see Marx 1966).
Reproductive capital is progressively devalued through insolvency while, at the same
time, the thinghood of capital in the form of money exists only in and through labour.
Credit needs to be turned into effective command over labour so as to turn credit into
means of payment. The integration of abstract labour with the value form on the
basis of credit-expansion constitutes the supreme power of capital in the form of
money-in-command. Credit exists as a form of money, the most abstract form of
capital, that is as the supreme social power through which social reproduction is
subordinated to the reproduction of capital. In order to maintain the cash flow
productive capital needs not only to realise its own capital but also that of its
creditors so as to service interest and to repay credit. Although, in credit, the
relation to labour as substance of value is seemingly eliminated, credit asserts itself
as social power which imposes upon productive capital the need to intensify work so
as to avoid insolvency by guaranteeing credit as a claim on surplus value. Credit
attains social existence as command to exploit labour effectively.
The contradiction involved in the coexistence and sequence of different value forms
composed within the process of social capital is the potential autonomisation
(Verselbstandigungt of monetary from productive accumulation. This autonomisation
involves the displacement of the contradictory unity of the production process (i.e.
labour and valorisation process) to the constitution of this same contradiction in the
form of a contradiction between productive and loanable capital (i.e. the
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contradiction "between the factory and the credit system";Marazzi 1976, p. 92).
This process is mainly constituted through the development of the credit-system "in
which money no longer functions as a hoard but as capital, though not in the hands of
its proprietors, but rather of other capitalists at whose disposal it is put" (Marx
1978, p. 261). The self-contradictory character of capital assumes an apparently
"independent form" (Marx 1966, p. 382) in interest as a relation between the
owner of money capital and the manager of production. This displacement of the
contradictory unity of surplus value seemingly eliminates the relation of interest
profit to surplus value. However, interest profit exists only as a mode of existence of
surplus value. Hence social reality is constituted as a movement of contradiction in
and through labour, a movement in which the contradictory unity of surplus value
production reasserts itself in M...M - "the meaningless form of capital, the
perversion and objectification of production relations in their highest degree, the
interest-bearing form, the simple form of capital, in which it antecedes its own
process of reproduction" (Marx 1966, p. 392). Productive accumulation has to
succeed in order for money capital to be sustained, while the failure to turn credit
into productive command over labour reasserts, for productive capital, the limits of
the market to realise capital profitably in the form of insolvency and bankruptcy.
"Money capitalists are then the arbitrators of the struggle for survival" (Weeks
1981, p. 145). It is no longer the market which imposes the limits of social
reproduction on capital. Rather, it is the financial system which provides the credit
that underpins capitalist reproduction. The supremacy of monetary accumulation
reasserts the limits of the market in the form of monetary constraint, i.e. in the
form of scarce and costly credit. Left to their own devices, bankers, i.e. the
representatives of social capital, will tend to fuel overaccumulation by
overextending credit. However, the default of productive activity threatens to bring
about a collapse of the credit relations, upon which all social relations rest. In order
to sustain the most elementary, and meaningless, form of capital, labour and
productive capital needs to be sacrificed so as to make it possible for banks to absorb
heavy losses without default. However, the sacrificing of surplus value production on
the altar of money destroys the basis in and through which the meaningless form of
capital exists. The unity of monetary and productive accumulation reasserts itself in
and through their destructive separation. The supremacy of money displaces, as a
form of class struggle, the contradictory existence of the production process into a
contradiction between credit and functioning capital. This displacement of the
contradictory unity of surplus value production is abstract in terms of social
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command as its form of wealth is meaningless in content (use value production);
none other than the uncoupling of the valorisation from the labour process (see Marx
1983, p. 48). Credit represents abstract labour in the form of a claim on the future
exploitation of labour, a claim on surplus value enforced through the abstract
equality of the power of money as the representative of the limits of capitalist
reproduction.
The break-down of credit-sustained accumulation does not provide an
understanding of how the continuity of production and circulation came to be
disrupted in the first place. The break down of credit, precipitated by a rush into
means of payment and rising cost for credit, manifests a formal possibility of crisis.
This formal possibility exists as an elementary form in and through which crisis
expresses itself. This elementary form is less abstract than the one introduced above
because money exists as incarnation of wealth: "value in process, money in process,
and, as such capital" (Marx 1983, p. 225). A monetary crisis is not simply the
"result of the 'animal spirits' of investors, but is rather a symptom of the
overaccumulation and uneven development of capital, as the associated expansion of
credit increasingly spills over into unproductive and speculative channels" (Clarke
1988b, p. 59). In the course of crisis and overaccumulation the spill over of
overaccumulated capital in the form of (superfluous money) capital into speculative
and unproductive channels appears as an uneven relation between the production of
goods and market relations. In turn, this uncoupling seems to be determined through
contingent factors (i.e. erratic monetary policies), the eradication of which appears
as a simply readjusting exercise so as to restore proportionality between supply and
demand on the market. However, because of the inner connection between different
value forms, the rupture of production and circulation cannot be explained by
reference to the autonomisation of one form from the other (i.e. inflationary supply
of money). The contradictory relation between the forces and relations of production
expresses itself in the form of a tension between functioning capital and the credit-
system. The tension between different value forms constitutes a mode of motion of the
constituting power of labour in the form of a contradiction between the unfettered
expansion of the productive forces and the limits of the capitalist form of social
reproduction.
The central contradiction is not the contradiction between production and
circulation. The central contradiction is constituted in the class relation of capital
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and labour. The context of social production of value is composed of the inversion of
social production as private product- ion and the realisation of the sociality of
private production behind the back of the private producer. The contradiction
between the crisis-ridden process of unfettered accumulation (self-valorisation of
value) and the need to confine production within the limits of the capitalist form
compels each individual producer to exploit labour effectively. The compulsion for
each individual capital, if its devaluation is to be avoided, not only to produce, but to
increase relative surplus value in the course of accumulation, forces upon each
capital the necessity of expelling living labour from the process of production and of
attempting to decrease necessary labour to its utmost. This process relates to the
"relation between necessary labour and surplus labour that is ... the relation
between the constitutive parts of the working day and the class relation which
constitutes it" (Negri 1984, p. 72). Capital exists only in antithesis to living labour
as the substance of abstract labour.
Surplus value is produced by the productive consumption of living labour. Capital's
ability to impose work through the commodity form involves the containment of
labour's disruptive power to resist managerial strategies to set labour in motion.
The constant struggle over the imposition of managerial control over work involves,
in turn, constant class struggle over the progressive displacement of living labour
by machinery. The only way in which the revolutionising of the means of production
can be productive in terms of capital (surplus value) is by containing the disruptive
power of labour in the face of intensification of work. Further, the revolutionising of
the means of production involves the self-contradictory harnessing of the productive
power of labour. The unfettered revolutionising of the productive power of labour
carries with it the tendency to overaccumulation and crisis. The contradictory
relation between the unfettered development of the forces of production and the
limits of the capitalist form of social reproduction urges the compression of
necessary labour so as to multiply the productive power of labour. The compulsion to
compress necessary labour and to control the disruptive power of labour in
production makes itself felt to the individual capital through competition. The
attempt to avoid competitive erosion by increasing the productive power of labour
exists as a movement of contradiction, the rupture of which makes labour's
productive power worthless in the form of capital: overflowing markets, devaluation
and liquidation of capital, redundancy of labour, while superfluous capital spills
over into unproductive and speculative channels. All this is expressed in the break
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down of the unity between production and circulation, manifested in their destructive
separation. In the course of the class struggle over domination, the composition of
capital undergoes changes as the revolutionising of the forces of production decreases
living labour relative to constant capital. Assuming a prevailing value composition of
capital, the increase in its technical composition increases the organic composition
of capital. While the concept of the 'technical composition' of capital refers to the
forces of production, expressing the productive power of labour, the term 'organic
composition' of capital refers to the social form of the social relations of production
in and against which the productive power of labour exists. With a rising ratio of
constant capital relative to variable capital, the value composition of commodities
represents a growing component of value transferred (means of production) relative
to value reproduced (variable capital) and value produced (surplus value). In the
course of accumulation, the "relative decrease of the ratio of variable to constant
capital" (Marx 1966, p. 249) indicates labour's productive power as less living
labour is needed to produce an equal amount of commodities. While labour's
productive power increases, the cost price of production grows in terms of constant
capital relative to variable capital, the value constituents representing living
labour. The class struggle over capital's tendency to decrease necessary labour so as
to increase surplus labour, increases the total capital required for imposing work
(Marx 1983, p. 529). Capital needs to intensify the exploitation of labour so as to
make the means of production productive in terms of capital. Further, capital has to
expand the exploitation of labour so as to increase the mass of surplus value in the
face of a declining rate of profit. In the face of a growing component of value
transferred and a decrease of value reproduced and produced, capital needs to realise
a growing mass of commodities in order to secure the accumulation of capital.
Competitive pressure forces each individual capital to intensify exploitation so as to
increase the rate of surplus value and to withstand competitive erosion by realising a
growing mass of commodities. The generalisation of the revolutionising of the
productive power of labour involves that there is too much capital than can make a
reasonable profit from exploiting labour. Capital spills over into speculative
channels seeking profitable returns in interest bearing investment and sustaining
capital's command over labour's productive power through credit: maintaining
demand on the market through consumer credit and maintaining productive
accumulation through production credit. The generalisation of labour's productive
power and the sustaining of accumulation through credit entails the tendency to
overaccumulation of capital, an accumulation of too much capital relative to the
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profitable expansion of accumulation, that is, the capitalist ability to exploit labour
effectively.
The contradiction between the productive power of labour and the capitalist form of
social reproduction affects all capitals, no matter how big or small.
Overaccumulation and crisis manifests itself unevenly as the more successful
capitals have greater scope to respond to the limits on the realisation of adequate rate
of profit for expanded accumulation (greater mass of profit, devaluation of excess
capacity, greater credit-worthiness and hence financial liquidity and greater scope
to buy off labour's disruptive presence through wage increases). On the other hand,
weaker capitals have no other option left but to increase pressure on their
work-force in order to survive. "In the face of competitive pressure the less
successful capitalist does not simply give up the struggle and call in the receiver,
but seeks to restore profitability by extending the working day, intensifying labour
or revolutionising the forces of production" (Clarke 1989, p. 143). At the same
time, the more successful capitalist attempts to exploit its relative position
vis-£-vis its competitors so as to secure its surplus-profit before its method of
production has been generalised to other capitals and "other branches of production
once generalised in a particular branch" (Clarke 1988a, p. 53). The consequence of
this process is that "even the more advanced capitals come under increased
competitive pressure as the overaccumulation confronts the limits of the market"
(ibid.). Devaluation and liquidation of capital accelerate the concentration and
centralisation of capital as the more advanced capitals are able to capitalise on their
position as defunct capitals are partly taken over by bigger capitals. Further,
overaccumulation is preceded by an expansion of credit. The fictitious character of
credit-sustained accumulation generalises the tendency to overaccumulation and
crisis as the failure to command labour effectively for expanded surplus value
production constitutes the contradiction between the forces and relations of
production in the form of a possible default of money capital in its most elementary
form of credit, i.e. a default of the accumulated claim on future surplus value.
The generalisation of the productive power of labour ruptures capitalist command
over labour as the unfettered expansion of labour's productive power reaches the
barrier of its capitalist form. Value relates to itself as value being realised in the
form of money on the market. Overaccumulation of capital makes itself felt in the
form of monetary constraint on the market as value created fails to have the stamp of
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value imposed on it in exchange. The generalisation of the productive power of labour
is expressed in "a fall in the rate of profit - perhaps first in this sphere of
production [overaccumulation being pronounced in the most dynamic branches], and
eventually it achieves a balance with the rest - which is, therefore, wholly
independent of the will of the capitalist" (Marx 1966, p. 265). In the face of limited
markets, a high organic composition of capital needs to be reduced so as to increase
the margin in which the equalisation of the rate of profit might fluctuate without
compromising capitalist reproduction. A fall in the rate of profit decreases the rate
of accumulation as less value is realised relative to the reproductive structure of
accumulation. The motive of profitability exists as a moment of expanded
accumulation and vice versa. Both a fall in the rate of profit and a decreasing rate of
accumulation express the productive power of labour that produces too much capital
relative to the limits of the market to realise capital. This development threatens to
transform the uneven development of capital into a crisis-ridden rupture of
accumulation as commodities cannot be realised sufficiently to impose work
profitably on an expanding scale. The tendency of the rate of profit to fall, including
the countertendencies to its fall (see Marx 1966), "is identical in meaning" (Marx
1973, p. 749) with the development of the productive power of labour that reaches,
in the form of overaccumulation and crisis, the barrier of its capitalist form. The
tendency of the rate of profit to fall is a moment of the capitalist tendency to
overaccumulation (Altvater et.al. 1975, p. 270), i.e. a mode of existence of the
unfettered exploitation of labour (4). Overaccumulation and the tendency of the rate
of profit to fall are thus conceived of as different moments of the class struggle over
the imposition of the value form. The rate of profit is the governing motive of
capitalist production inasmuch as it determines the possibility of reconverting
realised profits into expanded surplus value production.
The social character of production reasserts itself in and through the constituting
power of labour that challenges capital's ability to contain labour within the form of
capital. Disruption of expanded reproduction makes itself felt in the form of
overaccumulation, a rising organic composition of capital and a falling rate of profit.
"At this point the development of the productive forces is inconsistent with
prevailing values, and a dynamic process of adjustment is necessary" (Weeks 1982,
p. 75). The adjustment process, referred to by Weeks, involves class struggle over
the intensification of work, the redundancy of labour, pressure on wages and the
devaluation and liquidation of capital (closure of plant) - all this in the attempt to
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render the productive power of labour profitable by decreasing necessary labour in
the attempt to contain the productive power of labour within the limits of the
valorisation process. The class struggle over the containment of labour's productive
and disruptive power focuses on the contradictory mode of existence of the production
process. The class struggle over capital's tendency to limit necessary labour involves
the struggle over the reimposition of the valorisation process on the labour process
through the intensification of work and the reassertion of command over labour's
disruptive power. Fundamentally, the struggle to confine labour's productive power
within the form of capital involves the disorganisation of labour's tendency to limit
the provision of work. The class struggle over domination is a presupposition and
premise in and through the constituting power of labour as the abstraction of social
reality in action. Capital exists only in and through labour whose power capital needs
to contain by denying self-determination and social production under the control of
society itself (5). Capital's attempt to contain labour is repressive in form and
self-contradictory in substance. The reimposition of capitalist command involves the
use of unemployment as a means of reinforcing the division within the working class,
to reassert the right to manage, to put pressure on wages and reimpose the wage
relation (i.e. to maintain and guarantee formal exchange equality). The containment
of labour involves the reassertion of authority through impoverishment in the face
of overflowing markets, unemployment, liquidation and devaluation of productive
capacity, and monetary scarcity in the face of overliquidity of capital. The class
struggle over domination involves thus the destruction of use-values (through the
liquidation of capital) in order to determine social reproduction as production of
value confined within the limits of the capitalist form of reproduction, i.e. the
reimposition of the integration of abstract labour with the value form. This process
does not follow an internal logic of capital but, rather, the class struggle over
domination.
Overaccumulation and crisis is a mode of existence of class antagonism in and
through the productive and disruptive power of labour in and against capital. What
distinguishes capitalism from other modes of production is not overproduction, but
the constitution of overproduction as an anarchic, crisis-ridden process. While
overproduction is a condition for the reproduction of capital, it obtains in capitalism
as tendency to overaccumulation and crisis (6). The contradiction between the
presupposition of overproduction and overproduction as an 'anarchic element' entails
the contradiction between the labour and valorisation process, or, in other words,
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between value and use-value: "whose developed form is the contradiction between the
capitalist tendency to develop the forces of production without limits, and the need to
confine accumulation within the limits of the social relations of production" (Clarke
1989, p. 142). Expansive reproduction proceeds in and through the constant class
struggle over the constitutive parts of the working day, the reimposition of the
labour process as valorisation process and the destruction of value (i.e. productive
capacity), the redundancy of labour and the unemployment of capital that can no
longer be converted into effective command over labour for the purpose of
exploitation. On the other hand, the sustaining of accumulation through credit
constitutes the circuit of social capital on the basis of a speculative deferral of mass
devaluation of capital, a speculative deferral which entails an accumulation of debt,
money as the incarnation of abstract labour in the form of a (potentially) worthless
claim on surplus value. Crisis is not just a vehicle for the transformation of the
social relation of production that constitutes a new starting point for accumulation.
The movement of the contradictions of capital is determined by the class struggle.
This class struggle is an open-ended and unpredictable process and costly for capital
(devaluation and liquidation of capital), and potentially disastrous as the years
post-1929 signpost in dramatic fashion.
The presence of labour in and against capital assumes the form of overaccumulation
of capital which asserts itself in the form of the redundancy of the worker and
, unemployed capital. However, unemployed capital does not simply cease to perform
as capital. Contrary to its partner in the form of excess capital in production,
unemployed capital exists in the general form of capital and, at the same time, in its
elementary form: money. In the face of overaccumulation and crisis, the associated
expansion of earned profits placed on monetary markets spills over into increasingly
speculative and unproductive channels. "The so-called plethora of capital always
applies essentially to a plethora of the capital for which the fall in the rate of profit
is not compensated through the mass of profit - this is always true of newly
developing fresh offshoots of capital - or to a plethora which places capitals
incapable of action on their own at the disposal of the managers of large enterprise in
the form of credit" (Marx 1966, p. 251). This development is a moment of the
overaccumulation of capital as money capital itself can no longer be converted into
reproductive activity, or, in other words, money capital cannot be converted into
expanded command over living labour. Hence, "unemployed capital at one pole and
unemployed workers at the other" (ibid.) - different poles of a dialectical continuum
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of the presence of labour in and against capital, the development of which is being
determined by the class struggle. Superfluous capital exists and makes itself felt as
the incarnation of the process of abstract wealth to which all other forms of capital
and labour have to be sacrificed in order to sustain capital in its general and
elementary form. All social relations rest on the maintenance of formal exchange
equality of credit. The constitution of the productive and disruptive power of labour
in the form of credit-expansion involves the class struggle over the money power of
capital: i.e. the enforcement of debt over the working class through pressure on
living standards, imposition of poverty and the intensification of work so as to turn
credit into real value.
In the course of overaccumulation, which is itself stimulated by credit expansion,
the uneven development between reproductive and monetary accumulation
transforms from a lever of accumulation to a crisis-ridden tension between
functioning capital and the credit-system. The contradiction involved here is that the
tension between different value forms is constituted in the form of an autonomisation
(Verselbstandingunq) of money from the production of surplus value, while, at the
same time, existing only in and through it. Overaccumulation and crisis increases
reproductive capital's demand for means of payment so as to maintain command over
labour's productive and disruptive power for the purpose of exploitation. This
demand can only be satisfied by credit. Consequently, credit becomes more expensive
as demand rises, while depressed 'economic activity' and defaults of credit threaten to
turn debt into insolvency and bankruptcy of reproductive capital. Banks themselves
face the threat of insolvency as credit defaults, threatening a collapse of the circuit
of social capital based on speculation and debt financing of reproduction. The tension
between different value forms is signposted by the autonomisation of the
meaningless, but elementary, form of value from the immediate command of capital
over labour for the purpose of exploitation upon which the social reality of money
rests and which is sustained by money independent from its parent stock. The
contradictory movement of the contradiction between functioning and money capital
indicates the fragility of capital's command to exploit labour effectively as
reproductive capital is sustained by 'unemployed' capital, threatening insolvency and
liquidation for both in and through the failure of one of the extreme poles of the
contradictory unity of productive and money capital. The supremacy of monetary
accumulation is a direct expression of the weakness of reproductive accumulation
(Kruger 1985), i.e. the crisis of domination over labour's productive power. While
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the plethora of capital signposts the rupture of capital's power to impose work
within the limits of the capitalist form of social reproduction, the autonomisation of
monetary accumulation constitutes capital's most elementary and meaningless form
of command. The money power of capital is a mode of existence of the conceptual and
practical movement of the class antagonism; the class struggle over labour's
productive and disruptive power constitutes the contradictory unity of surplus value
production in the form of the self-contradictory existence of money.
The contradiction of social production in the form of capital relates thus to the
substance of value, the presence of labour in and against capital. The
self-contradictory existence of capital is temporarily 'normalised' through the class
struggle over the recomposition of the production process and, of importance here,
through the expansion of production through circulation. The compulsion towards
expanded appropriation and homogenisation of social reality is a tendential part of
capital's own reality: i.e. the displacement of production to the world market. The
world market is a presupposition and a premise of the whole process of capitalist
reproduction. The world market "is directly given in the concept of capital itself"
(Marx 1973, p. 163) as it constitutes the presupposition of social reproduction "as
well as its substratum" (ibid., p. 228). The world market posits the most developed
mode of existence of the integration of abstract labour with the value form. The world
rrTarket constitutes the place "in which production is posited as a totality together
with all its moments, but within which, at the same time, all contradictions come
into play" (ibid., p. 227). The inversion of social reproduction as production of
capital is complete: the world market as the result of the conceptual displacement of
substantive abstraction transforms into a premise of abstract wealth; a premise
which serves as a presupposition for the crisis-ridden reproduction of the social
relations of production. The world market constitutes a mode of existence of the
presence of labour in and against capital which subordinates the conditions of life to
the richest concrete development of the most general abstraction of the antagonistic
tendency of capital and labour and conversely. The world market constitutes the most
concrete mode of existence of the crisis-ridden development of social reproduction as
the reproduction of capital. Accordingly, the utmost expansion of the process of
abstract wealth founded on exploitation comprises also the expansion of the power of
money as form of value because of the international character of the circuit of money
capital within the circuit of social capital situated on the world market. From the
conceptual standpoint advocated here, the displacement of the presence of labour in
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and against capital from production to the world market subordinates the conditions
of life to the most richly developed form of the category of abstract labour. Hence,
the development of domestic accumulation is subordinated to the equality,
repression, ultimate expression and thinghood of value in the form of (the
international character of) the circuit of money capital. The constitution of the world
market turns into the premise of the imposition of work within national boundaries
(see v. Braunmuhl 1978).
II Social Constitution and the Form of the Capitalist State
The historical constitution of abstract labour as generality of the social relation of
capitalist reproduction presupposes the historical constitution of the state. The first
chapters of 'Capital' presuppose the existence of the state as an historical process and
premise for the reality of the law of value. The dismantling of feudal (7) restraint is
an historical process that establishes social conditions which constitute the reality of
value production: the free individual bound by legal relations instead of relations of
direct coercion, territorially homogeneous markets, money with a political title (see
Marx 1973,1983), the political protection of the right of property and the
provision of infrastructural means within which the law of value can unfold. This
formal, but nevertheless real, determination of the state comprises an historical
development in which-the state arrogated to itself particular functions. The
historical development of the state transforms from the political revolutionising of
personal relations of domination into the political normalisation of bourgeois society.
The impartiality of legal standardisation of rights reasserts the liberation from
feudal constraints within the proper motion of capitalist social constitution
(individual freedom and equality). In capitalism, the constitution of the general
conditions within which formal freedom and equality obtain are abstracted in a form
distinct from exchange relations and production (Holloway/Picciotto 1978). The
state enforces the norm of social interaction between property owners in a way
which safeguards the formal recognition of (property) rights to which each
individual is subject. The enforcement of property rights involves, fundamentally,
the enforcement of the power of money, as the most abstract form of capitalist
property. This relation of the state to society implies that private individuals exist
as abstract individuals endowed with standardised rights and, as such, are treated as
abstract citizens (Blanke/Jurgens/Kastendiek 1978;Holloway 1980). This
treatment complements politically the processing of class as wage labour. This
reassertion of the right of property 'denies the existence of class' (Gunn 1987c).
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The form-determined function of the state is something real and as such provides
legitimacy for the state (Agnoli 1975). These functions cannot be provided by the
conscious decision of the community since the community exists only in the inverted
form of the private individual in a social context characteristic of commodity
production.
However, behind the sanction of the right of property lies the doubly free labourer
(see Marx 1983, p. 166,668) and the concentration of the conditions of the means
of social production and subsistence in the hands of capital. Behind formal equality
and formal freedom lies social reproduction in the form of capital: value production
(that is surplus value production: Negri 1984). The formal safeguarding of rights
inverts into the substantive guarantee of exploitation (Gunn 1987d) and specifies
the state as a moment within the 'context of the valorisation process' (Clarke 1978).
The form of the state, as social practice, inverts hence from achieving the
instantiation of human rights which, itself, is the right of political emancipation
(revolutionising of direct relations of power) to imposing work as the social reality
of the right of property which, itself, is a negation of social emancipation. The
constitution of social reproduction as reproduction of capital involves the state as a
distinct moment of the imposition of value and the organisation of life around imposed
work. The form of the state, which attains generality in terms of the harmonies of
formal equality and formal freedom as political domination, is hence posited as
political organiser of the 'republic of the market': formal freedom and equality as
mode of existence of exploitation. The political guarantee of the right of property
determines the state as a strong state that imposes the rationality and equality of the
right of property over society in the attempt to contain the social antagonism of
capital and labour by the force of law (8). Therefore, the contradictory unity of
surplus value production is displaced to the form of the state in a way which
concentrates the social reality of exploitation in and through the guarantee of formal
freedom and formal equality of property rights. The social process of formation and
implementation of rights in and through the state mediates exploitation in and
through the form of rights of property.
This social determination of the state, as an historical precondition, reality and
process of the social relations of production, characterises the state as an 'illusory
community' (Marx/Engels 1958) subsuming particular interest (private
production and exploitation) as universal (social reproduction and the republic of
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the market as human right). The contradictory unity of surplus value production is
mediated as social existence in the form of the state as 'external', as 'alienated form
of community' (ibid.). This determination of the state in the historical process of
capitalist class relations posits, at the same time, its substantive character as
imposing law and order: instead of privileges, the state sets rights;instead of
relations of will and power, the state sets relations of legality;instead of despotism,
the state concentrates coercion as law and orderjinstead of relations of conflict, the
state sets contractual relations of social interaction. The concentration of the
universal in the form of the state presupposes the state as "concentration of
bourgeois society" (Marx 1973, p. 108). This constitution of the state involves the
displacement of control over the means of production into the form of the state,
imposing order in and through legal standardisation of formally equal property
owners. The social process of wealth as one of value is thus displaced and constituted
politically in the form of the safeguarding of rights, equality and freedom upon which
the social reality of the process of value rests (9). The 'concentration of the coercive
character of bourgeois society in the form of the state' (Agnoli 1986) guarantees and
sanctions the right of property for each commodity owner in a form independent
from them. The particularisation of the political as distinct from the social implies
that the state can only relate to the private individual in a social context through
certain general forms, i.e. monetary or legal means and direct coercion, so as to
impose the existence of the private individual as an abstract citizen within the rule
of law (10).
Formal freedom and equality figure not as accomplished fact but as a process of
class antagonism. Formal freedom and equality constitute the historical
presupposition of the state, its historical premise and result. The mode of existence
of the state inheres in the historical tendency towards expanded social organisation of
social reproduction in terms of law: the elimination of social conflict in and through
the instantiation of human rights, i.e. law and order control. It is here that the
process of surplus value production attains generality in the form of political
domination. The dynamic unity of surplus value production does not eliminate the
antagonism of capital and labour, but pushes continually each mediation of the
contradictory unity of surplus value production to its point of supercession
inasmuch as formally equal, but mutually exclusive, property rights (see Marx
1983 on the working day) constitute relations of exchange as relations of political
domination, involving the imposition of relations of legality over the class conflict.
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Therefore, the state exists as the political concentration of social normalisation,
organisation and domestication of social conflict in forms conforming to formal
rights and the safeguarding of these rights through coercion separated from society
and, at the same time, existing within society. The particularisation of the state from
society entails specific functions arrogated by the state in the development of
capitalism. The historical tendency of 'statification' is presupposed in the
substantive abstraction of capital and labour and in the result of the concrete
historical movement of the abstract tendency as concrete class struggle. The
legalisation (as well as political supervision) of the social relations implies at the
same time their statification. a statification which aims at the development of the
social relations of production in politically supervised, legally controlled,
non-conflictual forms (Agnoli 1975;Blanke/Jurgens/Kastendiek 1978). The
organisation of social conditions in and through which the contradictory unity of
surplus value production of value exists is perceived here as the state's content as
mode of domination, a content which is presupposed in the determination of the state
as historical result, reality and process of capitalist social relations. The separation
of the political from the social operates within society. Thus the contradiction
between form and content: particularisation of the state imposing the generality of
formal freedom and formal equality as 'community', the content of which is the
'perpetuation of the slavery of labour' (Marx 1969, p. 33), a perpetuation that
comprises the 'sine qua non of the existence of capitaP (Marx 1983). The
"autonomised [verselbstandigte] power of the state" (Marx 1974, p. 882) entails
the form-determined content which puts the state right back into the process of
value. Hence, the state is constituted as a contradictory unity of form and content
(Clarke 1977), a unity that is impossible to separate inasmuch as, in practice, it
constitutes a dialectical continuum.
The social normalisation and pacification of the aspiration of labour in the sphere
of social reproduction is beyond the scope of the private contract between capital and
labour and the latter's existence for capital as merely a means of valorisation. The
social organisation of the reproduction of labour can only be processed by the state as
a distinct moment of the class antagonism between capital and labour, a moment
within which the contradictory unity of surplus value production exists as a political
relation, complementing the economic. The pacification of class conflict into forms of
law and order caused, regarding the regulation of the working day, "capital at last to
be bound by the chains of legal regulation" (Marx 1983, p. 223). The displacement
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of the contradictory unity of surplus value production (in its mode of existence as
formal freedom and equality) to the state specifies the state as a moment of the social
relations of production that preserves the conditions of capitals' existence: living
labour. This preservation of living labour, both in terms of the existence of the
working class and the normalising of the aspiration of the working class within the
limits of value, is abstracted from capital as individual capital and conforms to the
state's constitution as a mode of existence of the social relation of capital and labour.
'The legal chain of regulation' thus exposes capital's general need, as social relation,
for living labour opposed to capital in its real existence as individual capital. Capital
cannot exist without the state. The form of the state is thus to be seen as a distinct
mode of existence of exploitation in that the state internalises in its historic
development the preservation of the substance of value (labour); the state mediates
capital's dependence on the reproduction of labour power within the limits of capital.
The state attains historical existence in the dialectical process of these functions
arrogated by the state. The development of the state needs to be seen as one in which
the contradictory unity of surplus value production is reproduced in a political
form, as a moment of the same process of class struggle: social reproduction as, and
in and against, domination.
The tendency of the state to arrogate to itself functions to organise labour power
(housing, education,skills,health,social reproduction, discipline,living conditions, '
legal provisions, enforcement of legal rights,organisation of free-time), and
likewise the processing of the aspiration of the working class within the historical
limits of capital and the state, is restricted by the state's own precondition: surplus
value production. The state is a mode of the existence of labour in capitalism (Agnoli
1975), i.e. a moment of the imposition of abstract labour through the commodity
form. The statist moderation of the 'perpetuation of the power of capital and the
slavery of labour' (Marx 1969, p. 33) posits the state, in regard to labour, as an
instance of oppression and, at the same time, an instance of its existence in
capitalism (Agnoli 1975). The state provides 'things we need, but in a form that is
oppressive' (London 1980) as it denies and disorganises by use of force, in the name
of citizenship, social emancipation in contrast to the political emancipation
characteristic of capitalist domination. This contradiction of the state exists not as
accomplished fact but as process of class struggle. Therefore, it is not sufficient
simply to indicate the class character of the state. Rather, the class character needs
to be analysed as a specific form and praxis of class domination (Holloway 1980;
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Holloway/Picciotto 1978), and, as such, open to the class struggle itself. The
attempt of the state (and capital) to harness class conflict into bourgeois forms of
legality and to confine the aspiration of the working class to the limits of the state
(and capital) implies not only the legalisation of social relations;it implies also the
recognition of the aspiration of the working class and the processing of the latter's
aspiration in a way that denies the existence of the working class as. class by
processing its struggle through the forms of abstract citizenship; the disorganisation
of class relations on the basis of the wage relation.
The state is thus to be conceived of as the concentration of the coercive character of
capitalist society, both as its historical presupposition and its historical premise
and result. The historical composition of the state during fascism cannot be seen as an
'exceptional' form of state (Poulantzas 1973); nor can the so-called 're-
authoritarianisation' of the state during the crisis of 'Fordism' and the strengthening
of the authoritarian character of the state in 'post-Fordism' (Jessop, Hirsch) be
seen as a qualitatively new period in capitalism. Rather, the coercive character of
the state exists as presupposition, premise and result of the social reproduction of
the class antagonism and not as an exceptional form of the state or as a qualitatively
new period of capitalist development. The historical determination and composition of
the form, state, as the "concentrated and organised force of society" (Marx 1983, p.
703) is a process of class conflict, entailing the political attempt to sustain and to
reassert control over labour. In the face of the difficulty of periodising specific
historical forms of capitalist development (see Clarke 1990a), the attempt to
contrast specific forms of political violence to phases of a seeming civilised use of
political power disregards the general character of the form of the capitalist state.
The sociology of different types of capitalist modes of production (as in Poulantzas
and the debate on (post-)Fordism), entails an essentialisation of specific aspects, or
functions, arrogated by the state to itself in the course of the class struggle. The
question about the authoritarian character of the state, and its historically concrete
role vis-a-vis the social, concerns the composition (re/decomposition) of the
historical presupposition of the state as a form assumed by the class struggle. The
republic of the market preemptively stabilising the process of value through
corrective repression of the aspirations of labour attains generality in the state's
'preemptive counter-revolution' (Agnoli 1975), i.e., in the reimposition of the
value form over the conditions of life. The 'relative latency of the terrorist use of
force' (Hirsch 1978a) involves the imposition of the historical premise of the
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state's own constitution (i.e. capitalist domination) against the disruptive and
productive presence of labour in and against capital. This use of force entails the
safeguarding of social reproduction in the form of capital by maintaining the
'peaceful, civilised, formally legal and democratic form of appearance of bourgeois
society' (ibid.). The development of the form of the state is neither a reflection of
political and ideological changes, nor merely a result of economic crisis, but a mode
of motion of the self-contradictory form of the capitalist state in the face of the
crisis-ridden development of accumulation and, as such, a process of the constituting
power of labour in and against capital. The limits of capital are, at the same time,
limits of the state: the presence of labour in and against capital. The activities of the
state "are bound and structured by this precondition [the reproduction of the capital
relation] of its own existence, by the need to ensure (or attempt to ensure) the
continued accumulation of capital" (Holloway/Picciotto 1978, p. 25). This
domination does not have to be theorised anew at the level of the state, since the
powers the state arrogated during the historical development of capitalism are
already "inserted in a particular society" (Clarke 1978, p. 64) and since it already
exists as the historical precondition of social reality as a whole.
Seeing the state as a mode of existence of the presence of labour in and against
capital implies that the state cannot be understood as agent of capital. The state cannot
provide general conditions suitable to every particular capital beyond the guarantee
of the reproduction of the social form of social reproduction, because each capital
exists only in and through each other as moments of one process that constitutes
their difference in and through the unity of the abstract category of labour in action.
Social capital exists only as a process of difference-in-unity within the life-cycle of
value. For capitalist reproduction to take on the form of overaccumulation and crisis,
each individual capital must be involved as a moment of the social process of value in
terms of negation (devaluation) and affirmation (average rate of profit). The state
and capital depend on the continuous reproduction of the transformation of value as
between particularity and universality (Reichelt 1978), mediated and composed
within the circuit of social capital (see Marx 1978, Ch. 1-4). Therefore, one cannot
derive the historical development of the state from the specific interests served by
particular policies. Rather the form of the state needs to be seen as a mode of
existence of the class relation which constitutes and suffuses the circuit of capital.
Consequently, the form of the state attains existence as the political mode of existence
of the abstract category of labour in action. The political form of the state is
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determined by the class struggle. The relationship of the form of the state to the
economic form is established by the subordination of the state to the power of money,
through which an overaccumulation of capital impinges on the state and sets limits to
the power of the state of how to mediate such crisis politically. In turn, this
constitution of the state is displaced to the world market as the concentration of the
richest concrete development of the constituting power of labour in and against
capital.
The class struggle in and against the form of the state needs to be seen within the
context of the world market if the 'inner connection' between the economic and
political is to be understood in its materialist constitution as distinct-in-unity. In
the debate on the (post-)Fordist state, the world market is perceived as a power that
dictates state policies and coerces the state to reconstruct its historical form of
existence (see Hirsch/Roth 1986). To be sure, the world market dictates, but its
existence is not power as such but the constitution of the contradictory unity of
surplus value production. The so-called 'dictates' of the world market are the
dictates of the crisis-ridden development of accumulation that obtains only in and
through the disruptive and productive power of labour. The dictates of the world
market amount to the displacement of the class antagonism from the conflict between
necessary and surplus labour to the constitution of this same contradiction within
the form of the world market. The form of the state is a moment subaltern to the
international movement of capital, that is, to the richest possible concrete
development of the substantive abstraction of class antagonism (v. Braunmuhl 1976,
1978). The state is constituted within the proper motion of the "mode of existence of
social capital operating internationally" (v. Braunmuhl 1978, p. 176). The world
market constitutes a mode of existence of the contradictions of social reproduction:
global concentration of capitalist accumulation, that is the negation and affirmation
of appropriated labour. "Each national economy can only be conceptualised adequately
as a specific international and, at the same time, integral part of the world market.
The nation state can only be seen in this dimension" (v. Braunmuhl 1976, p. 276;
my translation). The state, while constituted on a national basis, is subordinated to
the global power of money, imposing the global limits of accumulation on the
domestic attempts to secure the reproduction of capital and the integration of the
domestic accumulation of capital into the accumulation of capital on the world
market. Thus, the multiplicity of nation states exist in and through the constitution
of the contradictory unity of surplus value production on the world market as each
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state exists as a particular node within the global flow of capital. The attempt to
secure the integration of domestic accumulation into the world market provides a
basis on which to secure the political pacification of the working class.
Certainly, differences obtain between the policies of nation states of how to contain
the class struggle and to secure integration into the world market. These differences,
however, stem from the 'reproductive structure' of a given country (see Altvater
1985) relative to its integration into the circuit of social capital on the world
market. Britain's ailing productive base, relative to its main competitors,
contrasting with its strong integration into the international circuit of social capital
indicates the "fact that Britain shows the Janus face of capital in its most developed
form" (Clarke 1988c, p. 3). In the UK, the contradictory unity of surplus value
production is mediated in the form of a dissociation between productive and financial
capital, discussed by some authors as indicating the incompleteness of capitalist rule
in Britain. This dissociation constitutes the contradictory unity of the circuit of
different value forms composing social capital internationally. The integration of the
UK into the global accumulation of capital signals the historical development of the
substantive abstraction of class antagonism in action: i.e. the international
composition of the contradictory unity of surplus value production, comprising
different social structures of reproduction of capital as a whole in a particular
country (Altvater 1985). Different social structures of reproduction exist as
moments of the global development of accumulation. The argument on the
peculiarities of British capitalism needs to be taken seriously in at least one respect:
the integration of the UK into the world market holds "a mirror to the future of the
rest of the world" (Clarke 1988c, p. 33, in reference to Anderson 1987).
Ill Money-Crisis and the State
Within the crisis-ridden development of accumulation, the development of the
capitalist state is processed in immediate form through social conflict and in
mediated form through monetary constraints. Basic for the development of the state
is the social conflict over the imposition of the value form over the conditions of life.
It is through the power of money as a form of value that the imperatives of capitalist
social reproduction make themselves felt to the state. The displacement of the
antagonism of capital and labour in the form of monetary pressure involves the state
because of the state's responsibility for national currency (state as central banker).
Monetary constraint over the state expresses itself in the form of a drain of
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reserves, inflationary pressure, speculative movement of money capital against
national currency and a growing claim of international finance markets on public
revenue. The drain on reserve towards nations that export more to, than they import
from, a particular national economy precipitates, if sustained for a long time,
changes in the currency exchange rate. The fluctuation of the exchange rate is
aggravated by speculative movements of money capital. The exchange rate indicates
the international movement of money in and out of a particular currency,
jeopardising the way in which domestic accumulation is integrated into, and
composed within, the global circuit of capital. The drain on the national reserve
indicates the movement of abstract labour in its most elementary form: money as
command to impose work productively in terms of capital.
However, the safeguarding of domestic accumulation exists as a mode of existence of
the global character of accumulation, i.e. the world market as the most developed
form of the category of abstract labour in action. The crisis-ridden process of
accumulation contains, as manifested in the contemporary development, the tendency
to a growing synchronisation of the capitalist cycle in and through the global flow of
money capital. This development integrates different nation states firmly as moments
of the international process of abstract wealth, undermining 'traditional' attempts to
"control the cycle in one country" (O'Connor 1984, p. 2;see also Radice 1984 and
the collection of articles in Radice 1975). The global character of capitalist
accumulation makes itself felt by the state in the form of monetary pressure on the
domestic regulation of money. In a crisis the over-expansion of credit appears in the
form of a growing drain on the reserves of the central banks as creditors seek to
discount bills of exchange with 'real' money. The reserve funds of the national banks
are pivotal for the functioning of the credit-system and, as such, for the
reproduction of capitalist exploitation of labour. The reserves guarantee the
existence of credit in terms of a convertibility of bills of exchange in real money.
The barrier to sustained accumulation appears in the form of a limited supply of
official reserves with which to support the credit-sustained accumulation of capital.
Inadequate reserves indicate the fragility of credit-sustained accumulation. For the
state, the drain on reserves asserts itself in the form of balance of payment deficits,
overridden by a claim on tax revenue by creditors. The convertibility of credit
depends on the ability of the state to restrict the expansion of credit as banks will
fuel overaccumulation of capital by investing their capital in interest bearing
ventures. The global limits of accumulation assert themselves to the state in the form
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of speculative pressure on the exchange rates and a growing claim on tax revenue,
threatening the convertiblity of currency in commodities on the world market. In its
historical development the state arrogated to itself powers to restrain the
inflationary expansion of money. These powers provide the basis for the state's
monetary and financial policies (see Marx 1966 on the Bank Act of 1844). It is the
monetary policy of the state that underpins accumulation and domestic circulation of
money subaltern to the international movement of money capital. The reimposition
of the limits of the market over productive activity and labour through restrictive
monetary policies involves not so much a quest for sustaining capital in its most
elementary form of money (i.e. money in the form of credit) but, rather, a quest to
sustain the existence of capital as social form of reproduction. A default of the
credit-superstructure endangers not only the abstract process of wealth in the
meaningless form of money capital but, also, the elementary form of capital upon
which all social relations rest. "It is ultimately through the monetary policies of the
state, mediated through the banking system, that the 'interests' of capital-in-general
are imposed on particular capitals, as the expansion of production is confined within
the limits of its capitalist form" (Clarke 1988c, ms. p. 9-10). Fundamentally, the
attempt to regain control over the money supply involves the reimposition of the
global limits of capital over the working class so as to integrate the category of
abstract labour with the value form through the guarantee of credit, thus securing
'money', and the formal exchange equality of commodities, through the exploitation of
labour. The guarantee of international credit-relations rests on the ability of the
(multiplicity of) state(s) to impose the money power of capital upon the conditions
of life.
If confidence in the ability of the central bank to meet demand for cash payment is
undermined, the financial system is threatened with collapse, as the notes of the
central bank lose their ability to function as money in the reserve of the banking
system. The integration of national currency on the world market is backed by the
ability of the central bank to meet a drain on reserves and to convert bills of
exchange into means of payment. This ability of the central bank is, in turn, backed
by the revenue of the state. It is the revenue of the state which supports the reserves
through the guarantee of credit as claim on taxation. If the ability of the cental bank
to meet demand for cash payment is undermined, it is the revenue of the state which
guarantees the convertibility of bills of exchange into cash payment. The
convertibility of national currency in commodities on the world market depends on
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the accepetability of national currency as legal tender on the world market. Such
acceptability depends on the acceptance of credit as claim on tax revenue by financial
markets, endowed with the ultimate sanction of speculative pressure against
currency in case of domestic mismanagement. The attempt to guarantee such
acceptance entails the sustaining of formal exchange equality on the world market
through the political guarantee of national currency as legal tender. It is ultimately
the revenue of the state that guarantees the convertibility of national currency into
commodities on the world market. The individual states exist not only in competition
with each other, as each tries to divert the flow of capital to its own territory; they
exisi also as particular nodes of regulation in the global circuit of capital (v.
Braunmuhl 1978). The failure of any state to maintain convertibility of national
currency may create problems for the international flow of capital as a whole
because the stability of international credit-relations rests on the political
guarantee of credit.
Seeing the relation between money capital and the state as a relation in which the
contradictory unity of surplus value production "makes itself felt by the state in a
mediated form" (Clarke 1978, p. 66), indicates the material discontinuity of the
real process of class antagonism: erosion of tax base, balance of payment problems,
and accumulation of public debt. These pressures indicate the reassertion of the
contradictory unity of surplus value production over the form of the capitalist state
in and through the abstract equality of the money power of capital. In order to
understand the working of the money power of capital; one has to descend "from the
monetary image of crisis to an analysis of the crisis of social relations, from the
crisis of circulation to the crisis of the relation between necessary and surplus
labour" (Negri 1984, p. 25). The antagonistic tendency of the class struggle is
concentrated in the power of money as the incarnation of value. The movement of the
contradiction between productive capital and the credit system is determined by the
class struggle over capital's command over labour for the purpose of exploitation.
This'struggle is, in turn, constituted at the level of the money power of capital which
is mediated through the state. In this crisis-ridden process, the state attains
generality as a self-contradictory moment of the social power of money. The
subordination of the state to its own precondition, i.e. the integration of the abstract
category of labour with the value form, contradicts the substance upon which this
social form of command rests. The limits of capital manifest themselves to the state
through money power of capital (M...M'), a power in which the precondition of its
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existence is seemingly eliminated, i.e. the expansive reproduction of capitalist
exploitation of labour (M...E—M'). The crisis of accumulation appears in the real
disproportion of productive and monetary accumulation. This disproportion appears
to be related to the inflationary expansion of money and not to the crisis of
domination over labour's productive power. The contradictions of capital appear as a
mere disproportion between production and circulation. However, because of the
contradictory unity of productive and money capital, the state rather than resolving
the contradictions of capital, reproduces these contradictions in a political form.
The acceptability of credit as a claim on tax revenue by financial markets depends
on sound monetary management. At times of overaccumulation and crisis, the
speculative character of credit-sustained accumulation comes to the fore as the
pseudovalidation of surplus value production through credit expansion erupts,
precipitated by a rush into means of payment, i.e. real money which existed so far
only as anticipation of future settlement, or a rush into safe assets (e.g. gold, strong
currency etc.). In turn, the rush into safe assets involves a threat to the money
reserves of central banks as reserve money is issued in exchange for bills of
exchange. All this calls into question the ability of the central bank to act as lender of
last resort at the same time as the stability of international credit relations depend
on the political guarantee of credit as a claim on a proportion of tax revenue. In order
to maintain formal exchange equality on the world market, the state needs to cut back
on credit so as to sustain financial stability. Cutting back on credit involves a
contraction of the money supply and high interest rates, making credit scarce and
expensive. The reassertion of the limits of the market in the form of scarce and
costly credit suppresses the ambitions of producers, reinforcing the competitive
pressure to intensify exploitation so as to maintain solvency. The stability of credit
depends on the ability of capital to exploit labour effectively. However, the
imposition of tight money is fraught with contradictions. Productive accumulation
has to succeed in order for money capital to be sustained, while the failure to turn
credit into productive command over labour reasserts, for productive captial, the
limits of the market to realise capital profitably in the form of insolvency and
bankruptcy. The reassertion of the limits of the market through a policy of tight
money sacrifices productive activity and labour on the altar of money, precipitating
a default of credit as a claim on future surplus value. The substance of money as form
of value is labour, the acceptability of money as legal tender being guaranteed by the
effective command of capital over labour (i.e. the acceptance of credit as a proportion
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of future surplus value). The guarantee of credit depends on the containment of
labour within the limits of capital: integration of the labour with the valorisation
process and the integration of abstract labour with the value form.
A Keynesian policy of easy credit helps to prevent overaccumulation from leading
to price wars, mass bankruptcy and depression. However, an easy credit policy does
not resolve overaccumulation, nor does the growth of the market which it stimulates
(i.e. demand management)(Guttmann 1976;Altvater et.al. 1976;Mattick 1976;
Rodel/Brandes 1976;Clarke 1988b). A Keynesian credit policy fuels over-
accumulation through the way in which the working class is integrated through the
guarantee of full-employment growth and the underwriting of profits by the creation
of demand. The increase in the money supply, through the extension of credit and
state loans, provides the guarantee that price increases can be realised, permitting
accumulation and the maintenance of full-employment growth on an ever growing
inflationary spiral. While depreciation charges might be absorbed through credit-
expansion and while unemployment is postponed, the tendency to overaccumulation
accelerates, expressing itself in the form of price increases, budget difficulties,
speculative pressure on currency and growing devaluation of money capital through
inflation, erosion of confidence in the domestic organisation of money, threat to
formal exchange equality of national currency on the world market, and, ultimately,
a possible collapse of international credit-relations. Credit-sustained over-
accumulation tiptoes on the edge of collapse, the manifestation of which will be ever
the more severe the greater overaccumulation sustained by credit. The expansion of
capitalist production through credit expansion and growing state expenditure,
domestically and internationally, only eventually exacerbates the very tendencies
which these policies sought to regulate in the first place (Altvater et.al. 1976;
Mattick 1976). The reassertion of monetary constraint over the state manifests a
barrier to the integration of the working class on the basis of social reform and
demand management. A monetarist credit policy seeks to rectify overaccumulation by
reimposing the limits of the market through a restrictive monetary policy,
reinforcing politically devaluation and liquidation of capital as well as
unemployment. The reimposition of the limits of the market through a policy of tight
money and high interest rates involves the enforcement of debt over the state, the
working class and capital. Such a policy makes it expensive for reproductive capital
to draw additional means of payment required to sustain productive activity and
employment, while high interest rates accelerate capital insolvency and liquidation.
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Although high interest rates make it possible for banks to absorb heavy losses
without defaulting, a policy of tight money threatens to undermine the whole process
upon which accumulation rests: expansion of credit. Productive activity cannot be
sacrificed because money exists only in and through labour - production of surplus
value. The attempt to reimpose the capitalist form of social reproduction through
high interest rate policies reinforces the slump in productive activity as credit for
outside financing gets scarce and costly and as debt service becomes more expensive.
The credit-system tiptoes on the edge of collapse through the default of the claim on
surplus value.
Both monetarism and Keynesianism are political phenomena of the contradictory
unity of the abstract category of labour and the value form. Keynesian and monetarist
money policies are distinct moments of the dialectical continuum of the
unity-in-separation of production and circulation. While Keynesianism seeks to
sustain the unity by establishing demand which sustains overaccumulation through
debt and inflationary pressure on profits, discriminating against, and precipitating a
collapse of, the elementary form of money capital, monetarism seeks to rectify
disunity between production and circulation by sacrificing reproductive
accumulation on the altar of money. Such a restriction of the ambitions of
reproductive capital reproduces threatens the production of surplus value and as
such the credit system itself. Although Keynesian and monetarist monetary policies
can, to a certain degree, moderate the disunity between production and circulation,
neither offers a solution of how to resolve the contradictions of capitalist
reproduction. Keynesian and monetarist monetary policies seek to rectify the
disruptive tension between distinct moments of social capital (i.e. productive and
money capital) from different extremes, threatening to intensify the tension by
sacrificing one moment in favour of the other. The difference between monetarism
and Keynesianism is political concerning the way in which the productive power of
labour is subordinated to value production, i.e. the political integration of labour.
The reimposition of formal exchange equality depends on the containment of labour's
disruptive power to resist deflationary attack and the reassertion of capitalist
domination over labour's productive power. The attempt to restore financial stability
is a question of enforcing debt over the working class and of imposing work so as to
sustain credit as a claim on surplus value. The containment of the working class on
the basis of tight monetary control implies the guarantee of credit through bigger
reserves, securing the convertibility of credit in tax payment. Further, the
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contraction of the money supply involves a restriction on the ambitions of
functioning capital as credit-sustaining of accumulation gets more expensive in the
face of scarce money with which to maintain the exploitation of labour. In order to
prevent insolvency, reproductive capitalists have to guarantee credit as claim on
surplus value by intensifying labour and by restraining wages. The reassertion of
the limits of the market in the form of scarce and costly credit implies the
imposition of the power of money as social command to confine social reproduction
within the limits of the reproduction of capital: intensification of work, job losses
and deteriorating living standards.
The reimposition of the limits of capital over the working class concerns the state
in imposing the generality of social existence (value production) over the social in
and through the elementary form of capital (Marazzi 1976). The state is thus
conceived of as imposing the elementary form of capital (money) over the working
class through a policy of state austerity. The imposition of the money power of
capital involves the state in safeguarding the enforcement of debt through coercion,
binding the present to the future in the attempt to make certain the turn over of a
claim on social life into effective command over labour in the future. In this process,
the self-contradictory form of the state attains generality as the "harmonies' last
refuge" (Marx 1973, p. 886), harmonies of formal equality and formal freedom
upon which the historical constitution of the state rests. The state as the harmonies'
last refuge represents thus 'communal interest', imposing formal exchange equality
in and through the sacrificing of social life to the meaningless form of the money
power of capital. The imposition of the market involves the state in imposing the
lurid face of equality in the form of money over society, reimposing economic
freedom as the abstract average of equality, the incarnation of which is money. The
state attains existence as the collective representative of money in command: i.e. the
subordination of the conditions of life to monetary scarcity, involving law and order
control as its preconditions, premise and result. The reimposition of the limits of the
market involves not only the subordination of the working class to monetary scarcity
but, more fundamentally, the monetary decomposition of class relations on the basis
of the wage relation. Capital cannot autonomise itself from labour. Rather, it has to
contain labour within the form of value as the condition of its own existence.
Monetary constraint over the state asserts the limits to containing labour through
policies of social reform. Such limits assert pressures to reimpose the
individualistic pillage of social cooperation, i.e. the political imposition of the limits
79
of the market as the paradigmatic form of formal freedom. The reimposition of the
market involves the class struggle over the containment of class in a mode of being
denied, i.e. the recomposition of class on the basis of the category of citizen; the
precondition and premise of the form of the capitalist state.
Notes
1: On the conceptualisation of the state in term of the base/superstructure metaphor see
Jessop (1982). The widely canvassed version of Marx's base superstructure metaphor in
state theory, that is the superstructure arising on the economic base, is not only
misleading in view of the state but also regarding Marx's theory itself. The triumph of the
base superstructure metaphor in structuralist Marxism was the triumph of what Marx
termed in Capital vol. I abstract materialism over what I see as the substance of his work
(substantive abstraction, see later). However, this triumph constituted the dissolution of
both which can be seen in Poulantzas's (1980) later work where he attempts to derive the
state not from the economic base but from the social relations of production.
2: According to Marx's (1983, p. 141) the global movement of money "acquires to the full
extent the character of the commodity whose bodily form is also the immediate social
incarnation of human labour in the abstract". For a formalist derivation of money see
Reuten 1988.
3: The term abstraction of points towards the development from the actual social
processes to the social form in which they exist (see Marx 1983;Lukacs 1971). The notion
of substantive abstraction is identical in meaning with Marx's (1973) notion of the abstract
as existing within the concrete and vice versa.
4: The tendency of the rate of profit to fall was heralded by Marx (1973, p. 748) as the
"most important law of modern political economy". An understanding of the necessity of
crisis on the basis of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall sees crisis as being rooted in
the production of surplus value. This understanding supposes that a theory of crisis has to
leave aside 'market relations' because the disequilibrium on the market which might
contingently arise merely contains the possibility of crisis and not its materialist
necessity. Rather, it is the manifestation of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall which
is seen as the cause of crisis. The unity-in-difference between production and circulation is
neglected as the specificity of the form of production is seen as the causal nexus for
understanding crisis.
The tendency of the rate of profit to fall is seen by Hirsch (1978a) as a manifestation of
the 'internal logic of capital' providing the 'objective foundation for the c^ass struggle'.
"What decisively determines the process of accumulation and, according to Marx,
constitutes the essential point of analysis, are the transformations in the composition of
capital, which inevitably come about in the course of the accumulation process and with the
development of the productive forces advanced through this process" (p. 67-68). The
revolutionising of the forces of production manifests the inevitability of crisis because of
the rise in the organic composition of capital relative to the rate of exploitation, a
development which finds an expression in a falling rate of profit. The manifestation of this
tendency is seen as the cause of the crisis because a declining rate of profit reaches a point
at which the produced mass of profit is to small relative to expanded accumulation of
realised profits (ibid.).
While there should be no doubt that a fall in the rate of profit might lead to crisis, the law is
not a sufficient condition to understand crisis. How much is a rate of profit to fall to trigger
crisis? In which way does a falling rate of profit lead to overaccumulation? Is
overaccumulation a mere consequence of falling rates of profit? How does a falling rate of
profit prohibit accumulation?, since, according to Marx (1966), a falling rate of profit
might coincide with an increasing mass of surplus value. The answers provided by Hirsch
are hypothetical since the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall is understood in
an a priori manner expressing the internal logic of capital. Treating the law of the tendency
of the rate of profit to fall in this way entails, by implication, a technological determinist
understanding of social reality because everything depends on the technical composition of
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capital and the social forces that act on it in a way determined by the logic of capital (see
also Reuten 1989). The class struggle is dismissed because class struggle plays no role in
the internal logic of capital. The tendency of the rate of profit to fall manifests, according
to Hirsch, the crisis-ridden framework of the 'objective laws of motion' within which
'subjects act'. Lastly, this conceptualisation of crisis dismisses the contradictory relation
between production and circulation as different moments of the one process of the category
of abstract labour in action. This understanding of crisis merely generalises a particular
moment of the crisis-ridden development of accumulation to which other elements have to
be added (see Reuten 1989). While the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall is
seen as primary, it attains generality as the determining variable, subordinating
accumulation as a moment dependent on it. This understanding confuses the dialectical
interrelation between different moments as premises and presuppositions of one another in
and through the social relation which constitutes them. Rather than seeing the law in
question as primary, it needs to be seen as mode of existence/motion of the historical
specific form of labour (i.e. social reproduction in the form of capital).
5: Approaches that stress the class struggle as the immediate cause for capital to take the
form of crisis are misleading. The understanding of crisis as an expression of the
inevitability of the struggle between capital and labour over and against domination can be
systematised into two different approaches: the reformism of the profit squeeze and
'autonomist Marxism' (cf. Cleaver 1989). While both approaches stress the militancy of the
working class as being at the heart of capitalist crisis, the profit squeeze discusses the
militancy of the working class in terms of the wage struggle. The autonomist approach, on
the other hand, understands crisis as a manifestation of working class self- determination
against the imposition of work ('strategy of refusal', cf. Tronti 1979) and, as such, as an
'attack* on surplus value production tout court. I concentrate here on discussing the
autonomist understanding of crisis.
Autonomist Marxism sees the cause of the crisis as being rooted in the inevitability of
class struggle that undermines capital's domination. Capital responds to the rupture of its
domination by restructuring the production process through new means of control (means of
production). Restructuring and crisis are understood as creative inasmuch as it intensifies
the class struggle and recomposes the power of labour within and beyond the factory. Thus,
capital's response to crisis constitutes the power of the working class as restructuring
leads to an ever more fully socialised presence of labour against capital (see Negri 1988,
1989). Crisis erupts in the form of a cyclical pattern of class struggle (de- and
recomposition of class). Capital's crisis is seen as inevitable because of the inevitability of
the class struggle. "Marx defines the crisis as the necessity for capitalism to enact a
general devaluation and overall re-alignment of the relations of production in situations
where the pressure of the working class and the proletariat on the rate of profit has
become irresistible" (Negri 1979a, p. 40). A falling rate of profit has disruptive effects
for the circulation of capital, precipitating a crisis of money, especially in the form of a
chain of defaults of the credit-system.
The necessity of crisis cannot be found in the immediate production process simpliciter
(Marx 1974b, p. 513). This is not to say that the possibility of crisis is not entailed in
production. The production process is process of appropriation of labour (exploitation).
However, production exists only in and through circulation and vice versa. The
contradictory unity of both cannot be systematised in terms of cause (working class
power) and effect (disruption of circulation and the development of pathological forms of
domination reflecting back on production); crisis cannot obtain in production separated from
the imposition of work through the commodity form. The understanding of crisis founded on
the primacy of the class struggle against domination does not provide an understanding of
the necessity of capitalist reproduction to take the form of crisis. It rather conceptualises
the possibility of crisis while focusing on the elementary form of crisis (class struggle). In
other words, the autonomist theory of crisis is not so much a theory of crisis but an
essentiaiist theory of the inevitability of the class struggle.
6: A theory of crisis based on the notion of proportionality is put forward by Aglietta
(1979). In this approach, the generalisation of a particular method of production based on a
particular form of technology reaches a point of exhaustion. This exhaustion is signposted
by an increase in the organic composition of capital that makes it more and more difficult to
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increase productivity, putting pressure on the rate of profit and increasing unemployment.
Disproportion is more pronounced in department I (production of the means of production)
causing an uneven development between the two branches of production (Driver 1981). The
tendency of the rate of profit to fall defines the limits of accumulation consequent upon the
disruption of proportionality between the departments of production. The relative decrease
in productivity leads to intensified competition which, in turn, intensifies overaccumulation
in the department which produces the means of production leading to an immense
devaluation of fixed capital. Crisis takes the form of unemployment and inflation that forces
the state to cut welfare spending, undermining the regulative forms of social reproduction.
The social mechanisms that ensure proportionality are in disarray because of the
exhaustion of the productive potentials of a given method of production. The structural
reintegration of production in terms of proportionality is founded on the implementation of
new technology and a new set of regulative forms that permit reproduction. In the event,
this approach sees the break down of mechanisms which ensure reproduction as the cause
of the crisis. The Keynesian foundation of this understanding of crisis need not to be
discussed here (see Mahnkopf 1988;Clarke 1988b).
7: 'Feudalism' is used here in its analytical and popular sense: i.e. the constitution of social
relations in and through personal relations of domination. For a discussion on feudal society
and the rise of capitalist social relations see Gerstenberger (1990).
8: See Marx on the 'Jewish Question' where he makes it clear that the right of property is
not merely one right among others but, rather, the paradigmatic right.
9: However, while safeguarding the right of property, the state has no power to
guaranteeing the realisation of appropriated labour by capital. The state is a mode of
existence of the social relation of capital and labour and, as such, a distinct moment of the
process of abstract wealth.
10: In Liberalism, right is merely seen as an abstraction from, as opposed to an abstraction
of, social reality. This is so because the social unity of object and subject is regulated
under the universality of bourgeois right, permitting a philosophy of law as a normative




This chapter analyses the crisis of domination over labour's productive and
disruptive power. Attention focuses on the constitution of this crisis in the form of a
growing tension between different value forms, money and productive capital. The
chapter is divided into two sections. The first section concentrates on the crisis of
capitalist domination over labour. The second section summarises the implications of
the crisis-ridden autonomisation of the global flow of money capital for the state and
looks at the way in which the UK is. integrated into the world market.
I Crisis of Accumulation
-General Overview
The key to the reconstruction of capitalist accumulation after the second world war
was the new discipline imposed on labour through recession, the experience of
fascism and war and managerial innovations associated with assembly line work.
Further, accumulation was sustained by huge markets and cheap access to raw
material. The tendency of the organic composition of capital to rise was compensated
for by a high rate of exploitation (Mandel 1975, pp. 147). Alongside the massive
devaluation and liquidation of productive capacity through the depression of the
1930's and the war, the increase in the rate of surplus value provided the foundation
for post-war prosperity. Further, post-war reconstruction was based on the
recomposition of the role of the state associated with political reformers like Keynes
and Beverige. The sense of capitalism's failure during the inter-war period and the
tremendous working class unrest before the 1930's gave rise to the Keynesian
conception of the interventionist state. As the failure of capitalism was understood as
being caused by a lack of effective demand for commodities produced, the state's role
was to generate demand through deficit spending, i.e. state expenditure based on
credit. Keynesian state intervention means that a significant portion of surplus value
is channelled to the state through taxation and redirected by the state through
expenditure. Such a channelling of surplus value through the state was not new. What
was new was the scale on which it was considered legitimate and the scale on which it
was considered legitimate for the state to channel monetary claims on future surplus
value through credit expansion. Neither credit nor deficit budgeting was new.
However, Keynesianism raised them to a principle of capitalist reproduction.
Demand management through deficit financing means precisely the use of credit, i.e.
the creation of monetary claims on not-yet existing surplus value, in order to
guarantee full-employment growth. Inherent in Keynesianism was the divorce of
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money from existing value, the uncoupling of monetary from real accumulation.
Upon the new discipline imposed on labour through recession and war, the
Keynesian 'revolution' in political economy recognised the strength of labour by
integrating the trade unions into the state. The quid pro quo for trade union
co-operation was the welfare state and the commitment to full-employment growth
policies. The political quid pro quo for co-operation was the subordination of the
working class to national values, a subordination which was to be policed by the trade
unions. In the UK, the post-war institutionalisation of the balance of class forces was
articulated in the Beverige report. This report put quite clearly the "responsibility
for the avoidance of inflation on the unions, demanding a united wage-restraint
policy as a quid pro quo for full employment and social services" (Panitch 1986, p.
88). The recognition of the trade unions expressed in institutional form the strength
of the working class. The power of labour was recognised in the form of demand;
demand management became the principal goal of state economic policy (Negri
1988a). The containment of labour on the basis of demand rested on the
disorganisation of class as. class (i.e. the working class as consumer). The
disorganisation of class on the basis of demand involved the politicising of the wage
relation through the political guarantee of employment and general prosperity.
Rising wages, as well as rising social expenditure, and the expansion of credit to
sustain full-employment growth constituted the post-war institutionalisation of a
particular balance of class forces. Capital had to pay for relative industrial and
social peace in form of rising wages and welfare expenditure. The Keynesian attempt
to contain labour was achieved at the cost of potential monetary instability.
The form and substance of the Keynesian reconstruction of political economy was
the international dimension of deficit demand management. The Keynesian
recomposition of the role of the state vis-a-vis capital and the working class
involved a close integration of the multiplicity of states into the international circuit
of capital (see v. Braunmuhl 1978). The form and substance of the international
integration of nation states was based, fundamentally, on three elements: the
consolidation of the dominant position of the US circumscribed through the
maintenance of gold as the guarantee both of the dollar and US supremacy (the US
owned most of the world's monetary gold); the stabilisation agreement between the
US and other capitalist countries through the Marshall Plan, pumping dollars into
the reconstruction of capitalism in Europe; and the fixing of the US's imperialist
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relationships through military pacts (NATO). The immense transfer of dollars into
Europe stabilised the international basis for accumulation and provided the financial
foundation for integrating the working class on the basis of income and employment
guarantees as well as social reform (see Clarke 1988a;Armstrong et.al. 1984). The
Bretton Woods agreement was one of the cornerstones of post-war reconstruction.
The system of Bretton Woods regulated the international deficit financing of demand
on the world market on the basis of an inflationary supply of dollars to the rest of the
world. Bretton Woods institutionalised the competition between, and mutual
dependence of, nation states on the basis of a global demand management built around
the recognition of the dollar as the key international currency. The centre of Bretton
Woods was the dollar which was defined in parity to gold. National currency was
subordinated to the dollar which performed in the dual function of international and
national currency. National currency was tied to the dollar by fixed exchange rates,
which could be altered only in the case of fundamental disequilibrium and on the
basis of an international agreement (Hubner 1988). National banks were obliged to
intervene in currency when the market exchange of currency deviated above or
below the predetermined margins (ibid.). The aim of Bretton Woods was to protect
productive accumulation against exchange risks and to protect national economies and
accumulation against speculation on raw material and currency markets. The system
of Bretton Woods was designed to reduce the danger of trade wars between the main
capitalist nations by fixing the conditions of international exchange and by insulating
national currencies from short-term speculation on the international money
markets. The institution designed to finance short term balance of payment
imbalances and to police the containment of labour within internationally agreed
margins of currency deviation was the International Monetary Fund (hereafter:
IMF). The role of the IMF was to provide international liquidity so as to safeguard the
functioning of Bretton Woods in times of difficulties.
The dual function of the dollar meant that the only source of international liquidity
on the world market was a constant US balance of payment deficit (Hubner 1988).
The international supply of dollars made it possible for the US to meet monetary
constraint on its trade balance by expanding the supply of dollars (global demand
management through the inflationary supply of dollars). As long as the US was a net
exporter, the dollar functioned as credit that was supplied to other countries as a
means of exchange for US produced commodities. These dollars did not perform as
means of payment but as credit whose realisation as means of payment existed as
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future (Innes 1981). The stability of Bretton Woods depended on an US trade surplus
compensating for balance of payment deficits.
-Destabilisation and break-down of global demand management
By the mid 1960's, the expansion of international liquidity developed a market in
dollars outside the regulation and control of the US. This market is usually referred
to as the Eurodollar market. The development of the Eurodollar market coincided with
the recovery of capitalist economies in other countries after the war and a gradual
decline in the superiority of the US economy (Mandel 1981). The shortage of
international liquidity after the war gradually changed into a dollar saturation which
started towards the end of the 1950's. The dollars that were previously spent to
realise commodities exported from the US national economy, were increasingly
transformed into reserves in European banks (Wachtel 1987). These dollars were
thus no longer repatriated to the US. They existed outside the control of US regulation
and were used as a means of credit for both public authorities and for private capital.
Eurodollar markets developed in the early 1960's: there was a growth of an
international market which existed outside all state control, and which existed
alongside the national, regulated markets. By 1969, other capitalist countries held
$40 billion dollars compared with $11 billion in 1964 (Wachtel 1987, p. 22).
This figure far exceeded the gold held in the US reserves. All these dollars existed as
a claim on the US gold reserves. Under these circumstances, the convertibility of the
dollar into gold began to appear more and more fragile. The very institutional
arrangement upon which Bretton Woods rested was thereby threatened.
The conditions that had prevented the tendency to overaccumulation from
manifesting itself were exhausted by the end of the 1960's. The key to the declining
rate of profit and capitalist overaccumulation (documented, inter alia, by Mandel
1975;Glyn/Sutcliffe 1972;Armstrong et.al. 1984) was that the unfettered
development of the productive power of labour reached the barrier of its capitalist
form. The productive power of labour produced too much capital relative to the
capacity of the market to realise, with adequate rates of profit, the surplus value
created in production. Secondly, the exploitation of labour was getting more and more
expensive because of higher wage demands and, most fundamentally, because of a rise
in the investment required to set labour in motion in production. Even under
conditions of a rising rate of exploitation, increasing costs of production tend to
decrease the rate of profit and reduce the rate of accumulation, permitting an
overaccumulation of capital. The rate of exploitation failed to compensate for a rising
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organic composition of capital. In order to exploit labour effectively capital required
to invest an ever increasing amount of labour saving machinery and raw materials.
The rising costs of exploitation expresses the difficulties of capitalist reproduction,
which, between 1968 and 1973, led to the slowing of growth of productivity in all
major economies (Armstrong et.al. 1984, p. 249). As profits fell and as the costs of
appropriating labour's productive power increased, two things happened: on the one
hand capital borrowed more money to make up for falling profits so as to overcome
difficulties for expanded accumulation, and, on the other, earned profits were
increasingly placed on money markets, either because of the risks of productive
investment or because earned profits were not big enough for instant reconversion
into productive investment.
The disruptive strength of the working class that Keynesian demand management
sought to contain through full-employment guarantees and demand made itself felt by
the end of the 1960's in resistance to intensification of work and income policies.
Complaints about loss of managerial control over the workplace exacerbated in the
late 1960's and early 1970's (Holloway 1987). In the face of labour's power to
resist the imposition of new working practices, the establishment of effective
control over labour became more and more difficult, as expressed in growing wage
demands, often accompanied by the threat of strike action (Armstrong et.al. 1984).
Further, capital's attempt to contain the productive power of labour by intensifying
work and by imposing new working practices involved that the wage became less and
less effective to control the disruptive power of labour. The attempt to transform
protest into demand became less effective because of growing inflationary pressure
on wages and working class resistance to the Keynesian quid pro quo (i.e. higher
wages for intensified work). So-called 'autonomous' forms of unrest (CSE 1979,
1980;Aglietta 1979;Hirsch 1980) threatened to undermine the role performed by
the trade unions and to challenge capital's organisation production. The May events in
France in 1968, Italy's 'hot autumn' of 1969 (CSE 1979), Germany's 'September
strikes' of 1969 (Roth 1976) and the UK's wave of unrest against Wilson's attempt
to impose income ceilings and labour laws and against Heath's deflationary policies in
the early 1970's, manifested a revolt against capital's attempt to impose the
valorisation over the labour process. In the face of falling rates of profit, decreasing
rates of growth and readily available, and relatively cheap, credit, governments
responded by inflationary expansion of credit. This development helped to sustain
relatively unproductive producers. This sustaining of productive activity maintained
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employment and fuelled overaccumulation of capital as devaluation of surplus
capacity was, to a large extent, prevented.
The productive power of labour expressed itself in the spill over of earned profits
into interest bearing investment. This capital, in turn, was used as credit by
functioning capital and political authorities. The credit-sustaining of accumulation
coincided with an overextension of the credit-system. The credit expansion was made
possible by the build up of surplus liquidity in the developing Eurodollar markets
during the 1960's. By the end of the 1960's, the containment of labour's productive
power within the form of capital through deficit financing and speculative deferral of
capital devaluation was transformed into a growing tension between money and
productive capital. The expansive use of credit coincided with declining rates of
accumulation, falling rates of profit and industrial unrest against intensification of
work and pressure on wages. The overextension of the credit- system expresses the
overaccumulation of capital as earned profits were no longer reconverted into
expanded capitalist exploitation of labour. In the face of readily available, and
relatively cheap, credit on developing Eurodollar markets, the containment of labour
through credit-expansion involved a speculative deferral of capital devaluation.
Credit-sustained accumulation constituted the crisis of domination over labour for
exploitation in the form of a growing conflict between functioning and money capital.
Money capital placed on to money markets was called upon as credit by public
authorities and productive capital in the attempt to alleviate difficulties in
containing the power of labour. The inflationary growth of the money supply through
the issue of credit outside the control of central banks, most importantly the Federal
Reserve, moved into increasingly speculative and unproductive channels (i.e.
speculation in raw material markets and exchange rate fluctuations). The movement
of this capital, however, was still officially regulated within the system of Bretton
Woods. In the face of a growing competitive strength of the US's main allies and a
growing competitive erosion of the US's national economy, more and more dollars
were placed on Eurodollar markets (see Strange 1986). The inflationary supply of
dollars by far exceeded the gold kept in Ford Knox, permitting a dollar overhang in
relation to gold (Glyn/Harrison 1980;Strange 1986). The parity of gold, at a fixed
price of £35 per ounce (Wachtel 1987, p. 21) was increasingly difficult to
maintain.
The failure to contain the class struggle through a policy of state austerity
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increased the tension between functioning capital and the credit-system.
Accumulation was increasingly sustained by credit, resulting in a growing
inflationary pressure on wages and the rate of profit. At the same time, the pyramid
of debt consequent upon credit-sustained accumulation, threatened the role of the
dollar as international currency. By the end of the 1960's, the controls laid down at
Bretton Wood failed. The inflationary environment of post-war reconstruction
became a serious political issue by the late 1960's. When the repatriation of foreign
held dollars through the US trade surplus diminished, the US were forced to
underwrite Bretton Woods by selling its relative stock of gold (Hubner 1988). The
deterioration of the US's balance of trade expressed itself in a growing overliquidity
of money in the form of Eurodollars. Official purchases of dollars, with which
national governments sought to underwrite Bretton Woods, accelerated inflation
which, by the end of the 1960's, was assuming global dimensions. While deficits
were financed by a pyramid of international credit which had been built since the
late 1950's, growing inflationary pressure progressively eroded the value of money.
At the same time, confidence in the convertibility of credit in means of payment
deteriorated. Rather than financing a productive expansion of capital's command over
labour, the expansion of credit maintained reproduction through a speculative
deferral of capital devaluation. The inflationary growth of the global flow of money
constituted the crisis of capitalist command over the productive power of labour in
the form of a disruption of the international regulation of the money power of capital.
In the face of the uncoupling between the internationally regulated and unregulated
money markets the crisis-ridden development of accumulation was more and more
processed through the movement of money on unregulated markets and not through
the international regulation of money and credit (Schubert 1985). Growing balance
of payment deficits implied that the ability of central banks to act as lender of last
resort was restricted.
Confidence in the validity of money was dented when the UK was forced to devalue
the pound in 1967. The devaluation of the pound led to a rush to convert bills of
exchange, securities and dollars outside the US into bank money, and all this bank
money, in turn, into gold. In the face of declining rates of profits and productivity,
working class unrest, political tension, and growing outside financing of
reproductive activity at the end of the 1960's (see Schubert 1985), the dollar was
called upon as means of payment - a role the dollar could not meet (Innes 1981). As
money holders rejected the emission of the 'phantom dollar' (Mattick 1976;lnnes
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1981) and demanded real payment (gold), the crisis of overaccumulation turned into
a severe monetary crisis. The "international wave of struggle beginning in the mid
1960s meant the breakdown of the whole system of international stratification of
command over living labour, upon which the gold-dollar exchange was based"
(Marazzi 1976, p. 97). In the face of a growing incongruence between externally
held dollars and the US gold reserve, the US was neither willing nor capable of
performing the task of underwriting Bretton Woods and of guaranteeing the
conversion of the dollar into gold (Hubner 1988). The rupture of Bretton Woods was
officially acknowledged when the Nixon administration announced the freeing of the
dollar from gold parity (1971), ended fixed exchange rates of other currency to the
dollar (1973) and devalued the dollar in 1973.
The sustaining of accumulation through credit-expansion postponed economic
recession until shortly after the official deregulation of the international circulation
of money in 1971/3. Following upon the quadrupling of oil prices at the end of
1973, which in its effect coincided with a downturn of accumulation, output
stagnated or fell in most industrial countries. Further, expansionary policies
resulted in a rising rate of inflation. By 1973, the US monetary authorities "moved
to restrict the supply of reserves to the banking system", resulting in a rise of
interest rates to record levels (Evans 1985, p. 114). By 1974, the recession had
hit ail advanced capitalist countries. The chain of bankruptcies and defaults was not
confined to productive capital, but included the banking system. When the crisis
struck, the banking system was overextended consequent upon the massive transfer
of loanable capital into financing productive activity and public spending. "The most
serious international aspect of the crisis was in the unregulated Euromarkets, where
many banks made substantial losses. In the absence of an international lender of last
resort, a serious collapse of confidence between banks was only averted as a result of
concerted action by several Central Banks, most notable the US Federal Reserve and
the Bank of England" (Evans 1985, p. 115). In the face of bad debt, banks found it
increasingly difficult, in the early 1970's, to balance their accounts, a development
that led to a chain of default that liquidated the Herstadt Bank (FRG) in 1974.
Various other banks experienced similar difficulties and generated huge losses
(Hessenland Bank, Franfurterhandels Bank (FRG);Lyods Bank International, London
County Securities (UK);Union Bank (Switzerland) and the U.S. National Bank of San
Diego (U.S.) (see Itoh 1978).
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-Deregulation of the international flow of money and the state
In contrast to 1929, the rupture of the international composition of order did not
dethrone the dollar, as was the case with the pound in 1929. When the US abandoned
convertibility of the dollar into gold in 1971, the "US made it impossible for holders
of dollars to exchange them for gold, thereby strengthening the dollar in its function
as means of payment" (Innes 1981, p. 25). Further, when the US finally devalued
the dollar in 1973, the US reduced its deficit and devalued dollars that were held in
other countries. The devaluation of the dollar against other currency by 1973
strengthened the dollar because of the effective reversal of the US's trade deficit into
a surplus and a reduction of the balance of payments (Innes 1981). "The pressure on
the banking system was relieved by an upturn in the world economy by Spring
1975" (Evans 1985, p. 115). The upturn focused1 on the US. The US enhanced its
competitive position on the world market relative to its main rivals as cheaper
export prices undercut its competitors. The leading role of the dollar imposed on the
rest of the world a kind of forced self-discipline. Other national economies had to
support the dollar in the attempt to prevent the global reproduction of capital from
collapsing. However, the depreciation of the dollar in 1973 that strengthened the
export sector of the US economy did not cause an immediate acceleration of inflation
in the US. This development made possible credit-sustained accumulation
internationally, enhancing a Keynesian inspired processing of the aspiration of the
working class until the mid 1970's. Keynesians celebrated the deregulation of the
international flow of money as a form of flexibilisation that would make a Keynesian
policy universally more elastic (see Itoh 1978). Deregulation was seen as removing
restrictions to the international balance of payments. Alongside the financing of an
US balance of payments deficit through its balance of trade surplus, the enormous
spill-over of capital into money markets and the relatively low rate of interest for
credit after the slump in 1974 (Schubert 1985;Hubner 1988) provided relatively
cheap access to liquidity on international monetary markets. This made possible the
containment of labour through deficit financing of balance of payments imbalances. In
the face of industrial relations problems, access to international liquidity made it
possible for reproductive capital to postpone restructuring, while weaker capitals
avoided devaluation and liquidation through a policy of easy credit and state-deficit
underwriting of profits. While the 'rest of the world' had no option but to adjust
monetary polices to the pressure of the international movement of money capital that
was politically and economically backed by the US, the breathing space created by
cheap cost of credit gave the illusion of restored accumulation which, in fact, was
sustained in an increasingly speculative dimension.
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A deflationary attack on the working class had failed in the late 1960's and early
1970's, domestically and internationally. In response to the tremendous social
unrest at that time, expansionary policies were reinvoked as a means to transform
protest into demand and full employment guarantees (see 'Modell Deutschland and the
social contract in the UK). This institutionalisation of the political strength of the
working class established deficit financing of accumulation and accelerated inflation
as a means of social peace. In the face of labour's disruptive and productive power,
the expansion of credit was driven forward by the demand for credit both by
productive capital and the state seeking to transform protest into demand, and by the
supply of loanable capital seeking a more secure return than that which could be
obtained from direct productive investment. The deregulation of the system of
Bretton Woods established the Eurodollar market as the international system that
provided means of payment. The Eurodollar market constituted an important shift in
the international composition of domination. After 1973, the international credit-
system was dominated by multinational banks which determined, to a great extent,
the availability of international means of payment (see McCracken 1977). The
Eurodollar market took over aspects of a developed domestic credit-system. This
credit-sytem operated globally and independently from central banks. Speculative
capital took over the function of national and international institutions, providing the
finance for deficit spending of balance payment deficits (ibid.). Additionally, the
break-down of Bretton Woods involved the abandonment of currency relations in a
fixed relation to the dollar and the deregulation of currency relations. This
deregulation is referred to as the floating of exchange rates. Floating established
multi-currency standards with flexible rates between them (see Strange 1986;
Hubner 1988). This integration of national economies on the world market opened up
possibilities for capital to engage in currency speculation globally, reimposing
monetary discipline over national governments through the destabilising movement
of speculative capital against currency. The crisis-ridden tension between monetary
and productive accumulation impinged on the state in the form of pressure on
exchange rates. This pressure was generated by the movement of capital in and out of
a particular currency. In view of the difficulty of containing labour's productive and
disruptive power within the limits of capitalist reproduction, the money power of
capital superimposed monetary constraint on the way in which nation states sought to
contain the class struggle. The monetary constraint asserted itself in the form of
speculative checks on the productive imposition of work in any one country. The
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movement of capital on international money markets involved uncertainties once the
recomposition of the international order had been achieved. The "uncertainty that
rules the financial world spills over not only to industry but also into the fortunes of
governments and of countries - and sooner or later into the relation between the
states" (Strange 1986, p. 3). United in their concern to ease pressure on
international money markets, the rivalry between nation states concerned the way in
which these pressures were to be moderated. Interimperialist rivalry took the form
of interest rate policies with which governments sought to stabilise exchange rates
so as to maintain and improve formal exchange equality of domestic accumulation on
the world market. The international comparison of national wealth through the
movement of money capital made the balance of payments and budget deficits
important variables for the ability of nation states to guarantee formal exchange
equality on the world market through the stability of national currency. Such
stability depended on the ability of the state to guarantee all money as claim on the
reserves, a claim which itself rests on the subordination of the working class to the
limits of capital.
The international credit-system that provided the credit for deficit financing of
public expenditure, balance of payment deficits and outside financing of productive
activity was institutionalised in the Eurodollar market. On Eurodollar markets there
i6 no regulation, no control, no central bank as lender of last resort and no laws
(Delmaide 1986;Wachtel 1987). The only regulation of Eurodollar supply beyond
the risk taken by the banks is the cost of credit, that is the interest rates "which
themselves depend on Fed's own interest rate on American soil" (Lipietz 1985a, p.
96)(1). In this sense Eurodollars are not stateless. Money on unregulated money and
credit markets exists as a claim on central bank money. "What distinguishes a
Eurodollardeposit from a 'native' dollar deposit is that it is the liability of a bank
located outside the USA ... Eurodollar deposits are, however, readily convertible into
native dollars, since they are all promises to pay dollars in New York: the debtor
normally settles by cable transfers on New York, which serves as a clearinghouse
for transfers of Eurodollar deposits, following instructions from foreign centres"
(Tew 1982, p. 139). The national bank has obligations towards the Eurodollar bank
which operates outside the regulation, laws and controls of the central bank and
political authorities. The Eurodollar while existing independently from national
regulation, exists as a claim on the central bank dollar. Deposits of dollars in the
Eurodollar bank are claims on central bank dollars. In Eurodollar markets money is
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replaced by a claim on money.
The concept of the Eurodollar makes sense only in the context of a claim on money
that exists as an equivalent of a particular money volume in national reserves,
particularly in the Federal reserve. The break-down of Bretton Woods and the
deregulation of international money and credit relations in 1971/3 led to a
development in which the state "took over the function of gold as means of payment by
acting as guarantor of the credit system" (Innes 1981, p. 9). The state now
guarantees the "exchangeability of all money - it is no longer possible to devalue the
total supply of money by destroying the money created by just a few banks" (Evans
1985, p. 103/4). In the face of the unregulated international money and credit
markets and the speculative movement of money capital, the nation state, and its
national bank, turned from redistributor of wealth in the last instance to lender of
last resort. The international movement of money is backed by all states through the
ability of national banks to act as lender of last resort. "This meant that national
authorities needed larger, not smaller, reserves to defend floating currencies, while
the latitude to pursue domestic policies independently of external considerations was
reduced, not increased" (Clarke 1988a, p. 168). Larger reserves, however,
depended on the ability of nation states to confine the working class within the limits
of global accumulation through deflationary attack (intensification of work and the
pressure on living standards) without, thereby, provoking costly and damaging
strikes. In sum, national governments exercise only indirect control over much of
the expansion of credit as most of the credit-markets is outside the control of
national governments. At the same time, however, all states guarantee all money by
acting as lender of last resort. At the same time as the national imposition of work
was sustained by credit, the validity of the credit depended on the capacity of the state
to guarantee the convertibility of credit into cash payment. The contradiction of the
containment of labour on the basis of demand management is that the integration of
the abstract category of labour with the value form is based on credit-expansion, an
expansion which is guaranteed by the state through its reserves and its revenue. The
deficit financing of balance of payment imbalances depended on the imposition of tight
monetary control over the working class so as secure the formal exchange equality of
currency through the acceptability of credit as a claim on tax revenues.
With the break-down of Bretton Woods, national organisation of money is no longer
insulated from global short term speculation on money and currency markets.
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Failure in managing domestic accumulation in line with the global limits of
accumulation involved speculative pressure on exchange rates. Such pressure
questions the formal exchange equality of national wealth on the world market and
implies, in the event of the central banks losing their ability to act as lender of last
resort, a possible collapse of international credit relations through a chain reaction
of debt default. The movement of money capital on internationally unregulated
markets sustained productive capital whose reproduction was increasingly
underpinned by access to the increasingly speculative provision of credit that was
provided on Eurodollar markets. Unregulated international credit relations and an
ever more speculative movement of money capital integrated national economies on
the world market by means of a synchronisation of falling rates of profits (Hubner
1988), balance of payment problems (O'Connor 1984) and of the business cycle.
"The cyclical pattern of accumulation in the various different countries, which had
previously been dominated by domestic political and economic conditions, was
overridden by the cyclical pattern of accumulation on a world scale, dominated by the
US" (Clarke 1988a, p 168). The deregulation of the financial system subsumed each
national currency to the movement of international money, making it impossible for
nation states to manage accumulation internally in a way 'incompatible' with global
accumulation. The penalty for domestic failure to contain the working class within
the limits of global accumulation was speculative pressure on the formal exchange
equality of domestic accumulation on the world market. This pressure,
institutionalised in floating exchange rates, subordinates nation states to the
international flow of money.
During the 1970's, increasing inflationary pressure was assuming a speculative
dimension. In the face of an inflationary expansion of the money supply, an
increasingly speculative sustaining of accumulation and public and private
indebtedness, domestically and internationally, the global movement of money capital
"began to undermine national systems designed to control capital movements and
individual governments found it increasingly difficult to resist pressure to
de-control" (Thompson 1986, p. 14). The Keynesian mode of integrating labour
through demand management and full-employment guarantees came up against the
barrier of the capitalist form of reproduction. These barriers manifested themselves
in the form of monetary constraint over public expenditure in the form of balance of
payment difficulties, pressure on reserves, and a growing claim of international
credit-markets on the states' revenue. The pressure to de-control implies the
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abandonment of an expansionary integration of labour (i.e. full employment
guarantees and deficit financing of the balance of payment and demand) in favour of a
policy of state austerity. Before analysing this development in greater depth,
attention focuses on the growing interrelation between productive and money capital.
-Money and Productive Capital
The growth of the international money market in the 1970's is a direct expression
of the underlying rupture of the profitability of reproductive accumulation (Hubner
1988), precipitated by the productive and disruptive power of labour. At the same
time, class struggle over domination gave the rupture of accumulation an indecisive
form as the state was forced to maintain accumulation and full-employment growth
on the basis of an accumulation of debt. During the 1970's, the inflationary
expansion of credit absorbed overaccumulation, while full employment was
maintained in relative terms compared with the 1980's. During the 1970's,
overaccumulation and crisis were not characterised by falling prices and a slump in
output but, rather, by stagnant output and inflationary realisation of profit (see
Gamble 1985;Gamble/ Walton 1976;Clarke 1988a;Rodel/Brandes 1976;Altvater
et.al. 1979). This development gave the illusion of the profitable reproduction of
capital, while, in fact, accumulation was sustained on an increasingly fictitious
basis. However, growing inflationary pressure and growing reliance on credit as a
means of overcoming difficulties involved a shift from the monetary constraints on
the product market to the realisation of surplus value, to the limits of the credit
market. It is the financial system which underpins accumulation through access to
cheap credit. Money capital manifested itself no longer as a lever for expanded
reproduction of capitalist command over labour but as a means of speculative
deferral of bankruptcy. Monetary constraint in the form of access to credit and the
inflationary erosion of profits as well as a growing share of creditors in profits,
confined the ambitions of productive capital within the limits of the market.
The limits of the market asserted themselves unevenly in different branches of
production. While heavy engineering, textiles, the car industry and the building
industry were most severely hit, other sectors of production such as new technology
production realised exorbitant profits (CSE 1980;Glyn 1982). The new technology
sector was a high profit growth area in the 1970's. This sector was dominated by
smaller, advantageous capitals that experimented in the production and development
of new technology. The new technology sector produced the new means of production
with which capital sought to revolutionise the methods of production through
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computerised forms of control and a higher saving ratio of variable capital (Palloix
1976;CSE 1980). The new technology sector was soon dominated by big
international companies, as multinationals bought themselves into the market,
taking over, or outmanoeuvring smaller capitals (CSE 1980). The outmanoeuvring
of smaller capitals was mediated through the international money markets that
provided the credit for take-overs and for productive investment in new technology
plants. In the event, production is "dominated by a handful of companies with plants
in the United States, Western Europe, Japan and the capitalist enclaves remaining
under imperialist control in the South Asia. These companies have a variety of
backgrounds. Some of them, like the West German giant Siemens, have their roots in
the older electrical industry formed in the late 19th century" (CSE 1980, p. 20).
This development increased the minimum cost for the production of new technology,
expressed in a higher technical composition of capital and mass production. However,
this development unleashed the working of the tendency to capitalist
overaccumulation in this sector by the end of the 1970's. While entry barriers to
these sectors mounted, the competitive conflict over increasingly monopolised
markets intensified by the end of the 1970's. In the event, the revolutionising of
labour's productive power depressed rates of profits, signalling that the time of
super profits was over (Duncan 1982). In the face of a rising organic composition of
capital, pressure to intensify labour mounted (ibid.). Fierce competition for market
shares on oversupplied markets and the crisis-ridden process of devaluation and
liquidation indicated the sudden death of what was widely regarded as the new growth
area on which to build the miraculous cure of economic recovery. "Bruised and
battered, drawing in their horns, some (like Acorn), at least survived; many (like
Sinclair) did not" (Bassett 1986, p. 26). In 1985, the possibility of an
international depression in the new technology sector seemed almost certain as
shares of even some of the leading companies lost half their value (ibid.). The limits
to unfettered accumulation asserted themselves in the form of monetary constraint,
i.e. the limits placed by financial markets upon the provision of access to further
cheap credit with which to overcome difficulties and maintain productive activity in
the face of (speculative) movements of money capital on the stock market.
Excess capital was built up, and largely sustained by credit expansion and state
deficit financing, in the spheres hardest hit by the crisis of overaccumulation. In the
face of a low rate of profit, the high capital composition in these industries changed
from entry barriers to exit barriers (Semmler 1982). While entry barriers
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indicate the concentration of capital in a particular industry, signalling the
productive power of labour, overaccumulation turned these entry barriers to exit
barriers, making it harder for productive capital engaged in these industries to
apply itself to more profitable and secure ventures elsewhere, including the
international money markets. At the same time, realised profits were increasingly
invested as loanable capital which provided the credit for sustaining accumulation.
While weaker capitals found that the only way to preserve their capital was to
increase the use of credit and to intensify exploitation, more advanced capitals
redeployed their capital into profitable sectors especially through growing
cross-investment between multinational companies and between multinational
companies and multinational banks (see Andreff 1984;Altvater 1985;Clarke 1988a;
Schubert 1985). Multinational companies raised funds on international financial
markets, moved their capital between branches of production and between productive
and financial investment. Increased mobility of capital resulted in the closing of
plant and the moving of productive investment abroad, while cash was diverted into
speculative investment (see authors as diverse as Andreff 1984;Atkins 1986;
Coakley 1984;Spence 1985;Clarke 1988a;Fine/Harris 1985). The growing
integration between multinational companies and banks, a development first
observed by Hilferding, made multinational companies on balance the net creditors
on financial credit markets. The closer integration between financial and productive
activities increased the mobility of multinational companies which diversified their
business, acquired entry into sectors which were new for them and which provided
the opportunity of higher rates of profit. As inflation accelerated in the 1970's,
multinational companies were much better equipped than smaller capitals to
withstand competitive pressure as they could decrease prices to outmanoeuvre
smaller capitals, close down plant without liquidating their capital as a whole and
move into higher profit areas. As such, inflation needs to be seen as a lever of the
concentration and centralisation of capital as smaller capitals are 'selected' (cf.
Altvater et.al. 1976) through bankruptcy and liquidation. The competitive advantage
of multinational companies over weaker capitals let accumulation on a world scale be
dominated by multinational companies that "take on the form of financial holding
companies, closely integrated with multinational banks and financial interest"
(Clarke 1988a, p. 3). This development makes the very distinction between
financial and industrial capital increasingly anachronistic (Andreff 1984;Clarke
1988a), as it signals a global reintegration of different capitals on the basis of
financial capital.
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During the 1970's, the unregulated and continued expansion of credit served to
stimulate the overaccumulation of capital, which acquired an increasingly
inflationary form. As money capital sought to overcome the limited opportunities for
the productive employment of capital and as surplus capital was diverted into ever
more speculative outlets (Traber 1986), credit-sustained accumulation shifted
from boom lending to speculative deferral of capital devaluation. At the same time as
capitals bound by domestic constraints were sustained through the accumulation of
public and private debt, deficit financing devalued money capital through growing
inflationary pressure at a time at which inflation eroded profits rates and increased
the cost of investment ('deflationary inflation': Mattick 1976). The
overaccumulation of capital made itself felt in an increasingly depressed movement
of money capital on the world market by the mid 1970's. On the other hand, the
international orientation of advanced producers and their integration into financial
markets entailed a greater reliance on sound monetary policies and stable currency
exchange relations so as to maintain formal exchange equality on the world market
and to safeguard money against inflationary devaluation. While weaker capitals
reduced productive investment to the basic essentials, multinational companies were
able to buy themselves into other enterprises, domestically and internationally, and
to globalise their productive and financial activities. The close integration of
multinational companies with the financial sector intensified the concentration and
centralisation of capital on a global scale.
The globalisation of exploitation provided a means for more advanced producers of
moving into less cost-intensive areas and of imposing upon a more docile work-force
conditions of work which capital was, on a general basis, unable to achieve in
metropolitan countries. The increase in direct investment 'abroad' was well under
way before the end of the post-war boom. However, between 1970 and 1978, the
globalisation of exploitation developed rapidly as "world total direct investment
abroad jumped from around $150 billion to $400 billion" (Olle/Scholler 1982, p.
44). This big increase signals the difficulties faced by capital in dominating its
domestic labour-forces in a way that allowed continuous accumulation, while the
deregulation of international finance, that followed the break-down of Bretton Woods
in the early 1970's, paved the way for using exchange rate fluctuations and
international pressure on currency as a lever for 'bloody Fordism' (see Lipietz
1982,1984). Although the penetration of the world market relieved the pressure on
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profitability for capitals, the globalisation of production did not overcome capital
overaccumulation. The globalisation of production reinforced the tendency to over-
accumulation in and through the global imposition of work and the global extension of
labour's productive power. Capital had to force down wages in a considerable way, to
intensify labour and to revolutionise the methods of production associated with a
successful mobilisation of countertendencies so as to combat a high organic
composition and to liquidate excess capital without triggering a default of
international credit-relations.
The globalisation of production involved the outmanoeuvring of less advanced
producers bound by domestic constraints and lacking access to redeployment of their
capital on the basis of financial capital. Economic growth, though it rebounded by
1976, remained slow in comparison with the rates achieved in the 1960's. The
tension between the fictitious containment of labour's productive power through
credit and the supremacy of the abstract equality of the money power of capital over
production asserted itself in growing inflationary pressure on profits and
inflationary pricing of new means of production. During the 1970's, a Keynesian
policy of easy credit regulated the integration of the labour with the valorisation
process on the basis of debt. The containment of labour's productive power and
political strength was more and more paid for by a speculative issue of means of
payment to productive capital and the state. While backward producers were
sustained through credit expansion, rather than devalued and liquidated, a rather
costly restructuring of the methods of production was to a large extent postponed
(Aglietta 1979) because of labour's disruptive power to resist intensification of
work and the recomposition of working practices while the limits of the market
asserted themselves in the form of a speculative deferral of mass devaluation and
liquidation of capital.
The attempt to contain labour's productive power within the concept of
profitability through deficit financing and outside financing of production coincided
with a spiral of debt. At the same time, working class resistance to real reductions in
wages and to the recomposition of capitalist domination over labour's productive
power in production forced the state to continue expanding the money supply on an
ever growing inflationary basis so as not to provoke costly and damaging strikes. The
result of this process was twofold: the supremacy of money capital reasserted itself
in a growing indebtedness of productive capital and the state and also a growing
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uncoupling of different value forms from each other. This development manifested
itself in the form of a decreasing importance of boom lending and a growing
importance of, what Hilferding (1910/1981) called 'circulation credit', or what
Altvater (1985) refers to as 'recycling credit' (2). Credit no longer performed as a
means of boom lending that extends the barrier of the market. Instead, credit came to
function largely as a means of preserving the social relations of production on an
increasingly speculative basis. The issue of credit turned from boom lending to
'recycling lending' (Altvater 1985).
The increasing use of recycling credit pertained throughout the 1970's and
1980's, domestically and internationally. This credit does not finance expansive
accumulation but, rather, alleviates pressure of illiquidity so as to enable
productive capital to service debt without defaulting. This form of credit is purely
speculative as it is supplied to debtors so as to enable them to meet difficulties in
servicing interest on credit, if insolvency is to be prevented. The increasing use of
this credit indicates the difficulty of turning credit into effective command over
labour. For those capitalists receiving this kind of credit, it does not exist as means
of purchase, but as means of payment, or, in the face of insolvency, as a means to
defer liquidation and, hence, as postponement of credit default. The speculative
dimension of this credit prevents collapse as it maintains solvency on an ever more
fictitious basis that calls for an ever more drastic imposition of command in
production so as to maintain financial solvency of enterprise. Continued expansion of
recycling credit stimulated overaccumulation as it prohibited the devaluation of
capital on a larger scale. The limits of the postponement of the rupture of
overaccumulation through credit-expansion is visibly expressed in the speculative
issue of credit in the form of recycling credit. Credit exists as pseudovalidation of
value and thus as a claim on profit. The repayment of credit depends on the capacity
to command labour effectively, that is in a way which yields a profit high enough for
dividing profits into enterprise and interest profit without compromising continuous
expanded reproduction. The manifestation of monetary constraint in the form of a
conflict between loanable and productive capital increased the urgency for productive
capital to turn credit into effective command over labour so as to realise a rate of
profit sufficient to service debt and to acquire additional liquidity to meet
competitive pressure. However, the sustaining of productive accumulation continued
on an ever more speculative basis the more productive activity was sustained by
credit. Credit-sustained overaccumulation during the 1970's provided a 'smooth'
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process of capital liquidation without threatening the system as such. While this
credit maintained productive capacity and employment, it constitutes an
unproductive, speculative outlet of superfluous capital that fosters inflation. While
inflation devalues money capital in the face of a threat of defaulting repayment, the
"leap forward in the organic composition of capital in order to restabilize command
over living labour and increase productivity has come up against the real
impossibility of using inflation to finance future investments" (Marazzi 1976, p.
102-3). This development fostered the diversion of surplus capital into
increasingly speculative channels. Monetary accumulation increased substantially,
permitting a growing uncoupling between the category of abstract labour and the
value form, or, in other words, capital's command over labour for the purpose of
expanded exploitation and interest bearing investment.
The international credit-system that provided the credit for public and private
accumulation of debt was institutionalised in the Eurodollar market. Unemployed
money capital was desperate to invest. Sovereign states and productive capital
established themselves as credit takers. At the same time, it was mainly the
non-banking sector (industrial capital, insurance companies and pension funds) in
metropolitan countries that placed their money capital onto Eurodollar markets
(Schubert 1985). The net creditors on financial markets are productive capitals
(Altvater 1985). Deposits on Eurodollar bank accounts increased not only because of
the higher saving ratio of productive capital and/or diversion of funds away from
productive activity in metropolitan countries, but also because of the recycling of
OPEC earnings following the increase in price of oil in 1973/4. "In 1974, after the
first big increase in oil prices, OPEC countries had $68 billion of surplus dollars,
from one year's take alone. This represented a nearly ten-fold increase over their
$7 billion surplus in 1973. Between 1974 and 1977, surpluses were $173 billion
and between 1978 and 1980 another $184 billion" (Wachtel 1987, p. 23).
However, the so-called Petro-dollar represented only a small proportion of the rise
of the volume of money placed on Eurodollar markets (Schubert 1985). The bulk of
investment came from metropolitan countries, approximating two-thirds of the total
investment. At the time of the second rise in the price of oil at the end of the 1970's,
money owners in metropolitan countries increased their savings on Eurodollar
markets from $534 billion dollars in 1978 to $824 billion in 1980 (Schubert
1985, p. 39). Eurodollar deposits by OPEC countries account only for a small
proportion of the total increase in Eurodollar deposits (ibid.). On a year's average,
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Eurodollar markets expanded their volume of credit by approximately 25%
(Altvater/Hubner 1987, p. 20), in contrast to an average rate of growth in world
trade by 4% (Wachtel 1987, p. 20). The disproportion between monetary and
productive accumulation indicated the growing uncoupling between different value
forms on the basis of the meaningless, but elementary, form of interest bearing and
speculative capital (M...M'). Monetary accumulation expanded partly by creation of
artificial credit in and through interbank exchanges and revolutionising of banking
that annihilated space by time (3). While productive capital is a net creditor, it
borrowed heavily from these markets at the same time, together with national
authorities in metropolitan and what came to be known as debtor countries (Schubert
1985). The coexistence of productive capital as creditor towards, and debtor of,
Eurodollar banks indicates the uneven development of accumulation between
reproductive and money capital. It signals also the growing interrelation between
different capitals (functioning and money capital) on the basis of financial capital.
Credit-sustained accumulation that held back the destruction of excess capacity and
which sustained weaker capitals ('lame ducks') gave accumulation an increasingly
inflationary bias that prevented overaccumulation from leading to mass
bankruptcies, price wars and depression. Credit-expansion merely postponed
overaccumulation. Overaccumulation took the form of an ever growing uncoupling
between different value forms on the basis of the supremacy of monetary over
productive accumulation. Monetary constraints on the realisation of surplus value
appeared less and less in the form of monetary constraints on the product market
than in the form of inflationary constraints and the limits of financial markets to
sustain business through speculative deferral of bankruptcy. Monetary constraint on
productive capital asserted itself through an increasing claim of creditors on future
surplus value. This assertion reimposed the limits of the market in the form of
capital's most elementary and meaningless form of existence: the power of money
that underpinned accumulation through speculative credit-expansion. The
reimposition of the limits of the market took the form of a scarcity of credit that
underpinned productive capital. The build up of superfluous capital on the world
money markets signals the international dimension of the power of labour. While the
limits of the market were stretched through credit and state deficit financing,
inflation and accumulation of debt increased pressure on productive capital to
reassert its right to manage so as to turn credit into effective command over labour
and, as such, into means of payment. In the face of increasing inflationary pressure,
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the real returns of money capital were increasingly threatened as debt accumulation
gathered pace because more and more credit was needed to sustain productive capital.
The sustaining of productive accumulation took an ever more speculative dimension
at the same time as the international movement of money capital attained an ever
more fragile form.
In the aftermath of Bretton Woods the volume of currency transaction on
international foreign exchange markets increased dramatically. This volume
multiplied several times within a view years (Strange 1986), by far exceeding the
amount necessary to finance total commodity exchange and direct investment.
Speculation in buying and selling of currency "has become an esoteric art aided by
computer technology [that] reduced global communications to a fraction of a second"
(Wachtel 1987, p. 20). Floating and unregulated credit-markets opened up new
possibilities of interest earning for money capital. These markets are so diverse that
even financial experts find it hard to keep track (Hubner 1988;Traber 1986;
Strange 1986). The diversion of money capital into ever more speculative channels
expressed the shortage of profitable opportunities in productive investment (Clarke
1988a;Hubner 1988), and were not the cause of a shortage of productive
investment, as discussed by some authors in terms of a blockade of productive
investment by money capital (Fine/Harris 1985;lngham 1984;S. PolkrA 1982).
Indeed, there was "no shortage of funds for projects which can pay immediate fixed
returns at a going rate of interest over a short period of time" (Minns 1982, p. 24).
The shortage of funds for productive investement is the consequence of the shortage of
profitable opportunities. Annual global economic growth was 3.3% on average
between 1971 and 1980, while the real growth rates of international transaction
were higher than 12% (Schubert 1985, p. 58). The growing international
accumulation of debt asserted the policing role of speculative money capital over
nation states in the form of speculative pressure on exchange rates on the basis of
floating currencies. Additionally, the IMF and transnational banks reasserted the
limits of global money in the form of credit-restrictions, calling for the deflation of
the money supply by nation states so as to guarantee the validity of credit through
central bank money.
-Keynesianism and the containment of labour through debt
From a Keynesian perspective of containing labour and controlling its disruptive
potential, the improvements of states' revenue had to be invoked in a way which had
no effects on accumulation, productive capacity and effective social demand. In order
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not to provoke costly and damaging strikes, the only option available was to increase
deficit financing (Deutschmann 1973), measured in the Public Spending Borrowing
Requirement (hereafter: PSBR) which expresses the difference between state income
and state expenditure. These deficits were financed by credit. The fictitious character
of this credit expansion doubled: it existed as a claim on money by the money owner
towards its bank, and as a claim on money by these banks upon the national reserve.
The attempt to turn crisis into a function of containing labour by increasing use of
superfluous capital to sustain accumulation was itself transformed into crisis by the
end of the 1970's. Expansionary policies did not in themselves provide any means of
overcoming the crisis of overaccumulation (Clarke 1988a;Altvater et.al. 1979).
The postponement of the rupture of accumulation made the repayment of public debt
in real terms impossible (Rodel/Brandes 1976). The effects of expansionary
policies is that the higher the credit sustained accumulation the more additional
demand is required to avoid a breakdown of the credit system and to maintain
international competitiveness in the face of soaring inflation and looming recession.
State deficit financing of accumulation did not create possibilities for the state to
repay debt directly. The state deficit can be reduced only by rectifying the balance of
payments so as to earn foreign currency and through cuts in public expenditure, or
during a period of booming accumulation. During most of the 1970's a sustained
pursuit of the two first options was ruled out because of the strong position of
labour. Retrospectively, the latter option was ruled out as well since the barrier to
accumulation was not overcome by credit expansion. Rather, credit deferred an
explosive manifestation of the crisis-ridden disunity of production and circulation.
The shortage of state revenue was increasingly supplemented by borrowing money
in various forms. The expansion of state expenditure was to a great degree financed
through bonds. The security of these bonds depends on the power of the state to tax
and to expand the tax base (O'Connor 1973). However, a 'sufficient' increase in
taxation so as to repay debt and to improve revenue in the attempt to restore
international confidence in currency, permitting the integration of domestic
accumulation on the world market to be maintained, was ruled out for the same
reason as state deficit financing was introduced. This is not to say, as O'Connor
(1973, p. 189) argues, that the state becomes "politically indebted to this class of
bankers", because the bankers themselves face the destructive power of value in the
form of money, as indicated by the collapse of banks in 1974. While commercial
banks sought, on the one hand, to protect their liquidity by higher discount rates and
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contraction of credit, and, on the other hand, to augment their reserves by
discounting bills with the central banks (Schubert 1985;Altvater 1985;Clarke
1988a), the substance of the Keynesian welfare state was threatened by the
reassertion of monetary constraint over public finances in the form of an increasing
claim on tax revenue by creditors. The reassertion of monetary constraint over the
state threatened the substance of the Keynesian state in that it depended on an
expansion of liquidity. However, the 'defence' of national currency implied larger
reserves so as to guarantee and to maintain formal exchange equality on the world
market. All this questioned the attempt to contain labour on the basis of social
reforms and full-employment guarantees. The barrier to sustained accumulation
appeared in the form of a limited supply of official reserves with which to support
national currency in the face of the speculative movement of private capital. In the
face of growing global balance of payment problems and increasing public debt, the
first sign of internationally fragile money appeared in the form of a severe pound
sterling crisis in 1976. The defence of national currency was less a question of
maintaining national integration into the world market than of preventing the global
movement of money from collapsing. In order to maintain confidence in the stability
of the international value of the currency, the state had to eradicate debt (i.e. cutting
back on state expenditure) while the restoration of the international confidence in
money depended on the achievement of a surplus in the balance of international
payments.
Deficit underwriting of capitalist reproduction had to be turned into effective
command over labour so as to service interest, to repay debt and to rectify the
inflationary supply of money that sustained accumulation in an ever growing
speculative dimension. The productive power of labour impinged on the state through
the speculative integration of the category of abstract labour with the value form,
i.e. the sustaining of capitalist command over labour's productive power through an
inflationary money supply and an accumulation of debt. So far as the state is
concerned, this contradiction appears in the form of a disunity as between the
unfettered revolutionising of labour's productive power (i.e. the so-called
overheating of the economy) and speculative pressure on currency that destabilises
exchange relations through speculative movements of private capital. State credit
expansion 'incompatible' with global limits of credit-markets is acceptable by
monetary markets only when sufficient reserves provide the security for the
convertiblity of credit into means of payment. Failure to secure acceptance of
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international money holders in the political guarantee of convertibility of money into
central bank money involves, firstly, speculative pressure on currency, prompting
a diversion of the global flow of money and threatening to undermine the integration
of domestic accumulation into the world market. It involves, secondly, a
destabilisation of international credit-relations as creditors' confidence in the
validity of money is dented, prompting creditors to demand cash payment. Such a
demand, in turn, threatens to undermine the reproduction of all social relations
which rest on credit. The tension between different value forms (i.e. money and
productive capital) puts enormous pressure on the domestic organisation of money
because the state guarantees ail money by acting as lender of last resort. Further,
deficit spending involved an accumulation of debt, prompting speculative pressure on
national currency. The crisis-ridden dependence of the circuit of money capital on
the imposition of work in production expressed itself in the form of balance of
—
payment problems and an ever more fragile movement of international credit due to
the failure to turn credit into productive command over labour that would have made
it possible to turn public debt into means of payment. Lending to sovereign countries
entailed a pseudovalidation of national wealth. As the growth of the world money
markets gathered pace, fuelled by growing payment imbalances, increasing use of
unregulated credit-expansion and suspension of productive capital into financial
markets, speculation increased dramatically destabilising attempts by national
government or international agreement between governments to accommodate
currency adjustment (see Clarke 1988a). The crisis of accumulation manifested
itself to the state, in the form of inflation, balance of payment problems and adverse
effects of the floating of exchange rates which threatened the integration of domestic
accumulation into the world market and which threatened the basis on which nation
states secured the political integration of the working class. In order to safeguard
domestic accumulation against the speculative erosion of formal exchange equality on
the world market, the state had to restore financial confidence in national currency.
However, Keynesian policies of maintaining jobs mitigated against attempts to defend
currency against speculative pressure through improving the balance of payments
and larger reserves. The aggravation of this development after 1975 made the
Keynesian-inspired resolution of containing labour's productive and disruptive
power through easy credit ever the more difficult to sustain. A significant indicator
of the 'effective' containment of labour is the balance of payments. During the 1970's
balance of payment considerations grew in importance as they indicated the liquidity
of nation states to guarantee debt. At the same time, the PSBR grew in importance as
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it indicated the ability of nation states to accommodate a drain on reserves without
suspending the guarantee of credit as a claim on a proportion of taxation.
The development of domestic accumulation is not dependent on the exchange rate
mechanisms. Balance of payment deficits express the underlying difficulties of
imposing work effectively and of imposing upon the conditions of life the limits of
global accumulation. The stability of the global flow of money depends on the
productive imposition of work so as to rectify payment imbalances and debt through
the imposition of effective command over labour. The deregulation of the world
money markets established a potent force to impose policies of state austerity with
which to integrate the working class on the basis of tight money. This potent force
asserts itself over the domestic attempts to normalise the class struggle in the form
of speculative movement of private capital. Eurodollars move around the world in an
instant, attacking weak currencies and forcing nations whose currency is under
attack to change their policy direction. The movement of speculative capital
reasserted monetary constraint over nation states in the form of currency
speculation, destabilising exchange rates and eroding national liquidity through
pressure on the national reserves. Speculative pressure imposed the money power
of capital upon nation states. In turn, the mediation of the power of money through
the state entails the use of austerity measures as a means of containing labour within
the limits of accumulation by enforcing debt over the conditions of life. Further, the
deregulation of exchange rates increased the volatility of the international
realisation of national wealth as it was only after profits realised in dollars were
converted into the money of bookkeeping that individual capitals located in a
particular nation state were able to determine whether the cost price of production
was recovered and an average rate of profit was realised. This development, in turn,
increased the uncertainty of the domestic organisation of money, put pressure on
national currency and increased pressure to curb inflationary credit-expansion and
state-deficit underwriting of profits. Balance of payment problems and international
pressure of money capital forced nation states to rectify payment imbalances by
increasing export earnings and by deflating the money supply.
The tightening of the money supply involves an intervention into the financial
position of productive capital, reasserting the limits of the market through a threat
to the solvency of producers. A tightening of the money supply implies greater
financial pressure on functioning capital as credit becomes scarce and expensive at
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the same time as markets contract consequent upon the effects of a reduction of state
deficit financing of demand. At the same time, while the political authorities can
force the domestic supply of money, no such powers exist over the international
movement of money. A tightening of the money supply affects weaker capitals bound
by domestic constraints and the domestic working class through the effects of tight
money on employment, wages and living standards. Monetary constraints asserted
themselves over the state in the form of the rule of money as capital: destabilising
speculation against currency and restrictive conditions for further debt financing.
During the 1970's, inflationary pressure on profit rates communicated itself to
more advanced producers. The costs of exploiting labour increased through the effects
of 'deflationary inflation' at the same time as the working class resisted the
downward pressure on wages, the intensification of work and the recomposition of
production. This development manifested itself to the state in a further deterioration
of the balance of payments at a time of a growing need to earn foreign currency so as
to relieve the pressure on the reserves. In order to restore international confidence
in money, nation states had to regain financial stability so as to alleviate pressure on
the reserves. Such an objective implies reductions in public spending and the
achievement of a surplus in the balance of international payments. Such a
development, however, could only be achieved through a deflationary attack on the
working class and the recomposition of command in production so as to improve
productivity and restore actual accumulation globally. In the face of inflationary
devaluation of money capital, monetary policies became increasingly the source of
support for the assets of the whole banking system that underpinned productive
accumulation through (an overextension of) credit.
By the mid 1970's, the capacity of states to underpin the credit system gradually
eroded as the guarantee of money by central bank reserves was increasingly
questionable. At the same time, inflation gathered such a pace that it became less and
less attractive for money capital to provide credit since interest rates were, with the
exception of West-Germany, lower than rates of inflation (Rodel/Brandes 1976;
Hubner 1988). The stability of international money depended on the dollar. The
international role of the dollar rested on an US trade surplus. Coinciding with the
devaluation of the pound, the US trade balance moved into a deficit by 1976 and
increased through 1977 and 1978. This development threatened to undermine the
confidence in the dollar and, as a result, the confidence of international markets in
the security of money. Since the immediate source of difficulties for government
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appeared to be inflationary and the immediate cause of inflation appeared to be rising
wages, the limits of Keynesianism appeared in the form of barriers to inflation and
the balance of payments. The disproportion between productive and monetary
accumulation appeared to be caused by the expansion of the latter and not by the
deterioration of the former.The reassertion of international monetary austerity over
the state fostered political forces which sought to confine the conditions of life to the
dictates of the market: deflationary policies gathered momentum, attacking the
integration of the working class on the basis of an inflationary growth of the money
supply and increasing public and private debt. The Keynesian mode of integration
turned from guaranteeing prosperity into a socially controlled deflationary regime
(see Negri 1988b).
Although the multiplicity of states had implemented deflationary policies, the
attempt to regain control over public finances was made difficult by the recognition
of labour's political strength in institutionalised forms of class collaboration. Class
collaboration involved integration costs. Trade union collaboration with government
involved the maintenance of employment as a quid pro quo for income restraint. In
order to avert a global collapse of exchange equality through a break-down of the
credit system the multiplicity of states had to impose sound monetary discipline and
to improve productivity by reasserting command over labour's productive and
disruptive power. The attempt to regain financial stability focused mainly on those
sections of the working class who were not a constituents in the trade union
movement (i.e. unemployed, claimants, women,'racial' minorities: Hirsch 1980;
Hirsch/Roth 1980;Deppe 1984; and below, chapter IV). During the 1970's, the
imposition of tight money rested on the capacity of the trade unions to collaborate
with government in domesticating the class struggle. For productive capital, the
reassertion of monetary constraint in the form of increasing rates of inflation and
credit made it ever more urgent to intensify exploitation so as to prevent illiquidity
from turning into insolvency. The rate of enterprise profit as opposed to the share of
interest depends on the productivity of labour in production. While the sustaining of
productive capacity depends on credit worthiness, measured in comparatively high
rates of profit, increased productivity provides the solidity required for additional
credit. Competitive erosion of capital takes on the form of credit worthiness,
measured by the profitability of enterprise and, as such, the ability of management
to impose work productively. The institutionalisation of corporatist forms of
negotiation gradually changed from ensuring a competitive advantage, through peace-
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keeping costs of trade union collaboration, into a barrier to the implementation of
new means of production and new working practices. The reorganisation of
production had to be achieved with the consent of the shop-floor, involving wage
incentives for intensification of work. The attempt to transform protest into demand
turned, by the end of the 1970's, into a barrier to sustaining reproduction. When
management and political authorities adopted a more aggressive imposition of work
and deflationary attack on living standards, the intensification of the class struggle
threatened to undermine the stability of political domination on the basis of class
collaboration (see Hirsch 1980 on the crisis of 'Modell Deutschland'; see Clarke
1988a on the crisis of the social contract; see Semiotexte 1980 on the reassertion of
political confrontation and repression in Italy). By the end of the 1970's the
stability of political domination on the basis of class collaboration looked more and
more fragile.
The imposition of capitalist command in form of money over the working class
through restrictive monetary policies involved a crisis of the form of the state. "In
subjecting the state to international monetary dictates, there is a grave risk for
capital that these 'limits' may not only create a vicious circle in which the
contradiction within monetary policy is constantly reproduced, but that they may
escalate the crisis of money into the crisis of the state itself" (Marazzi 1976, p.
110). The pursuance of deflationary policies within a Keynesian framework of
containing the class struggle through forms of collaboration with the trade unions
tiptoed on the edge of growing social unrest against deflationary attack mediated
through restrictive monetary and credit policies. Offe's (1984) thesis of the
'ungovernability' of society, while hardly addressing the problem at issue, provides
a nevertheless provocative suggestion of the crisis of the state. The tightening of the
money supply involved a defence of national currency through cuts in public
spending and higher interest rates for credit. Higher interest costs increased the
costs of recycling credit and of the revolutionising of labour's productive power.
Higher interest costs increased debt financing of productive capital as the state
enforced the limits of the market by making credit more expensive. Restrictive
monetary and credit policies involved the abandoning of full-employment and income
guarantees, the quid pro quo upon which the containment of the class struggle since
the end of World War II rested. The adoption of restrictive monetary policies is
associated with monetarism.
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The attempt to regain control over money within the framework of class
collaboration involved a shift in emphasis of the role of the state. Instead of pursuing
state deficit underwriting of capitalist reproduction, monetarism sought to restore
accumulation by regulating social reproduction through the financial system. The
shift in emphasis involved the reimposition of the money power of capital through
scarce and costly credit, enforced by the state. The monetarist view of macro-
economic necessity articulated the imposition of international monetary austerity
mediated through monetary and credit policies. The attempt to impose the
imperatives of capitalist reproduction through reimposing the power of money
subordinated productive capital and the working class to a tight discipline of
internationally depressed money and credit markets. The Keynesian class
compromise was based on a state of liquidity so as to finance the integration costs of
full-employment growth and general welfare. However, the assertion of policies
designed to regain control over the money supply implied a 'state-of-limited-
liquidity', imposing the limits of global accumulation over the working class through
deflationary policies. International monetary pressure can be alleviated only by
restoring monetary soundness domestically through higher export earnings and
reductions in public spending, both of which presuppose a containment of labour on
the basis of intensification of work and eroding living standards. The movement of
money capital thus turned from global comparison of national wealth on the world
market to global policing of the ability of nation states to launch a deflationary attack
on the conditions of life. The speculative movement of money capital on the world
market undermined Keynesian attempts to moderate domestic accumulation through
credit-expansion and forced governments to turn debt into means of payment by
containing labour through the command of money: law and order control. From 1975
onwards, the multiplicity of states were less and less able to guarantee
full-employment growth. Instead the states were forced to become governments of
austerity and to transform from redistributors of wealth to administrators of cuts in
order to alleviate the pressure of debt and to ease monetary pressure on balance of
payment and budget deficits. The tension between monetarist policies within a
Keynesian framework of class collaboration was increasingly difficult to contain by
the end of the 1970's. The struggle over the use of money as power to discipline the
working class was directed against the form of the state because it is the state
through which the money power of capital is mediated.
The mobilisation of political forces that endorsed the "rejection of the conception of
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the interventionist state in favour of the microeconomic view of desirability and the
macroeconomic view of necessity" (Clarke 1987, p. 393), involved a repressive
response to the productive and disruptive power of labour that had ruptured the
domination of capital and precipitated the integration of nation states into the world
market through unregulated money and credit markets, an increasingly speculative
dimension of social reproduction and the reassertion of the imperatives of capitalist
social reproduction fn the form the money power of capital. The importance of
monetarist policies since the 1970's has been the political attempt to recompose the
form of the state by bringing about the subordination of the conditions of life to the
dictates of the market, i.e. money in command. Monetarism rejects the
transformation of protest into demand and asserts the reimposition of the limits of
the market through the eradication of debt. The eradication of debt involves the
deregulation of existing guarantees of full-employment growth, income (reduction of
welfare expenditure) and the abandoning of the maintenance of unproductive plant.
The rejection of transforming protest into demand involves the acceptance of the use
of force to impose the abstract equality of money over the conditions of life. The shift
from full-employment growth guarantees and policies by the mid 1970's, and the
deflationary attack on the working class, entail the attempt to impose international
monetary austerity over the conditions of life. The monetarist attack on the working
class, although unevenly, articulated a form of state policy that implied "a shift in
state power to the world level - the level at which monetary terrorism operates"
(Marazzi 1976, p. 107). The changes in the relation between money capital and the
state led to a development in which the rule of money was more and more mediated
through the state. The state sets the general context of financial regulation by
imposing restrictive monetary and credit policies that are themselves imposed upon
the state through the movement of 'unemployed capital', policing the capacity of the
state to guarantee the convertibility of credit into means of payments. The depressive
development of these markets expressed the crisis over the productive and
disruptive power of labour in the form of a global monetary scarcity. The state and
the financial system determined the devaluation and liquidation of productive
capacity through insolvency once high interest rates undermined productive activity.
This rule of money is not mediated through the product market. The evaluation of
capitals' ability to appropriate surplus value does not manifest itself in commanding
high rates of profits. Rather, high rates of profit imply credit-worthiness which
underpins functioning capital. As the ability to appropriate surplus value does not
have necessary connections with the efficiency of use value production, the power of
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value in the form of money asserted the abstract equality of capitalist social
reproduction, i.e. the supremacy of valorisation over use value production. Monetary
constraint on unfettered accumulation asserted the limits to the revolutionising of
the productive power of labour within the context of the integration of the abstract
category of labour with the value form. These limits were imposed upon the
ambitions of producers through the social power of money, the incarnation of the
imperatives of capitalist reproduction.
By the end of the 1970's depressed money markets threatened to bring about a
collapse of international credit relations that sustained social relations. The political
enforcement of the social power of money is associated with monetarism. The
monetarist prescription of a policy of tight money (i.e. restrictive credit policies)
articulated the fragility of the international composition of domination. Monetarist
policies involved the attempt to reimpose the limits of the market over the conditions
of life through a rigorous deflation of the money supply. Such a policy implies the
subordination of the state, capital and the working class to the limits of the market
through high interest rate policies. The massive attempt to bring back the ideology of
the market to the centre of the political stage needs to be seen as a result of the global
reintegration of abstract labour with the value form on the basis of debt. The
reintegration of the circuit of social capital, not on the basis of the supremacy of the
valorisation over the labour process, but on the basis of a tension between
functioning capital and the credit-system had come into conflict with the effects it
produced: inflation, public and private indebtedness and a growing fragility of the
international movement of money.
The success of restrictive monetary policies depended on the capacity of capital to
impose the abstract equality of money-in-command over the working class without
triggering a collapse of productive activity. The imposition of tight monetary policies
involved the enforcement of debt over the working class through cuts in public
expenditure, deregulation of existing wage protection, anti-trade union policies and
the reassertion of the right to manage in production so as to impose work effectively
in order to service and repay debt and to increase the economic performance of
functioning capital. Although capital had sought during the 1970's to implement new
technology and to intensify exploitation, the class struggle over domination was
generally located in the institutional framework of the Keynesian welfare state and a
corporatist kind of industrial relations (see Hirsch 1980;Gorz 1982;Esser et.al.
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1983;and see below, chapter IV), both of which expressed labour's strong
bargaining position. The strength of labour made it difficult for capital to undermine
the institutional form of labour's integration simply by coercion, if costly and
damaging strikes were to be avoided. The strength of the working class prohibited a
ruthless imposition of the right to manage and of mass redundancy of labour. While
this way of containing labour was, in retrospect, instrumental for the normalisation
and domestication of the industrial militancy of the late 1960's and early 1970's, it
implied increasing inflationary and monetary pressure. After 1975, the attempt to
contain labour's productive and disruptive power through a policy of easy credit was
more and more difficult to sustain. This development turned the existing forms of
industrial and political negotiation of order into a barrier to social reproduction. The
containment of labour through inflationary expansion of money ceased to provide
sufficient means to sustain accumulation, while the financial solvency of the state
was increasingly in question. The limits of the market over productive capital and
the state reasserted themselves in the form of inflation, debt and a possible collapse
of international credit relations.
The limits to sustaining capitalist exploitation of labour through credit-expansion
asserted themselves over productive capital and the state in the form of more and
more fragile global credit-markets. The first signs of inflationary expansion of
credit turning into a major problem of maintaining the credit system occurred in
1976. The failure of credit-expansion to invoke effective command over labour
resulted in a further intensification of the tension between different value forms.
This tension expressed itself in the pound sterling crisis of 1976 following poor
balance of payments and growing industrial relations problems. In the UK the shift in
Keynesian inspired policies for containing labour from full-employment growth to a
policy of deflation occurred in 1976, symbolised by the intervention of the IMF
demanding a reduction in public spending. Deflationary policies aimed at restoring
confidence on financial markets, as the ability of national currency, and hence the
central bank as lender of last resort, to meet demands for means of payment was
severely in question (see Clarke 1988a) and as the financial system was moving on
the edge of a depression (dollar crisis in 1977/78). While the IMF, which had long
since been transformed to a political credit institution (Hubner 1988), was calling,
"in increasingly urgent and strident terms, for a globally coordinated attack on
inflation", including cuts in welfare expenditure and deregulation of labour market
(Cleaver 1989, p. 28), governments, domestically and internationally, reasserted
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their determination to contain labour through deflationary policies. Labour's turn to
'unbelieving monetarists' (Brittan 1977) was not a question of will but, rather
dictated by the class struggle over domination, a struggle over the 'terrorist use of
money' (Marazzi 1976) that sought to subordinate the conditions of life to conditions
of austerity and intensification of work. The shift to monetarist policies of tight
money reasserted the imperatives of capitalist reproduction over the conditions of
life through the power of money. In the face of growing obligations to back newly
created credit the class struggle over domination developed to a second dollar crisis
by 1977/78, leading up to the deep depression of the early 1980's.
The focus of international credit relations was the dollar and American banks in
which a massive volume of money capital was deposited in the form of a claim on
national reserves and in which enormous claims towards debtor countries
accumulated. The stability of international currency and credit relations depended on
the stability of US banks and, thus, on the containment of labour in the US. The
deterioration of the dollar started in 1977. In the face of a balance of payment deficit
of $20 billion, and rising inflation from 6.8% in 1977 to 9% in 1978, Carter
tried a devaluation of the dollar. "From late 1977 the dollar was allowed to float
down on the foreign exchange market, but this turned to a rout in Autumn 1978 as
short-term capital cut and fled" (Evans 1985, p. 116). Massive speculation against
the dollar and depreciation of the dollar in relation to other currency (Yen and
Deutsch Mark) accelerated the run on the dollar. Investors liquidated Treasury
securities massively and converted the dollar into different currency. The role of the
dollar, in the face of international accumulation of debt monetised in a claim on the
dollar, was once more in question. The dollar crisis threatened to aggravate to an
international crisis of credit (Schubert 1985). The crisis of the dollar expressed
the crisis of capitalist overaccumulation at the most fundamental level of money
capital. The fragile accommodation of the pyramid of debt with reproductive
accumulation indicated the limits of credit-sustained accumulation through
depressed money markets, the stability of which depended on the stability of the
dollar. The crisis of the dollar undermined international confidence in the stability of
money. This development increased pressure on currencies, forcing the political
authorities to restore financial confidence under the penalty of a collapse of
international credit relations. Labour's productive power asserted itself in the form
of internationally unstable credit markets and in depressive pressure on currency in
the face of accelerated inflation and balance of payment problems.
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The benign neglect of the dollar's exchange rate was soon reversed under Carter
(see Schubert 1985). In an attempt to alleviate pressure on its reserves, Carter
introduced deflationary measures so as to push up interest rates and stem the flow
(ibid.). At the same time the US borrowed on international currency markets $28
billion dollars in 1978 (twice as much as its balance of payment deficit in 1978)
(ibid., p. 100-102). High interest rates in the US restored confidence in the dollar,
marked by appreciation of the dollar relative to other currencies. This step turned
overliquidity of credit into monetary scarcity. The dollar crisis and the restoration
of the dollar through high interest rates was merely a first tremor, foreshadowing
worse things to come. The supremacy of monetary accumulation is a direct
expression of the weakness of reproductive capital, a weakness that fuelled the
spill-over of capital into speculative outlets in a way which replaced the regulation
of accumulation through the limits of the market by the limits of credit. Higher
interest rates implied an increasing scarcity of credit, threatening to push
producers into insolvency. The transformation of overliquidity to monetary scarcity
signalled that accumulation was heading for a renewed recession by the end of the
1970's. High interest rates enabled banks to absorb heavy losses without defaulting.
At the same time, however, high interest rates threatened to turn credit-sustained
accumulation into a depressive spiral of devaluation/liquidation of productive capital
and rising unemployment.
The rise in interest rates intensified the threat of credit-sustained productive
accumulation turning into mass insolvency and put pressure on the PSBR through
higher costs of interest servicing. Between 1973 and 1976, interest rates had been
relatively low, making it feasible to sustain accumulation in the face of depressed
rates of profit. When interest rates started to rise in 1977, and especially in 1980,
the pressure on indebted producers increased as depressed rates of profit coincided
with rising cost of interest service and high rates of inflation (Schubert 1985). The
compulsion to revolutionise the methods of production bears down on productive
capital through the force of competition as a requirement to realise a sufficient rate
of profit for reproduction. Upon this competitive pressure were superimposed
increasingly volatile exchange rates (Hubner 1988), pressure to service debt and to
provide high rates of profit so as to acquire additional credit in order to prevent
speculative reproduction turning into insolvency. By the end of the 1970's, the
offensive against labour's disruptive power increased. Radical new technologies
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(computer-aided automatisation: Palloix 1976) have been implemented unevenly,
incrementally and spasmodically, but nevertheless increasingly since the late
1970's. However, in the face of high interest rates, the introduction of new
technologies reasserted the tendency to overaccumulation. High interest rates
accelerated capital devaluation and liquidation at the same time as the implementation
of new means of production entailed renewed debt financing of capitalist command
over labour's productive power. High interest rate policies reinforced the second
deep recession from 1979 to 1982.
In the deep recession between 1979 and 1982, industrial growth slowed almost to
a standstill. The recession brought to the fore the contradictions of credit as credit-
sustained accumulation threatened growing insolvency, precipitating a chain of
bankruptcies and defaults, while the overaccumulation of capital appeared in the
form of an accumulation of worthless debt and a massive devaluation of capital and
the destruction of productive capacity. The recession brought to the fore the
circumstance that accumulation in the 1970's was largely sustained by credit. When
the crisis struck, the reassertion of the limits of the market in the form of costly
and scarce money expressed itself in mass insolvency and liquidation of functioning
capital as well as mass unemployment. At the same time, the more advanced
producers faced intense financial pressure because the introduction of new methods
of production at the end of the 1970's was largely financed by credit, permitting a
prevalidation of the productive potentials of fixed capital at a time of a looming
recession. Although high interest rates prevented banks from defaulting in the early
1980's, the effects of restoring confidence of money capital through a policy of tight
money threatened to bring about a severe financial crisis as the default of productive
activity involved a massive default of credit which threatened the stability of banks
because of the overextension of credit (Guttmann 1989). Further, the rapid
deterioration and devaluation of reproductive capital marked gaping holes in the
shareholders' dividends - ruin echoed ruin. At the same time as functioning capitals
went into receivership, slashed investment and devalued productive capacity, the
money supply, far from contracting, exploded as companies borrowed heavily from
international credit markets so as to maintain solvency and cash flow (see Sutcliffe
1983;Clarke 1988a). Upon credit default, banks invested new recycling credits.
This development coincided with a merger boom as defaulting producers were taken
up by banks or more advanced capitals. Additionally, earned profits were diverted
into (high interest rate) money markets, financing public debt and balance of
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payment imbalances. Further, mass unemployment and the reassertion of the limits
of the market in the form of scarce and expensive credit reasserted management's
determination to intensify work, to recompose working practices and put downward
pressure on wages. In the face of mass unemployment, the deterioration of whole
industrial areas and monetary constraint in the form of high interest rates,
management's aggressive approach towards the working class succeeded in
reasserting the right to manage, resulting in a reorganisation of work, speed-up, and
curbing of customs and practices and a drop in wages.
The slashing of investment, devaluation of productive capacity, the liquidation of
unproductive producers and the imposition of new working practices and
intensification of work, resulted in productivity increases. However, the
revolutionising of labour's productive power reinforced the constitution of the
circuit of social capital on the basis of credit and debt as capitals borrowed heavily to
avoid insolvency and to finance the revolutionising of labour's productive power,
while the enormous spill-over of capital into unproductive and speculative channels
continued, precipitated by high interest rates and a lack of profitable opportunities
in productive investement. The political strength of the working class was weakened
through mass unemployment and aggressive monetary and managerial policies.
However, political authorities were not able, for fear of a major confrontation with
the labour movement, to inflict a substantial destruction of the relation between
public expenditure and (indirect and direct) wages. During the recession, the
tendency in public expenditure was up (Mullard 1987). High interest rates made
additional means of payment for financing public expenditure more and more
expensive. Further, the destruction of productive activity aggravated balance of
payment problems in the early 1980's, putting pressure on national reserves. At the
same time, banks sought to augment their reserves by discounting bills of exchange
with the central bank (Guttmann 1989). The synchronisation of balance of payment
difficulties and debt problems threatened to undermine the attempt to maintain
formal exchange equality by sustaining the political guarantee of credit through
central bank reserves. In the face of a major economic slump, increasing speculative
spill over of capital into monetary markets and increasing debt financing of public
expenditure, the constituting power of labour manifested itself in a possible
break-down of international credit-relations. By 1981, the growing tension
between functioning capital and the credit-system asserted the constituting power of
labour in the form of a default of productive activity, threatening to undermine the
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stability of the credit-system in and through the collapse of the claim on future
surplus value. At the same time, heavy borrowing on international finance markets
involved the overextension of credit at a time at which economic growth came almost
to a standstill.
By 1981, the economic slump threatened to undermine global credit-relations. The
tightening of the dollar supply coincided with a rapid competitive deterioration of the
US. This development manifested itself by 1981 through an increasing balance of
payments deficit of the US. Further, the tightening of the money supply raised the
cost of debt service substantially for debtor countries. The recession of 1979
increased the difficulty of earning foreign exchange for those countries who had
borrowed during the 1970's. The tightening of the international money supply called
into question the ability of debtor countries to turn credit into means of payment,
enforcing a severe regime of domination over labour and leading on to an intense
fragility of international credit-relations. This fragility turned into a severe
rupture in 1982. Increased lending to what became debtor countries through
Eurodollar banks during the 1970's had to. become real international value.
Accumulation of debt in those countries increased dramatically during the 1970's
from $100 billion in 1972 to $800 billion between 1973 and 1982, and to $1000
billion in 1987 (Altvater/Hubner 1987, p. 21). On average debt increased by 20%
annually in the debtor countries, as compared with a 16% annual increase in net
exports and a 12% annual increase in the GNP. By 1982, international credit
obligations amounted to about $100 billion per year compared with $15 billion in
1977 (Altvater/Hubner 1987, p. 21). This credit had to become effective command
over labour if credit was to turn into means of payment. However, the crisis of
accumulation turned credit into the source of an acute liquidity crisis in those
countries that at first drove down raw material commodity prices and therewith
their export earnings. Additionally, the US monetary 'authorities' raised the dollar
and the rate of interest, and Western banks dried up their voluntary flow of loan
capital to the South and the East. To prevent illiquidity from turning into insolvency,
so-called debtor countries had to generate much more foreign exchange just to
service the interest on their debt. These countries, like metropolitan countries,
were obliged to start slashing imports, produce more for export and become capital
exporters on a massive scale. The imposition of money in command in these countries
was and is overtly repressive in form. The military command to ensure the
enforcement of debt over the working class in so-called debtor countries signifies a
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taste of domestic policies of a monetarism in crisis. However, in the face of
increasing problems of servicing interest and repaying debt, the intense class
struggle in some of these countries inhibited a further tightening of deflationary
attack (see Cleaver 1989).
Higher credit cost raised the cost of credit servicing for productive capital, forcing
many out of business through insolvency, and for those countries that had borrowed
heavily during the 1970's. While the only means available to prevent a crisis of
money was a sustained deflationary attack on labour domestically and
internationally, the class struggle over the imposition of the imperatives of
capitalist reproduction escalated the crisis of money to one of the state. As credit was
called upon as means of payment, growing international demand for cash in the face of
faltering repayment of credit increased the vulnerability of the international system
of finance and credit. The compulsion to export under any circumstances in order to
repay debt, and growing social tension, forced Poland (1981), Argentine (1982)
and Mexico (1982) to declare insolvency. The rupture of international debt fed back
into metropolitan countries through the deterioration of the international flow of
money and pressure on banks. The debtor crisis not only destabilises the
international relations of payments and currency, but also threatens to undermine
the political unity of the Western world (see Schubert 1985). Such a possibility
was impressively manifested in the collapse of banks in 1982. This collapse by far
exceeded the scale of the 1930's (Dziobek 1987). The attempt to restore financial
confidence through a policy of tight money had turned into the real possibility of
apocalypse, threatening to undermine the composition of the international relations
of domination. Mexico's declaration of insolvency in 1982 ruptured international
credit relations to such an extent that the political authorities iri metropolitan
countries, especially the US, were forced to abnegate monetarist economic policies
(in the narrow understanding of the term) and to reinvoke credit-expansion. In the
wake of an international debtor crisis of sovereign countries, there was only one
solution possible to avert a collapse of the financial system: the decrease of interest
rates on credit channelled to debtor countries (see Altvater/Hubner 1987;Lipietz
1987) and renewed credit-sustaining of productive accumulation (Clarke 1988a;
Gamble 1988). Capital was able to dominate the rupture of global credit-relations
by shifting debt to, and by guaranteeing international validity of debt by the economic
and political power of, the US. This shift, associated with a growing importance of
supply side policies, repealed monetarism in the narrow conception as an economic
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policy and effectively restored pseudovalidation by 1982, internationally and
domestically. The monetarist attempt to reimpose the limits of the market
precipitated a potential destruction of the market itself. Monetarism, while it was
made politically strong and credible through the failure of Keynesianism, reproduced
the contradiction between monetary and productive accumulation in an intensive
form. The reimposition of the limits of accumulation through a policy of scarce
money had brought international credit-relations on the edge a major collapse. The
failure to convert credit into effective command over labour indicates labour's
productive and disruptive power which capital had sought to contain by reimposing
the abstract equality of money over the conditions of life.
Monetarist policies were abandoned (Lipietz 1987) and Keynesian fiscal policies
were activated. Keynesian policies gained in comparison with the targeting of the
money supply (Tomlinson 1986;Guttmann 1989). Discretionary monetary policies
did not involve an U-turn to Keynesian-inspired budget financing as the financial
conservatism of monetarism was retained. The boom of the 1980's rested on
Keynesian fiscal expansion within a tight monetary framework (Clarke 1988a;
Gamble 1988;Thompson 1986). The boom rested on Reagan's attempt to
simultaneously increase public spending, notably in defence, cut taxes, eliminate the
budget-deficit and maintain high interest policies so as to curb inflation. While the
combination of these objectives is a mathematical impossibility, Reagan's
monetarism formulated the attempt to reassert control over the working class
through austerity measures and to encourage capital reproduction through credit and
fiscal expansion; the unfettered operation of the market forces on the basis of
unregulated monetary and credit expansion and the enforcement of debt over the
working class. The shift to credit-expansion involved the retention of a tight
monetary framework over the conditions of life through the deregulation of wage
protection, cuts in social spending, the restructuring of the welfare state in terms of
repression and efficiency and the increase of poverty and tax traps, pushing a vast
number of people into a life of poor wages and insecure employment. The relaxation
of monetary policies was embedded in the attempt to restore the rule of the money
through a policy of financial conservatism (Clarke 1987,1988a;Gamble 1982,
1988;Thompson 1986). The target of this policy was not to subordinate functioning
capital to the limits of credit, but to subordinate the conditions of life to a stringent
deflationary attack that persisted throughout the 1980's. In this context, the shift to
discretionary policies made impossible the restoration of a Keynesian-inspired
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collaboration with trade unions so as to establish a form of negotiation of order over
integration costs in exchange for social peace. Instead, social peace was to be imposed
rather than negotiated in the attempt to make the social environment certain without
thereby making extensive monetary concessions to the working class. Under the
impact of relaxed monetary policies and Reagan's 'military Keynesianism' (Clarke
1988a;Frank 1987;Gamble 1988), the attack on the way in which the working class
was officially integrated moved into the centre of monetarist inspired management of
accumulation. As Gamble (1988, p. 122) puts it, "Keynesian techniques continued to
be used, only now the objective was to restore financial stability rather than to
preserve high levels of employment and growth". Discretionary policies aimed at
reducing wage-costs and living standards through restrictive monetary policies that
discriminated against the working class, and through restrictive fiscal policies
which restricted consumer demand and increased the tax burden discriminating in
favour of capital through tax incentives. The retention of a tight monetary
framework, domestically and internationally, involved the imposition of money in
command over the conditions of life: i.e. the use of the welfare state not as a means of
recuperating the effects of unemployment but as an institution administering a
socially controlled imposition of economic and financial insecurity.
The imposition of money in command involved, as its precondition, the oppressive
use of force so as to secure the pacification of social aspirations on the basis of
poverty and so as to secure the domestication of the disruptive power labour to resist
debt enforcement. The law and order imposition of money in command (and the
converse) involved thus the use of money not as a means of transforming protest into
demand but as a means of enforcing debt and of supervising possible monetary control
collapses through bureaucratic means of repression and the imposition of obedience
through law and order control. However, the enforcement of debt required the
financing of the oppressive monetary decomposition of class on the basis of the
private individual, thus permitting increasing levels of public expenditure. Further,
the monetary decomposition of class relationships involved the state in relaxing
monetary policies so as to contain the class struggle through the only consistent way
of imposing the wage relation, i.e. sustained accumulation. Reagan's policy of easy
credit and deficit financing of demand increased the budget-deficit of the US
enormously from $39 billion in 1980 to $221 billion in 1985 (Guttmann 1989, p.
42) at the same time as domestic debt of all kinds rose 15 to 20% faster than the
US's GNP (Frank 1987, p. 3). The return to a policy of easy credit and the
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stimulating effect of the budget-deficit financing of demand established the basis for
the US boom in 1983-4 (Guttmann 1989). The attempt to integrate labour into the
capital relation involved the deficit financing of sustained accumulation and the costs
of decomposing class relations on the basis of tight money. Further, the boom made
possible the decomposition of class relations through the discriminating effects of the
boom: i.e. the segmentation of labour markets (retaining of, and wage concession to,
skilled workers and imposing poverty on the basis of rising state expenditure over
those the boom passed by); and the preemptive desolidarisation of possible resistance
through the imposition of a sense of inequality (supporting those who gained during
the boom and discriminating against the vast majority of the population who were its
victims). However, the costs of integrating labour into the capital relations militated
against a policy of debt enforcement. Despite its emphasis on sound money,
monetarist policies have presided over an explosion of debt, an orgy of speculation
and a stock market boom which accelerated, despite the rhetoric of the Thatcher and
Reagan governments on the powers of competition, the centralisation of capital and
the monopolisation of the market.
The boom of the 1980's rested on the intensification of exploitation, the
destruction of productive capacity and mass unemployment on a scale unprecedented
since the end of the second World War. However, the barrier of the limited market
was suspended by fiscal expansion and a global explosion of credit, based on the
renewed budget-deficit financing of demand in the US. The boom rested on the
integration of labour into the capital relation on the basis speculation, constituting
the circuit of social capital on the basis of an accumulation of debt. The sustaining of
accumulation by credit-expansion gave the boom an inflationary bias which dictated
tight monetary policies throughout the 1980's. Persisting high interest rates in all
major capitalist countries (Hubner 1988) allowed banks to cushion losses and to
yield real returns on monetary investment. The inflationary bias of the boom
gathered pace in the later half of the 1980's. Further, major financial deregulations
in the US (Guttmann 1989) and the UK (Coakley 1984) abolished interest rate
controls so as to make the supply of credit more flexible, especially in times of
acellerating rates of inflation, and to inject a competitive edge to the banking system.
The global liberalisation of financial markets and the deregulation of credit controls
made possible an orgy of speculation during the 1980's, the breeding of profits by
unemployed capital through unproductive investment in money markets. Under the
impact of financial deregulation and a policy of easy credit, "consumer expenditure
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surged forward, financed by a fall in personal savings as inflation moderated and by a
rapid growth of consumer credit" (Clarke 1988a, p. 164). In the US, savings fell
dramatically from about 6% of personal inomce in the 1970's to 2.9% in 1985
(Guttmann 1989, p. 42). The unregulated and uncontrolled banking system made it
possible for a great number of people to maintain, in the face of a policy of state
austerity, living standards through access to private credit. In the face of austerity
policies, the only way to sustain living standards for a great number of people was to
incur debt. Monetarist policies developed, after 1982, a two-fold face: credit-
sustained accumulation and the unrestricted and unregulated expansion of credit on
the one hand, and the integration of private debt through austerity policies with an
abrasive enforcement of debt over the conditions of life on the other. However, the
enormous accumulation of debt during the 1980's contradicted the political attempt
to guarantee convertibility of credit in cash payment through a policy of debt
enforcement over the working class. Not only did the abrasive attack on living
standards require domestication costs, but, also, the deregulation of financial
markets increased the pressure on central reserves through the increase in public
and private debt. Alongside soaring foreign debt, domestic debt in the US increased
dramatically during the 1980's. In the US, private household debt increased from
$1,626 billion in 1982 to $3,176 billion by 1988 (Bond 1990, p. 151;see
Berthould/Kempten 1990 for the UK). Further, corporate indebtedness increased
dramatically during the 1980's (Bond 1990), a development which, by the end of
the 1980's, caused banks to write-off bad debt on an enormous scale (see Guttmann
1989; The Guardian 2.8.1990). The more credit is committed, the more claims on
not-yet existing surplus value accumulate, while the central banks face a growing
mountain of claims on their reserves in the face of a falling rate of savings. The more
debt was stimulated during the 1980's, the more the state had to reduce its
expenditure so as to guarantee the convertibility of debt into means of payment.
However, public expenditure increased during the 1980's, making the political
guarantee of debt as claim on tax revenue difficult. The boom of the 1980's
accelerated the autonomisation of monetary from productive accumulation, an
autonomisation which fuelled the boom and which led to the crash in 1987.
The containment of the debtor crisis through the reshuffling of debt and the shift of
debt to the US gave the boom an intensely fragile foundation. Since Mexico's
declaration of insolvency in 1982, crisis management became a routine as debt
service was renegotiated and payments postponed. Crisis management of debt opened
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up new opportunities for profitable advance of Eurodollar. While the rate in which
credit to debtor countries grew declined sharply in 1983 and while additional credit
was invoked to service debt (Altvater/Hubner 1987;Lipietz 1987;Schubert 1985),
the financing of the US budget-deficit offered a new speculative outlet for interest
seeking capital: the vicious circle of debt reproduced itself in ever more intense
forms. At the same time, banks sought to reduce the risk of defaulting credit by
establishing a 'second hand market' for bills of exchange. This market offered bills of
payment of debtor countries to speculative capital for reduced prices. This new
speculative channel for superfluous capital was risky. However, the risk was
cushioned by a 'risk-rate': the interest to be paid by debtors related to the nominal
value of the bill while its real value was much lower (Altvater/Hubner 1987).
Multinational companies are also engaged in this second-hand market. By buying
second hand bills of payment from banks and by exchanging their purchased claim for
real national currency in debtor countries they attained cheap access to direct
investment in a given country with low wages and intense working conditions. While
multinational companies extended their business by taking over productive capacity
at a bargain price (Altvater/Hubner 1987;Lipietz 1987), weaker capitals found
themselves under intense competitive pressure, resulting in liquidation and
concentration of capital globally. The shift of productive capacity into debtor
countries helped to devalue productive capacity, on a relatively cheap basis,
internally, and to undermine resistance to the reassertion of the right to manage in
metropolitan countries.
The speculative dimension of the boom is expressed in the autonomisation of money
capital from functioning capital. In the US alone, $ 575 billion was spend on some
16.250 separate merger deals between 1979 and 1985 (Wachtel 1987, p. 17). The
massive corporate debt, including the inflation of short term stock values (Pillay
1988), incurred by mergers had to become real value. The expansion of
international credit and speculation led to an overvaluation of share prices (Glyn
1988) that permitted a growing disproportion between the market and the book
value of enterprises (Pillay 1988), permitting an ever more fictitious character of
accumulation. In 1984, global financial flows were anywhere from $20 trillion to
$50 trillion, while world trade in goods and services amounted to only $2 trillion
(The Economist 2.3. 1985, p. 11). This development coincided with an intensified
investment of speculative capital in future markets and an accelerated turn-over of
money capital (Guttmann 1989). The volume of the turn-over of fictitious capital on
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financial markets reaches on an average business day, as approximated by the New
Yorker Federal Reserve (cited in Pillay 1988, p. 70), $1 trillion in 1987, that is
$2 billion per minute. This volume does not include turn-over of capital in
commodity transactions, nor wage anchor salary payments, nor the credit taken for
these payments (Pillay 1988, p. 70-1). During the 1980's, credit market
indebtedness grew by 9% per year, while the market value of shares grew by 12%
and public debt titles by 17% per year (Pillay 1988, p. 70). In the third quarter of
1987, the daily world wide trade in futures and options peaked at $750 billion,
while daily movements of funds in currency exchange amounted to $200 billion.
From the end of June 1977 until the end of June 1987, the volume of interbank
exchange increased by ten times, approximating $1 trillion in June 1987 (ibid).
The containment of labour on the basis of an autonomisation of money capital from
functioning capital expresses the presence of labour in and against capital in the
form of the speculative and fragile movement of capital. The intensification of work
and the revolutionising of the methods of production was not based on a recomposition
of production, subordinating the labour to the valorisation process, but on the
reconstitution of the circuit of social capital on the basis of a credit-explosion.
During the 1980's, the increase in productivity derived from the liquidation of
unproductive producers in the early 1980's and from industry shedding labour to a
much greater extent than output fell during the recession. The destruction of
unproductive producers and the imposition of effective work made possible rises in
productivity, while pseudovalidation of profits made possible the containment of
labour's productive power within the circuit of social capital on the basis of
speculation. The speculative boom of the 1980's is an expression of the crisis of
capital's domination over labour's productive power. The expansion of credit and the
associated spill over of capital into unproductive and speculative channels indicates
the enormous autonomisation of monetary from productive accumulation, an
accumulation of capital which was inconvertible into capitalist command over labour
for the purpose of expanded exploitation. The containment of the abstract category of
labour within tbe value form was based on the political guarantee of global debt by
the US. Once again, the productive imposition of work and the containment of labour
within the limits of capital in the US asserted itself as a condition of stability of
international reproduction of capital.
The recovery of accumulation after 1982 expresses labour's productive power not
only in terms of increased output which capital contained within the limits of its
1 27
form by speculative credit-expansion. The productive power of labour is expressed,
also, in the revolutionising of its disruptive power. The revolutionising of its
disruptive power is expressed in the form of the new methods of production that have
been implemented unevenly, incrementally and spasmodically, but increasingly
since the late 1970's.
The boom of the 1980's did not reintegrate those made redundant into expanded
capitalist command over labour for the purpose of exploitation. The closure of plant
has occurred at the same time as the leading corporations have been implementing
programmes for investing in new machinery on a very large scale. Under conditionjof
intense international competition, this investment fostered the tendency to
overaccumulation because the revolutionising of labour's productive power increased
output compensating for the liquidation/devaluation of capital during the recession.
The revolutionising of labour's productive power increased output in such a way that
capital found it difficult to regard the unemployed as a component of variable capital
(i.e. living labour as a component of capital's imposition of the valorisation
process). The organisation of those 'disenfranchised' from direct capitalist command
in production involved the state in imposing the capitalist form of social
reproduction over the working class. Such an imposition, however, involves
normalisation and domestication costs militating against the reduction of public
expenditure. However, how can one understand that capital, in the face of a major
success in reasserting its right to manage in the form of speed-up, and the curbing of
customs and practices, did not adopt a managerial strategy of hire and fire, of job and
employment flexibilisation?
The way in which the new methods of production were implemented by capital took
away control from the production workers and furthered centralised management
control (A. Polled 1988). The compulsion for each individual capital to increase the
density of work (i.e. increased flexibility/mobility in work) made itself felt through
the increased productive power of labour which the new means of production allowed.
Capital's attempt to increase flexibilisation in work (and in employment) is not new
(4). As A. Polled (1988, p. 45) argues, "capital has always required flexibility of
labour; the struggle over its control has structured management, developed the
capital labour process and form of labour organisation. Capital's harnessing of
flexibilisation of living labour is the most important feature of the labour process".
Management's attempts to increase labour's flexibility and mobility in work
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"remains an area of struggle as it was before; in spite of unemployment and the
appropriation of 'flexibility' as a managerial and market concept..." (ibid., p. 70).
The area of struggle mentioned by Polled is the struggle over the way in which
management seeks to set labour in motion. This struggle involves the recomposition
of the use of living labour in production by extending and intensifying the working
day, by curbing living labour's rigidity (i.e. absenteeism, sabotage, and deliberate
sloppiness), by increasing mobility within production, by 'flexibilising' wages
(upwards and downwards and hence against each other), by decentralising bargaining
procedures based on individual worker's performance, by imposing wage
differentials in the attempt to undermine collective identity in favour of paternalism
and individual gratification for quality work (see Garrahan/Steward 1989 on
Nissan) (5), by recomposing the hierarchical organisation of control and the role
trade unions in the negotiation of order, by curbing health and safety standards, by
curbing costums and practices etc. However, management had to reorganise work not
only against the resistance of the working class, but also with the agreement of the
working class if capital was to ensure the productive potential of self-discipline at
work (i.e. 'work with pride': Holloway 1987). The high capital intensity asserted
labour's productive and disruptive power as marginal disruptions of work have a
considerable impact on the organisation of continuous production.
The continuity of production is of vital importance if capital is to avoid devaluation
and competitive erosion. The sustaining of continuous production is much more
important in the face of overaccumulation, a high organic composition of capital and
the supremacy of interest bearing over functioning capital. The new methods of
production need to be consumed much more productively by stretching their
productive potentials to the limits (intensification and extension of exploitation).
While good working relations with trade unions might solve some of these problems,
control can never be strong enough to be always master. Competitive pressure to
realise abstract labour on contracting markets bears down on the individual
producer as constant pressure to eradicate the volatility of the living, form-giving
fire of labour. The revolutionising of labour's productive power centred around
robotisation, computerisation, and computer aided screening and monitoring of
work. Monitoring, screening and work pacing by robots offered a means of control
with which management sought to ensure effective work performance. New
technology was of help as it supervised much more efficiently the direct production
process. According to Palloix (1976;see also Coriat 1980;Coriat/Zarifian 1986;
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Woods 1986) the productive potential of the new methods of production is due to the
advance delivered by new technology in controlling living labour. Equipped with
computer aided forms of control, every minute of the worker's day can be monitored
and the worker's work rate can be paced (CSE 1980). "The application of technology
has been more about control than about flexibility" (Wood 1987, p. 14 on the
restructuring in the car industry)(6). By watching a screen, foremen are able to
monitor how fast workers are working and when they take breaks (see CSE 1980).
This development had implications for the function of management to contribute to
the collective process of production by setting labour in motion. The function of
management to control labour is implied by the wage contract that merely concerns
the price of labour power and hence the ability to work. The realisation of labour's
potential to work is by no means a simple economic exchange; it is a process outside
the limits of the market. The class struggle over the imposition of work recomposed
the role of management as the implementation of computer-aided control involved the
redundancy of established rules and practices (or customs and practices and job
demarcations). The implementation of computer-aided means of control diffused
management's control over labour to the shop floor through screening. However, the
diffusion of management to the shop floor had to permit a certain degree of job
control by workers so as to exploit the productive potential of workers'
self-discipline and job motivation.
i
The continuity of production is dependent on at "least a measure of self-discipline
of the work-force, the consciousness of a work obligation which requires the
performance of a 'fair day's work'" (Hyman 1989a, p. 30). In general, employers
sought to achieve competitive advantages by human resource management (see Hyman
1985b) so as to have a devoted work-force and, as such, to reduce the risk of
deliberate sloppiness, sabotage and absenteeism (7). In the face of overaccumulation
and crisis the greater the intensity of capital, the greater is the risk that marginal
discontinuity in production turns into competitive disadvantage and, as such, into a
devaluation of existing productive capital. There is hence reason for private capital
to be reluctant to impose the 'right to manage' through a ruthless managerial policy
of hire and fire. "Employers require not merely the passive compliance of their
workers with specific managerial orders but their active co-operation, ingenuity
and initiative" (Hyman 1989b, p. 30)(8). A devoted labour force provides a
competitive advantage. The power of labour is expressed in managerial strategies
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that, even at the moment of a defeat of the organised labour movement during the
early 1980's, seek to achieve 'a real break-through in attitudes' (9) through human
resource management rather than by an overt imposition of command. When there
are some four million unemployed, few managers attempt to control simply by
wielding the threat of the sack as the "inevitable outcome would be bloody-minded
resentment and active or passive sabotage" (Hyman 1985b, p. 103-4). Additionally,
the new means of production require particular skills. For example, operator jobs in
British manufacturing industry were down by 35%; craftsmen jobs by 15%, and
supervision jobs down by 31%. On the other hand, employment of scientists and
technologists in industry increased by 40% (Bassett 1986, p. 17) The form of
constant capital demanded the harnessing of the productive potential of a motivated
and devoted work force. Further, the skills that the new means of production
demanded are in short supply. "Yesterday's labour aristocrats, once contemptuous of
those on the margins like women, now find themselves on the scrap heap" and the
"young find that no-one wants their muscles" (Leadbeater/Lloyd 1987, p. 196). The
shortage of skilled labour which the new methods of production demanded made it
necessary for management to retain and motivate skilled labour so as to consolidate
internal labour markets. In turn, the retaining and motivation of skilled labour
involves that the imposition of work had to be imposed in a way which is more or less
acceptable to workers.
Employers could not just adopt Edwardes's (1984) prescription and practice as to
how to reassert the 'right to manage' because it would undermine the self-discipline
of workers that is needed to make the intense composition of capital productive.
Management depended on retaining and motivating its labour force. The dependence on
particularly the skilled section of the work-force and the competitive advantage of
work motivation rendered impossible a policy of hiring and firing. As such, the new
means of production are only implementable by bigger capitals having the means of
buying off their work-force and having the financial resources, including credit
worthiness, of meeting the minimum cost of production (entry barrier of
production). In sum, the revolutionising of labour's productive power asserted itself
not only in the form of increased output which was realised on the basis of global
deficit financing of demand. The productive power of labour asserted itself also in the
form of constant capital that demanded a motivated, devoted and skilled work-force.
In sum, the revolutionising of the productive forces involved the reassertion of
labour's productive and disruptive power which, in the form of constant capital,
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impinged on capital in the form of a shortage of skilled labour, high investment costs
and a high capital intensity. Instead of increasing the turn-over of labour so as to
undermine the downward rigidity of wages and so as to impose work by telling the
worker what to do and at what speed, management relied on consolidating internal
labour markets. Further, the boom did not absorb those who were made redundant
during the early 1980's. Mass unemployment persisted throughout the 1980's. The
revolutionising of labour's productive power did not result in an expansion of
capitalist accumulation absorbing those made redundant. This development signals
that capital found it difficult to consider the social labour power as a variable
component for expanded surplus value production. Capital's revolutionising of
labour's productive power coincided with the exclusion of a vast number of people
from direct production. Additionally, management responded to the disruptive power
of labour by conceding wage increases; the monetisation of protest into demand. The
average increase in wages during the 1980's seemed to have been, however
reluctantly, acceptable for management as a quid pro quo for industrial peace and
intensified work. Given the competitive advantage of good working relations with
labour, the managerial strategies might be termed 'payment for commitment'.
The costly revolutionising of production led to managerial strategies of decreasing
the faux frais cost of production (e.g. cost of storing components of production) so as
to achieve a competitive advantage by decreasing cost price of production. Here too,
the issue of continuity is of vital importance. For individual capitals engaged in
strategies such as just-in-time production (see Sayer 1986), the central issue of
containing labour within the concept of profitability constitutes itself as a question
of control over living labour within and beyond the direct production. From the point
of view of management to organise the direct production process the practicality of
just-in-time production presupposes a social environment that is certain (Holloway
1987). Disruption in production of required components interrupts production
beyond the particular company in which the disruption occurred by disrupting the
whole productive system constituted by just-in-time. The disruptive potential
involved in just-in-time production was highlighted in the recent national strike at
Ford-UK (early 1988). The implementation of just-in-time at Ford-Europe
implies that stocks were reduced to the very limits of the requirement for final
assembly. When the strike started, "the effect has been that, as soon as Ford workers
in Britain started their strike, Ford's multinational production in the rest of Europe
was crippled because of a shortage of supply" (Martin 1988, p. 50). In the face of
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huge loss in production and money, Ford was forced to give in to the demands of its
work-force after only a short period of strike action. Just-in-time production
makes capital enormously vulnerable to disruption, once social peace breaks down.
While the work-force in one factory might be committed to work, the one in another
might not, causing the disruption of production in both. Reduction of the work-force,
automatisation and cost saving organisation of production increased the productive
power of labour and its disruptive potential; the presence of labour in and against
capital asserted itself in the form of constant capital.
The willingness of employers to manage industrial relations by consolidating
internal labour markets needs to be set in the context of the integration of abstract
labour with the value form on the basis of credit-expansion. Reproductive capital
has to realise not only its own capital but also that of its creditors. Industrial
relations difficulties not only involve competitive disadvantage on the produce
market but foster also speculative movement of money capital on the stock market.
Such movements might well produce adverse effects on the liquidity of enterprise, in
particular at times of nervous financial markets. Money capital offers additional
credit as long as this investment offers real returns. The increase in productivity
after 1982 offered such a security. However, this security was fragile as labour's
productive power was contained within the value form through credit-expansion. The
stability of international money depended on the productive imposition of work.
However, labour's productive and disruptive power implied a strong bargaining
position vis-a-vis management. Capital's command over labour's productive and
disruptive power depended on retaining and motivating labour and on the stability of
global credit markets which underpinned productive activity. The revolutionising of
labour's productive and disruptive power was not contained on the basis of the
development of new forms of production, i.e. the integration of the social labour
power into an expansive reproduction of surplus value production and the
constitution of the circuit of social capital on the basis of an integration of the
valorisation with the labour process. Rather, the category of abstract labour was
integrated with the value form on the basis of a credit-explosion and a credit
expansion. The ability of capital to realise abstract value on the market was based on
the fictitious integration of production and circulation: i.e. the restoration of
profitability for reproductive capita! was based on the suspension of limited markets
through the massive redistribution of income in favour of the rich and the enormous
expansion of credit, in particular in the US. The shift of debt to the US and the
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diversion of surplus capital into global deficit financing of demand contained labour's
productive power during the 1980's. The boom of the 1980's has been based on the
intensification of work, the revolutionising of labour's productive power and the
containment of this power within the limits of the value form through deficit demand
management. The stability of the boom depended on the ability of the multiplicity of
states, in particular the US, to underpin credit-expansion through monetary and
credit policies. The security of the global flow of money depended on the capacity of
the state to secure acceptance by international credit-markets of the convertibility
of the huge increase of speculative capital into reserve money. The stability of the
boom depended on the ability of the multiplicity of states to impose the money power
of capital upon the conditions of life. The restoration of financial stability depended
on the ability of the multiplicity of states to enforce the imposition of the abstract
equality of money upon the working class. Such an imposition involved,
fundamentally, the enforcement of debt over the working class and the international
guarantee of the credit expansion that financed the US's deficits. In the UK, the
eradication of debt was achieved through the recomposition of the welfare state,
decreasing personal allowances, the imposition of tight monetary control over the
local state and, fundamentally, through North Sea Oil profits that kept the balance of
payment positive, as well as the financing of public expenditure through
privatisation of nationalised industry.
During the boom, superfluous capital found new speculative outlets in financing the
growing US budget-deficit, while rates of profits remained lower than interest
expectations. International stability rested on high interest policies, especially in
the US. The redistribution of wealth in favour of the rich and high interest rates
stabilised the dollar which, in turn, stabilised global money markets through the
absorption of superfluous money that financed expansionary deficit demand
management. However, the realisation of capital on the US market was largely
fictitious, financed by budget deficits, which themselves were financed from
Eurodollar markets. The boom rested on the ability of the US to reconcile rising
deficits with a strong dollar, thus accommodating global recovery with the
absorption of speculative capital. High interest rates in the US led to an appreciation
of the dollar (the dollar exchange rate increased by 60% compared with a basket of
currencies on world market between 1981 and 1985: Guttmann 1989, p. 42).
However, the appreciated dollar increased imports into the US at the same time as US
exports decreased. As a consequence, the US trade deficit deteriorated. However,
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net-imports into the US stimulated economic growth in other countries, stimulating
a recovery on the world market. Further, the appreciated dollar reduced the risk of
inflation because of the import of relatively cheap commodities from other countries
into the US and the depressive effect of the dollar on prices on the world market.
Further, the deteriorating US trade deficit reduced the economic growth rate in the
US at the same time as superfluous capital found new ventures of investment on the
US credit market. The financing of the eormous US's trade and budget deficits through
capital imports transformed the US from being the biggest creditor to being the
biggest debtor of the world (Dziobek 1987). This deficit was financed by borrowing,
the dollar being sustained by the inflow of speculative capital and debt bondage forced
upon so-called debtor countries (Frank 1987). In the aftermath of the debtor crisis
in 1982, this development opened up new opportunities for banks to switch the focus
of loans to governments of advanced capitalist countries (Altvater 1985;Coakley
1988). The money flow into the US was made possible by high interest rates in the
US. This development permitted the US dollar to remain world currency, despite the
rapid deterioration of the US national economy (Frank 1987;Altvater 1985;Hubner
1 988).
The growing tension between the speculative containment of labour's productive
power and the ability to guarantee the convertibility of debt into central bank money
depended on the stability of international money markets which, in turn, depended on
the stability of the dollar. The stability of the dollar depended on the productive
imposition of work in the US and the containment of the working class, domestically
and internationally, through austerity measures. However, the "high dollar reduced
the US exports" (Evans 1988, p. 13). As in the late 1960's and late 1970's, the
national economy of the US was not only weak in relation to its main competitors, but
on the edge of a deep crisis. Reaganomics put a face of glamour on this development
while in fact fostering decline. The containment of labour's productive and disruptive
power had taken a new turn in that the world money markets developed on a
depressive spiral ever the more fragile the more the boom progressed. The
restoration of the international role of the dollar and the international chain of debt
was living on borrowed time. This time was running out as the US trade imbalance,
financed through credit, grew out of all proportion (Hubner 1988). In 1982 the US
had a debt of $6 billion which grew to $130 billion by 1987 (Dziobek 1987, p. 60)
and to more than $500 billion of foreign debt and $11.4 trillion of domestic debt at
the end of the decade (Bond 1990, p. 175), compared with an external 'Third World'
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debt of $1.3 trillion at the end of 1988 (ibid.). Reagan's attempt to make the US
politically and economically strong again by 'living beyond its means' turned the
supply side policy to a supply of foreign capital. This development made high interest
rates in the rest of the world a means of checking the flow of money capital to the US
and for stabilising currency. The initial success in putting downward pressure on
inflation proved to be a boomerang because of the increase in the money supply
through international deficit financing and fiscal redistribution of wealth in favour
of the rich. In the face of the unresolved debtor crisis, the sustaining of labour's
productive power in the form of capital through speculation could not last.
By 1985, the US responded to increasing speculative pressure on the dollar that,
in the face of a deteriorating balance of payments, threatened to halt the US boom. The
US reacted by devaluing the dollar in the attempt to "reduce its need for foreign
finance not by curtailing domestic accumulation, but by devaluation so as to make
exports more attractive" (Evans 1988, p. 13). While the rest of the world had to
cope with inflationary pressure, difficulties in maintaining export rates and in
preventing import penetration, the devaluation of the dollar drove the dollar into an
uncontrollable slide threatening to destabilise the international monetary system
which was working with an overextended volume and turn-over of fictitious capital
that, itself, was spreading into more and more speculative channels (Traber 1986).
In order to prevent this slide from ruining the domestic accumulation, European and
Japanese Central Banks spent £70 billion between January and May 1987 in the
attempt to stabilise exchange relations (Evans 1988, p. 14). In the event, official
intervention by central banks meant that they effectively financed over a third of the
US trade deficit in the first half of 1987. The international attempt to stabilise
exchange rates failed, unleashing "a renewed round of real competition for financial
capital and real investment between the United States on the one hand and Germany
and Japan on the other. The chosen weapon in this economic warfare was a repetition
of competitive interest rates hikes, which among other things depressed bond values
and stock prices" (Frank 1987, p. 4). While the rate of return on US bonds
increased from 8% in January 1987 to just over 10% at the beginning of October,
and while the stock market boom continued to attract capital, the price of shares had
risen, by the end of August, "to a level that yielded a return of only 5 per cent"
(Evans 1988, p. 14). In the face of an enormous accumulation of debt that looked
more and more dubious, the combination of overliquidity of money capital and
declining rates of return gave momentum to increased speculation that ruptured in
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1987. The crash in 1987, and its after shocks in 1988 when £5000 billion were
wiped off on the London Stock Exchange in August (see The Guardian 16.8.1988), and
in October 1989, indicated the fragile foundations of the boom.
The crash, while bringing home dramatically how precarious were the foundations
of the boom, did not result in an entire meltdown of the stock market, which was
prevented by a temporary shutdown of the futures exchange in Chicago (see Frank
1987). Further, the stock market boom during the 1980's had a "negligible effect in
encouraging capital accumulation" (Glyn 1988, p. 22), as can be seen in the big
disproportion between monetary and productive growth rates. On this score, the
crash wiped out speculative capital that had accumulated by investment in junk
bonds, overvalued shares, safety net markets, and other secondary markets. Further,
the Federal Reserve launched a rescue operation on the day after the crash, providing
financial help to cover losses. Additionally, it reduced the dollar exchange rate and
interest rates, permitting industry to survive the crash without further damage
(Guttmann 1989, p. 47). However, the crash indicated how far the autonomisation of
unemployed capital that could not be reconverted into capitalist command over labour
had developed.
Whether the rupture of the tension between capitalist command over labour and the
supremacy of the meaningless, but elementary, form of money capital will lead on to
a deep depression or a prolonged crisis-ridden process "with alternating phases of
recession, stagflation, and even renewed bursts of accumulation" (Clarke 1988b, p.
87) depends on the outcome of the class struggle over the imposition of work and the
ability of political authorities to reimpose the value form upon the conditions of life
(i.e. debt enforcement). However, there is no doubt that the crash in 1987 has set
the containment of labour's productive power through credit-expansion and
speculation to music. Before the crash, the multiplicity of states failed to square the
circle of simultaneously balancing domestic budgets and foreign trade, stable interest
rates and exchange rates and economic growth without triggering inflation or
recession. Mutual dependence between the multiplicity of states, with the supremacy
of the US, and immobility on the domestic and international economic front, indicates
that the room for manoeuvre is more than ever restricted after the crash. After the
crash, capital succeeded in sustaining the boom by reconciling global reproduction
with controlled devaluation of superfluous capital. Since 1987, a series of partial
defaults were "juggled skillfully by the bureaucrats and money mandarins of the
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international financial system (primarily the US Federal Reserve, International
Monetary Fund, Bank for International Settlements), and backed by easy government
'lender of last resort' liquidity for highly exposed and especially vulnerable financial
institutions" (Bond 1990, p. 173). However, the skillful control of partial default
coincided with a further increase in global debt. Estimates by financial experts
suggest that the US foreign debt will be at about $1000 billion by 1991 (Guttmann
1989, p. 42;Bond 1990). Additionally, interest rates are on the way up again,
sacrificing productive activity on the altar of money. "There is no doubt that we are
entering a period in which the overaccumulation of capital will lead to an
intensification of class struggle and increased domestic and international tensions"
(Clarke 1988b, p. 87). The inflation of credit and the channelling of money capital
into increasingly speculative and unproductive forms of investment is the most
powerful expression of the non-resolution of the crisis of overaccumulation and the
current fragility of the reproduction of social relations of production. The financial
system survived the crises of 1974, 1979 and 1982. The crash in 1987 "has
further undermined the pyramid of debt, and it is unlikely that it could survive
another severe blow" (Clarke 1988a, p. 175). The development of class struggle is
by no means predictable. However, if there were to be a renewed US contraction and a
major default of credit, a global collapse would be likely.
II The Implications of the Money Power of Capital for the State
After the break-down of Bretton Woods, nation states are no longer insulated from
short-term speculation on the international money markets. For the state, the
barrier to the sustained domestic accumulation appears in the form of global
constraints on the realisation of national welkh in money on the world market. The
global limits of accumulation assert themselves to the domestic organisation of
accumulation through the money power of capital. The credit-sustained accumulation
integrates labour into the capital relation on the basis of global deficit financing,
sustaining accumulation in a more and more speculative dimension. The speculative
dimension of accumulation impinges on the state through the speculative movement of
superfluous capital. The mobility of speculative capital asserts the rupture of
capital's domination over labour's productive power in the form of international
financial volatility over the conversion of debt into means of payments. International
volatile money increased uncertainties of economic and financial policies. The
deregulation of exchange rates increased the volatility of the international
realisation of national wealth as it is only after profits realised in dollars on the
world market are converted into the money of bookkeeping that individual capitals
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located in a particular nation state are able to determine whether the cost price of
production is recovered and whether an average rate of profit is realised. The
reassertion of monetary constraint over the state in the form of balance of payment
problems and international speculative pressure against currency checked the
imposition of work and domestic financial soundness, subordinating monetary and
credit policies to the global limits of accumulation. In the event, the deregulation of
international money markets and floating exchange rates made a nationally
engineered recovery of accumulation through monetary expansion impossible. "With
conditions of high inflation and little economic growth the spectrum of economic
activity about which decisions have to be made shifts to a much quicker and unstable
regime, led by the exchange rates" (Thompson 1986, p. 48). International monetary
pressure on national currency put constraints on budget-deficit financing as
international capital movements began to undermine domestic attempts to contain
labour by stimulating productive activity through deficit spending. Pressure to
rectify inflationary money supply and to reduce public debt asserted itself over the
state in the form of a destabilising movement against the exchange rate by private
capital. As "capital movements within the international economy began to dominate
balance of payment and exchange rate considerations" (Thompson 1986, p. 13) the
uncertainty of the domestic organisation of money increased, asserting pressures to
curb inflationary credit-expansion, i.e. state deficit financing as a means of
integrating labour's productive and disruptive power. The ultimate sanction for a
domestically engineered management of accumulation (expansive policy) that is in
some way 'incompatible' with global accumulation was speculative pressure on its
national currency. Such pressure restricts national authority over money and
credit-expansion and subordinates national policies to the international movement of
money capital. While the multiplicity of states guarantee all money, the national
organisation of money became more and more dependent on the global flow of capital
outside the state's control. In sum, the international monetary pressure on the
national organisation of money implied that national authority over monetary
policies was severely restricted as it was the international flow of money which
imposed global constraints on nation states. National authorities could no longer
spend their way out of a recession and could no longer contain labour's productive and
disruptive power by transforming protest into demand.
The containment of labour on the basis of deficit financing of 'integration costs'
(social reforms, welfare, full employment guarantees) and balance of payment
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deficits involves the contradiction that the state incurs debt, the validity of which
depends on the capacity of the state to act as lender of last resort. In order to
guarantee convertibility, national authorities need larger, not smaller, reserves
(Clarke 1988a), so as to be able to convert claims on central bank money, if the
stability of international exchange on the world market is be secured and the global
flow of capital maintained. Failure to secure acceptance of international money
holders through the political guarantee of convertibility of money into central bank
money involves, firstly, speculative pressure on currency, prompting a diversion of
the global flow of money and threatening to undermine the integration of domestic
accumulation into the world market. It involves, secondly, a destabilisation of
international credit-relations as creditors demand cash payment, threatening to
undermine the reproduction of all social relations which rest on credit. The
implication of unregulated global credit-relations is that the state transforms from
being redistributor of wealth in the last instance into lender of last resort in the last
instance (Marazzi 1976). The implication of the liberalisation of international
currency and credit relations was that the state could no longer adhere to policies of
social consensus.
The effect of expansionary credit policies was that, the higher the credit sustained
accumulation, the more additional demand for credit was required in order to avoid a
break-down of the credit-system and to maintain global reproduction of capital in
the face of high inflation and slow rates of economic growth. The regaining of control
over inflation involves the eradication of debt. In turn, the eradication of debt entails
a shift from inflationary demand management to a policy of sound money so as to
improve the reserves and to maintain formal exchange equality. Larger reserves
depend on abandoning an expansionary integration of labour tnrough deficit demand
management. Abandoning deficit-financing implies the deregulation of existing
guarantees of full-employment growth, income (rising welfare expenditure) and the
maintenance of unproductive producers (scrapping of unproductive plants). State
deficit financing does not create possibilities for the state to repay debt directly. The
state deficit can be reduced only through cuts in public expenditure or during a
period of booming accumulation which, itself, presupposes a rigorous intensification
of work and mass devaluation of capital. Such a devaluation, in turn, involves a
possible threat to international credit-relations through debt default, and
bankruptcy of nation states as markedly expressed in 1982 (debtor crisis). The
constituting power of labour impinges on the state through the contradiction between
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functioning and money capital.
So far as the state is concerned, this contradiction appears in the form of a
disunity as between the unfettered revolutionising of labour's productive power (the
so-called 'overheating of the economy') and speculative pressure on currency
(credit-expansion 'incompatible' with global limits of accumulation). However, the
state can not resolve the contradictions of capital through inflationary or
deflationary policies but reproduces them in a political form. The regaining of
control over the money supply involves the enforcement of debt over the conditions
of life. The enforcement of debt over the conditions of life involves the imposition of
money in command (poverty, unemployment, economic insecurity). At the heart of
inflationary and/or deflationary policies lies the class struggle over the imposition
of the value form over the conditions of life. Fundamentally, the imposition of money
in command involves the monetary decomposition oFclass relations, i.e. the
imposition of formal exchange equality on the basis of the categories of property
owner and citizen endowed with certain rights and responsibilities. The imposition of
exchange equality involves the state in imposing the limits of the market over the
ambitions of 'property owners' through the money power of capital as form of social
command: i.e. the suppression of labour's productive power (i.e. the 'overheating of
the economy') and the oppressive accommodation of social aspirations to tight
monetary control. The imposition of money in command involves, in turn, the
attempt to undo the whole way in which social relations were constituted since the
war. Instead of the Keynesian attempt to transform protest into demand, the
imposition of money in command implies the subordination of the social to the limits
of capital, expressed in the abstract equality of money. Instead of income and
employment guarantees, money in command involves the subordination of the
working class to the 'dictates' of the market (pricing into employment, abdication of
political responsibility for recuperating the effects of unemployment and economic
hardship). The imposition of money in command entails the repressive use of state
power so as to supervise the imposition of the commanding power of money over the
conditions of life and to make certain the subordination of the conditions of life to
debt enforcement.
Fundamentally, the attempt to contain labour within the limits of capitalist
reproduction responds to the composition of the class relations that are characterised
by the universalisation of the collective power of labour as the antagonistic force to
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the power of money. Labour's power is collective because of its productive power
which capital sought to contain through credit-expansion and because of the
globalisation of its collective power as, for example, the assertion of resistance
against austerity policies in debtor countries involved a threat to the stability of
international credit-relations and the political stability of the multiplicity of states.
On this score, labour assumes an existence as an antagonistic force to the power of
money; labour assumes existence as a collective subject that exists in the power of
money in a mode of being denied. The rupture of the contradictory unity between
different value forms and the category of abstract labour involves the recomposition
of class as the antithetical subject of money In command. The collective power of
labour is constitutive of the speculative dimension of accumulation as capital cannot
be converted into effective command over labour for expanded exploitation and as
labour resists the decomposition of social relations on the basis of austerity control.
In turn, the category of money is a reification of labour's constituting power. It is a
reification of labour because, in money, the social usefulness of production appears
as a mere thing (interest), inasmuch as the connection of money to labour, and
thereby the constituting power of labour, is seemingly eliminated. Capital, that is
the presence of labour in and against capital, becomes a subject in the form of the
destructive power of money that threatens to undermine the whole way in which the
productive power of labour is contained within the form of capital. However, it was
the failure to contain labour's productive and disruptive power within the concept of
profitability which led to the spill over of unemployed capital into monetary
investment. At the same time, the stability of credit depended on the capacity of
capital to set labour in motion productively. The stability of credit depends on the
reintegration of the abstract category of labour with the value form on the basis of
the supremacy of the valorisation over the labour process. Since the late 1960's,
credit expansion integrated abstract labour with the value form on the basis of
speculative deferral of mass liquidation and of devaluation of capital. The recessions
of 1974-5 and 1979-82 and the crash in 1987 have not removed the tendency to
overaccumulation of capital. Indeed, labour's productive power has been accomodated
by the explosion of domestic and international debt. Inflationary and deflationary
policies reproduced and reinforced the speculative integration of the category of
abstract labour with the value form. The abrasive attack on the working class
through the imposition of money in command imposed the limits of the unfettered
expansion of capital by reimposing formal exchange equality over the conditions of
life.
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The integration of national wealth into the world market depends not on exchange
rate fluctuations, but on the reproductive structure of national economies within the
circuit of social capital on the world market. Although the reassertion of
overaccumulation and crisis in the form of the money power of capital impinges on
all nation states, it is much more severe in the case of the UK. This is so because of
the UK's peculiar integration into the international division of labour, i.e. into the
circuit of capital. From the point of view of the most fundamental level of the world
market, the peculiar integration of nation states exists as a moment, or mode of
existence, of the contradiction of capital in its development of the productive forces
of labour without limits and its need to confine accumulation within the limits of the
capitalist form. Within the international circuit of social capital, the UK attains a
role not only as a low wage and low productivity country (Fine/Harris 1985).
Fundamentally, the UK attains a position as an offshore financial centre in and
through which the monetary circuit of social capital flows. The 'fractionalist
approach', as introduced in chapter I (Ingham,Anderson), accounts for the
peculiarities of the UK as ones which mark the division between finance and
industry. The historical roots of this division can be traced back to the commercial
and financial dominance of the UK in the last two centuries (as expressed in the
power of the City as an international clearing house, the military creation of an
internal market (i.e. the British Empire) and the transnational organisation of
British capital associated with the British empire) (see Ingham 1984;Gamble
1986;Clarke 1988a,1988c). However, such dominance cannot be explained by
the social, economic and political power of finance capital and its embodiment in the
institutional structures of the state and society (as in, for example, Ingham 1984).
Such dominance needs to be explained through the integration of the UK into the
international circuit of capital, a circuit in which the monetary circuit is only one,
however the most elementary and meaningless, moment of the general 'interest' of
capital: profit.
Despite a relative decline of the UK's industrial might relative to its main
competitors, the City of London was able not only to defend its position but to
improve its competitive position by taking advantage of new financial markets. The
competitive position of the City vis-a-vis its main rivals on the world market is
underpinned by the relative advantages of the City as one of the least regulated
banking centres in the world. The international orientation of 'British' capital
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coincides with relatively unrestricted political constraints on enterprise,
permitting the unfettered operation of the market forces beyond domestic
constraints. This liberal political organisation of enterprise underpinned the
international role of the City. It was the City of London which opened up the first
off-shore banking institutions in 1957 (Schubert 1985). "London had a long
history as an international financial centre, although until the 1960s it was still
oriented towards the remnants of the British empire. The City quickly recognised
the importance of the Eurodollar and, with zeal that was in marked contrast to that of
industry, it set about restructuring its operations so as to capture the new market
for itself" (Evans 1985, p. 109). The City is "the main centre of this rapidly
growing international financial market" (ibid.). The City is one of the world's main
centres of all international lending. "In 1982, 27% of all international lending took
place from London, making it far and away the most important single international
centre" (Spence 1985, p. 122). In contrast to the development of the City, the
British economy has gradually declined since the end of the last century (Gamble
1986;lngham 1984;S. Pollqrd 1982).
Ingham and S. Polled are right in pointing out that British industry has been
sacrificed on the altar of money. However, the 'decline of Britain' has by no means
been matched by a decline in the power and prosperity of 'British' capital. "The
overseas strength of British big capital has compounded the debility of British
capitalism" (Rowthorn 1975, p. 175). While the City responded to the decline of the
pound by detaching its operations from reliance on the domestic currency,
productive capital has taken, in the face of domestic mergers and monopolisation (see
Gamble 1986), advantage of the global strength of the City. 'British' capital has
expanded business to international markets. This expansion has been based on
multinational companies. "It helps to account for one of the great paradoxes of
British decline - why an economy performing so poorly should nevertheless have
produced more multinational companies than any other country apart from the
United States" (Gamble 1986, p. 109). The distinctive feature of multinational
companies is not simply that they plan and execute production on a global scale, but
that they internalise the complementary functions of productive, commercial and
money capital, subordinating production to the expanded reproduction of capital by
exploiting opportunities for profit wherever they may be found. The international
orientation of 'British' capital involves more advanced capitals being less dependent
on domestic markets at the same time as their competitive position on the world
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market depends on a policy of financial stability so as to maintain and to improve
formal exchange equality on the world market itself..
After the second World War, a strong pound reduced the cost of 'British' based
multinational companies transferring production abroad as overseas assets could be
acquired relatively cheaply (see Clarke 1988a). The rapid globalisation of capital
accumulation after the World War reinforced the dominance of the City, neutralising
attempts to revive the British economy through inflationary deficit demand
management. The international orientation of 'British' capital coincided with a
powerful pound sterling, permitting a global orientation for exploiting productive
and financial opportunities on the world market. With the restructuring of
international monetary relations (see Bretton Woods), the UK became subject to
strict balance of payments restraints which resulted in the so-called 'stop-go' cycle.
Although the problem of developing the domestic economy within internationally
fixed exchange rates is to some extent the 'normal' situation for any nation state, it
was more severe in the case of the UK because of the reserve role of the pound. The
reserve role of the pound formed the basis for the City's post-war revival as an
international financial centre. The international role of the pound and the
international orientation of 'British' capital was matched by a constant decline in the
productive power of the UK (Gamble 1986;Gamble/Walton 1976), resulting in
constant balance of payment problems and difficulties in stimulating domestic
expansion through deficit financing because of constant pressure on the exchange
rates. After the second world war the pound was no longer backed by the UK's
industrial strength (Gamble/Walton 1976). Pressure on the exchange rate
continued after the break-down of Bretton Woods. The floating of the pound in 1972
meant that the volatility of speculative pressure on the pound intensified while
fictitious transactions which cross international boundaries increased. As these
transactions are in a sense "fictional transactions and indicate nothing else about the
real economic activities that occur within nations" (Harris 1977, p. 127;see also R.
Murray 1975), the contradiction between the tendency of capital to develop the
productive power of labour without limits and the need to confine labour's productive
power within the limits of capital asserted itself over the UK in numerous pound
sterling difficulties. These difficulties express the underlying weakness of imposing
work productively and of containing the working class on the basis of deflationary
attack. "Given the inadequacy of the reserves, every balance of payments crisis
caused a run on sterling and produced measurers to deflate demand and cut credit and
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investment" (Gamble/Walton 1976, p. 156). Because of the relative decline of the
British economy (Gamble 1986), the global limits of accumulation impinged on the
UK in the form of chronic balance of payment deficits and accelerated inflation,
threatening to undermine the solvency of the UK and the formal exchange equality of
'British' capital on the world market. Every balance of payment crisis involved
pressure on sterling, impinging on the state in the form of international pressure on
the currency exchange rate and precipitating difficulties for servicing
credit-financed balance of payment and budget deficits.
In the face of an accumulation of public and private indebtedness during the
1970's, the City's reorientation from purely borrowing and lending in currency to
profit seeking engagement in interest rate and exchange rate speculation affected
import and export costs and increased the volatility of the balance of trade. Associated
with growing budget-deficits during the 1970's, this development intensified
speculative pressure on the pound as confidence in the ability of the UK to act as
lender of last resort eroded. By 1976, the balance of payment;was poor enough to
reduce the value of the pound substantially. This depreciation, in the face of high
inflation, low productivity and industrial relations problems, effectively
precipitated a further deterioration of the balance of payment; as a growing import
penetration could not be compensated by increased export earnings. Although the
depreciation of the pound favoured capitals integrated into the world market via
exports, high inflation, low productivity, the generalisation of the methods of
production and growing export of productive capacity did nothing to ensure the
working of the mechanism of currency depreciation. Further, depreciation was faced
with the opposition of the City because of the devaluation of pound sterling and, with
it, the debt monetarised in sterling. The crisis of capitalist domination over labour
impinged on the UK so dramatically because of the combination of an international
orientation of 'British' capital and a weak domestic economy which no longer
underpinned the international role of the pound and the financial activities of the
City. The UK had industrial strength neither to increase its exports sufficiently nor
to finance its soaring public expenditure which increased dramatically during the
1970's (Gamble/Walton 1976). In the face of a falling pound and a steady increase
in the balance of payments deficit, the Labour appealed to the IMF in 1975 and 1976.
Britain applied for credit so as to finance its deficits and so as to maintain formal
exchange equality of the pound on the world market. IMF credit helped to maintain the
cash flow, the long-term condition of which was the regaining of financial control
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through deflationary policies. As the then Prime Minister, James Callaghan, put it at
the Labour Party Conference in 1976: "We used to think that you could spend your
way out of a recession and increase employment by cutting taxes and boosting
government spending. I tell you in all candour that that option no longer exists and
that so far as it ever did exist, it only worked by injecting inflation into the economy.
And each time that happened the average level of unemployment has risen. Higher
inflation followed by higher unemployment. That is the history of the last twenty
years" {as cited in Gamble 1984, p. 87). By 1976 the speculative pressure on the
exchange rate and balance of payment problems led government to alleviate pressure
on its budget-deficit through cuts in especially social expenditure. The Callaghan
government's economic policy was extensively praised in the international business
press as "a significant break with the neo-Keynesian 'demand management"', and the
Labour government was seen as pushing in the right direction with its "more
monetarist strategy" (Business Week, 30.10. 1978). By 1977 speculative
pressure on the pound decreased, as the pound started to appreciate markedly in
value because of the response of the financial market to the anticipation of North Sea
Oil profits (Gamble 1988). The appreciation of the pound restored the international
role of the pound, neutralising attempts to alleviate pressures on the productive
integration into the world market through the depreciation of the pound.
The global crisis of capitalist command over labour for purposes of exploitation
manifested itself in an autonomisation of money from productive accumulation. This
autonomisation asserted itself, so far as the UK is concerned, in the dissociation of
the City from the fate of domestic production. In the 1980's, the crisis-ridden
disunity of productive and monetary accumulation asserted itself over the UK in the
form of a disproportionate development between the balance of trade and the balance
of payments. "Earnings on foreign assets have surpassed 5bn pounds in 1986, almost
equalling the earnings from services (...). Despite a negative trade balance since
1983 the overall balance of payments has remained positive over the past 5 years,
supporting the exchange rate of the pound and harming manufacturing exports even
more" (Overbeek 1987, p. 8). Despite a massive destruction of productive capacity
in the early 1980's, the balance of payments improved during the 1980's. This was
so because of the windfall profits of North Sea Oil (see Clarke 1988a;Keegan 1984;
S. Pollard 1982;Spence 1985). The second deep recession in the early 1980's,
although severe for the UK, was cushioned by these profits, especially in the wake of
the major rise in the price of oil in 1979. The only thing that kept the visible
balance of payments positive was North Sea Oil (Keegan 1984). The effects of North
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Sea Oil have been contradictory. On the one hand, North Sea Oil profits helped to
alleviate the financing of public expenditure and to improve the balance of payments,
reducing speculative pressure on the pound and leading to a rapid appreciation of the
pound between 1977 and 1982. North Sea Oil restored international confidence in
the pound. At the same time, it intensified competitive pressure as the appreciation
of the pound, and higher interest rate policies, made it harder to export from, and
easier to import into, the UK (Gamble 1985). On the other hand, the overvalued
pound reduced the cost for 'British' based multinationals transferring production
abroad as overseas assets could be acquired relatively cheaply (Clarke 1988a). The
stability of the pound has also consolidated the City as one of the main centres of
globai speculation. However, the appreciation of the pound coincided with a further
deterioration of the balance of trade, marked by the rapid decline of productive
activity in the UK. The underlying deterioration of balance of trade asserted itself in
the aftermath of the crash in 1987 (see Ball 1988). During the 1980's, the
appreciation of the pound, rather than implying sound reproductive conditions of
capitalist accumulation, put a face of glamour on the crisis of imposing work
profitably. The international role of the City is not a sign of the strength, but an
expression of the weakness of capitalist reproduction on a world scale. The 'decline'
of the UK has only been the counterpart of a world boom which has developed the
contradictions of capital "to a degree unprecedented in history" (Clarke 1988c, p.
33).
Since 1978 the UK has experienced a net outflow of capital (see Coakley/Harris
1983). This development was fostered by the abolition of remaining exchange
controls in 1979. The abolition of already liberal exchange controls underpinned the
globalisation of production, permitting multinational companies to devalue
productive capacity internally and to move production into different areas. The
internal devaluation of capital, a form of devaluation impossible for smaller
capitals, is "the basis of trade union fears that the production abroad induced by
direct investment is being used to substitute former export of commodities, and
hence endanger jobs at home" (Olle/Scholler 1982, p. 52). The fear of job losses
helped to undermine workers' resistance to restructuring (see Soskice 1984;and see
Picciotto 1984 on the restructuring at Talbot-Poissy). However, this development
needs to be treated with caution as high interest rates attracted money capital to
London and since the UK is one of the main countries attracting productive
investment, particularly from US based multinational companies (Overbeek 1980;
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Fine/Harris 1985). In the 1980's, the bulk of the inflow of productive investment
contributed to a geographically uneven recomposition of accumulation
(de-industrialisation of the old heartland of heavy engineering and the opening up of
greenfield sites). The threat of moving production abroad or into other areas within
the UK proved to be of importance for the struggle over the right to manage and
wages. However, the main proportion of capital inflow was attracted by the City. The
international position of the City fostered the net outflow of capital since 1978, the
merger boom of the 1980's and the international restructuring of multinational
companies. Following upon the break-down of Bretton Woods, various financial
deregulations aimed at recouping a central role of the City in the global financial
networks. The incoming Conservative government lifted exchange controls in 1979
and deregulated the City in 1986 (Big Bang). The principal motive behind the
deregulation of the City was the realisation that the London Stock Exchange was in
danger of losing ground to other centres. "The Big Bang has afforded London one major
advantage over its two main competitors [New York and Tokyo]. London is the only
one of these three centres which does not restrict the securities activities of its
commercial banks and which grants banking licences to investment banks. That is,
London is the only centre which offers free trade in all types of international
securities and banking markets to both commercial and investment banks" (Coakley
1988, p. 18). The lifting of exchange controls reaffirmed the organisation of
'British' capital detached from domestic accumulation and markets. The-abolition of
exchange controls led to an enormous export of capital from Britain. Capital outflow
increased from £2 billion per year at the end of the 1970's to £6.5 billion in 1979,
£8 billion in 1980 and £10.7 billion in 1981 (Spence 1985, p. 122; citing Harris
1983). The stock of British direct investment abroad reached £110bn at the end of
1986 (up from £80 bn in 1985), amounting to a post-war record of 28% of GDP
(see Financial Times 18.3.1987). British takeovers in the US reached the level of $
5.2bn in 1985, up 33% from 1984 (Financial Times 20.2. 1987). The surge of UK
takeovers in the US accounted for more than £12 billion in 1986, indicating the
reliance on acquisitions at the expense of reproductive investment in the UK (see
Financial Times 5.1.1987, as quoted in Overbeek 1987, p. 8). This development
reaffirmed the transnational orientation of 'British' capital. Further, the City was
one of the centres of interbank lending, interbank lending of money accounted for
90% of all foreign exchange dealings in the 1980's (Coakley 1984, p. 171). The
interbank market of credit expanded international credit-relations in the face of
fluctuating interest rates and floating exchange rates.—The fictitious character of
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these transfers puts pressure on the domestic organisation of money as money moves
in and out of national boundaries attacking weak currencies, thus policing the
political integration of the working class on the basis of the abstract equality of the
money power of capital.
In sum, the so-called peculiarities of the UK (i.e. the division between finance and
industry) connote the integration of the UK into the world market predominantly
through the dissociation of 'British' capital from domestic constraints. The
integration of the UK into the world market as an offshore financial centre is not
backed-up by the productive imposition of work in the UK because of its relatively
weak reproductive structure. The thesis of the incompleteness of capital organisation
in the UK is misleading as the transnational organisation of 'British' capital and the
development of London as the financial centre for the international circulation of
capital expresses, fundamentally, the organisation of 'British' capital at the most
fundamental level of the abstract category of labour in action (see chapter II).
Rather than signifying the incompleteness of the organisation of capital, the
international orientation of 'British' capital expresses the organisation of capital at
the most fundamental level of the contradictory unity of surplus value production:
the global character of accumulation and money as the elementary form of capital.
The integration of the UK into the world market involves that the management of
accumulation is much more exposed to the international movement of money, making
the political integration of the working class on the basis of balance of payments and
public spending deficits much more vulnerable to short-term speculative
movements of capital on the pound. The attempt to confine the working class within
the limits of accumulation involved the class struggle over a policy of state austerity.
In the following chapter attention focuses on the development of the British state
during the 1970's. There then follows an analysis of the monetarist attempt to
reconstruct social relations on the basis of the market in the 1980's (chapter V).
Notes
1: Fed stands for the US Federal Reserve.
2: The following quote by Marx (1966, p. 515) may clarify the argument. "The demand for
loanable capital is demand for means of payment and nothing else; it is by no means demand
for money as a means of purchase." This "demand for means of payment is a mere demand
for convertibility into money, so far as merchants and producers have good securities to
offer; it is a demand for monev-capital whenever there is no collateral, so that an advance
of means of payment gives them not only the form of money but also the equivalent they
lack, whatever its form, with which to make payment".
3: Loanable capital can accumulate independently from actual accumulation. With the
following quote by Marx (1966, p. 495), I hope to clarify this argument. "We have seen, on
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the other hand, that an accumulation of loan capital can take place without any actual
accumulation, i.e. by mere technical means such as an expansion and concentration of the
banking system; and a saving in the circulation reserve, or in the reserve fund of private
means of payment, which are then always transformed into loan capital for a short time.
Although this loan capital, which for this reason, is also called floating capital, always
retains the form of loan capital only for short periods of time (...), there is a continual ebb
and flow of it. If one draws some away, another adds to it. The mass of loanable money
capital thus grows quite independently of the actual accumulation (...)". Increased interbank
exchange and electronic banking in the 1980's needs to be seen as an important lever of the
accumulation of loanable capital independent from actual accumulation.
4: Forms of 'flexibilisation' unmentioned here are 'flexible specialisation' and 'flexible
production'. These concepts are regarded in the debate on post-Fordism as structural
elements of a new system of social regulation. For a critical assessment on 'flexibility' in
this wider sense: Murray (1983,1987);A. Pollert (1988);Sayer (1988);Tomaney (1990);
Oliver/Wilkinson (1988).
5: These qualifications of the imposition of work at Nissan were presented in the discussion
of the paper by Garrahan/Steward (1989).
6: See also Winterton (1985) and Bohen/Wroughton (1988) on the coal industry (following
the defeat of the miners in 1985; and see Brumlop/Jiirgens (1986); Rollier (1986) on the
car industry in West-Germay and Italy; and Scherrer (1989) on the steel and car industry
in the US.
7: It is almost impossible to gather empirical data on the effects of sabotage, sloppiness
and absenteeism on production. However, "the overall effect of the more usual run of
strikes is probably considerably less than absenteeism" (Bassett 1986, p. 10-11). As M.
Phelps, board member for personnel of British Shipbuilders, says: "Since 1977 we've
actually lost about half a per cent of working hours in industrial action - and of that about
one-tenth I suppose would have been official". However, "if we could reduce absenteeism
by one per cent, we would be much better served" (quoted in Bassett 1986, p. 11).
According to union figures, absenteeism at Vauxhall "was running at up to 22% in 1985 at
its Ellesmere Port and Luton plant" (ibid.).
8: Hyman's (1989a, p. 30) reference to Bendix (Work and Authority in Industry (New York)
(1956, p. 204) is telling: "Bendix cites the 'case of inmates in Nazi concentration camps,
who were employed in factories during the war and who sabotaged the production effort by
consistently asking for detailed instructions on what to do next'".
9; Management's intention to 'get a real breakthrough in attitudes' was cited by Bob
Ramsey, former director of Industrial Relations at Ford UK, quoted in Woods (1987, p. 22).
151
CHAPTER IV
THE POLITICS OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
This chapter analyses the development of the state between 1974 and 1979. The
chapter is divided into three sections. The first section looks at the politics of the
social contract, in the context of a government of limited liquidity. There then
follows a section on the discrediting of the social contract in the late 1970's. Finally,
the conclusion draws together the main aspects of the presentation and prepares the
ground for the analysis of the development of the state during the 1980's. The central
argument presented in this chapter is that the social contract was of vital importance
for arresting the social conflict of the late 1960's and early 1970's, and for
subordinating the working class to a government of limited liquidity. The
demobilisation of class conflict during the social contract prepared the ground for the
development of the state during the 1980's. Indeed, as will be argued in the
concluding section, most of the changes which contributed to the recomposition of the
role of the state vis-a-vis capital and the working class during the 1980's can be
found, in embryonic form, during the 1970's.
I Crisis of Liquidity and the Politics of the Social Contract
The deregulation of the money power of capital made apparent the crisis of global
demand management. This crisis involved a crisis of the Keynesian state whose
substance depended on an expansion of liquidity. By the late 1960's, the reassertion
of the limits of accumulation in the form of speculative pressure by private capital
on deficit demand management coincided with a shift in emphasis of political
domination from mere piecemeal tinkering to the imposition of law and order,
domestically and internationally (see Agnoli 1968;Negri 1988b;Panitch 1976). The
break-down of Bretton Woods asserted the global dimension of capitalist crisis and
overaccumulation in the form of the money power of capital. The global character of
capitalist accumulation involves that "the management of the domestic currency
could not ignore the fundamental importance of maintaining the stability of the
international value of the currency in order to permit the integration of the domestic
accumulation of capital to the accumulation of capital on a world scale" (Clarke
1988a, p. 56). In the UK, the link between the world money market and domestic
organisation of reproduction had asserted itself, during the 1960's, in the form of a
sharp currency crisis, precipitated by Wilson's dash for growth. When the decline of
the British economy expressed itself in balance of payment problems, speculation
against the pound by private capital through the then developing Eurodollar markets
led finally to the devaluation of the pound in 1967. During the 1960's, Labour in
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government had sought to tighten the institutionatisation of the balance of class
forces by legal intervention into industrial relations and incomes policies. None of
these measures proved to be successful as the predetermined margins for wage rises
were constantly undermined by wild-cat strikes and shop-floor bargaining and as
social unrest undermined attempts to contain industrial relations through legal
intervention .('In Place of Strife'). On the other hand, pressure on the pound
undermined a domestically engineered sustaining of accumulation, which was in some
way incompatible with the global limits of accumulation, through monetary
expansionism.
The problem for the state was how to impose a government of limited liquidity in a
socially controlled way, i.e. how to restore international confidence of financial
markets in the domestic management of money without provoking costly and damaging
strikes. The global money power of capital entailed growing pressure to deflate, i.e.
to cut back on credit through wage restraint, through cuts in public spending and
through intensified exploitation so as to rectify balance of payment problems. The
working of these contradictory pressures brought down the Heath government as its
initial attempt to use deflationary measures and law and order control failed in the
face of the social conflict of the early 1970's. The class conflict forced political
authorities "to hold back from encouraging aggressive employers for fear of the
destabilising political impact of such class confrontation" (Clarke 1988a, p. 138).
The shift from Keynesian deficit demand management to deflationary attack, i.e. the
imposition of money in command, could be accomplished only with the support of the
trade union movement and not against it. The involvement of the trade union
movement in the normalisation of the class conflict depended on full-employment
growth and general welfare guarantees. Cooperation with the trade unions involved an
expansive integration of labour into the concept of capital, i.e. the deficit financing of
the containment of labour's productive and disruptive power.
The type of labour upsurge represented by the Hot Autumn of 1969 in Italy (see
CSE 1979) was delayed in Britain into the early 1970's (CSE 1980). From 1972
onwards, the Heath government responded to the class conflict by recommitting itself
to monetary expansionism, seeking to arrest class conflict by transforming protest
into demand. The indiscriminate increase in direct and indirect wages (Burden/
Campbell 1985) needs to be seen as an ultimately desperate attempt to block the
class struggle. The pacifying direction of these concessions consolidated the working
class in the form of the wage relation. That is, the 'success' of the working class
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blocked the class struggle by channelling it into demands for higher living standards
that, at the same time, were provided in a way which reimposed bourgeois forms of
social relations (wage relation and working class as consumer). The 'success' of the
working class in forcing the state to pursue inflationary policies, was a 'defeat' in
form; involving as it did inflationary devaluation of wages and the channelling of the
political strength of the working class in ways that denied the existence of class as
class. However, the consolidation of the working class in terms of the wage relation
politicised the wage owing to the political guarantee of income and prosperity.
Heath's U-turn in 1972 to monetary expansionism found an institutional form in the
social contract under Labour. The social contract made explicit in institutional form
the containment of labour through demand and social reform, i.e. the normalisation of
the class conflict on the basis of increasing peacekeeping costs. These peacekeeping
costs acknowledged the political strength of labour in and against capital. The attempt
to contain labour on the basis of expansionary policies implied low interest rates
policies, deficit financing of demand so as to boost employment, wages and investment
through the absorption of excess capacity, and the underwriting of profits by deficit
demand management. The attempt to arrest the class conflict through deficit spending
precipitated balance of payment difficulties, increasing public indebtedness and
global pressure on currency. The reimposition of the wage relation on the basis of an
inflationary supply of money needs to be seen as having contributed to the deep
recession between 1974 and 1975. Between 1972 and 1975, the attempt to
transform protest into demand implied increasing public borrowing so as to acquire
the means of payments which the containment of labour on the basis of deficit
financing required. The expansionary response to the class conflict put pressure on
the pound and contributed to payment imbalances and PSBR problems, the impact of
which hardened by the mid 1970's. The expansive imposition of the wage relation
implied an accumulation of public debt, coinciding with culminating inflationary
pressure. The UK's contribution to a growing balance of trade deficit of the capitalist
world (see Guttmann 1976) was hardened by the fact that Britain's main
competitors started much earlier to impose deflationary policies.
There is, of course, a distinction to be made between Heath's more conciliatory
second phase, during which tension between the state and the working class mounted,
leading to the miners' strike in 1974, and the first period of the Labour government
between 1974 and 1977. While the Heath government failed to contain the social
conflict, Labour succeeded in establishing social passivity. Upon the demobilising
peacekeeping objective of monetary expansionism, Labour superimposed a
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reassertion of political domination on the basis of corporatist strategies of class
collaboration. The corporatist reconstruction of political domination recognised in
institutional form the political strength of labour through the incorporation of the
trade unions into the 'corridors of power' (Coates/Topham 1986), permitting a
normalisation of the class conflict on the basis of the guarantee of social reform.
Because of labour's political strength, the consolidation of state power could not
proceed against the working class, but only in and through forms of class
collaboration. Retrospectively, the political strength of the working class made it
impossible for the state to confine labour within the limits of accumulation as was
the case during the 1960's (statutory incomes policies; coercive imposition of law
and order). Corporatist forms of integration had to be legitimated and imposed
differently, permitting a closer relationship between Labour and the trade union
leadership (tighter consultation, closer integration into policy formation and
implementation). While the social conflict in the late 1960's undermined the
coercion of trade unions into corporative forms of negotiation of order and disrupted
the close relation between Labour and the trade unions (see Panitch 1976), the
social conflict under Heath not only renewed the close relationship between the trade
union leadership and Labour, but, also, swept Labour back to office in 1974. During
the Heath government Labour and trade unions negotiated and agreed on policy
programmes to be put into effect with the re-election of Labour (1). The policy
documents of the Liaison Committee provided the basis of Labour's electoral
programmes in the 1974 elections. The quid pro quo for trade union collaboration
was spelled out in the policy agreements of the Liaison Committee. These agreements
committed Labour to a programme of extensive public ownership and price control,
massive redistribution policies, and non-intervention in collective bargaining by
statutory means. Although Labour pressed hard to achieve commitment from trade
unions to income policies, the policy programmes remained silent on this issue. This
silence expressed, in the face of the failure to impose income restraint in the
1960's, the political strength of the working class. Agreement was reached that
income policies should be reached by consultation and implemented voluntarily by
trade unions (see Coates/Topham 1986;Panitch 1986). Income policies were thus to
be replaced by the social contract; the trade unions would practice wage restraint in
exchange for a political commitment to full-employment growth and redistribution
of wealth. In the field of industrial relations; the Liaison Committee declared that the
Industrial Relations Act of 1971 was to be repealed and to be replaced by legislation
extending trade union protection from legal liabilities in industrial disputes. The
policy documents called further for the constitution of an independent conciliation
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and arbitration service which was subsequently embodied in ACAS. Additionally,
attention was given to manpower planning and industrial training, embodied in the
Manpower Service Commission (MSC; founded, under Heath, in 1973). Finally, the
agreements committed Labour to promote industrial democracy through a legislative
requirement for the disclosure of company information and through reform of
Company Acts (see Coates/Topham 1986). The institutional basis of all these
"policies would be tripartite and change would be through agreement, not
compulsion. Above all, the 'first task* of a Labour government would be to agree
policy with the TUC" (Coates/Topham 1986, p. 55). The social contract was a
measure of the balance of class forces that coerced the state to attempt a tighter
integration of the organised labour movement, an integration which was "without
precedent" (Coates/Topham 1986, p. 55;see also Panitch 1986, p. 103). The social
contract made explicit in institutional form the consolidation of the working class in
terms of a general expectation of rising wages and living standards. The tight
incorporation of the organised labour movement into formulating policies manifested
the strength of the working class and a defeat in form: the incorporation of the labour
movement into the institutional form of the state.
The incorporation of the organised labour movement "involves not an attempt to
break the unions as organizations and replace them by state bodies, as in fascism, but
an attempt to require and back by state sanctions union discipline over the rank and
file" (Panitch 1986, p. 175). The resuscitation of corporatist forms of class
collaboration reinforced the consolidation of the working class in the form of the
wage relation and provided a means of diffusing the state to the shop-floor through
the coordinative effort of the trade unions to implement policy objectives. The
reassertion of political domination figured as a policy of 'national consensus' to
which the working class needed to subordinate its aspirations in the interest of
national salvation. The corporatist reconstruction of political domination rested on
the willingness and capacity of the trade union leadership to guarantee social
passivity and to impose the political objectives reached in consultation with
government upon the trade union membership. During the social contract, the trade
union movement pledged its organisational strength to supporting Labour in
government, eager not to jeopardise its achieved position of influence in the existing
negotiation of order. By implication, the attempt to stabilise its achieved position
entailed the domestication of discontent into peaceful forms of negotiation and
arbitration as provided by the social contact. Such an institutionalisation of the class
conflict put the trade unions into a policing role, observing the well-ordered conduct
1 56
of industrial relations and preventing social discontent from taking the form of
strike action. In the event, the trade unions took on "the role of policing their own
members" (Bassett 1986, p. 7). The stability of the social contract depended on the
normalisation of the class conflict through the coordinated effort of Labour and the
trade union leadership to ensure social passivity. While the left within the Labour
Party and the trade union movement sought to achieve real reforms in favour of the
working class, they were put into a position of defending the power of the state to
manage social peace on the basis of non-conflictual, i.e. domesticated, forms of
working class action.
How can one understand the readiness of trade union leaders to act as managers of
discontent who seek to make regular what might otherwise be disruptive? The
readiness of trade unions to participate in formulating policies needs to be seen in
the context of the (constant) social conflict over the recognition of trade unions. The
conflict over trade union recognition entails an accommodation of trade union
objectives to 'institutional needs', subaltern to management and the state and confined
within the formal exchange relation between labour and capital (Hyman 1985a). The
accommodation to institutional needs responds to pressures to safeguard achieved
positions of influence and recognition. The recognition of trade unions by management
and the state implies the setting up of formal links of interest representation and
arbitration between social partners. These formal links, in turn, do not exist as an
accomplished fact but, rather, in and through a constant struggle over the ability of
the trade unions to reach acceptable settlements, without' jeopardising existing
positions of influence. "If the objectives which are in practice pursued by trade
unions are confined to the negotiation of limited improvements within the framework
of capitalist work relations, this represents a restrictive policy which is in turn the
outcome of a specific set of power relationships both inside and outside the unions"
(ibid., p. 53-2). Trade unions operate in a dialectical continuum, the extreme poles
of which are the articulation of their members' discontent and the recognition of
formalised bargaining procedures with management and the state. The contradictory
unity of these at times conflicting tasks, is, in turn, displaced into a constant conflict
within the trade union movement: the conflict over the 'power for and power over'
(ibid.) its members. This constant conflict is constituted by, and is a process of, the
class conflict as the trade union leadership is so constructed as to confine the
aspiration of its members within the limits of capital without cutting their ties with
their members and without jeopardising achieved positions within the existing
negotiation of order. The attempt by unions to maintain good working relations with
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management and the state and, as such, to safeguard their organisational existence
against adverse moves of management and the state, implies the stabilisation of
bargaining procedures, rather than the coordination of struggle against capitalist
domination (ibid.). Hence, the objective of making certain what otherwise might be
disruptive. "In this way, union control and workers' control may face in opposite
directions, and the element of power over the members inherent in union
organization may be turned against them" (ibid., p. 56). Trade unions are thus torn
between maintaining and improving their institutional recognition, and articulating
discontent in a way which is restricted to the terms of the wage relation. The possible
direction this contradiction might take depends on the actual social conflict. Since
trade unions can not cut their ties with their membership, but aim at using those
ties to legitimate their own existence subaltern to capital, and to elaborate control
over their members (see Panitch 1986), the possibility of repression against trade
unions can never be ignored because of the at times impossible task of compromising
the representation of their members with the limits of capitalist accumulation. The
class collaboration with the trade unions needs thus to be seen as manifesting the
political strength of the working class that coerced the state to permit political
influence to the trade union movement. At the same time, this manifestation of
strength was a defeat in form: the 'responsibilisation' of the working class to national
interest through the role played by the trade unions within the Keynesian
composition of political domination (2).
When Labour took office in 1974, it was faced with a major economic recession,
unstable international money markets, falling rates of investment, ever increasing
inflationary pressure, deteriorating balance of payments and a large PSBR. In the
UK, inflation rose from 2.5% in 1967 to over 24.5% in 1975 (compared with
1.4% to 6.0% in Germany; 4% to 11.8% in Japan and 2.8% to 9.1% in the US in the
respective years (see OECD Economic Outlook, July 1979). By 1975, unemployment
had risen to 1 million for the first time after the second world war. By 1977,
unemployment reached 1.6 million. Further, high inflation outstripped interest
rates (Hubner 1988, p. 61), making it harder to divert the flow of money into the
UK so as to finance balance of payment and budget deficits. While the deficit financing
of employment sustained especially weaker capitals, high rates of inflation "often
outstripped the profit rate altogether" (Gamble/Walton 1976, p. 161). The balance
of payments continued to deteriorate, increasing the UK's contribution to the balance
of trade problems of the capitalist world. The balance of payments deficits increased
from £800 million in 1964 to £4000 million in 1974 (Panitch 1986, p. 103).
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Further deficit financing of reproduction and rising costs for social welfare
expenditure contributed to an increase in the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement
(PSBR). The PSBR increased from £6.3 in 1974 to £10.5 billion in 1975. In
1976 the PSBR had been reduced to £9.5 billion (Gough 1985, p. 130). The
expansionary response to the crisis under Heath and Labour in the early 1970's
contained and demobilised the class struggle at the same time as the integration of the
UK into the world market came under severe pressure. In the face of inadequate
reserves, the pound came under severe pressure; there was a "large outflow of
short-term capital from Britain" (Evans 1985, p. 116). In the face of decreasing
competitiveness, declining investment, stagnant output and rising inflation,
international pressure on the pound precipitated a financial crisis of the British
state, threatening to turn the expansive response to the class conflict into an
accumulation of debt.
By 1975, Labour responded to growing financial difficulties by drawing means of
payment from the IMF. The IMF loan was associated with severe restrictions, calling
for a rigid anti-inflationary policy. Such a policy involved wage restraint, cuts in
the PSBR and the watering down of full-employment growth guarantees (3).
However, the restrictions associated with the IMF loan did not involve a blackmail by
'external forces' on national policies but expressed, rather, the global limits of
domestic attempts to contain labour. The intervention of the IMF, in turn, provided
legitimacy for deflationary policies with which the Labour government sought to
confine the working class within the limits of accumulation. The restrictions
associated with the loan from the IMF marked a resurgence of well established
deflationary policies which had been watered down in the early 1970's because of the
danger of uncontrolled class confrontation. The severity of the financial crisis
threatened the stability of the pound. The pound was under increasing pressure and
was falling heavily by 1976 as money holders were losing confidence in the
prospects of accumulation in the UK. All this implied that the reassertion of control
over labour through material concessions and full-employment growth policies could
no longer be maintained without compromising the ability of government to
guarantee the convertibility of debt into means of payments, to manage the
international role of the pound and, as such, to safeguard the integration of the
British national economy on the world market. In order to stem a collapse of the
exchange rates the British economy had to earn foreign currency through improved
competitiveness without thereby increasing the rate of inflation. Such an objective
implied a restrictive control over the circulation of money and the reimposition of
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the right to manage in production so as to improve productivity and restore
confidence in the pound.
The way in which the state had blocked the class struggle of the early 1970's
entailed the political problem of how to turn this pacification into a deflationary
attack on the working class, without thereby provoking costly and damaging strikes.
The working of the social contract depended on the ability of the state to demobilise
the conflict over the imposition of money in command within the framework of the
existing hierarchical composition of order, i.e. the corporatist reconstruction of
political domination. The stability of the social contract depended on the containment
of labour's disruptive power through the implementation of deflationary policies
(i.e. money in command) on the basis of class collaboration.
The corporatist reconstruction of political domination expressed in institutional
form the strength of the working class, permitting a demobilisation of the class
struggle on the basis of an institutional advance of the trade union leadership seeking
to ensure real gains for the working class. Upon the demobilisation of the class
conflict on the basis of monetary expansionism, the corporatist reconstruction of
political domination imposed the ideology of trade union influence over government.
The integration of the political and industrial wing of the reformist left in Britain in
the form of the social contract expressed, in institutional form, the aspirations of
the working class in the form of rising living standards and secure employment. The
corporatist reconstruction of political domination was based upon income and
full-employment guarantees which involved the channelling of the social conflict of
the 1970's into demand; the Keynesian attempt to transform protest into demand.
These guarantees contributed to the demobilisation of the class conflict which had
swept Labour back to office. The elections of 1974 coincided with an exhaustion of
industrial militancy. This exhaustion needs to be seen in the context of the Labour
government implementing those policies (i.e. full employment growth and income
guarantees) which the Labour left and the trade unions had demanded during Labour's
time in opposition. However, the practice of expansionary policies contradicted its
results. The deep recession between 1974 and 1975 increased unemployment to an
unprecedented scale of 1 million after the second World War. Workers experienced
their militancy as leading to unemployment, growing inflationary pressure on real
wages and bankruptcy of producers. The industrial militancy of the 1970's that had
succeeded in forcing a shift in emphasis from deflationary to expansionary policies
in 1972, became increasingly subdued by the results of those policies, which were
1 60
designed to achieve real gains for the working class. Expansionary policies
guaranteed no longer full-employment and income but, rather, fostered the decline of
international competitiveness, resulting in mass unemployment and a growing gap
between nominal and real wages. The recognition of the aspirations of the working
class in the form of full-employment policies and social redistribution of wealth in
favour of labour contradicted the aspiration of the working class, permitting, in the
face of rising unemployment, an exhaustion of industrial militancy. The global crisis
of demand management asserted the limits of an expansionary response to labour's
productive and disruptive power. The exhaustion of the Keynesian attempt to contain
labour on the basis of social reform involved the exhaustion of the way in which the
trade unions had sought to channel protest into demand. Expansionary full
employment growth policies that were favoured by the Labour left came under
pressure as regards their legitimation at a time when growing unemployment and
economic insecurity seemingly asserted the futility of industrial militancy. The
influence of the left within the Labour Party, and its constituents in the trade
unions, started to deteriorate as expansionary policies coincided with rising
unemployment, growing inflationary pressure and a further deterioration of the
balance of payments. The loss of influence was reinforced through the resistance to
entry into the EEC by the Labour left, which saw Benn sharing the platform with E.
Powell. On the other hand, those in the Labour administration pressing for sound
monetary policies won credibility in the face of major economic and financial
problems as well as rising unemployment. The failure of expansionary policies to
achieve economic growth and to maintain full-employment proved the
impracticability of these policies and the truth of a deflationary response to the
crisis. However, the reliance on trade union co-operation for achieving social
pacification did riot permit a radical enforcement of debt and intensification of work.
The attack on the working class had to be achieved with the co-operation of the trade
union movement. The stability of such a co-operation involved the provision of real
gains for the working class in the form of social reform and employment guarantees
in exchange for income restraint and cuts in welfare expenditure. The loss of
influence of the Labour left and the exhaustion of expansionary policies in the matter
of guaranteeing full-employment and income fostered a shift in emphasis from
demand management to controlled stagflation, i.e. selective monetary expansionism
favouring those workers upon whose passivity the stability of the social contract
rested and discriminating against those on the margins of the organised labour
movement.
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The attempt to stabilise the corporatist reconstruction of political domination on
the basis of controlled stagflation involved the desolidarisation of the working class
through social reforms that were specifically structured to integrate the organised
labour movement into the existing social order (see later on labour laws). The
stability of the social contract depended, also, on the increase of pacification costs
that were specifically structured to ensure social passivity. These pacification costs
were designed to integrate those workers who had been at the forefront of the
industrial militancy of the early 1970's (see later on industrial policy). The
stability of the social contract depended on the successful sectionalisation of the
working class, permitting social passivity through the disorganisation of class
relations on the basis of a selective guarantee of employment. The shift from
expansionary policies to controlled stagflation depended on the disorganisation of the
class conflict through the corporatist integration of some workers, discriminating
against others. The synthesis of political domination with its legitimating discourse
of social consensus depended on the integration of those workers upon whom the
stability of class collaboration rested.
In the face of the global crisis of deficit demand management, Labour in government
saw no alternative but to respond to the assertion of the money power of capital by
adopting essentially monetarist policies so as to stem a collapse of the pound, to
secure national integration into the world market and to avert financial collapse. The
global dimension of the crisis of Keynesianism made it ever more difficult for Labour
to resist the use of restrictive monetary policies and to reduce the level of material
concessions (cuts in social spending). Labour sought to stimulate investment and to
restrain the growth of pay through income policies and increasingly restrictive
budget policies. Restrictive income policies were introduced in 1975. The shift to
monetarist policies occurred in 1976, the second year of the social contract. Labour
came to accept to a considerable extent the use of the growth of money supply as a
means of social moderation (Clarke 1987). At the heart of the control of public
spending was the use of cash limits. Following severe pound sterling problems in
1976, drastic cuts in the PSBR were announced for 1977/8 and 1978/9. While it
would have been difficult for the Labour government not to have accepted monetarist
policies (Evans 1985), the shift to restrictive monetary policies mitigated against
the spirit of the social contract. The imposition of the international 'terrorism of
money' (Marazzi 1976) over the conditions of life manifested the death throes of
Keynesianism (Clarke' 1987,1988a) as it entailed the abandonment of full
employment growth policies for a political commitment to industrial rationalisation
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within a tight monetary framework. The acceptance of the monetarist assertion of a
close relation between the money supply and inflation indicated the submission of
state policies to the dictates of the market, i.e. the power of money. This shift in
emphasis was of no great importance concerning the control over the global
movement of money because of the international dimension of the credit-relations,
over which the state had no influence. The importance of these policies lies in the
attempt to subordinate the working class to the limits of accumulation through
deflationary attack on living standards. Labour added monetary policies to fiscal
policies, whose redistributive effect was seen as keeping the money supply within
the forecast margins, while, at the same time, stimulating investment and
modernisation. By keeping a close check over monetary targets government
reaffirmed the subordination of political criteria to the power of money, retaining
the confidence of financial markets through the state's ability to impose a
government of limited liquidity over the conditions of life. In order to avoid damaging
and costly strikes, the deflationary attack had to be sanctioned by the trade unions. In
the event, the trade unions did accept deflationary measures as a sacrifice the labour
movement had to accept for the sake of national salvation. How can one understand the
trade unions' acceptance of deflationary policies?
Industrial unrest in the late 1960's brought about a massive shift to the left in the
trade union leadership (Minkin 1979). However, this shift did not coincide with an
overturn of the traditional boundaries between the political and industrial wings of
the organised labour movement (Minkin 1974). Despite a general advance of the left
within the trade union movement, Labour's position as the party of national interest
was not challenged. While the trade union leadership had no political concept of their
own (Minkin 1979) of how to react to the crisis of accumulation, the social contract
provided the trade unions with a channel to influence government once Labour was
back in office. Once Labour was swept back to office in the wake of the industrial
militancy of the early 1970's, the trade union leadership, while insisting on
full-employment growth policies and social reforms, saw no alternative but to
support Labour's deflationary policies because the alternative to Labour was seen as
much bleaker, as experienced under the Heath government. Confronted with economic
decline, high rates of inflation and a possible financial collapse, the trade unions
came to accept Labour's remedy for the management of economic difficulties. The TUC
and most of the trade unions became increasingly aware of the dangers of inflation
and the futility of political influence in economic policy, including the systematic
development of full-employment growth policies (see Minkin 1979). Consequently,
1 63
historical realism prohibited trade unions from rallying their members against
deflationary attack, as the result was seen as aggravating economic difficulties even
further, jeopardising the prospect of industrial democracy and social reform and
threatening the institutional recognition and advances of the organised labour
movement itself. At the same time, the TUC claimed to use its influence to good effect,
ensuring a socially fair distribution of the social costs of deflation. Although the
trade unions believed that they were conned by Labour (Minkin 1978;Panitch
1986), Labour was, at the same time, seen as a victim of external forces that
prevented Labour from implementing policies in the spirit of the social contract
(ibids.). At the same time, the formal procedure of the social contract remained
intact. Trade unions regarded public dissent against deflationary measures and
industrial militancy as playing into the hands of the Conservatives, if not leading
ultimately to a new Conservative government {Minkin 1978). In order to maintain
the unity of the labour movement and to keep achieved positions and influence in the
hierarchical composition of political domination, the organised trade union
movement took over the role of stabilising the existing composition of political
domination. This policy of conservation implied trade union participation in the
demobilisation and demoralisation of social conflict. While David Basnett (TUC
president in 1977) saw a defeat of Labour as entailing a danger for the labour
movement similar to the aftermath of the General Strike in 1926, the trade unions
saw no alternative but to demobilise discontent so as to make certain that social
unrest was minimal. By aiming at channelling unrest into institutional procedures of
negotiation and arbitration, a socially controlled curbing of inflation was seen as
recreating conditions for renewed prosperity, especially with balance of payments
deficits rectified and North Sea Oil profits allowing a renewal of full-employment
growth policies (Minkin 1978, p. 483).
Further, the incorporation of the trade unions reinforced the division within the
working class as solidarity with trade union policies implied the acceptance,
however reluctant, of political domination, while class policies, however sectional
and confined to the wage relation, implied an attack on the organised labour
movement. The 'responsibilisation' of the working class dwelled thus on principles of
solidarity, subduing and extirpating working class energy. Loyalty to trade unions
and Labour on the one hand, and discontent and organisation of resistance on the
other, undermined a collective response to deflationary policies (see Fryer 1979 on
the disorganisation of the public sector dispute in 1977). As trade unions
participated in formulating government polices, the social contract fuelled the
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ideology of trade union influence over govern- ment, putting the trade unions into
the limelight of public attention. Such a position manifested a permanent test-case on
the trustworthiness of trade union statesmanship. The permanent threat of a
Conservative denunciation of excessive trade union power over government, as it
materialised in ever more pejorative terms with the advance of the second deep
recession at the end of the 1970's, hardened the coordinative effort of the TUC to
secure the objective of social peace to secure the restoration of financial stability
and economic recovery. The role of the trade unions depended on their ability to
control social peace. The real possibility of social unrest implied a threat to trade
union class collaboration from the Conservative Party, the working class and
employers and a weakened position in the political negotiation of order. Such a threat
entailed the undermining of the hierarchical composition of domination that
constituted the social contract. Labour in government and the TUC clung together on
the road to the administration of cuts as the failure of either to control law and order
implied the defeat for them both. Consequently, militant sections of the working class
were treated as traitors serving the aim of the Conservatives (see Minkin 1978).
Social unrest was denounced as dangerously out of touch with socialist policies and
principles of solidarity, permitting disciplinary attempts to marginalise discontent
and to denounce the culprits (Fryer 1979). The constitution of the social contract
took away the breath of life from the shop floor as the trade unions sought to
demobilise social conflict in the name of socialist class collaboration. The important
factor for political stability, however, was the exhaustion of shop floor unrest.
Workers experienced their militancy as resulting in unemployment, inflationary
erosion of wages (Panitch 1986) and a demoralising effort by trade unions. The
exhaustion of unrest was exploited by Labour, pointing to the way in which the Heath
government had by-passed trade unions, had attacked wages and had sought to restore
law and order. In contrast to Heath's initial policy of confrontation, Labour
proclaimed itself as being the party of social consensus, executing a 'socially fair'
and balanced contribution of the working class towards the improvement of national
values. As such, deflationary policies were defended as being in the long-term
interest of working people, whose, socially balanced, sacrifices would generate real
results in terms of future prosperity. While the IMF was held to be responsible for
the severity of the deflationary measures proposed, Labour proclaimed itself as
victim of external powers. In the face of the growing problems of containing, on the
basis of expansionary policies, labour's productive and disruptive power within the
global limits of accumulation, the trade union leadership and Labour came to accept
the futility of full employment growth policies and the realism of a policy of
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controlled stagnation. The TUC accepted the need to curb inflation (i.e. the imposition
of money in command through deflationary attack) and to increase productivity (i.e.
intensification of work and recomposition of work practices). The attempt by the
trade union leadership to stabilise the corporatist reconstruction of political
domination put them into the position of managers of austerity, executing towards the
working class the imperatives of capitalist accumulation. In the event, "the 'social
contract" of 1974 has become the means by which government and the unions impose
the deflationary regime, exploiting the monetarist blackmail to the full while
externalizing responsibility for the crisis to shadowy and ill-defined 'international
financial operations'" (Marazzi 1976, p. 109). However, the recognition of the
political strength of labour in the institutional form of class collaboration implied
pacification costs. The imposition of money in command rested on the ability of the
trade unions to secure social discipline, i.e. to pacify resistance to deflationary
attack. Such normalisation of the class conflict rested, in turn, on the integration of
those sections of the working class which are at the core of trade union
representation.
The shift in emphasis from demand management to controlled stagnation and
financial stability involved the abandoning of full-employment growth guarantees in
favour of a selective maintenance of jobs. The shift to a policy of controlled
stagnation involved, fundamentally, the adoption of "essentially monetary policies of
cutting expenditure and pursuing a restrictive monetary policy in order to bring
down inflation and restore financial stability, even at the cost of rising inflation"
(Clarke 1987, p. 414). The policy objective was to contain labour through a policy
of controlled stagnation; to initiate economic stability and financial solidity by
stimulating investment without imposing heavy costs in terms of unemployment and
recession. This policy not only consolidated the demobilisation of industrial
militancy through certain employment guarantees and social reforms; it also
reinforced the division within the working class as the selective expansion of money
favoured those sections of the working class represented by the main body of the
trade unions (industrial unions) and discriminated against those who were not. The
stability of the imposition of money in command within the framework of class
collaboration entailed the disorganisation of the working class on the basis of the
'corporatist collective'. The decomposition of class relations on the basis of the class
collaboration involved an expansive use of money, i.e. pacification costs, in exchange
for industrial peace and wage restraint. The quid pro quo for the monetary
decomposition of class relations was the adherence to a^policy of social reform,
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especially labour laws, nationalisation of hard-pressed manufacturers and subsidies
to 'lame ducks'. The shift from demand management to monetary control involved a
tacit trade off between Labour and the trade unions favouring industrial
rationalisation and modernisation in the framework of 'realistic' monetary policies,
i.e. financial stability. Although the "Labour government gradually abandoned its
commitment to maintaining full-employment growth by means of fiscal expansion in
favour of policies of monetary constraint to maintain financial stability" (Clarke
1987, p. 405), the containment of the class struggle on the basis of deflationary
policies involved pacification costs in the form of subsidies to industry and
nationalisation so as to disorganise possible resistance by selectively transforming
protest into employment guarantees. Deflationary policies did not attack the working
class head on. Rather, the social contract intensified the division within the working
class. Labour introduced social reforms, put financial pressure on the welfare state
and alleviated pressure on profitability through tax concessions to, and a relaxation
of price controls on, capital. At the same time, Labour maintained jobs through
expansionary policies favouring hard-pressed industries (car, steel and coal),
containing labour's disruptive power by limiting the impact of the recession on
employment through selective monetary expansion. Selective monetary expansion
was specifically structured to integrate those workers upon whom the stability of
class collaboration rested and who had been at the forefront of the unprecedented
unrest in the early 1970's. The stability of monetarist policies in a Keynesian
framework depended on the capacity of the state not to provoke those workers upon
whose passivity the class collaboration with the trade unions rested. The
decomposition of class relations on the basis of the corporatist collective rested on
the weak, credit-sustained, recovery of accumulation during the 1970's. Sustained
accumulation provided a basis for the synthesis of domination and its legitimising
discourse of social consensus as it made possible a reinforcement of the division
within the working class, permitting Labour in government and the TUC to secure
political stability.
The commitment to full-employment growth was unveiled in the 'industrial
strategy' of the social contract. The agreement on industrial policy brought together
three interrelated elements: planning of industrial modernisation through the
existing NECD together with new planning agreements, financial assistance and direct
intervention through the new National Enterprise Board (hereafter: NEB). Sector
working parties were set up to prepare modernisation schemes for industrial
sectors. These quangos were organised in partnership between government,
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management, and the trade unions (England/Weeks 1981). Mechanisms for the
implementation of the schemes were not introduced (Burden/Campbell 1985). The
planning agreements reached the statute book through the 1975 Industry Act.
Whereas the original draft version involved means of compelling companies to enter
into planning agreements with the Department of Industry, involving trade unions in
the negotiation of restructuring at all stages and the provision of financial aid
contingent on agreement, the 1975 Act determined that agreements were to be
voluntary, and for the most part the discussion leading up to an agreement would be
between the Department of Industry, with little or no involvement of the trade
unions. I he contingency conditions tor financial aid disappeared (ibid.).
Although the original draft version of industrial planning was watered down, two
planning agreements were signed. One involved the NCB and the other the ailing
Chrysler Corporation UK (see Burden/Campbell 1985). Because of the crisis in the
coal industry, financial aid to the NCB needs to be seen, fundamentally, as a means
adopted by government of safeguarding social peace by reinforcing the division
within the working class through a selective monetary expansion. The selective use
of money as a means of underwriting the maintenance of jobs manifested a form of
monetary decomposition of the class relations through the 'privatisation' of a distinct
workers interest. By this I understand the use of money as a means of undermining
possible resistance to deflationary attack by integrating some sections of the working
class through the guarantee of employment, discriminating against other sections
and, thereby, undermining concerted resistance through a monetary disintegration of
class. Labour's selective industrial policy, which indicated the willingness of
government to limit the impact of the recession as much as possible, involved the
privatisation of a distinct workers' interest as such, harnessing the interest in
secure employment of a particular section of the working class in contrast to job
losses and unemployment in other areas of industry. Such monetary decomposition
fostered the sectionalisation of the working class through the integration of a
particular section of the working class upon whose passivity the synthesis between
the corporatist reconstruction of political domination and deflationary attack rested.
The miners were the main force of the social unrest in the early 1970's. The 'Plan of
Coal' indicates a use of pacification costs which are designed to prevent possible
resistance in opposition to deflationary policies. At the time of a deep crisis in the
coal industry, government's support to the miners signalled its willingness to stick
to its commitment to full-employment policies, while, in fact, abandoning full
employment policies and replacing them with the deficit financing of pacification
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costs that demobilised and fragmented the resistance to deflationary policies that only
a few years ago had brought down the Heath government. The Keynesian attempt to
transform protest into demand continued to be used, only now the aim was not to
integrate the working class on the basis of an expansive reproduction of capitalist
accumulation but, rather, on the basis of controlled stagflation, i.e. the imposition of
money in command over those sections of the working class who were not part of the
corporatist collective of class collaboration. By meeting the demands for secure
employment by one of the then influential sections of the working class, the selective
use of monetary expansion expresses the political strength of the working class
which government sought to manage and domesticate on the basis of a divisive
monetary decomposition of class relations. The pacification of the miners involved a
preemptive demobilisation and fragmenting of possible resistance to deflationary
policies, to the restructuring of industry, income policies and the imposition of a
tight monetary regime over those made redundant.
The NEB suffered a similar fate to the planning agreements system in the sense that
its final form was less radical than the initial proposal. The measured success of the
NEB was to promote modernisation and rationalisation of production. The bulk of
financial aid provided by the NEB was directed to sustaining such 'lame ducks' as, for
example, British Leyland (hereafter: BL), while funds involving the new technology
sector remained low (Burden/Campbell 1985). The maintenance of lame ducks
discriminated against possibly more important sectors of industry as, for example,
new technology industries which, globally, were the growth sector during the
1970's. This monetary expansion in a tight monetary framework indicates the
political strength of the working class. The selective underwriting of employment
involved, fundamentally, pacification costs that were directed mainly towards
industries which were hit hard by the crisis and which were troubled by industrial
relation problems during the late 1960's and early 1970's. One of the most
significant activities of the NEB was the support to BL, which was, in the face of near
bankruptcy, nationalised under Labour in 1974. The nationalisation of BL was an
important step in demobilising the class struggle and in fragmenting resistance to
deflationary policies. In addition to BL, Labour nationalised British Aerospace,
British Shipbuilders and British National Oil Corporation.
The car industry played an important role in the British economy in terms of
employment, the balance of payments and the network of affiliated industries. The
crisis of car producing capital had major implications for the position of the British
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economy on the world market. In the UK, the class struggle over the productive
power of labour in the car industry had led to a government sponsored concentration
process in the course of which 60 independent companies were reduced to only one:
British Leyland Manufacturing Corporation which changed name to BL in 1968 (4).
By 1974, this concentration process allowed BL to command a large share of the
domestic market. However, BL's productivity was well below its main competitors
(Marsden et.al. 1985). In the course of the international restructuring of
accumulation, BL's market share fell constantly during the 1970's (Marsden et.al.
1985;Garrahn 1986;Scarbourgh 1986) (5). The crisis in car production reduced
exports of cars in the face of increasing imports. From 1970 to 1985, exports of
cars shrank by 2/3, while imports doubled between 1979 and 1983. From 1977
onwards the UK became for the first time since world war II a net importer of cars
(Fine/Harris 1985, p. 258) (6). The crisis in car production added considerable
pressure on the balance of payment and, as such, contributed to international
pressure on the pound. The nationalisation of BL was regarded as a question of
'national interest' because of BL's importance to the supply industry and
employment, and, in particular, to the balance of trade. The retreat from the original
radicalism in industrial policy to subsequent modest reforms of rationalisation and
modernisation made possible "productivity gains for plants remaining at the expense
of substantial job losses for those made redundant" (Clarke 1988a, p. 156). Despite
nationalisation and deficit financing of lame ducks, selective financial aid to
modernisation, the replacing of deficit demand management, and the growing
importance of market criteria of management in nationalised industry (e.g. the
appointment of Edwardes at BL in 1977) all implied a subordination of political
criteria to the 'dictates' of the market (see Panitch 1986). This shift dissociated
Keynesian interventionism from full-employment policies. However, within a
framework of class collaboration the subordination of political criteria to the limits
of the market involved pacification costs. "The attempt to subordinate industrial
policy to the constraints of international competition was undermined by the
maintenance of a tripartite apparatus of consultation between government,
employers and unions that directed industrial subsidies on the basis of political
influence" (Clarke 1988a, p. 158). While the Labour government used "greater
amounts of public money, and the NEB remained an important interventionist
agency", the "criteria by which it acted did not differ significantly from those
dominant in private financial agencies" (Coates 1980, p. 98).
The integration costs, which the class collaboration with the trade unions
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demanded, contributed to persistent inflationary pressure, constant PSBR problems,
pressure on the pound and a deterioration of the balance of payments as unproductive
plants were sustained by credit-expansion. The attempt to decompose and to
demobilise the class struggle through a selective sustaining of employment for those
workers who had been at the centre of the industrial militancy in the late 1960's and
early 1970's required a monetary expansion designed to contain the social conflict
over an ever more drastic imposition of tight money on the conditions of life.
Workers in the car industry had been at the forefront of industrial militancy. In the
UK, the level of strike activity in car production increased dramatically from 1959
to 1963 and again from 1964 to 1968. Strikes reached their peak between 1969
and 1973, a period in which 1.853.2 thousand working days were lost per year.
Between 1974 and 1978, the average number of strikes declined. However, the
average working days lost increased marginally compared with the previous phase
(Marsden et.al. 1985, p. 121 )(7). Despite the importance of those industries which
were sustained through nationalisation, the overriding issue of nationalisation was
the preemptive pacification of concerted resistance in opposition to rising
unemployment, income restraint and cuts in social expenditure. Selected support for
particular industries consolidated the corporatist reconstruction of political
domination through the selective integration of those workers upon whose reliability
the tacit synthesis between, on the one hand, the abandoning of full employment
guarantees and the imposition of a tight money regime and, on the other hand, the
legitimation of this policy in the form of a discourse of social consensus, rested.
The acceptance of essentially monetarist policies and selective monetary expansion
designed to impose the commanding power of money over the conditions of life in a
socially controlled way, involved trade union collaboration with income policies, the
price the corporate collective was to contribute towards national salvation in
exchange for employment guarantees through nationalisation and subsidies. In
exchange for government's attempt to harness the productive and disruptive power of
labour by demobilising and fragmenting peacekeeping costs, the trade union
leadership came to accept income policies from 1975 onwards. In the short term,
income policies proved to be largely successful. The trade unions "did accept, for
practical purposes, wage restraint from 1975 to 1978" (Panitch 1986, p. 38).
Income policies became the centrepiece of the social contract (Clarke 1988a;
McDonnell 1978;Panitch 1986). The trade unions responded "with an exercise in
voluntary wage restraint unprecedented in modern British history" (Panitch 1986,
p. 118;see also p. 103). Between 1975 and 1977, strikes fell to their lowest for
171
well over a decade (ibid. p. 204), at the same time as real wages decreased
considerably (ibid. p. 118). "In the summer of 1974 the TUC agreed to a zero real
income growth, and the following summer to a £6 pay limit. The effect of the success
of these policies reduced workers' real incomes, and this was followed by a
TUC-government agreement on a 4.5 per cent ceiling on wage increases plus modest
tax cuts for 1976-77, which as estimated by The Economist, was designed to produce
a 2.75 per cent reduction in real wages. Not surprisingly, The Economist also
crowed that 'if the pay deal sticks, there is no escaping the conclusion that companies
are in for a bonanza'" (ibid. p. 103-4). During the social contract, the TUC and
government were able to introduce and safeguard the most sustained and dramatic
reductions of real wages in the post-war period (Clarke 1987;Panitch 1986).
However, in the face of an unprecedented rise in unemployment to 1.6 million in
August 1977, the British national economy did not show signs of recovery. If
anything, the situation looked likely to worsen. While the UK contributed
considerably to a growing collective trade deficit of the capitalist world, industrial
production was, by 1977, "barely above 1970 levels, industrial investment was
down to 80 per cent of 1974 levels" (Gough 1985, p. 132). In the face of high rates
of inflation, the imposition of income restraint meant that "incomes remained
stagnant for four years and for the average wage-earner were no higher in 1977
than they were in 1970" (ibid.). In response to wage restraint and growing pressure
by management seeking to implement new labour saving machinery and attempting to
recompose work practices, the coordinated effort by the trade unions and government
showed signs of exhaustion, threatening to undermine the attempt to contain the class
struggle through selective monetary expansion. The wage dispute at BL in 1977, the
failure of the trade unions at BL to contain their members by calling a prompt
return to work and the vote of the TGWU to return to free collective bargaining in
1977, indicated the cracks in the hierarchal composition of the social contract.
"Once the TGWU had made that decision, the Labour Government was living on
borrowed time" (Bassett 1986, p. 7). The growing tension at the work was most
visibly expressed at the refusal to go back to work at BL in 1977. "Scanlon's [leader
of the Engineering Union] inability in March 1977 to secure a prompt return to
work on the part of his members at British Leyland, who were striking against the
continuation of the wage restraint policy, indeed the hostility with which his appeal
to them was greeted ('go home, bum')" (Panitch 1986, p. 106) indicates the
growing isolation of the trade union leadership from the rank-and-file.
By 1977, growing unrest at work threatened to undermine the containment of the
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disruptive power of labour at the shop-floor on the basis of social reform, i.e. the
instantiation of certain legal rights and the formalisation of industrial relations. For
the trade union leadership, the labour legislation of the 1970's constituted a "quid
pro quo for wage restraint and resuscitated corporative political structures"
(Panitch 1986, p. 202). Labour and the trade unions agreed on repealing the
Industrial Relations Act of 1971. Wilson's opposition towards this Act was mainly
motivated by the social unrest it provoked. Wilson saw the Act as one that "fostered
revolutionary tendencies in the working class, that it was a militant charter, that it
heralded industrial relations as part of a wider political conflict" (ibid., p. 117-8).
At the same time, the TUC raised new demands for a positive legislation, indicating a
new willingness to use the law for protective purposes (health and safety;unfair
dismissal), and for advancing industrial democracy. Rather than run the risk of
endangering social peace through wild-cat strikes, the trade unions themselves
raised the demand to "integrate the lower levels of the movement-right down to the
shop floor-more effectively" (ibid., p. 203). Thus, the Act was not simply repealed
as a range of legal reforms entered the statute book (Trade Union and Labour
Relations Act and the Health and Safety at Work Act in 1974, the Employment
Protection Act and the Sex Discrimination Act in 1975 the Race Relations Act in
1976 and the Employment Protection Act in 1978) (8). The labour legislation of the
1970's needs to be seen as a responsive action to the social unrest of the late 1960's
and early 1970's. Legislative intervention in industrial relations enmeshed the shop
floor.in the legal structure of the state, permitting a pacification of industrial
relations in non-conflictual forms. Legal intervention into, and formalisation of,
industrial relations involved the extension of the corporatist reconstruction of
political domination right down to the shop-floor, diffusing political control into the
shop-floor through trade union attempts to channel discontent into established legal
procedures.
Contrary to the 1960's when the state employed coercive measures to integrate the
trade unions into a corporative structure (see Panitch 1976), the legislation of the
1970's was based upon existing corporative arrangements. The labour legislation
aimed "to foster workers' participation schemes in company boards and work
councils (...); to institutionalize local level bargaining and shop steward committees;
and to provide a legal framework for qualitative issues (...), unfair dismissals and
redundancy" (Panitch 1986, p. 203). Additionally, industrial unrest was to be
channelled into corporative forms of arbitration (i.e. ACAS). ACAS was constituted as
a tripartite body designed to handle industrial conflict in non-conflictual forms
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(negotiation, consultation, arbitration). However, decisions reached in ACAS are not
legally binding and do not permit the right of legal enforcement (Wedderburn
1978). The laws are not only deficient in central respects "but are only effective
when unions are already strong enough to advance their members' interest beyond
minimal legal qualities" (Panitch 1986, p. 121). The litigation concerning strike
prone issues, such as unfair dismissal, and the introduction of mechanisms of
arbitration established means of law and order control that brought industrial
relations more directly into the ambit of the state, channelling (possible) discontent
into bourgeois forms of social relations (i.e. the legal decomposition of collective
action through the individualising of dissent on the basis of the instantiation and the
enactment of rights). The labour laws introduced reforms which were specifically
structured to integrate the working class into the existing social order, closing,
rather than opening up, room for the class struggle. The legal intervention into
industrial relations expresses in institutional form labour's disruptive power which
the state sought to contain through legal means of control. The coordinated effort of
Labour and the trade unions to regain and sustain control over industrial relations
amounts to an attempt to make the social environment certain through legal
intervention.
For the trade union movement the social contract provided a means to further
industrial democracy. The labour legislation of the 1970's included the "the
encouragement of trade union recognition and the establishment of the closed shop,
the right to disclosure of information necessary for effective collective bargaining,
and the right of union representatives to advance consultation and information and to
take time off for trade union or public duties" (England/ Weeks 1981, p. 419). Such
a development was reinforced by the rapid spread of the closed shops during the
1970's, a development which, despite mass unemployment, contributed to the rise in
trade union membership to an all time high during the 1970's. However, this
development, rather than reflecting a sudden expansion of trade union consciousness
(Hyman 1984,1989b), needs to be seen as*a coordinated effort by management and
trade unions to integrate the shop floor more directly into the formalised structure
of collective bargaining. Closed shops are usually set up because of an
"administrative arrangement between company and union officials" rather than as a
"result of pressure from below" (Hyman 1984, p. 96). The encouragement of closed
shops by employers, the state and trade unions needs to be seen as a constitutive
moment of the corporatist form of social pacification and normalisation inasmuch as
they allow a tighter control over the shop floor, permitting a domestication of the
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working class through a tighter control of the labour force by the trade union
bureaucracy. The "artificial accretion of paper membership" (ibid., p. 96)
manifested the attempt to coerce the shop floor into a form of control specified and
constituted in the hierarchical composition of domination of the social contract
(negotiation, compromise, implementation). The integration of shop-stewards into
the hierarchy of control, as at BL under Ryder (Holloway 1987), was a general
feature of industrial relations in the 1970's (see W. Brown et.al. 1982). The social
conflict in the late 1960's over incomes policy and intensification of work was
largely spontaneous in character, organised and coordinated by the shop-stewards.
This challenge 'from below' threatened established forms of negotiation or order
between trade unions and management. The by-passing of trade union channels for
the articulation of working class demands in the late 1960's/early 1970's found
expression in the attempt to regulate industrial relations through legal means ('In
Place of Strife'; Industrial Relations Act 1971). These attempts were matched with
trade union and management efforts to tighten the grip on the shop-floor through
bureaucratization, formalisation and centralisation of collective bargaining which
generated a "powerful impetus for the 'professionalisation' of work place
representatives" (Hyman 1979a, p. 58). The general trend since the late 1960's
was to consolidate the hierarchy within the shop steward organisation and to tighten
internal managerial control through formalised negotiation and disciplinary
procedures. This trend was reinforced by the attempt to centralise control within the
shop stewards organisation in order to turn the past coordinative effort of resistance
by shop-stewards into an exercise of control. "This trend, in turn, coincides with a
significant degree of integration between steward hierarchy and official trade union
structures" (Hyman 1979a, p. 57;see also Hyman 1979b). The attempt to formalise
and professionalise industrial relations entailed the disorganisation of the proximity
of the shop stewards to the organisation of industrial militancy as during the wild cat
strikes of the late 1960's and early 1970's.
The formalisation of industrial relations sought to use the shop stewards as a means
of coordinating the organisation of social peace (see Hyman 1979a,b). The diffusion
of the state to the shop-floor was one of the key elements in sustaining the
hierarchical composition of order of the social contract. Whereas the Industrial
Relations Act was rendered 'impotent' (cf. Panitch 1986), or 'ineffective' (cf.
Hyman 1979a) because of resistance and defiance by trade unions and employers
alike (9), resistance to the labour law in the 1970's was rather limited. The erosion
of shop-steward led industrial unrest was partly conditional upon the exhaustion of
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shop-floor militancy and partly a result of the integration of shop stewards into
decision-taking processes as well as their responsibilisation through trade union
policies. The litigation concerning strike prone issues combined with the
bureaucratisation, professionalising and incorporation of shop stewards into the
machinery of formalised collective bargaining over wages, manning levels, health
and safety regulation and consultative rights of shop stewards concerning the
restructuring of production, contributed to the decline in shop-floor militancy as
the former work place representatives of discontent turned, in the face of mass
unemployment, into representatives of normalisation and domestication of conflict.
The incorporation of the shop stewards into a codified and formalised machinery of
collective bargaining helped to contain the industrial militancy of the previous years
(disorganisation of the close relationship between shop floor discontent and shop
stewards). In the event, the shop-stewards were torn between representation and
bureaucratisation mediating between official trade union organisation and shop floor
(Hyman 1979a,b). The consolidation of social relations at the shop-floor sought a
form of control in which the objectives of collective bargaining between
management, trade unions and the state were delegated to the shop-stewards who
attained a position of ensuring the implementation of policy agreements reached
(notably incomes policy). This form of negotiation of order diffused, to a large
extent, social conflict over incomes policies, recomposition of production and, as
will be discussed below, the welfare state. In the face of this development, the
contradictory role of shop-stewards, as between effective work-place
representation and objectives arising from their integration into the institutional
form of negotiation of order, established certain constraints on their activity. In
order to keep 'good working relations' with management so as not to provoke
counter-attacks by management that could jeopardise existing achievements, and to
comply with trade union policy, shop-stewards were put into a self-contradictory
position of managers of discontent (Hyman 1989a). The attempt to integrate the
shop-floor into the corporatist reconstruction of political domination entailed a
distancing of the trade union bureaucracy from its members, as implied by trade
union co-operation with management in the running of effective industrial relations.
However, the increase in industrial unrest at the end of the 1970's manifested the
failure to contain labour on the basis of formalised industrial relations. The social
conflict over the reassertion of the right to manage was highlighted by the conflict at
BL. This conflict comprised two different strategies: Ryder's negotiation of consensus
and Edwardes's 'macho-management' (see Hyman 1985b,1989b;Holloway 1987). In
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the face of severe industrial relations problems, Ryder's strategy was progressively
undermined, resulting in the appointment of Edwardes in 1977. BL's main problem
was identified as its industrial relations problems. Management had difficulties in
containing the disruptive power of labour (Marsden et.al. 1985;Scarborough 1986;
Willman 1984;Willman/Winch 1985). Disputes at BL concerned pay and
management's attempt to recompose control over labour on the basis of new working
practices, intensification of work, extension of the working day (density of work)
(ibids.). Management's attempt to contain the uncertainty on the shop-floor was the
main target of restructuring. The central problem was one of abolishing the workers'
job control and of introducing manageriaily defined practices (Scarborough 1986).
Ryder sought to implement changes within the institutional structure of mutuality at
BL. The term 'mutuality' refers to a form of industrial relations in which every
change in the labour process had to be discussed with, and to be agreed on by, the
shop stewards. The incorporation of the BL shop-stewards into a corporatist form of
representation, strategy consultation and policy implementation, permitted an
alienation of the shop-stewards from the shop-floor (Holloway 1987). The
shop-stewards generally agreed to Ryder's objective of 'making BL strong again'
(ibid.). However, within the corporatist procedure, the shop-stewards had merely
the opportunity of putting forward their own ideas for restructuring. The
co-optation of the shop-stewards, while expressing the power of the working class,
undermined the possibility of organising resistance at the shop-floor against
restructuring, the terms of which were agreed on by the shop-stewards (need to
increase productivity centred on new methods of production). Although Ryder's
attempt failed because of persistent industrial relations problems, it nevertheless
contributed to the demoralisation and exhaustion of the conflict at BL. Under the
impact of declining profits and under the threat of competitive erosion, the system of
mutuality was regarded as the obstacle to increasing profitability and the survival of
BL (Holloway 1987). The reimposition of control was seen as the key objective for
achieving productivity increases. The new methods of production were seen as a
means to create that control. When Edwardes was appointed chief executive of BL, it
signalled not only a shift in managerial strategy, but also the abandonment of Ryder's
expansionist approach that had been backed by the then Labour government and upon
which the co-operation of the shop-stewards had rested. Edwardes sought to tackle
the continuing decline of BL's market share (see Scarborough 1986) and persistent
industrial relations problems by undermining labour's strength through the
destruction of productive capacity and closing down of plant, permitting a
disciplining of labour through the threat of the sack.
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By the end of the 1970's, the exhaustion of the capacity of the social contract to
ensure social passivity threatened to undermine the imposition of money in command
on the basis of downward pressure on indirect and direct wages. The attempt to regain
financial stability focused, to a large extent, on cuts in welfare spending. Alongside
the dissociation of Keynesianism from full employment guarantees, the attack on the
welfare state involved the reimposition of the rule of money, dissociating
Keynesianism from integrating the working class on the basis of social reform. The
reimposition of the rule of money entailed the enforcing of debt over the working
class on the basis of declining living standards. Deflationary attack on indirect wages
(social expenditure costs) was a means of cutting back on public debt so as to regain
control over public finances. The imposing of tight monetary control over the
working class involved, fundamentally, an attack on the existing relation between
public expenditure and wages, i.e. the integration of the working class on the basis of
social reform and general welfare. The attempt to destroy the existing relation
between public expenditure and wages needs to be conceived of as a monetary
decomposition of social relations through a divisive policy of state austerity,
exploiting and intensifying the divisions within the working class. During the
1970's, the recomposition of the welfare state depended on the containment of
labour's disruptive strength on the basis of the corporatist integration of a
particular working class interest through selective monetary expansion. With the
legitimating backing of the IMF, the Labour governments under Wilson-Callaghan
introduced significant social welfare reductions (10). In 1976, the government
announced cuts of £4.600 million for the next two years (McDonnell 1978, p. 43).
The cuts in 1976 were "far greater than any cuts in state expenditure ever made
previously" (London 1980, p. 70). Cuts in welfare spending rose to roughly £8.100
million between 1977-1979 (Krieger 1987, p. 182). In its 1977 budget, Labour
announced its decision to introduce new limits on the money supply by restricting
the domestic expansion of credit (see McDonnell 1978). This reduction aimed to
impose a drastic reduction in the PSBR, in line with the conditions associated with
the loan negotiated with the IMF.
Between 1974 and 1975, the number of people receiving unemployment or
supplementary benefit doubled, effecting a rise in benefit costs from £400 to £800
million (Gough 1985, p. 92). The significance of the cuts was not so much the
quantitative development of welfare expenditure in general but the imposition of
financial scarcity and economic insecurity over those relying on welfare spending. In
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the face of an increasing number of recipients, the cuts were much more critical
than the consideration of expenditure levels suggests (Gough 1985; McDonnell
1978). The cuts focused on curbing food subsidies, on reducing expenditure for
housing, education, health and personal services. It was the personal services which
expanded rapidly during the 1970's, making the "switch from 17 per cent growth in
1973-75 to 11 per cent contraction in 1975-77" a dramatic reduction (Gough
1985, p. 129). An important feature of the cuts was the reduction of capital
spending. In the face of inflationary cost increases for infrastructual items, cuts in
capital spending made it difficult to finance standards required, domestically and
internationally (see Gough 1985;Altvater et.al. 1976). Reductions in capital
spending led to underspending in the fields of infrastructure, education and health.
Within the total reduction of public spending, Fryer (1979) estimates an
underspending in capital spending of about £2.8 billion, resulting in deteriorating
services, while necessary repair work remained undone and hospitals were forced to
close.
The key word in the defence of imposition of money in command over the conditions
of life through cuts in social expenditure was to 'meet needs', that is, to 'scrutinise
waste' (cf. London 1980). To scrutinise waste implies making the whole system of
social security more repressive so as to contain possible cash control collapses. The
monitoring of possible misuse of welfare provisions and, hence, the' screening of
'claimants' so as to prevent frauds involved pacification costs that were made
available, not to recuperate the burden of economic hardship and financial
insecurity, but to contain the conditions of life within a tight discipline of the limits
of the tight money. The treatment of 'claimants' as possible scroungers came to the
fore in 1976 as "an ideological campaign against 'scroungers' led to an increase in
the number of fraud investigators" (Burden/Campbell 1985, p. 113). Additionally,
resources were not only shifted in favour of aid to industry, but also in favour of
policing (McDonnell 1978;Gough 1985). The search for waste, that is the cutting
back on debt, implies also the centralisation of financial control over the welfare
state on the basis of administrative rationalisation of government departments.
Financial centralisation involves the imposition of greater effectiveness over the
administration of welfare provisions so as to prevent mismanagement.
Administrative rationalisation took the form of centralised administration within
departments (i.e NHS), the bringing together of services of a similar kind under one
administrative body (i.e. health and social security; DHSS), and centralised budget
control over local government.
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Screening and monitoring of 'claimants' implied the removal of administrative
discretion and the introduction of central guidelines over form, content and scope of
services. To increase effectiveness entailed the introduction of managerial market
criteria over spending and the centralisation of the bureaucratic structure of the
state in the attempt to meet the ends of a government of limited liquidity. The
centralisation of budget control over spending was associated with the imposition of
rigorous cash limits. Cash limits need to be seen as an important element in imposing
money in command over the conditions of life. Cash limits entailed the introduction of
managerial criteria concerning the effective use of limited resources and involved,
as such, much more than merely financial control over spending. "They had the
fundamental implications for the form of public administration in subordinating
political and administrative discretion to the rule of money, ensuring that the
provisions of social services according to centrally determined bureaucratic and
political criteria would be confined within rigorously enforced financial constraints,
rather than expanding in response to social needs expressed at the point of provision"
(Clarke 1988a, p. 155). A tight monetary regime enforced competition between
different departments for financial provision, entailed managerial criteria over the
use of limited resources and implied deteriorating services and more intense
working conditions for those employed in areas that were hit hardest, straining the
relation between those running these services on the local basis and those dependent
on service provisions. Cash limits must therefore be seen not just as a technical
mechanism for imposing limited liquidity, but as a key element in the recomposition
of the welfare state in terms of repression and efficiency and in the tightening up of
relation of bureaucratic control within the state so as to supervise possible cash
control collapses, i.e. the collapse of controlling the working class on the basis of
tight money.
The objective to 'meet needs' involved also attempts to reinforce the division within
the working class as benefits for long-term unemployed were reduced. The gap in
unemployment benefits widened by 19% by 1978 (Gough 1985, p. 139). This
policy contributed to marginalising sections of the working class, reinforcing the
hardship of long-term unemployed through discriminating monetary pressure and
stigmatising them as parasites. This repressive form of divide and rule was
furthered by forms of bureaucratic control. The attempt to increase efficiency
implied the individualisation of 'claimants' through bureaucratic hurdles, computer
aided supervision and centrally formalised administrative procedures. The
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overwhelming structure of bureaucratic structures integrated 'claimants' through
administrative forms of control and defined their problems as aspects of the
administration of limited liquidity. As the unemployed are not seen as a constituents
within the Labour Party and trade unions, they became increasingly marginalised
within the formalised structure of interest-representation, while bureaucratic
forms of control permitted a treatment of 'claimants' more directly within the ambit
of the state. The administration of austerity over the conditions of life entailed an
official denial of the existence of the unemployed in terms of class as they were
treated as 'claimants' and, as such, a bureaucratic problem and a financial hazard,
permitting a tight network of political supervision so as to weed out possible
scroungers and misuse of public money. The imposition of money in command
comprised thus the tightening of formalised bureaucratic forms of control. These
developments implied a recomposition of the welfare state in terms of repression and
efficiency. The overall direction of these measures was to secure a socially controlled
imposition of the money power of capital.
Within the context of a government of limited liquidity, the subordination of the
conditions of life to the power of money reinforced the division within the working
class, affecting, in particular, those on the bottom of the wage hierarchy (i.e.
differentiation between long and short term unemployed; curbing of food subsidies;
cuts in housing). The restructuring of the welfare state imposed financial
self-discipline over large parts of the population. Further, the low waged and
unwaged were individualised through bureaucratic hurdles associated with the
provision of benefits. The subordination of political criteria to the 'dictates of the
market' subjected the working class to an individualising imposition of money in
command, safeguarded by law and order control (formalised bureaucratic hurdles;
computer aided surveillance; criminalising of 'claimants' as possible scroungers;
monitoring of possible maladministration etc). The massive redistribution of wealth
in favour of capital coincided with a policy of imposed economic insecurity for the
population at large. The imposition of money in command involved the decomposition
of class relations through changes in the relations between the centre and the
margins, which is to say between those higher up in the hierarchical order and those
lower down, between the waged and low waged workers, between the waged and the
wageless, and amongst the wageless themselves. While social unrest in opposition to
deflationary policies had only a few years ago brought down the Heath government,
the reconstruction of political domination through the incorporation of the trade
unions achieved a responsibilisation of the working class which made possible the
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socially controlled imposition of a deflationary erosion of living standards. According
to Burton (1985), the cuts achieved under Labour in the 1970's were much greater
than those under the Conservatives in the 1980's, permitting monetarists like
Burton to claim that the Thatcher government showed insufficient determination in
pursuing monetarist policies. Despite the drastic imposition of money in command,
the attempt to pacify class conflict through policies of class collaboration involved
integration costs. Cuts in social expenditure were outweighed by increases in the cost
of unemployment benefit, employment subsidies and temporary employment
schemes; by the increasing cost of industrial 'rationalisation' programmes;
nationalisation of industry; and by the increased cost of debt service associated with
higher interest rates. Public expenditure continued to rise as unemployment soared.
The pacification costs with which government sought to avoid resistance to social
expenditure cuts put pressure on the PSBR which continued to deteriorate between
1977 and 1979.
The recomposition of the welfare state in terms of repression and efficiency
involved also a confrontation with the trade union movement. The campaign against
the recomposition of the welfare state as a controlling institution over the imposition
of money in command was mainly organised by those unions whose members were
affected by the recomposition of the welfare state (NALGO; NUPE; COHSE: see Fryer
1979;Ascher 1987). Health and local government workers were among the earliest
public sector activitsts. Resolutions passed by those unions involved in the defence of
the welfare state called for an immediate return to a policy of full employment
growth, introduction of socialist planning principles, an end to cuts in social
spending and immediate measures to reduce the social consequences of high inflation,
including a redistribution of wealth in favour of labour. These demands were accepted
by the TUC General Congress in June 1976. However, neither the TUC nor the
industrial unions were willing to jeopardise relations with government by
supporting the campaign against cuts in any other way than by giving verbal support.
Instead, the TUC and the main industrial unions organised against the campaign in
that they criticised strikes as undermining the unity of the labour movement. This
denunciation of social conflict over the cuts contributed to the demobilisation of
social resistance through the marginalisation of those unions invovled in the
campaign within the trade union movement. The claim that public dissent constituted
a socially irresponsible confrontation with Labour that would destroy the unity of
the movement (see Fryer 1979) was a potent force. The unions which organised
public resistance were said to be constituting an alternative to the TUC, while the
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TUC claimed to use its influence in the consultative framework of the social contract
to alleviate the impact of cuts (ibid.). The struggle over the cuts was of decisive
importance for the survival of the social contract. The stability of the social contract
depended on the imposition of the limits of accumulation on the working class in a
socially controlled and peaceful way. The demobilisation of social unrest was of
crucial importance not only for the trade union movement's attempt to retain
achieved positions of political influence but, more fundamentally, for the
continuation of the delicate synthesis of the imposition of money in command and the
legitimation of deflationary policies through corporatist forms of class collaboration.
The attempt to regain control over, and to improve the efficiency of, public
spending, entailed the government in imposing tighter financial limits on, and
increasing budgetary control over, local government spending. The centralisation of
budgetary control implies a recomposition of the relation between central and local
government which is the biggest distributor of social services (Gough 1985), which
is vulnerable to popular demand (Jessop 1980), which is one of the biggest
employers and which has to 'manage' the 'local' working class and its poverty
(Cockburn 1977). Over the years, local government spending on education, housing
and social services increased (Gough 1985), while the proportion of local rates
gradually declined as a significant source of revenue. "We are then faced with an
apparent paradox: local-authority spending, particularly on social services, has
risen rapidly to one third of total government expenditure, but local-authority rate
income has fallen equally rapidly to one-tenth of government revenue" (ibid., p.
97). Local government became more and more dependent, to meet increased cost of
spending, on financial support from central government. The gap between local
government expenditure and direct tax income was filled by financial support from
central government, the total of which accounted for 39% in 1965 and 55% in 1975
(ibid.). In order to regain control over public spending, government tightened the
administrative structure of the state in the attempt to rationalise the imposition of
money in command and regain control over public spending. The centralisation of
financial control over local government integrated the local state much more closely
into the limits of the international movement of the money power of capital. The
attempt to centralise financial control over the local state, thus transforming local
government into a civil service institution of the central state, involved three
integrated strategies: the geographical reorganisation of local government,
intervention into its financial position, and centralised control over social services
run by local government.
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The reorganisation of local government occurred as early as 1974 when local
government was amalgamated to fewer and larger areas (see Gough 1985). This
centralisation of political authority on the local level implied a professionalising of
local government. At the same time, large departments such as the DHSS took away
administrative discretion from local government and introduced elaborate central
bureaucratic forms of control, including managerial market criteria. "Systematic
forward planning of health and social-security services has been developed within
this framework since 1974, the time when the structure of the NHS was altered to
secure more effective central control" (Gough 1985, p. 99/100) (11). Rigorous
interventions into the financial position of local government occurred by 1975/6 as
dramatic reductions in the rate support grant for local government (see London
1980) were introduced, including the imposition of cash limits over local
government spending (see Gough 1985). The support grant made up for more than
half (London 1980) of the expenditure of local government. Cash limits intervened
into capital spending of local government (Travers 1987;Gough 1985;London
1980). In order to control possible collapses of cash control, overspending in capital
spending was punished by the introduction of loan sanctions (Gough 1985;H.Davies
1987) which local government had to obtain for any capital spending that was to be
financed by credit. Rigid financial ceilings were introduced in 1975. Cash limits on
capital spending and loan sanctions restricted the financial room for manoeuvre of
local government and made them more and more financially dependent on central
government's financial discretion. By the mid 1970's two-thirds of voted
expenditure was subject to cash limits: "a planned ceiling in cash terms on the extent
to which initial estimates can be raised by supplementary votes" (Gough 1985, p.
99). Additionally, central government intervened increasingly in the way which
local government* saw fit to use 'public' money. The imposition of service
prescription is associated with specific grants. Specific grants are a proportion of
the support grant. This proportion increased from 9% in the mid 1970's to 16% in
1979/1980 (Travers 1987, p. 20). Special grants bypass local government's
freedom to impose policies it sees as desirable and made it possible for central
government to dictate the form, content and scope of local government activities.
The centralisation of budgetary control over spending involved attempts to improve
control over the effective use of public money by local authorities. The assessment
of cash limits and rate support grant focuses on what was termed 'social need', which
effectively means the determination of what local authorities should be spending to
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provide services. Additionally, tighter control over spending performance was, in
the face of punitive sanctions for overspending (loan sanctions), superimposed by
monitoring procedures over local government's effective use of resources. All this
imposed some sort of self-discipline on local government to restrain spending and to
scrutinise 'waste'. The imposition of self-discipline, in turn, entailed hidden cuts in
spending as local government sought to increase savings in order to meet financial
difficulties if they should arise. In sum, the centralisation of budgeting control
involves a shift in emphasis from local government as administrator of material
concessions to an administrative executor of cuts and deteriorating services. While
this development depoliticised local government, it made local authorities look like
the perpetrators of the deflationary attack on the conditions of life.
However, despite attempts to regain control over local government spending,
current spending levels continued to rise, while capital spending was increasingly
constrained since the mid 1970's (see Travers 1987). Rising current spending
levels need to be seen as an expression of the political strength of labour because a
high proportion of current costs in local spending is accounted for by wages of
workers in local government employment. Resistance by local government workers
to cuts in wages, had "significant direct and indirect effects upon the financial
situation of local government" (Ascher 1987, p. 212). The direct effects were
increasing wage costs at the same time as the squeeze on local government's financial
position forced "politically sensitive local tax increases" (ibid.). As pressure on
wages would have fuelled strike action, local authorities relied on cuts in capital
expenditure and increased fees and charges. The attempt to prevent social discontent
over cuts in social expenditure from spreading required the commitment of
pacification costs in the form of higher current spending. The imposition of money in
command led to deteriorating services, higher local taxes and rising fees for
services. Sustained increases in current spending eased the pressure on local
government that had become increasingly embroiled with community resistance in
opposition to the imposition of tight money (see Cockburn 1977). The state's
response to community resistance centred around 'corporate management' (Cockburn
1977, p. 34). When the struggle over the local state deepened, the defects of
containing resistance on the basis of corporate management saw the development of
'community development' which was regarded as a means of legitimating the state's
policy of tight money in the face of growing impoverishment of, particularly, the
workers in the ghettos of the big cities. Community development provided a channel
of local participation ('participatory democracy') in administering the organisation
1 85
of life within the limits of centrally determined resources (ibid.)- The
administrative reforms, ostensibly to increase democratic participation, involved
the attempt to deflect public dissatisfaction with the administration of the
government's financial straitjacket and bureaucratic constraints. However, higher
local taxes contributed to inflation while the rising levels of current spending
contributed to persistent PSBR problems.
The pressure on the PSBR derived also from the policing costs that the control of
the working class on the basis of tight money demanded. The domestication of the
social conflict on the bacis of the imposition of money in command involved not only
the policing of trade union members by the trade union the bureaucracy and the
extension of bureaucratic means of supervising possible cash control collapses. It
involved also the maintenance and extension of tough policing practices once the
coordinated effort of class collaboration to contain the class struggle on the basis of
corporatist strategies failed to control money in command's imposition. The
politicising of policing that marked a culmination of well established trends (E.P.
Thompson 1980;Bunyan 1977) safeguarded deflationary attack in case of a break
down of civilised forms of law and order control.
In response to the miners' strike in 1972, the then Conservative government
established the National Security Committee. Labour retained this body under a less
controversial name: the Civil Contingencies Committee (Geary 1985). The purpose
of this body is to draw up plans for the maintenance of supplies and services during
industrial disputes. The Committee is virtually a strike breaking machinery (ibid.).
Other preemptive measures for combatting possible public and industrial disorder
include the National Reporting Centre (founded in 1972)(12) and the expansion of
powers given to the Defence Scientific Advisory Committee to review available
intelligence gathering and crowd control equipment (ibid.). Additionally, Labour
proposed to establish a new centralised intelligence service in 1975. This service
was to coordinate "police, Special Branch, MI5 and various other intelligence
operations" (Geary 1985, p. 95/6). Whether this agency was ever established and
whether it is in full operation is, as yet, not known (ibid.). The National Reporting
Centre coordinates different police support units during strikes and public disorder
(ibid.). After World War II, it was decided that police support units "should be
formed to provide mobile squads of men for civil defence purposes" (ibid., p. 101).
In response to the Saltley mass picketing by the NUM in 1972, the police support
units formally took over peacetime civil order purposes (ibid.). The police support
units provide the basis for the national standardisation of police training,
organisation and equipment. This development dates back to at least the 1960's
(Kettle 1985). The riot squads of the British police are based on the police support
units. The operation of the police support units is coordinated by the National
Reporting Centre. This Centre "is to maintain full details of the availability of police
throughout England and Wales (does not include Scotland) and to deploy it to places
where it is judged to be needed" (Kettle 1985, p. 26). Although the mutual aid
system between police support units kept the decentralised structure of policing
formally intact, the central state secured increasing power over policing directives
and forms of 'crowd control'. In constitutional terms, there is no such body as a
British police (Morgan 1987). While the constitutional responsibility for the police
still rested with local authorities, preemptive emergency measures rendered
uniform the policing of society and established a central authority over form, content
and direction of policing, including the introduction of standardised equipment,
training and operational tactics. While their control over policing methods and
equipment decreased, local authorities had to carry the financial burden to pay for
equipment and, if required, the transporting of police officers to their destination of
crowd control.
The imposition of the power of money was thus complemented by the planning of
emergency combat of disorder. Centralised policing powers - fuelled by the desire to
uproot terrorism (Prevention of Terrorism Act) - need to be seen as complementing
the recomposition of the welfare state in terms of repression. Behind the
smokescreen of a policy of national consensus, national security policies gathered
momentum as a preemptive stabilisation of social peace once the coordinated effort of
class collaboration broke down. The preemptive use of force reinforced the attempt to
process class conflict in non-class forms of citizenship. The self-contradictory
displacement of class to citizenship is reinforced by the doubling of citizen into
citizen, endowed with particular rights, and potential criminal. By treating citizens
as objects of police control, citizenship is defined, and processed, as potentially
unlawful and deviant. The Conservative's crusade against the break-down of law and
order was based on already existing emergency measures, including the monitoring
and screening of those relying on welfare provisions and law and order control
supervising the monetary and legal decomposition of class relations. The Keynesian
objective of transforming protest into demand changed during the 1970's to a
co-ordinated effort of class collaboration seeking to impose the rule of money
through emergency planning for possible cash control collapses. In the face of
1 87
selective pacification costs designed to maintain social peace, a tight monetary
regime imposed the lurid face of equality upon the conditions of life.
II Discrediting of the Social Contract
Since the mid 1970's, the monetarist assertion of a connection between the rate of
growth of the money supply and inflation played an ever more important role in the
attempt to confine the aspirations of the working class within the limits of
accumulation. The shift to restrictive budgetary policies from the 1976 budget
onwards restored some confidence in the pound as the PSBR fell from 10.5 billion in
1975 to 9.5 billion in 1976. This development provided government with the
opportunity to finance its PSBR with less difficulties without thereby
simultaneously compromising the targeting of the money supply (see Clarke 1987).
However, the crisis of containing labour's productive power within the limits of
capital reasserted itself in the form of fragile international money markets,
earmarked by the crisis of the dollar in 1977. The dollar crisis manifested the
exhaustion of the policy of integrating the abstract category of labour with the value
form on the basis of balance of payment deficits and credit-expansion. The defence of
the dollar through high interest rates coincided, in the UK, with an increase in the
rate of inflation, and renewed PSBR and balance of payment difficulties. Labour,
rather than relaxing its monetary policies so as to stimulate economic growth,
"allowed pound sterling to rise in order to curb inflation" (Clarke 1988a, p. 156).
The sense of unfairness over the tyranny of the state increased as it became clear
that the policy of selective planning failed to bring about real returns in the form of
employment and wages. For the trade unions, the main difficulty was that they
co-operated with Labour in formulating and imposing deflationary policies which,
rather than providing the miraculous cure of the economy, turned out to be nothing
else than inflationism, credit-sustained accumulation, and a real sacrifice for the
working class in terms of deteriorating living standards, mass unemployment,
economic insecurity, bureaucratic control and supervision as well as intensification
of exploitation. Since 1976 any hopes had dwindled rapidly of the state raising
indirect wages and reversing restrictive income policies. The intensification of the
social conflict in the form of community resistance to tight money control, industrial
militancy against wage restraint and restructuring of production and opposition to
unemployment and financial insecurity, signalled that the corporatist reconstruction
of political domination was living increasingly on borrowed time. Class struggle
manifested itself in resistance to the intensification of work and to the imposition of
the abstract equality of money over the conditions of life. The class struggle
O O
I oo
responded to the attempt to reintegrate the category of abstract labour with the value
form on the basis of the enforcement of debt over the working class. Growing
opposition to unpalatable deflationary policies challenged not only the political
package of deflation, but, more fundamentally, the form of the state itself. Social
unrest was directed, implicitly or explicitly, towards the form of the state as it
manifested the concentrated force of the 'international terrorism of money' (cf.
Marazzi 1976). At the same time, the class struggle in and against the form of the
state entailed pacification costs which the maintenance of the increasingly fragile
synthesis between political domination and its legitimating discourse, or, in other
words, the relation between deflationary policies and Keynesian class collaboration,
required. Despite an abrasive attack on living standards, the tendency in the PSBR
was upwards, while the balance of payments continued to deteriorate.
Protest and resistance against the erosion of wages through income policies
gathered momentum as voluntary agreement over wage restraint shifted to statutory
income policies by 1978. While the trade unions remained largely committed to the
social contract, their support for highly unpalatable deflationary policies dwindled
as they were threatened with the loss of control over their members. The growing
tension between the TUC and the Labour Party is reflected in the joint publications of
the Liaison Committee. The tone of these statements became increasingly exhortative,
calling for the implementation of industrial democracy and criticising the neglect and
failure of government to sustain social consensus. "The irony in both the contents and
the tone of this and later documents of the LC [Liaison Committee] is that, while they
reflect the growing anxiety of the trade union wing of the partnership (and no doubt
of some members from the NEC), the appearance of solidarity is preserved by their
being presented always with the endorsement of the Prime Minister and ministerial
wing, who were themselves of course directly responsible for the procrastination
under criticism" (Coates/Topham 1986, p. 56/7). The statements of the Liaison
Committee reflected growing social dissent. As trade unions found it more and more
difficult to rally their members in support of the social contract, monetarist
policies within an institutionalised form of class collaboration reached their
historical barrier to the containment of class struggle. Labour lost its electoral
appeal as the Party of consensus able to integrate the working class behind the
smokescreen of a national interest in modernisation and rationalisation. Instead
Labour and the trade unions gained recognition as administrators of cuts and
deteriorating services associated with bureaucratic forms of control. The sudden, but
looming, outburst of industrial militancy by the end of the 1970's brought into the
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open the inherent tension of the social contract. While the Keynesian class
compromise was progressively dismantled since 1976, the eruption of a wave of
strikes in the winter of discontent drove the remaining nail into its coffin. The
winter of discontent signalled the exhaustion of the corporatist reconstruction of
political domination. The deflationary attack on the working class no longer sustained
the integration of those workers upon whom the stability of class collaboration
rested. The reassertion of industrial militancy undermined the political attempt to
disorganise the working class on the basis of the corporatist collective. The failure to
ensure social passivity undermined the capacity of the trade union movement to
collaborate in deflationary attack without losing its ties to its members. The
foundation of the social contract was thereby undermined.
When inflation began to rise at the end of the 1970's, globally and domestically,
and when Callaghan attempted to tease the delegates on the 1978 TUG General
Congress to either commit themselves to a new round of severe wage restraint or to
face a general election, the TUC lost its ability to control the tension longer. "The last
straw was the 5% ceiling imposed in August 1978 that provoked the 'winter of
discontent' in which an unprecedented wave of militancy greeted the government's
attempt to hold down wages in the face of inflation that was rising again" (Clarke
1987, p. 413). By the end of the 1978, "almost 20 per cent of the British
workforce had been on strike, from oil-tanker drivers to hospital porters, from
lorry drivers to journalists, from train crews to gravediggers" (Bassett 1986, p.
7). The coordinated effort by Labour and the organised trade union movement to take
the heat out of the cold climate of industrial relations had failed. In response to
growing social unrest and a looming recession, "the TUC joined government in
coining a new phrase, an 'Agreed Economic Assessment' aimed at 'a broader national
consensus on the overall distribution of income'. The February statement's
conclusion even pointed the way towards the priority of the new Toryism, which was
waiting a few more months to take over: 'central to the achievement of all this, is the
need to defeat inflation. A target of getting inflation below five per cent within three
years is a bold one, but we must take it as our aim'. It has since taken the Thatcher
government five years to reach the target bequeathed by the TUC and Labour's
departing Prime Minister at a cost which is now legendary" (Coates/Topham 1986,
p. 59). Labour's claim to be the party of social consensus lost its acclaim, as did its
claim to have a special relationship with the trade unions, because the trade unions
were incompetent to deal, in a responsible way, with the explosion of unrest in the
winter of discontent. However, the winter of discontent did not result in a renewed
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spiral of militancy, as in the late 1960's and early 1970's. In the face of mass
unemployment and a decomposition of work-place organisation, the decisive
demoralisation, demobilisation and fragmentation of class conflict during the social
contract did not, in retrospect, permit a sustained period of class polarisation and
confrontation. The channelling of resentment against the alien form of the capitalist
state power into the established composition of political domination, fostered the
ideology of the New Right concerning its condemnation of the tyranny of the state and
the coercive power of trade unions. The demobilisation and demoralisation of social
conflict laid the foundations for the recomposition of the role of the state under the
Conservative governments in the 1980's.
The discrediting of monetarist policies within a Keynesian framework of class
collaboration established the foundation for the removal of the empty shell of the
institutional form of class collaboration itself. The winter of discontent destroyed the
last vestige of political credibility of the Keynesian mode of integration, fuelling the
claim of the New Right that the miraculous cure of economic recovery rested on the
rejection of the interventionist state in favour of the subordination of political
criteria to the dictates of the market. In the face of a renewed recession that turned
stagnation into depression, the discrediting of the social contract strengthened the
hand of those who sought to exploit the popular resentment at the alienated form of
the capitalist state power. The ideology of the New Right filled the gap between
political domination and legitimation, whose Keynesian synthesis had broken down
during the last years of the social contract. The disillusion over the social contract,
whose policies turned from the 'planning of growth and output' to the 'planning of
deflation and supervision', illustrated the practical failure of Keynesianism and
proved the practicality of monetarism, as represented by the Conservatives.
Therefore, it was not surprising that the incoming Thatcher government dropped all
attempts to secure co-operation from the TUC. The TUC had not the strength to
promise social peace in exchange for something Labour proved to be unable to
deliver. Nor was it possible to reconstruct political authority through corporatist
forms of domination over the social unrest, as indicated by the failure of the trade
union movement to normalise and domesticate the class conflict during the winter of
discontent.
Ill Conclusion
The development of the state can be systematised into three overlapping phases of
the class struggle over domination: the indiscriminate expansion of welfare and
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direct wages between 1972 and 1975; the attempt to regain and to consolidate
control over the social conflict through a corporatist form of class collaboration,
associated with the demoralisation and demobilisation of class conflict (1974
onwards); and the attempt to reconstruct the domination over labour through
deflationary attack (1975 onwards;for a similar systematisation see Negri 1988c).
The first phase is characterised by expansionary policies that responded to the
tremendous class conflict of the early 1970's. Despite pressure on profit, neither
capital nor the state were able to hold down wages or to intensify labour. This phase
is characterised by deteriorating balance of payments, a sharp rise in the PSBR,
rapid inflation and a deep recession. The important feature of this phase was the
consolidation of class conflict over the wage, in the broader sense of the social wage,
i.e. direct wages and welfare concessions. The political strength of the working class
to resist intensification of work and to command a social wage, forced the state to an
expansive monetary policy that was in sharp contrast to the global limits of
accumulation. The consolidation of the social conflict in the form of the wage relation
manifested the political strength of the working class in a way which, by 1974,
blocked the class struggle over domination. The expectation of a rising social wage
(including employment guarantees and industrial democracy) was institutionalised
in the social contract as a quid pro quo for social peace. However, this
institutionalisation politicised the social wage as it constituted the focus of the class
struggle over the imposition of political domination (money in command). The
struggle over money in command involved the struggle over the living standard
commanded by the working class. The expectation of a rising living standard was
expressed in institutional form in the corporatist reconstruction of political
domination.
The second phase is characterised by the corporatist reconstruction of political
domination. The tight integration of the organised labour movement expressed the
political strength of the working class, as the social contract made explicit in
institutional form the dependence of capital upon labour. However, the
institutionalisation of the class conflict not only consolidated the working class in
terms of the wage relation, it also made explicit the social constitution of the trade
unions as existing in a dialectical continuum as representatives, and managers, of
discontent. Behind the smokescreen of a policy of social partnership lurked the
responsibilisation of the trade union movement to the authority of the state,
permitting a definition of the conflict over domination as one between national and
sectional interest. Within this displacement of the class conflict, the trade unions
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took over the role of representing the sectional interest of a working people
subaltern to national interest. Corporatist reconstruction of political domination
involved the disorganisation of the working class as, class: the channelling of
discontent over the reimposition of the value form into responsible outlets that were
construed as means of influence for appropriate responsible citizens (13).
Corporatist admission into the hierarchical composition of political domination was
conditional upon the effort of the trade unions to demobilise the class conflict and to
serve the ends of the imperatives of capitalist accumulation (see Negri 1988c). The
normalisation of class conflict through corporatist forms of responsibilisation
continued until the late 1970's.
The third phase comprises the imposition of a government of limited liquidity.
With the help of the organised trade union movement and credit-sustained
accumulation, restrictive incomes policies came into effect by 1975, cuts in public
expenditure were successfully imposed by 1976, and the welfare state was
progressively recomposed in terms of repression and efficiency. At the same time,
the state and capital turned from holding back aggressive management policies to
adopting a more aggressive approach towards the working class. By reimposing the
limits of the market over the conditions of life, the Keynesian attempt to plan
full-employment growth turned into a politically controlled planning of a socially
controlled imposition of money in command. Similarly, the Keynesian welfare state
turned from redistributor of social wealth into an administrator of cuts and the
planning of economic growth and output turned into the planning of social security,
safeguarding deflationary attack. The corporatist demobilisation of the working class
was superimposed through the desolidarisation of the working class on the basis of a
monetary and legal decomposition of class relations. The shift in emphasis to a
government of limited liquidity manifested the death throes of the Keynesian mode of
integration. However, while the 'spirit' of the social contract was violated, its formal
agreement remained intact. The TUC, for practical reasons, accepted the political
priority of deflation and was willing to domesticate the class conflict.
The recomposition of the welfare state in terms of efficiency, bureaucratic control,
and repression, including centralised budget control as a means of keeping monetary
targets and redistribution of wealth in favour of capital, permitted a resurgence of
the ideology of the market within the conception of the Keynesian interventionist
state. The main direction of the restrictive monetary policies comprised the
combination of selective financial support for capital with the attempt to gain control
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over inflation by a deflationary attack on the conditions of life. While Labour's
industrial policy was contradictory with regard to nationalisation of lame ducks, it
nevertheless involved the subordination of political criteria to the market as implied
by the the watering down of industrial policy, and selective financial aid to those
companies regarded as an asset to the balance of payments and troubled by industrial
relations problems. This development is in evidence also concerning the abandonment
of full-employment growth policies, i.e. the shift in emphasis from demand-
management (underwriting of profits) to the fine tuning of financial aid. Keynesian
policies no longer aimed at restoring output and balancing levels of consumption,
but, rather, at reactivating the limits of the market over the conditions of life. The
financial centralisation of the state entailed the tightening of the network of social
normalisation through restrictive material concessions and bureaucratic forms of
control, discriminating against the egalitarianism associated with the ideology of
social reforms. The tyranny of austerity spilled over into a repressive
recomposition of the welfare state, or, rather, this spill over constitutes a form of
control with which to make certain what otherwise might have been disruptive.
Money in command is premised on law and order control. However, continuing PSBR
and balance of payment problems as well as high rates of inflation indicates that the
struggle over deflationary attack was by no means resolved, despite a massive
imposition of tight money. The strength of the working class in struggling to defend
its living standards can be. seen in the desperate attempt by Callaghan to achieve
agreement for further wage restraint, sparking off the winter of discontent and
ending with what Hobsbawm et.al. (1981) termed 'The Long March of Labour Halted'.
The corporatist reconstruction of political domination and subsequent deflationary
attack manifested a centralisation of the hierarchical composition of political
authority in the form of centralised budget control, centralised control over direct
wages, centralised policing powers, centralised negotiation of order through
formalised patterns of incorporation, centralised bureaucratic structure of the
welfare state, including the combination of government departments and tighter
financial control over local government. These developments coincided, on the other
hand, with a diffusion of political authority in the form of formalisation and
legalisation of industrial relations, bureaucratic control over 'claimants',
transformation of local government to an administrative civil service department,
etc. The centralisation and diffusion of the alien form of capitalist state power
manifests,—in—the face of the fragility of credit-sustained accumulation, a mode of
motion of the class struggle over the reimposition of the power of money. The
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centralisation of political authority indicates the political attempt to secure a
socially controlled, non-conflictual, and politically supervised reimposition of the
limits of accumulation right down to the shop-floor and to the place of contact
between 'users and administrators' of the welfare state. Centralisation and diffusion
need to be seen as forms taken by the reconstruction of political domination which
sought to block the class struggle and to make certain the imposition of the power of
money. The attempt to enmesh social relations more directly in the ambit of the state
indicates a development consequent upon the loss of political influence over the
domestic management of accumulation, following the rupture of capitalist domination
over labour's productive power and the class conflict that forced the state to reassert
the Keynesian conception of the interventionist state. The crisis of domination over
labour that had led to the events of 1971 and 1973 (formal abandonment of Bretton
Woods) proved to be of fundamental importance for the development of the state.
Further, the class conflict in the early 1970's proved to be crucial as it made it
impossible for the state to launch a deflationary attack through a policy of
confrontation. The constitution of overaccumulation and crisis in the form of the
global power of money indicates a shift of state power to the world market wherein
the movement of money capital takes place. This shift is expressed in the
centralisation and diffusion of the state: the attempt to regain control over public
spending and the domestic circulation of currency through centralised budget control
and the diffusion of control so as to make certain the imposition of limited liquidity
over the conditions of life. While the constitution of the social contract proved to be
vital for the reassertion of political authority, the subordination of the social to the
limits of accumulation depended on sustained accumulation. By 1977, the political
composition of the social contract started to crumble as the constitution of capitalist
accumulation on the basis of credit approached a renewed recession.
In formal terms, the political substance of the social contract depended on the
legitimation of the deflationary attack on the working class through an input of
consensus. Such an input, however, depended on real achievements, i.e. the recovery
of capitalist accumulation and the reassertion of a policy of social reform. While the
credit-sustained accumulation made possible the fragmentation of the working class,
the looming recession that gathered momentum by 1978 implied the exhaustion of a
policy of social control on the basis of divide and rule. For the state, the crucial
problem raised by the threatening but sudden outburst of discontent concerns the
question of how to reimpose the power of money in a socially controlled way that
would harness discontent into non-conflictual forms of class disorganisation. The
135
New Right "were able to tap popular resentment at the alienated form of the
capitalist state power, which came to a head over issues of inflation and taxation,
which the monetarism of the New Right articulated in terms of the relationship
between money and the state" (Clarke 1990b, ms. p. 19). The relationship between
money and the state articulated by the New Right involved the rejection of the
interventionist state in favour of the subordination of the state, capital and the
working class to the limits of the market. The New Right's articulation of a closer
relationship between money and the state rested not on a philosophy of monetarism
but, rather, on the need of government to come to terms with the ability of the
working class to disrupt the unfettered rule of the market forces. This disruption is
expressed in the fragile movement of unemployed capital on the world market. The
attempt to reconstitute social relations on the basis of the market involves the
subordination of social relations to the global limits of accumulation, characterised
by the speculative accumulation of unemployed capital on the world's money markets.
The imposition of money in command concerns the political attempt to enforce debt
over the working class so as to defend the formal exchange equality of currency
through larger reserves and to intensify work in the attempt to ensure the existence
of credit as a claim on future surplus value.
Four major elements of the development of the state stand out, all of which
developed much more stringently in the 1980's: the recomposition of welfare in
terms of repression and efficiency, including centralised budget control; the shift
from a Keynesian form of economic planning to the political imposition of the limits
of the market on the working class, while discretionary fiscal and credit policies
sought to sustain accumulation; the demobilisation and demoralisation of the working
class through the reinforcement of the divisions within the working class, while, at
the same time, the state sought to subordinate the conditions of life to formalised
forms of control, including legalisation of industrial relations, and to restrictive
monetary intervention; and, finally, the subordination of political criteria to the
dictates of the market as implied by the adoption of essentially monetarist policies by
1976. These developments involve fundamentally the rejection of the interventionist
state in favour of the subordination of political criteria to the market, the imposition
of austerity over the working class, involving the destruction of the relation between
public expenditure and wages, law and order control of society, and the
accommodation of domestic management of accumulation to the unfettered rule of
value in the form of capital. Regarding the more stringent development of these
elements under the incoming Conservative government in 1979, the period between
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1974 and 1979 needs to be seen as a transitional phase during which the struggle of
the working class was blocked, domesticated and integrated into bourgeois forms of
the wage relation. The period between 1974 and 1979 needs to be seen as a
transitional phase also because of the constitution of the working class as the
collective antithesis to the imposition of money of command, a subjective power that
forced capitalist reproduction more and more into debt and that, despite an abrasive
attack on living standards, resisted the enforcement of debt.
Notes
1: The TUC and Labour discussed policies in the Liaison Committee, a consultative body that
was set up in 1972. The Committee consisted out of six members from the Parliamentary
Labour Party, Labour's national executive and trade unions respectively. During the period
of the social contract the Committee continued to meet and to publish statements
commenting on the policies of the social contract. On the historical, social and financial
relationship between Labour and trade unions see Minkin 1974,1978, 1979;Coates/Topham
1986;Crouch 1982;Panitch 1976,1986,1988.
2: The incorporation of the organised labour movement into the state, domestically and
internationally, gave rise to view of the trade unions as mass-integrative state
apparatuses (see Hirsch 1976,1977). The conceptualisation of the state, underlying this
understanding of the trade unions, dwells on the notion of the 'relative autonomy' of the
political from the economic and on Gramsci's conception of political power (on Gramsci's
conception of political power see Buci-Glucksmann 1981 ;Priester 1981 ;Showstack Sassoon
1987). Following Gramsci, Hirsch sees the Keynesian state as an integrated state that
combines 'leadership' (ideological integration and supremacy) 'armoured with coercion'
(political power and domination). Hirsch picks up on this conception by assuming the
separation of the political from the economic as an accomplished historical fact that serves
as a premise for the historically concrete development of political power. The historically
concrete composition of the state is identified with the state as apparatus. The state as
apparatus operates, in turn, within the form-determined separation of the state from the
social (Hirsch 1983b;for critique see Bonefeld 1987b;Clarke 1990b).
The relation between the state in general (form of the state) and the historically concrete
form of the state (state as apparatus) is construed in terms of historically specific
cohesion between the economic and political subsystems of society (historic bloc). In order
for the state to assume leadership - a problem of ideological cohesion of society - the state
needs to incorporate organisations of civil society, including trade unions, churches, the
media, the education system (Hirsch 1976,1977). This process specifies the state as an
heterogeneous unity of diverse apparatuses (ibid.), the historically specific concentration
of which is seen as an historic bloc. The state as apparatus is thus systematised as existing
in and through different apparatuses: the repressive, ideological and the mass-integrative
apparatuses. Their relation to one another is seen as one of relative autonomy (ibid.). This
relative autonomy is said to be functionally required for the reproduction of the capitalist
system as it allows the state to adapt in a flexible way to modifications in the balance of
class forces (relation between capital and labour) and between the balance of compromise
(relation between different capital fractions) (ibid.). The function of the state apparatuses
is to make the social environment assured for capitalist reproduction and hence to make the
aspiration of the working class compatible with the process of accumulation (ibid.). The
different apparatuses comprise the functional aspect of what is seen as the general aspect
of the state: leadership armoured with coercion. The different state apparatuses are said to
relate differently to the cohesion of this functionally derived requirement - either
predominantly repressive, ideological or massintegrative, while, at the same time, each
apparatus comprises, to a different degree, a mixture of repression and ideology. The
combination of the different apparatuses as well as the internal predominance of either
ideological/integrative or repressive accentuation depends on the class struggle operating
within the predetermined structure of the form of the state. Regarding the massintegrative
apparatus of the trade unions, they are seen as complementing, together with social-
a r\ —f
i y /
democratic parties, the ideological integration of society (ibid.). The massintegrative
apparatus provides predominantly material concessions for the working and middle classes.
These concessions are provided in a way which is 'compatible' with capitalist accumulation.
Hence the question of how to achieve the processing of the social conflict into forms
functionally required for the reproduction of capital. The answer provided by Hirsch points
to the structural predominance of the repressive state apparatus. "Consequently, the
intervention of the repressive state authority must always, and primarily, be directed at
guaranteeing the integrative functional capacity of the apparatuses for ideological and mass
integration" (Hirsch 1978c, p. 225). The conception of the trade unions as massintegrative
state apparatuses was watered down with the 'emergence' of monetarist policies in the
1970's and the difficulties faced by trade unions in fulfilling the function ascribed to them
by Hirsch. Following Esser's (1982) conception of the trade unions as intermediary
apparatuses, the incorporation of the trade unions was now seen as providing a 'regulative
transmission belt" between the economic and political (see Esser/Hirsch 1984).
This revision did not overcome the problem at issue: the conceptionalisation of trade
unions according to the function they are ascribed to play in the relation between the social
and political. This reasoning regarding the role of trade unions presupposed their form of
existence as following a particular, one- dimensional, logic within the systemic existence
of capitalism. Far from conceptualising the trade unions as a mode of existence of class
antagonism, and, as such, as a mode of motion of contradiction, constituted by, and a
process of, class conflict, the trade unions are construed according to the requirements of
the 'logic' of capital, a logic of a one-sided abstraction. This understanding is reminiscent of
Althusser's (1977b) differentiation between general and specific (ideological) structures
and gives rise to a structuralist and voluntarist understanding of social existence and
development (Bonefeld 1987b;Clarke 1978,1990b). In the event, the treatment of the state
as a one-sided abstraction and the separation of different levels of analysis (form state as
general abstraction and state apparatus as concrete existence conceptually separated from
the form of the state, while constituting its specific power structure) is at best descriptive
and suggestive.
3: The choice between the policies pursued and a more radical response to unemployment
and wage pressure was, according to Benn (1984, p. 148-9), "not forced upon us by
extremist pressure from the allegedly revolutionary left, but by the banker, and in
particular by the IMF which virtually blackmailed unions by imposing a rigid policy of wage
restraint upon them". The IMF loan has entered the "mythology of the Labour Party as the
crucial turning point in the strategy of the Labour government of 1974-1979" (Clarke
1987, p. 411). The imposition of deflationary policies marked rather a culmination of well
established trends that were, from 1972-1975, overridden by the more fundamental
concern of demobilising the class struggle through expansive integration costs.
4: In the UK, the four largest companies produced 99.5% of passenger car output in 1980.
Only one of these, BL, is 'British' owned. Ford and Vauxhall are subsidiaries of 'US'
multinationals whereas Talbot is a subsidiary of the French based multinational 'PSA'
(Peugeot,Citroen) (see Fine/Harris 1985).
5: BL's share of the market fell to 17.8% in 1982 and recovered only slightly to 18.3% in
1984 (see Marsden et.al. 1985). Recently, BL's struggle for survival has been put under
increased pressure by a government's sponsored development of the Nissan plant in
Sunderland. In the course of the crisis-ridden process of accumulation, BL's manual
work-force declined from 20,000 in 1975 to only 9,600 in 1982 (see Scarborough 1986).
6: On the world wide reductions in employment, see Fine/Harris 1985, p. 263
7: It was only between 1979 and 1983 that the average number of strikes and the working
days lost decreased. However, the number of strikes remained still at the level of 1959 to
1963, whereas the working days lost by far exceeded the phase between 1964 and 1968
(see Marsden et.al. 1985, p. 121).
8: For an assessment see Panitch 1986;Hyman 1979a,b,1987;Wedderburn 1978.
9: Although the Industrial Relations Act rendered closed shops unlawful, the number of
closed shop agreements increased, partly because of management's objective of using the
coordinating effort of trade unions to making certain and predicable social relations.
10: On the cuts see see Fryer 1979;Gough 1985;McDonnell 1978;see also London 1980.
11: "What we are see emerging for the National Health Service is the most managerial and
the most hierarchical of planning systems we have encountered either in America or in the
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United Kingdom" (H. Glennerster, Social Service Budgets and Social Policy (London 1975),
p. 153, cited in Gough 1985, p. 100). O'Connor (1973) discusses this development as
leading to the establishment of a 'social- industrial complex'.
12: The National Reporting Centre was in operation, as distinct from training practices,
only once in the 1970's (1974 during the miners' strike) and its role then was only to
monitor the strike.
13: At the point of crisis of the corporatist reconstruction of political domination, Jessop
(1978) conceptualises the social contract as a specific form of the state: i.e. the
corporatist form of the state. This form of the state is, in turn, identified with the highest
development of social democracy. "If the Keynesian mixed economy and welfare state
represent the first stage of social democracy as a form of state, corporatism represents
its second and highest stage" (Jessop 1978, p. 46). The 'emergence' of corporatism is seen
as following the development of accumulation that, by the 1970's, is, in turn, seen as
having created the structural conditions for the corporatist form of the state. By the end of
the 1970's, Jessop attributed to the corporatist form of the state and "its articulation with
other elements of the social formation" the possibility of its playing "a vital role in
securing the preconditions of capital accumulation in altered circumstances" (Jessop 1979,
p. 192-3). Since corporatist structures allow for tripartite interest-intermediation,
combined, in a contradictory unity, with parlamentarism (Jessop 1979, p. 195), Jessop
sees the class struggle as being constituted on the political level of the trade union
movement (Jessop 1978, p. 42,45). This development is regarded as constituting the
capitalist state as an ideal capitalist. Although Jessop attempts to integrate the emergence
of the corporatist form of the state with the development of capitalist accumulation,
including the reconstruction of control over labour, his argument remains ambiguous. The
conceptualisation of social form remains a mere point of reference, juxtaposed to a
ideal-typ discussion on corporatism (for assessment see Panitch 1986;see also Kastendiek
1980).
As Jessop understands the crisis-ridden reconstruction of political authority through the
class collaboration of trade unions as the highest stage of social democracy, he equates, by
implication, the crisis of accumulation during the 1970's with the best possible mode of
existence of a Keynesian mode of integration. However, impressed by the increasing
importance of monetarist policies, Jessop started to water down his earlier conception of
corporatism (Jessop 1980). With the Conservative election in 1979, Jessop casts
considerable doubt on the historical viability of corporatism in Britain. However, the
undermining of corporatism is not seen as a process of social conflict, but is, rather,
discussed institutionally: monetarism "has developed in Britain because parliamentarianism
has already lost, and corporatism has not yet acquired the facility of securing bourgeois
rule" (Jessop 1980, p. 82). In his work on (post-)Fordism, Jessop sees corporatism not as
a form of the state, but as an element of a more systematic concept: Fordism.
In the event, Jessop's understanding of corporatism remains merely suggestive and
descriptive. The problem with Jessop is that he seeks an understanding of corporatism as
constituting a systemic mode of articulation between different social subsystems.
Corporatism is seen as an intermediate concept between the abstract (logical) and concrete
(historic development of the mode of articulation between different social structures).
Since Jessop discusses concrete structural modes of articulation as being functionally
interdependent (see Bonefeld 1990a), and since corporatism is being discussed as
manifesting the highest stage of social-democracy, corporatism is treated as a functional
articulation of a system whose development accords with the logics of the different
subsystems within their historically specific combination. By implication, corporatism
conforms to the historical development of different, although interdependent, structural
logics. The causal logic of externally related variables implies a static relations of
different things, whose development can only be seen as a quantum leap between
structures: i.e. the leap from corporatism (Fordism) to monetarism (post-Fordism). In my
thesis, the conceptualising of corporatism is similar to Panitch (1986) and Hyman (1985b).
Hyman contends that the development of corporatist forms of integration "rested, not - as
some writers have argued - on a philosophy of 'corporatism', but on the pragmatic need of
government to come to terms with the ability of unions and their members to disrupt
(however unintentionally) national economic policy" (Hyman 1985b, p. 117).
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Chapter V
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE UNDER THE THATCHER GOVERNMENTS
The incoming Conservative government under Thatcher drew its strength from the
contradictions of Labour's monetarist practice embedded within a Keynesian
framework of class collaboration. By the end of the 1970's, the social contract had
become a 'paper tiger' which the Thatcher government could brush aside without
provoking costly and damaging resistance (see Clarke 1988a). However, the social
conflict that had brought down the Callaghan government could not be controlled
simply by a more stringent use of monetarist policies. The principal challenge to the
Thatcher government was neither the Labour Party nor the trade unions. The trade
union movement had cooperated with increasingly monetarist policies under
Callaghan and had accepted the urgent need radically to curb inflation through
deflationary attack. In the name of national solidarity, the organised left in Britain
had defended the "institutions of the capitalist state against growing working class
resistance, culminating in the 'winter of discontent' in 1978-9, but in so doing only
discredited itself" (Clarke 1990b, ms. p. 31). The incoming Thatcher government
did not challenge Labour's acceptance of monetarist policies. Rather, it challenged the
role of the state under Labour in the 1970's. In contrast to Labour's affirmation of
the concept of the interventionist state, the Conservatives put forward a much more
stringent programme for regaining financial control: the subordination of the state
and society alike to the unfettered rule of world money.
After the election in 1979, the momentum of the winter of discontent was far from
being contained. "A record number of days were lost through strikes in 1979. But
the 'Winter of Discontent' accounted for only one-quarter of them. More than twice
as many were lost in the national engineering stoppage which took place in the
autumn, well after the general election" (Maclnnes 1987, p. 33). With the
break-down of the corporatist normalisation of class conflict in the late 1970's, the
disruptive strength of labour no longer manifested itself in a collective corporatist
form of institutionalisation (i.e. in the corporatist reconstruction of political
power). Rather, the collective power of labour that had brought down the social
contract, manifested itself through resistance to money in command. The break-down
of the corporatist forms of domination reasserted the collective power of the working
class as the principal challenge to the monetarist reconstruction of political
domination. The Thatcher government inherited not only a renewed deep recession
but also social resistance to a government of limited liquidity. The break-down of the
social contract was based on the failure to moderate the pace of accumulation in a way
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which sustained the disorganisation of class as between those who gained and those
who lost in the course of credit-sustained stagnation in the 1970's. The monetarist
articulation of the relation between world money and the conditions of life, in terms
of the subordination of society and the state to the dictates of the market, entails the
coercive imposition of command. The coercive use of power manifests the right of
property in and through the use of force to secure private property against debt
default, i.e. the use of force to secure debt as claim on social life.
The monetarist attempt to bring back the ideology of the market involved an attack
on the ability of the working class during the 1970's to command pacification costs
in the form of selective employment guarantees. The instantiation of 'economic
freedom' entails the subordination of social relations to the power of the market that
rewards entrepreneurship. The reimposition of the power of the market involves the
reimposition of the power of money whose impulses mediate market expectations and
guarantee enterprise. Such a reconstruction of the market presupposes a predictable
growth in the money supply. Monetarist ideology proclaims the reimposition of the
presupposition of competitive capitalism so as to make it possible for every market
agent to be alert to the messages of the market. The reimposition of the unfettered
operation of the market forces presupposes, in turn, the rejection of the Keynesian
interventionist state as this latter stunts enterprise. It presupposes also an attack on
trade union power so as to make wages and labour markets flexible and so as to
undermine trade unions' blackmail on government. The reimposition of the power of
money is identical with the reimposition of money in command: i.e. the subordination
of social relations to the individualising and oppressive dictates of debt enforcement.
The enforcement of debt entails the intensification of work so as to secure credit as a
claim on surplus value and the regaining of financial stability through cuts in social
spending so as to guarantee the ability of the state to act as lender of last resort. The
attempt to integrate the working class on the basis of tight money involves the
imposition of work through the value form, i.e. through the abstract equality of
money as command to work. The imposition of the money power of capital entails the
recomposition of the role of the state, moving from corporatist integration of the
working class to concentrated force imposing upon the working class the limits of the
market (i.e. money in command). The monetarist attempt to instantiate economic
freedom over the conditions of life entails the destruction of Keynesian consensus
policies in favour of the republic of the market: no state meddling in the free play of
market forces, and the imposition of financial stability, as the preconditions of
enterprising individuals bound by the power of money which restrains the ambitions
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of those who are not alert to the messages of the market. Monetarist ideology
concerning the power of market forces proclaims the equality of each market agent.
State meddling in the free play of the market generates political privileges that
undermine the precondition of equality, the non-coerced operation of the market.
The principal target of monetarist attack is the role of the state vis-a-vis the
working class. Instead of integration and pacification costs, the monetarist
articulation of the limits of the" market involves the monetary decomposition of class
relations on the basis of the market. Instead of political privileges institutionally
expressed in the Keynesian guarantee of employment and income, monetarism
proclaims the destruction of the Keynesian relation between public expenditure and
wages, i.e. the Keynesian attempt to transform protest into demand. If there is
inflation, then the control of the money supply provides the mechanism for deflation.
While the social contract depended on the successful responsibilisation of labour on
the basis of social reform, monetarist reconstruction of the market proclaims the
responsibilisation of the social to the lurid face of economic freedom and equality: i.e.
the reimposition of the power of money in and through political force. Instead of the
Keynesian attempt to transform protest into demand, monetarism involves the
attempt to decompose protest on the basis of the violence of equality and the use of
force: accommodate to the forces of the market and make no argument. By attacking
Labour's conception of the interventionist state, the Conservatives articulated the
limits of capitalist reproduction in terms of a repressive reconstitution of the social
relations on the basis of the market which treats as equal the social to the power of
money. In the face of working class resistance, associated with a renewed wage
explosion, and a renewed recession which turned stagnation into depression, the
monetarist attempt to restore political domination rested on the decomposition of the
class relationships and the recomposition of class in a mode of being denied (see
chapter II), i.e. on the basis of the category of property owner and citizen (Clarke
1990a).
The monetary decomposition of class relations involved the systematic exercise of
law and order command so as to assure the reimposition of the power of money. This
reconstruction involves the imposition of work through the commodity form, i.e. the
free and non-coerced exchange on the market. The instantiation of free and
non-coerced exchange implies the reconstruction of social relations on the basis of
market equality, the incarnation of which is money. The monetary decomposition of
class relations manifests, in explicit form, the preemptive counterrevolution
against labour's collective power to resist intensification of work and deflationary
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attack. The subordination of political discretion to the market entailed the policing of
debt enforcement over capital (weeding out of unproductive capital), the working
class (wage restraint and intensification of work so as to realise credit as claim on
surplus value) and the state itself (reduction of PSBR). The principal target of the
reimposition of the money power of capital is the pacification and integration costs
with which the state had sought to pacify those workers upon whose passivity the
political stability of corporatist reconstruction of political domination had rested
during the 1970's. The Conservative's crusade against the trade unions expresses the
attack on labour's ability to command pacification costs and to resist the
recomposition of the production process.
I The MTFS and the Productive and Disruptive Power of Labour
Initially, the new Conservative government changed rhetoric but did not
fundamentally modify policies which had been pursued under the Labour government
(see Clarke 1988a). The Conservatives took over Labour's monetary targets
(Tomlinson 1986) and denied the TUC political involvement, challenging the whole
philosophy of corporatism. The attempt to banish the trade union movement to the
political periphery shows the strategy of the Thatcher government as one of
politically reinforcing the outcome of the class struggle of the late 1970's. Why
concede to trade unions a political status which, even if largely decorative,
nevertheless recognises in institutional form a distinctive working-class interest
within the formulation of political objectives? The exclusion of the trade union
movement from the corridors of power, including the ideological delegitimation of
trade unions and collective interest representation (Crouch 1985; S.Hall 1983;
Kastendiek 1982,1985), shifted emphasis from tripartite representation of
interests to a tightening of the hierarchical composition of political domination so as
to 'restore command' (Schwarz 1987). However, despite offensive rhetoric, the
Thatcher government proceeded relatively modestly. Practice has not altogether
matched the abrasive rhetoric. The "promised massacre of the 'quangos' has been
relatively modest; not all ministers and mandarins dismiss the ritual formalities of
traditional consultative relations; and if real union influence within these channels
is negligible, the same complaint could be heard even at the height of the 1970s
social contract" (Hyman 1989c, p. 190-1; on the first Thatcher government).
Trade union participation in the formulation of policies survived in quangos like the
NEDC, ACAS, and the MSC. Whereas the political significance of the former two
quangos eroded increasingly, the MSC grew in importance during the 1980's.
Nonetheless, the thrust of the government's approach towards the TUC has been to
203
"restrict involvement in broader policy developments. The withdrawal of
interventionist measures had circumvented the administrative channels through
which the TUC derived influence" (Waddington 1988, p. 8-9). The brushing away of
the empty shell of Keynesian class collaboration involved the eradication of
institutional forms that underlay the ability of the working class to command a
consumption norm based on a general expectation of rising living standards. The
attempt to reassert political domination on the basis of exclusion involves, by
implication, a shift in emphasis of the meaning of consensus. The meaning of
consensus shifted from negotiation of consensus to compliance with law and order,
that is unquestioned obedience to law and order command. Instead of consultative
relations at the level of government, the policy of exclusion implies unquestioned
compliance with the authority of the state. The attempt to reconstitute social
relations on the basis of exclusion affirms the aggressive strength of monetarism,
involving a law and order disciplining of defiance and, by implication, heavy policing
of disputes. The participation of trade unions in some of the quangos mentioned needs
to be seen as sort of tokenism designed to alleviate social tension and as a cautious
attempt to gain legitimacy for possibly unpopular policies, like the MSC training
schemes. This cautious attack on trade unions is clearly expressed in the early
labour legislation (Employment Act 1980; hereafter: EA 1980).
Government sought to intervene in industrial relations through the introduction of
trade union laws. However, the EA 1980 amounted only to a cautious attempt to
discipline trade unions through legal means. Rather than forcing changes in the way
in which trade unions operate, the EA 1980 buttressed established development
patterns and put into legal form the commitment of the TUC General Council to
contain the 'anarchy' of the winter of discontent. During the winter of discontent, the
"general council was drawn into producing, with indecent haste, a new Solemn and
Binding Agreement, the so-called 'Concordat', in which they agreed to undertake
voluntary control on picketing, the closed shop, inter-union disputes and
(eventually) wage demands" (Panitch 1986, p. 126). The EA 1980 outlawed strikes
which were not connected with the work conditions of those engaged in a dispute. This
regulation outlawed secondary action (see Clark 1985). However, as noted by
Clark/Wedderburn (1983), this regulation could be avoided easily. Further, a code
of practice restricted the number of pickets to six. During the early 1980's, all
these restrictions had only marginal effects (see Clark 1985). The EA 1980
restricted also the closed shop arrangements as it declared unlawful strikes whose
purpose it was to enforce closed shops. Such a dispute is seen as one between
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employees (employees opposing and affirming closed shops) and not between
employer and employees. Disciplinary measures are made unlawful against
employees who hold a personal reason for abstaining from such disputes or who
abstain from industrial disputes following the rejection of closed shop arrangements
through secret ballots (see Clark/Wedderburn 1983). Without a secret ballot the
dismissal of a non-union member is declared automatically unlawful. The Act
provides the possibility of financial compensation for an employee unfairly
dismissed. This compensation is to be paid by the employer, while the employer is
able to gain a just and equitable contribution from the trade union involved (see
Clark/Wedderburn 1983). The EA 1980 codified well established trends. Although
37% of all non-management employees were employed in closed shops between
1977-8 (Hyman 1989b, p. 178), the closed shop was in decline by the end of the
1970's (Dunn 1985). Closed shops were increasingly regarded by employers as an
obstacle to the restructuring of production while their disciplinary effect was in
disrepute following the winter of discontent (ibid.). For the fist five years after
1979 there were no new closed shop arrangements (Clark 1985). Lastly, the EA
1980 encouraged trade unions to hold secret ballots before taking strike action, an
encouragement sustained by financial provision to cover costs arising from such
ballots. The EA 1980 was largely symbolical as it codified existing developments and
stigmatised trade unions as coercive organisations restricting individual freedom and
violating democratic procedure. The EA 1980 was the first legal attack to restrict
the trade unions' ability to take strike action.
While income policies were ruled out because of the danger of political
confrontation between government and the working class, government's attempt to
reduce inflationary pressure was hampered by the wage explosion during the winter
of discontent and the government's commitment to honour the awards to public sector
workers recommended by the Clegg Commission set up under Labour (see Maclnnes
1987). Further inflationary pressure was generated from the fiscal redistribution
of income in 1979. The tax reductions in 1979 were for the vast majority of the
population tax increases (see Thompson 1986;Cronin/Radtke 1987;D.Hall 1983;
Esam et.al. 1985). The Thatcher government's first budget "reduced the standard
rate of income tax from 33 to 30 per cent and the top rate from 83 to 60 per cent"
(Cronin/Radtke 1987, p. 289). However, these reductions were more than
compensated for by increases in indirect taxes, as VAT increased from 8 to 15%
(ibid.) and as national insurance contributions increased from 6.5 to 9% of GNP
(Esam et.al. 1985, p. 125). On the other hand, major tax relief was introduced for
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business which received tax relief of £13000 million between 1980 and 81 alone
(D.Hall 1983, p. 27). Further, government reduced the capital gains tax (see Esam
et.al. 1985;Cronin/Radtke 1987). The use of fiscal instruments amounted to a
deflationary intervention that is not unfamiliar in the context of a Keynesian policy
of deflation. Fiscal redistribution of wealth in favour of capital, rather than
permitting productive investment, increased the money supply and inflationary
pressure as, in the face of overaccumulation, fiscal relief spilled largely over into
unproductive and speculative channels, financing public and private debt
internationally and domestically. Tax incentives fostered the expansion of the money
supply that monetarism pledged to control.
When the world boom was breaking, the effect of these policies was rather
different from the 1970's. During the depression, the pound was over-appreciated,
due to high interest rates and North Sea Oil profits, fuelling inflation through high
import prices and high costs of outside financing (see Clarke 1988a). At the same
time, the abandonment of remaining exchange controls in 1979 contributed to an
increasing outflow of capital. "The increase in VAT, rising wages and import prices,
high interest rates, the rising exchange rate and the fall in export demand put an
unprecedented squeeze on profits. As stockholdings rose, the indebtedness of the
corporate sector mounted, putting upward pressure on bank lending, the money
supply and interest rates, while the removal of banking controls meant that the
government had no means of regulating the growth of credit, short of draconian
monetary contraction" (Clarke 1988a, p. 162). The old policy instruments
aggravated the recession which was the deeper the more accumulation was sustained
by credit. Something had to be done.
The 1980 budget introduced a much more stringent monetarist policy, the main
objective of which was price stability. The Thatcher government sought to control
the money supply through the control of the terms on which government supplies
money and borrows from the private sector. The restrictive money policy was
institutionalised in the Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) which was launched
in the 1980 budget. The MTFS made explicit the subordination of the state, capital
and the working class to the power of world money as it imposed a drastic monetary
contraction in the attempt to regain control over the growth of credit. The MTFS made
explicit the rejection of the Keynesian use of money. The control of the money supply
implied high interest rates, designed as a means of eradicating debt by enforcing debt
over productive capital, the state and the working class, curbing erratic monetary
206
policies of inflationary deficit demand management associated with Keynesianism.
With its MTFS, government restricted the ambitions of employers through pressure
on their solvency, encouraging them to adopt a more aggressive stand against labour:
i.e. pressure on wages, intensification of work and reassertion of the right to manage.
The MTFS intervened in the circuit of capital not by underwriting profits through
demand management or by providing financial assistance for modernisation and
rationalisation of production. The imposition of tight money intervened in the
financial solidity of productive capital, reasserting the limits of the market through
scarce, and more costly, credit. Evidence of the tightness of money policies "was
provided by the 30 per cent rise in the sterling exchange rate and the jump in
interest rates" (Maclnnes 1987, p. 65). The cost of loanable capital increased as a
"lower quantity of money implied an increase in interest rates from 12% (1979) to
16/7% throughout the early 1980's" (Smith 1984, p. 20). Far from withdrawing
state intervention, state intervention changed form as the monetarist imposition of
tight money reasserted the limits of the market in the form of tight money. The
state's imposition of a regime of tight money affected the solvency of enterprise,
sacrificing labour and productive activity on the altar of money.
The monetary target set by government was defined by the money supply measured
in M3 (1). The targeting of the money supply was closely related to the control of
public expenditure. While high interest rates were seen as alleviating speculative
pressure on currency, the reduction of the PSBR was seen as easing inflationary
pressure on capital. The belief attached to the MTFS was that by announcing a firm
monetary supply target and by sticking to it the "monetary supply target would
translate itself into a deflationary expectation of the general rate of inflation and
price formation" (Thompson 1986, p. 63). The disproportion between money in
circulation and the output of goods and services, i.e. the speculative dimension of
accumulation, would thus be overcome, permitting the reimposition of a simple
market equilibrium. The expectation on the part of market agents for particular
prices "would be fixed in terms of a deflationary outcome. The 'problem' of inflation
would thereby be solved" (Thompson 1986, p. 63). The key variable for restoring a
sound relation between the productive and monetary sphere was the reduction of the
PSBR. "In the face of speculative pressure on financial markets the government could
only pursue a restrictive monetary policy, without driving interest rates sky-high,
if it could reduce public borrowing" (Clarke 1988a, p. 162). The MTFS was based
on the assumption that "public expenditure is related to national income as a
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resource constraint and also that government borrowing is correlated with changes
in the money supply" (Mullard 1987, p. 3-4). The reduction of the PSBR was of
decisive importance for the success of the MTFS. With the MTFS, government made
explicit the rejection of the Keynesian interventionist state, i.e. the integration of
the working class through demand. Fundamentally, the MTFS was designed to abolish
the reproduction of labour's productive power on the basis of credit through the
threat of unemployment, attacking the ability of the working class to resist
deflationary attack and intensification of work.
The MTFS made explicit the attempt to destroy the Keynesian relation between
public expenditure and wages (i.e. the Keynesian attempt to transform protest into
demand). The MTFS involved cuts in public expenditure, tighter financial control on
local authorities, unemployment, pressure on wages, recomposition of production
and job insecurity, in the face of a deep recession, all of this precipitated by the
monetary decomposition of a credit-sustained underwriting of profits. The MTFS not
only repealed the illusion of full employment policies that had prevailed during the
1970's, it also entailed the subordination of the working class to the use of money to
politically promote mass unemployment. The . MTFS attacked in particular those
workers (i.e. the organised working class) upon whose passivity the social contract
had rested. The MTFS challenged the integration of the organised working class on the
basis of pacification costs and employment guarantees (i.e. the quid pro quo of trade
union co-operation with government after World War II). Mass unemployment, in
turn, permitted a shift in the balance of class forces through the disciplining force of
unemployment, including the fragmentation of the working class (as between those
who remained employed and those who more were made redundant).
The lack of foundation of Monetarism's assertion of a simple quantitative relation
between money and goods made itself felt to the Thatcher government through the
devastating destruction of productive activity, rising unemployment, public
disorder, and a looming collapse of the international credit relations. The attempt to
arrest the tendency to overaccumulation of capital by reasserting the limits of the
market by means of restrictive monetary policies can contain the productive and
disruptive power of labour. However, it can do so only at the risk of intensified class
struggle, decreasing investment, a drop in public revenue and, in the event, the real
possibility of a chain of defaults and financial collapse (Clarke 1988b). In what
follows, attention focuses on these issues.
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For companies running large overdrafts, the policy of scarce money and high
interest rates entailed not only a substantial squeeze on profits, but also the real
possibility of accelerated insolvency. When the second deep recession struck in
1979, manufacturing had still not reached the level of 1973 (Maclnnes 1987). The
second recession from 1979 to 1982 hit severely. From 1979 to 1982, the volume
of production fell by 19% contributing to a decline by 4% in the GNP (Gamble
1983, p. 99). While productive investment fell by 36% (ibid.), manufacturing
output fell by 17% between 1979 and 1981 and employment in manufacturing
declined by 21% (Maclnnes 1987, p. 65). High interest rates contributed to the
immense devaluation and liquidation of productive capital in the early 1980's as
redundancies and closures reached record levels. "In manufacturing, average profit
levels fell by half, capital investment fell by over one-third and from 1981 onwards
net capital investment became negative as plant closures reduced stock of equipment
in use dramatically" (Maclnnes 1987, p. 65). The forty largest manufacturing
companies reduced employment in the UK between 1979 and 1986 by 415,000
(Maclnnes 1987, p. 80). At the same time, 12,000 company liquidations occurred
in 1982 alone (Gamble 1986, p. 194). "Major sectors like electrical engineering,
textiles, and clothing suffered an increase in import penetration of the domestic
market of 25 per cent. At the same time the flow of capital abroad sharply increased.
Between 1979 and 1983 £35.4 billion went out, a net outflow of £18.8 billion"
(Gamble 1986, p. 194). Domestic accumulation was severely hit by the
appreciation of the pound which the Thatcher government "did nothing to discourage"
and by the "very high interest rates which the financial strategy required" (Gamble
1986, p. 194). Exchange rate rises and an overvalued pound sterling cost ICI
half-a-billion pounds in 1981 alone (Leys 1985). In the face of changes in the
exchange rate of the pound and high interest rates, the competitive position of UK's
national economy fell by 20% (Gamble 1983, p. 99). This development furthered
the deterioration of the balance of trade and put pressure on the pound. However,
high interest rates cushioned the pressure on the pound, while oil exports cushioned
the balance of payments at the same time as the balance of manufactured trade
deteriorated. By 1982, the British economy imported more manufactured goods than
it exported for the first time ever (Gamble 1986, p. 194). The Thatcher
government presided over the worst economic collapse since the Great Depression
(Gamble 1986). Domestic accumulation in the UK was on the edge of an abyss in the
early 1980's. This development led some commentators to suggest that the relative
decline of the British national economy might have turned into an absolute decline
(Gamble 1986) which might lead to the UK's relative position within the EEC
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deteriorate to one similar to Scotland or Ulster (S. Polled 1982). It was not until
1984 that the volume of manufacturing exports regained its level of 1980
(Maclnnes 1987, p. 67).
-Rising unemployment and intensification of class struggle
Devaluation and liquidation of capital accelerated the rate of unemployment which
increased from 5.7% in 1979 to 13.1% in 1983 (compared with figures of 5.1%
and 8.7% in OECD countries in those years: Tomiinson 1986, p. 12). At the same
time, the population dependent on supplementary benefit increased by 49%, an
increase of about 3 million, including 'claimants' and their families (Schwarz 1987,
p. 139). Pressure on wages was seen as leading to a reduction in wage inflation,
allowing government to keep to its monetary targets. The underlying assumption of
monetarism that a rise in unemployment would enable capital to restore the 'right to
manage', to contain wage pressure and to restore profitability articulated in explicit
terms the use of mass unemployment as a means to pacify and to domesticate the class
conflict. However expectations did not adjust so smoothly.
The attempt to destroy the relation between public spending and wages involved
strategies aiming at the monetary decomposition of the welfare state. The welfare
state was not attacked head on. The Thatcher government continued the policy under
Labour of recomposing the welfare state in terms of efficiency and repression. The
search for waste included renewed cuts in welfare spending, the reassertion of tight
cash limits which worked as a form of public sector incomes policy, and financial
pressure on local authorities which worked as a means of centralising budgetary
control. By reinforcing Labour's system of cash limits, the Conservative government
pushed for increased (cost) efficiency of services, tighter bureaucratic control over
'claimants' and increasing influence of managerial criteria in the allocation of
restricted resources to an increasing number of 'claimants'. Under the
Conservatives, the use of the system of cash limits - a means to impose the money
power of capital over the working class - has been strengthened and applied with
increasing vigour. "Intentional official underestimates of inflation and a ruling of the
Treasury that a breach of cash limits would be treated as 'financial
maladministration' forced certain provisions of services below 'planned' levels and
intimidated responsible administrators" (Krieger 1987, p. 185). Between 1981
and 1982, hidden cuts accounted for a total net loss of 6.3% (ibid.). Further, when
the Thatcher government increased VAT in 1979, the NHS had to "save as much as
£40 million in wage costs and services to pay VAT to the government" (ibid.). Rising
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costs of health care were associated with systematic underspending. Although the
overall level of health spending increased, this increase was designed to keep the NHS
running without, thereby, arresting the financial squeeze on health care (see Krause
1989;Mullard 1987;Esam et.al. 1985;Bach 1989).
The financial squeeze on the NHS involved an attack on wages and work conditions.
Between 1979 and 1981, trade union responses had been isolated. By 1982,
however, there occurred a serious dispute in the health service. The dispute dragged
on for months. At the forefront of the action were ancillary workers. The government
responded to political opposition and trade union resistance by introducing financial
reforms, ostensibly to inrease efficiency, but in fact as an attempt to deflect
widespread dissatisfaction with the government's monetary squeeze on health care.
One element of the financial reforms was the incursion of commerical criteria into
the NHS. As early as 1980, "consultants' contracts were changed to enable them to
undertake more private work without deduction from their NHS salary" (Bach
1989, p. 9). The attempt to fragment popular resistance isolated especially those on
the lower end of the wage hierarchy. Additionally, the government changed the state's
responsibility for funding the NHS. "The state's finance is just 'towards meeting the
expenditure', and health authorities are specifically empowered to raise money
through jumble sales and the like" (D.Hall 1983, p. 67). This provision involved a
first step into the abdication of collective responsibility for health care. However,
the conflict over wages and work conditions entailed the government leaving the basic
institutions of the NHS relatively intact. The overriding strategy towards the NHS
involved financial squeezes that were legitimised as enforcing efficiency.
Cost efficiency involved also the introduction of administrative changes and
intensified financial control over those dependent on provisions. While employment
in departments such as the DHSS dropped, the introduction of computerised
administration allowed, alongside increasing use of fraud inspection,
technology-aided screening procedures (Esam et.al. 1985). The heavy handed use of
bureaucratic forms of control confirmed the use of repressive principles of
selectivity and means-testing of provisions. These developments continued the
policies of the 1970's. However, instead of 1.6 million unemployed, as in 1976,
these measures involved the bureaucratic control over the imposition of limited
resources on about 3 million unemployed plus the increasing number of part-time
and low paid workers. Cash benefits were,cut by six to seven per cent while high
rates of inflation and increasing indirect taxes eroded the value of security benefits
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(Krieger 1987). Additionally, the treatment of unemployment benefits as taxable
income from June 1982 onwards reinforced the poverty and tax traps. At the same
time, law and order expenditure increased by 11% between 1979 and 1983, an
increase that was much higher than government had aimed for (Mullard 1987, p.
172). While law and order spending increased, government increased pressure on
local authorities, seeking to regain control over public spending through the
imposition of tighter money on local expenditure.
With its Local Government Planning Act (1980), the Thatcher government
imposed stricter limits on local authorities' power to raise and spend money through
a block grant system (see D. Hall 1983;Parkinson 1987a;Uppendahl 1989). Instead
of controlling local authority spending through the control of borrowing, as during
the 1970's, the block grant system limited the amount of spending "which could be
made by an individual authority in any one year" (H. Davies 1987, p. 27). The block
grant is determined by central government's assessment of "what a local authority
should be spending", an imposition of tight money which "bears little or no relation
to what services and spending councils actually undertake" (D. Hall 1983, p. 63-4).
Punitive measures came into effect when local authorities overspent government's
ceilings by 10% or more (Travers 1987, p. 17). The punitive measure involved
grant withdrawal at a penal rate and the removal of local authorities' right to raise
additional taxes during the financial year (Ascher 1987). The block grant system
allowed central government to select particular authorities for grant reductions
without thereby, simultaneously, imposing reductions in the overall level of grants
made available to local governments (Travers 1987). The 1980 Act did not involve
cash limits on current spending (ibid.). In the face of persistent industrial militancy
by local government unions, the likely effect of the 1980 Act was therefore
reductions in capital spending and increased rates and local charges for services.
Government had anticipated this loophole. Shortly before the enactment of the
1980 Act in January 1981, the block grant system was amended through the
inclusion of current spending levels. Spending targets, as well as penalties for
maladministration, were under constant review and sharpened annually, making it
difficult for local government to plan budgets and activities in advance. The immense
discretionary power given to central government by the 1980 Act was used in such a
way that more generous targets were given to low spending councils while
restrictive targets were imposed on high spending ones, decomposing a possible
concerted resistance by local authorities through the imposition of tighter money
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upon those councils which sought to administer welfare rather than cuts. Selective
and arbitrary imposition of cash limits threatened to undermine the financial
solidity of councils. While financial restrictions undermined the power of local
authorities to implement policies they might have seen desirable, central
government reasserted the recomposition of the welfare state in terms of efficiency
and repression by targeting cash limits on those 'most in need'. The major
implication of these changes in expenditure control is that those local authorities
which want to oppose the government's spending strategy had less scope to do so.
However, the overall effect of the 1980 Act involved reductions in capital
expenditure and increased fees and charges for local services (Ascher 1987),
reinforcing the rule of the local government as an administrator of the poverty of the
local working class.
The 1980 Act put local authorities into a precarious legal position. Local
authorities were under pressure from two different fronts: central government's
penal system and pressure from below. The latter concerns resistance by companies
and business to increasing local property tax (Ascher 1987). Additionally, local
authorities were under pressure from public sector unions which resisted downward
pressure on wages and, in the face of the deregulation of council services, demanded
secure employment. Local government was under pressure also from those affected
by cuts and deteriorating services. Between 1981 and 1983 some local authorities
sought to alleviate pressure on their budget by contracting out services. Such a
development is not new as some services are not available in-house or as private
contractors were brought in to supplement existing staff at peak periods and during
strike action (ibid.). However, between 1981 and 1983, emphasis on cost-cutting
and cost-efficiency led to a growth of contracting out settlements to which some local
authorities turned "as a way to break the deadlock" (Ascher 1987, p. 220). This
development involved a direct attack on public sector unions, the bargaining strength
of which was partly responsible for the downward inflexibility of current spending
which was, by 1979 (Travers 1987), at an all time high partly because of the wage
explosion during the winter of discontent. Trade union response to competitive
tendering was relatively weak mainly becasue of the isolated nature of contracting
out agreements. Calls for non-cooperation were restricted to local ones (Ascher
1987). Contracting out of services to private subcontractors undercut labour costs,
casualised labour and undermined the collective bargaining strength of public
employees, hitting those at the bottom of the wage hierarchy in public services (i.e.
cleaning; catering; laundry) (ibid.). Competitive tendering needs to be seen a means
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of breaking the power of the public sector unions, forcing down wages and
intensifying and casualising labour. The most significant cases of contracting out
between 1981 and 1983 were the pioneering Conservative controlled councils of
Southend District Council and Wandsworth Council. In both cases, the contract was
awarded to the lowest private bidders (ibid.). Despite the attempt by some local
authorities to accommodate to tight money by means of competitive tendering, local
authorities were able to mount effective political campaigns in the face of widespread
dissatisfaction with deteriorating services, forcing the government to commit itself
to maintaining standards of services (ibid.).
However, despite cuts in public expenditure, rigorous imposition of cash limits,
selective and discriminating means-testing procedures and creeping competitive
tendering, the attempt to regain control over public expenditure was undermined by
mass unemployment, strikes, and the policing of the unemployed through the
institution of the welfare state, including higher direct policing costs. Welfare
benefits had been squeezed, while the massive increase in unemployment had led to an
enormous increase in the cost of welfare provisions, despite the reductions in rates,
an increasingly repressive administration of services and their more selective
application. At the same time as the rates of welfare provisions were reduced,
welfare spending increased in response to mass unemployment (Mullard 1987). The
sheer depth of labour-shedding in industry, political tension over the containment of
labour and working class resistance to tight monetary control (see the inner-city
riots in the early 1980's) undermined a radical reduction in the PSBR on the basis
of cuts in social welfare expenditure, contributing to constant overshooting of
government's monetary targets (Mullard 1987;Thompson 1986; Tomlinson 1986).
Government's attempt to regain control over public expenditure so as to eradicate
debt involved thus a monetary expansion within a tight monetary framework,
imposing poverty on large parts of the population, despite a growing share of public
expenditure in relation to the GDP (Tomlinson 1986, p. 18). The monetary
decomposition of class relations did not destroy the welfare state but, rather, shifted
emphasis from material concessions (i.e. integration cost as quid pro quo for social
peace) to the use of money as a coercive and repressive means to encourage low pay
and to impose social discipline through poverty and unemployment. Instead of
enforcing debt over the working class (i.e. reducing the PSBR), the Thatcher
government was forced to increase debt financing of repressive pacification costs.
These pacification costs were, however, no longer adopted as a means of transforming
protest into demand. Rather, they worked as a repressive means of normalising and
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controlling class conflict on the basis of tight money, permitting a decomposition of
the political strength of labour through individualising means of bureaucratic
supervision and a politically controlled imposition of deteriorating living standards.
The use of public expenditure as a means of imposing monetary discipline involved
the individualising of the working class through discriminating and frustrating
forms of bureaucratic control of the provision over severely limited resources. The
attempt to control the PSBR through monetary restraint worked as a means of
recomposing the welfare state as an instrument of monetary and legal supervision. As
the Keynesian commitment to full employment was replaced by a policy of 'natural
unemployment', the unemployed were advised to compete for what ever jobs were
available and to behave as good citizens who look after themselves and their families
without challenging the state to increase, unduly, the money supply. The imposition
of tight money upon the conditions of life articulated the political commitment to
subordinating political discretion to the market. The monetary expansion which the
reconstruction of the social relations on the basis of the market demanded was
overtly repressive in form, permitting the imposition of unquestioned compliance to
the form of the capitalist state power. Since the Finance Act of 1980, supplementary
benefit for families whose earner is on strike is subject to means-testing (Krieger
1987). The Act determines that the DHSS has to take into account strike money paid
by the trade union, even if strike money is not paid (Clark 1985;Crouch 1985). As,
at times fictitious, strike money is taken into consideration for calculating the
amount of supplementary benefit, families of strikers' have to submit to
bureaucratic forms of screening and monitoring in exchange for reduced
supplementary provision. Despite the government's affection for family values, the
Act complements government's anti-trade union policy through a policy of hungry
stomachs as the miners' strike in 1984/5 forcefully showed.
The disciplining effects of mass unemployment permitted a sustained offensive by
the state, and by those employers who survived the depression, to intensify labour
and to recompose industrial relations. The monetarist view of micro-economic
desirability was forcefully expressed in the way government sought to reassert the
right to manage over its own employees. As the largest employer in the country, the
Thatcher government saw its direct role in the assault on the workforce as a major
one. Any lead it could give employers in terms of aggressive managerial strategies
was seen as encouraging private employers to greater efforts. The Thatcher
government created a climate that encouraged the attack on existing formalised
procedures of collective bargaining. Instead of trade union consultation and
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participation, government by-passed the trade unions and reasserted the right to
manage rigorously. The Conservatives had, under Ridley, drawn up plans for major
confrontations with the trade unions, especially steel, rail, public sector unions and
the miners. The assault on working practices, renewed cash limits in the public
sector and the intensification of work in public enterprises started by 1980. These
assaults followed Ridley's plan closely, picking off one union after the other, while
operating with caution so as not to trigger major social unrest but, rather, to keep
resistance isolated. Additionally, private employers were - in the face of crisis, the
break-down of control during the winter of discontent and a government prepared to
take on and defeat major groups of workers - determined to recompose working
practices, to intensify work, to restrain wages and to reorganise industrial
relations. Although the sheer depth of the depression came as a shock, employers did
not take long to start turning the depression to their own advantage, realising that
workers' self-confidence had been sapped in an unprecedented manner. In the face of
mass unemployment, the Thatcher government created a climate in which defeat of
labour came to be seen as inevitable. Employers were using this climate to exert
greater control over the production process than had been theirs for decades. The
climate created by the Thatcher government concerns the restructuring at BL,
British Steel, British Shipbuilding and British Rail. All these disputes made use of
unemployment as a disciplining measure. Upon the politics of exclusion, the Thatcher
government superimposed a policy of confrontation, designed to combat defiance
through a 'repressive integration of the working class' (Benyon/Bourn 1986).
Heavy policing of industrial disputes (see Geary 1985) reasserted the political
attempt to decompose social relations through a ruthless impartiality of monetary
and legal intervention into the conditions of life. Rather than reaching compromise
through arbitration, the Thatcher government demanded unquestioned compliance to
the capitalist state power by wielding the stick of the sack.
British Steel, under the management of MacGregor, imposed massive cuts in output
and work-force in 1980-1 and intensified working practices. The assault on
employment, wages and work conditions at British Steel triggered a strike on the
part of the steel workers in 1980. This strike lasted for four months until the steel
workers were finally defeated in 1981. However, the defeat was costly for the
government not only in terms of working days lost, but also in terms of renewed
commitment to increase subsidies so as to maintain wages and employment. This
commitment was forced upon government as a means of demobilising the strike and of
undermining a possible spread of unrest. The imposition of the right to manage at
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British Rail has taken the form of cutting staff and increased shift work for lower
pay. Similarly to the case of British Steel, government was faced with a major social
conflict at British Rail which was defeated by 1982. Other major confrontations
included the strikes by the Health Service Unions in 1982 and at BL. The struggle at
BL saw the same formula: reassertion of the right to manage and renewed
commitment to increase subsidies in exchange for social peace (2). Further, the
government was faced with a possible miners' strike in 1981. In the face of
mounting political opposition, the government recommitted itself to honour the 'Plan
of Coal', thus averting a major political confrontation. The government committed
.itself to maintain employment and wages in the coal industry without a reassertion of
the right to manage.
BL's main problem was identified as its industrial relations problem. Management
had difficulties in containing unrest within production (Marsden et.al. 1985;
Scarborough 1986;Willman 1984). Disputes at BL concerned pay and the
recomposition of control through the introduction of new working practices,
intensification of labour, extension of the working day (density of labour) and, later,
the weeding out 'deviant' employees (Marsden et.al 1985;Willman 1984). The
attempt to 'control uncertainty' on the shop floor was the main target of
restructuring. The central political issue and problem was one of abolishing
workers' job control (Scarborough 1986) and replacing it with managerially
defined and therefore 'efficient practices' (ibid.).
The attempt to restore the 'right to manage' under Edwardes built on Ryder's
management through consent which involved corporatist forms of interest-
intermediation between management and shop stewards over management's
prerogatives (Holloway 1987;Willman 1984;Scarborough 1986). When Edwardes
was appointed chief executive of BL, it signalled not only a shift in managerial
strategy, but also the abandonment of Ryder's expansionist policy. Edwardes was
determined to tackle constant industrial relations problems by undermining labour's
strength through the destruction of productive capacity and the closing down of plant.
The scrapping of productive capacity, advocated as a means of achieving economic
soundness, responded through a rigorous policy of labour-shedding to persistent
industrial relations problems. Closure of plant disciplined the remaining
work-force which was faced with the stark choice of either submitting to the right to
manage or joining the dole queue. The key word of management's objective of control
was 'flexibility' which effectively meant the destruction of traditional work
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practices (only 2 out of 31 remained) and a ruthless imposition of the 'right to
manage" which effectively meant telling the worker what to do, where to do it, and at
what speed (Holloway 1987). The imposition of the right to manage undermined the
system of industrial relations characterised by 'payment for change', work
demarcations, strict work practices and the system of so-called 'mutuality'. This
system had institutionalised the transformation of protest into demand ('payment for
change'). Under the impact of declining profits and competitive erosion, this system
was regarded as Uie. obstacle to increasing productivity and hence to the survival of
BL within the international restructuring of accumulation (Holloway 1987;
Scarborough 1986;Willman 1984). The reimposition of control was seen as the key
issue for achieving productivity increases. The new methods of production were seen
as a means to create that control.
The assault and successful abolition of mutuality, payment for change and the
installation of tight work standards, greater flexibility and mobility within the
production process as well as computerised control of living labour and a
recomposition of the hierarchical wage structure and so on (Scarborough 1986;
Holloway 1987) was imposed on the work-force by large scale redundancy, intense
uncertainty about jobs, closure of plant, cutback in the size of remaining plant,
intimidation and sacking of what were regarded as 'deviant' employees (e.g. the
sacking of Robinson), the threat of complete closure of BL, direct communications
with the work force (i.e. the use of democracy for imposing authority) instead of
shop-steward representation and involvement, and, finally, the circulation of the
so-called 'blue newspaper* to every worker individually declaring that at the day the
regulations of the new working-practices came into effect (11.9.1980) every
worker passing through the factory gate would submit automatically to the new
pattern of control while those opposing management's objective would be sacked
immediately. Edwardes conducted the assault with the backing of the Conservative
government and the encouragement of rising unemployment in the midst of the second
deep world-wide recession. 'Macho management' (Hyman 1989b;Holloway 1987) at
BL was successful in terms of undermining the balance of class forces and thus in
destroying the way in which labour was integrated in the form of industrial relations
(mutuality).
While government was successful in reasserting the right to manage in exchange
for renewed commitment to subsidies in all the disputes mentioned, it was not sure of
success against the NUM in 1981 (see Goodman 1985). When 50.000 miners walked
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out following its announcement of pit closures, government was quick to defuse the
situation by declaring its commitment to honour the Plan of Coal reached between the
NUM and Labour in 1974. Government was willing to accept increased subsidies
without insisting on the imposition of new productivity deals. It was not only for the
possible miners' strike in 1981 that caution guided government's approach. Unlike
the miners' strike in 1984, the projected miner's strike in 1981 took place in an
environment overtly hostile to government (see Gamble 1988;Jessop et.al. 1988),
as indicated by the riots of the early 1980's, the dispute with steel workers, the
anger of railmen and the health service workers. The Thatcher government was
highly unpopular, while the CBI was openly critical of the suppression of productive
activity through draconian monetary contraction and associated high interest rates
(see Schwarz 1987). Lastly, the Thatcher government had, in 1981, not fully
organised its precautions for the showdown with the NUM as outlined in the Ridley
plan. "After giving way in 1981 when faced by the threat of a major stoppage over
pit closures the Government had carefully prepared for a major showdown. Little
was left to chance. Coal stocks had been built up at the power stations, alternative
sources of supply identified, the security forces prepared, detailed contingency plans
drawn up by Whitehall, and a new tough chairman, Ian MacGregor, appointed"
(Gamble 1988, p. 116). By giving way to the miners in 1981, the government
succeeded in undermining the alliance between steel, rail and coal systematically,
preventing, in the face of mass unemployment, strikes from spreading through a
selective policy of confrontation. Alongside the disciplinary threat of unemployment,
the government disorganised the momentum of the winter of discontent through a
step-by-step approach to confrontation. The incrementalism that characterised the
government's approach expressed the strength of the organised opposition, which
forced the government to commit itself to exceeding its own monetary targets.
In the event, the Thatcher government succeeded in demobilising the class conflict
through the repressive use of mass unemployment and a monetary decomposition of
#. class relations, permitting a fragmentation of the social conflict into sectional
disputes. When faced with more sustained resistance government sought refuge in the
option of paying up, in all the disputes mentioned and in particular when faced with
the projected miners' strike in 1981. The ability of government to prevent strikes
from spreading rested on the diminution of militancy at the level of the shop floor
(Coates/Topham 1986) as workers' saw that their resistance led to unemployment
and a rigorous display of law and order command in the face of a major economic
slump. The decomposition of social conflict needs to be seen in the context of mass
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unemployment. As the Times reported (31.3.1983): "What has happened in
shopfloor behaviour through fear and anxiety is much greater than ... could have been
achieved by more co-operative methods". Nonetheless, government had to pay up in
the form of renewed subsidies to coal, steel and British Leyland so as to demobilise
and demoralise the class conflict. These interventions were costly and militated
against the desired reduction in public expenditure. The government responded to the
disruptive power of labour through a renewed increase in integration costs. These
costs domesticated the class conflict not on the basis of the Keynesian transformation
of protest into demand but, rather, on the basis of mass unemployment and the
segmentation of labour markets. This segmentation prevented the social unrest from
spreading through employment guarantees for those workers upon whose (relative)
passivity the political stability of the Thatcher government rested. The quid pro quo
for subsidies was the acceptance of the intensification of work, assault on work
practices and compliance with management. However, the commitment of renewed
pacification costs reconstituted the sustaining of productive activity on the basis of
deficit spending, containing the class conflict on the basis of debt. While the MTFS
was designed to contain labour's disruptive power not on the basis of deficit financing
but rather on the basis of debt enforcement, the class conflict in the early 1980's led
government to overshoot its own monetary targets. While there can be no doubt of the
depth of the deflationary attack on the working class, renewed pacification costs for
particular workers reasserted the containment of labour on the basis of 'corporate'
integration. The political stability of the Thatcher government depended on
preventing social unrest from spreading. The commitment of pacification costs
expressed the political strength of labour which government sought to control
through a monetary decomposition of the homogeneity of social resistance in
opposition to deflationary attack, a resistance that had brought down the Callaghan
government in 1979.
Private employers exploited the climate created by the Conservative government.
Employers have been able to win trade union agreement to a range of new
productivity deals. Reflecting how far the balance of power on the shop floor has
shifted in favour of management, these deals are openly designed to get higher output
from fewer and lower paid workers. "Commercial pressure and the changed balance
of the labour market power have brought the unilateral imposition of reorganization
and speed-up, regardless of union (and particularly shop steward) resistance. The
threat of closure has itself provided a potent sanction: workers have been offered the
stark choice of co-operation with management or losing their jobs" (Hyman 1985b,
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p. 116). In the face of growing inflation during the early 1980's (see Tomlinson
1986), "real wages in manufacturing fell by about 3 per cent in 1980 and 1981
despite increasing in money terms by over 30 per cent. Living standards fell with
falling wages and reduced employment" (Maclnnes 1987, p. 65). The main elements
of the intensification of work are speed-up; increased use of time at work through
bell to bell working and loss of breaks and relief time; increased shift working;
removal of craft demarcation lines; a more severe disciplinary machinery to avoid
unofficial disputes and the disciplining of individuals; tightening up on lateness and
sickness; and making workers do different jobs. As resistance to the introduction of
new methods of production weakened, the implementation of new methods of
production contributed to a further shedding of jobs and productivity increases. All
this suggests that the trade unions and their members were in full retreat in the
early and mid 1980's. However, the trade unions remained an important partner of
negotiation over wages, manning levels, health and safety, and redundancy deals
(Batstone 1984,1986;Terry1986). The attempt to domesticate social relations
through trade union participation in the negotiation of order was at odds with the
government's tutelage of macho-management. The most significant changes took place
in the public sector where a rigorous strategy of confrontation won political benefits
despite economic costs (Hyman 1989c;Batstone 1986). Private employers, by
contrast, relied on the stability of labour relations, seen as a valued asset
particularly "within an unstable market environment; jl key company objectives can
be achieved without directly challenging established institutions of worker
representation, there is no obvious rationale in provoking gratuitous conflict"
(Hyman 1989c, p.191). 'Macho management' that was exercised by the state is, as
yet, not typical in industrial relations. "The most publicised accounts of 'macho'
management relate primarily to the public sector - where top management are on
short-term contracts and where major losses give the government a controlling
role" (Batstone 1986, p. 144). As shop stewards and trade unions agreed to
managerial adaptations to the crisis, employers kept intact an important factor of
legitimation inasmuch as management was able to secure acceptance to radical
decisions of restructuring. It would appear that management used consultations with
shop stewards as a means of impressing upon them the harsh realities of economic
decline in an endeavour to achieve co-operation. "And there is indeed much evidence
of a tacit trade-off: shop stewards acquiescing in a drastic diminution of influence
within the bargaining agenda which is itself severely circumscribed, but retaining
their formal representative functions unscathed" (Hyman 1989c, p. 191). By using
the climate created through unemployment and a government of (cautious but
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determined) confrontation, employers have regained significant job control while
protecting and maintaining their credibility in and through the persistence of strong
trade union workplace organisation. This workplace organisation continued the
trends of the 1970's, characterised by communication networks between
management and shop stewards. The tutelage of macho-management by the Thatcher
government exists, by and large, in contrast to a strong shop steward led
organisation of the workplace in private enterprise (see Batstone 1986,1988;
Terry 1986). "Facilities for shop stewards have not been substantially reduced;
some (notably Batstone 1984) would even argue that they have increased" (Hyman
1989c, p. 191-2). Thus it seems plausible to suggest that shop-stewards exercise a
not inconsiderable influence over traditional industrial relation issues at the same
time as managements are "playing a balancing act between weakening aspects of the
union role on the one hand while maintaining a degree of bargaining credibility on the
other" (Terry 1986b, p. 173/4). Negotiation first and, in case of the break-down of
negotiation, confrontational action remained the key feature of industrial relations
during the 1980's (see Fosh/Littler 1985).
The economic costs of confrontation, including the cost of policing and the cost of
preventing strikes from spreading (i.e. renewed subsidies as trade-off for
compliance) caused the Thatcher government to overshoot its own monetary targets.
The repressive use of monetary expansionism, while not contributing to the spread
of the monetarist micro-economic view of desirability, helped, nevertheless, to
create a climate of 'demoralisation and defeatism' (Hyman 1985b) that employers
were ready to exploit. As government's policy of sound money turned, on the basis of
mass unemployment, into a vicious law and order confrontation, it helped private
employers to regain control over labour in production to an extent which had not
been theirs for a long time. Lastly, the difference in strategy between private and
public employers contributed to the fragmentation of the social conflict as the
credibility of private employers remained protected because of a more moderate
reassertion of the right to manage which contrasted to the ruthless imposition of
domination in the public sector. Moreover, resistance was subdued for fear of a more
aggressive response by employers. In the face of mass unemployment and recession,
the acceptance of managerial objectives manifests a privatisation of a distinct
workers' interest (i.e. secure employment), which, in turn, contributed to the
fragmentation of resistance to the restructuring of production and the reassertion of
political domination. All this permitted government to decompose the collective
strength of labour through a ruthless impartiality of monetary and legal
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intervention, based upon the use of heavy policing as a means of imposing the
obedience.
The attempt to reconstruct social relations on the basis of the market (i.e. money
in command) fuelled social indiscipline on the part of those sections of the working
class whose labour power was largely pushed to the fringe of the labour market. The
doubling of unemployment in the early 1980's affected in particular the young whose
muscles were no longer needed. Most of the young unemployed come from so-called
'racial' minorities (blacks and workers of Asian origin) (Gamble 1983;Durr
1989). The unemployed who were faced with a despotic regime of welfare
reductions, and who were not reintegrated into production when the cycle of
accumulation reached its recovery phase, took to the streets in the early 1980's. A
dozen major riots between 1980 and 1985 threatened the reconstitution of social
relations on the basis of the unfettered operation of the market forces (3). The
burning of cities at the depth of the recession, with unemployment climbing towards
3 million, saw the government denying any connection between public disorder and
unemployment, discrimination and poverty. Instead, the Thatcher government argued
that the problem was one of public disorder sans phrase (Gamble 1988; Kettle/
Hodges 1982), employing racist discrimination as a means of disorganising unrest
and of stigmatising those involved as being immigrants in need of repatriation
(Miles/Phizacklea 1984) (4). As the reconstruction of the market implied the
imposition of a competitive cost price for labour power, arresting the threat to
property implied a repressive monetary expansion that imposed the rule of the
market through force. Alongside tight monetary control, social indiscipline was met
with an array of repressive means which criminalised those who did not offer
unconditional obedience to the austerity-based reconstitution of the social relations.
Unlike Heath's attempt to arrest social conflict through an indiscriminate expansion
of integration costs, the use of public spending under the Thatcher government
involved a dramatic expansion of law and order control, safeguarding the
subordination of the social to the power of money in and through the activation of
powerful coercive means of reimposing the value form over the conditions of life.
The imposition of tight money was designed to destroy the Keynesian relation between
public expenditure and wages in favour of a law and order imposition of compliance
to the 'dictates' of the market.
Heavy policing of industrial unrest and the preemptive expansion of new policing
techniques was forced upon those at the bottom of the wage hierarchy. Police
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preparations for handling public demonstrations, including picketing, "have been
forged on the backs of the black people; black communities, like Northern Ireland,
have provided a testing ground for specialist police squads, equipment and tactics"
(Gordon 1985, p. 162). Heavy policing practices worked, in retrospect, as a way of
separattng the ghetto from the organised working class, preemptively disorganising
concerted and coordinated resistance. Coercive and racist disorganisation of class
continued long established trends. As the organised left in Britain expected a major
assault on the welfare state, the Thatcher government continued policies formulated
under Labour, lulling the left into the belief that it had not much to fear. At the same
time, the Thatcher government kept its pledge to be the party of law and order
(Gamble 1988), enforcing a heavy handed law and order campaign against those at
the bottom of the wage hierarchy. As the bottom of the wage hierarchy are
constituents neither of the Labour Party nor of the trade unions, and since the forms
of resistance of those marginalised from collective representation stand in contrast
to the organisation of a distinct workers' interest (i.e. the channelling of protest into
demand) as represented by the organised left, the selective law and order campaign
exploited the division within the working class and undermined the homogeneity of
class composition as an antagonistic force to the power of money.
New policing practices were introduced after the riots in the early 1980's. The
riots were themselves. largely due to repressive policing of mainly black
communities. Policing focussed on the real possibility of public disorder in areas
that were hit hardest by unemployment, low wages and deprivation (see Durr 1989;
Kettle/Hodges 1982) and that were, because of racial resentment, easy to separate
from other sections of the working class. The preemptive use of heavy policing
practices manifested itself in the use of stop and search practices. The heavy handed
use of these powers is said to have sparked off the city riots in the 1980's (Bourn
1986;Scarman 1982). Stop and search surveillance was widely used in London
between 1981 and 82, "in spite of the fact that a substantial proportion of stops was
not justifiable within the terms of the law" (D. Smith 1986, p. 92). The use of stop
and search policing was later codified in the 1984 Police and Criminal Act which
buttressed established changes in legal form. Prior to this Act, 1.5 million stops
were made by the police per year while the arrest rate was one out of twelve. In
proportional terms, 91% of those stopped and searched were not arrested (Hansen
1986, p. 104). "A substantial minority of the population (16 per cent) had been
stopped by-the police once or more often in the previous 12 months, but certain
population groups were far more likely to be stopped than others: within certain
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groups, the chance of being stopped was well over 50 per cent, and a high proportion
of these groups had been stopped several times in that period" (D. Smith 1986, p.
92). Those most likely to be stopped were the young people, men and, in particular,
young men of West Indian origin (ibid.). Stop and search, legitimised as crime
prevention, created crime and hence criminals in the eye of the law because of the
arrestable offence of assaulting a police officer (Cox 1986). The arrestable offence
of assaulting and obstructing a police officer presents a resource for coercive and
preemptive community policing, a resource which is itself created by the
preemptive use of force. The increase in notifiable offences in Wales and England,
which rose by 37.9% between 1979 and 1984 (Renyon 1986, p. 3), is partly due
to the artificial creation of offenders through the stigmatisation of poverty in black
and Asian communities as entailing potentially criminal behaviour ('black crime and
mugging": Miles/Phizacklea 1984). The trend towards 'military policing' or, in
other words, overtly coercive imposition of domination, was furthered by
government's encouragement of tougher sentences for offenders. The Criminal
Justice Act of 1982 introduced a new framework of custodial sentences for offenders
under 21, while the Police and Evidence Act of 1984 increased the aggregate time for
which a suspect can be held to 96 hours (Zander 1986, p. 131). The monetary
decomposition of class relations was processed through the use of law and order
policing legitimatised as a means to securing the paradigmatic right of property. The
Thatcher government's law and order campaign permitted thus the recomposition of
class in terms of property owner and citizen, a recomposition that asserted itself in
and through the preemptive use of force.
Alongside heavy policing, government introduced, following the review of the riots
of the early 1980's, new policing practices of law and order control. These practices
continued the transferring of policing practices from Northern Ireland to mainland
Britain (Whitaker 1987). Elite Special Patrol Groups existed in every major City
in the late 1970's (ibid.). The review body of policing practices, coordination, and
crowd control, furthered the 'paramilitary policing' (cf. Gordon 1985) of law and
order problems: centralisation of police coordination and rationalisation of police
measures as a means to combat public disorder (ibid;Kettle 1985); introduction of
riot units and riot training for all police forces (C. Lloyd 1985); and rationalisation
and standardisation of equipment, especially riot gear (Manwaring-White 1983).
The development of a semi-military, unaccountable riot force within the ranks of the
English and Welsh police (C. Lloyd 1985;Fine/Millar 1985) involved the
stigmatisation of resistance to declining living standards, the intensification of
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labour, the loss of jobs and the erosion of welfare as entailing a criminal offence. The
expansion of repressive means of domesticating the working class required costs.
These costs were not provided as a means of recuperating economic insecurity of a
vast number of people but, rather, to discipline the aspirations of the working class
on the basis of tight monetary control of living standards, indicating the Thatcher
government's determination to impose over the working class the abstract equality of
money in command, whatever the costs. The imposition of the rule of money involved
domestication costs that government was willing to commit as an investment in
'economic freedom', i.e. the harsh enterprise culture of non-coerced exchange on the
market. The government's law and order campaign confirms the centrality of a
repressive use of public expenditure.
Alongside the use of new policing practices, the city riots sparked off
individualising forms of legal and monetary control in the form of government
training schemes. The city riots manifested the disruptive power of labour,
undermining government's attempt to contain the working class on the basis of the
unfettered operation of the market forces (i.e. money in command). Social unrest
made it impossible for the government to control the unemployed on the basis of the
deregulation of labour markets alone at a time of rising unemployment. While the
state, in the wake of the real possibility of an international collapse of credit and
speculative pressure on the national organisation of money, could no longer pursue
the ideology of full-employment growth, the regulation of labour markets had to take
a different form. The political regulation of the unemployed had to obtain within a
policy of monetary constraint and had to induce forms of control without reinvoking
full-employment policies. The recomposition of the working class posed the political
proolem of how to impose work and law and order without compromising the
imposition of the limits of the market over the working class in the form of tight
money. The resurrection of the MSC training schemes provided the costly solution.
During the first Thatcher years, the MSC was under severe monetary constraint as
its budget was cut and as it seemed poised for abolition altogether (Gamble 1988).
Public disorder provoked the regeneration of the MSC. As, in the face of disorder and
threat to property, non-intervention in the labour market was politically
unfeasible, the creation of a powerful, expansionist and increasingly centralised
body by far outweighed in urgency the cuts in public expenditure, contributing to the
permanent overshooting of the government's monetary targets. However, the MSC is
more than just a training agency. Fundamentally, the MSC developed as an agency of
social control (Leadbeater/Lloyd 1987;Benn/Fairley 1986) whose 'make to work
226
schemes' (Clarke 1988a) offered cheap and casual labour to enterprise. The
government training schemes impose control through work discipline, supervised by
law. The attempt to domesticate labour's disruptive power through imposed work
caused higher public spending the use of which was not designed to secure
employment and to alleviate hardship. Rather, monetary expansion was overtly
oppressive as it entailed the imposition of poverty in and through forced labour
under the penalty of benefit withdrawal, i.e. 'economic conscription' (Gray 1988).
The MSC training schemes will be analysed below when discussing the recomposition
of the welfare state.
In short, government's attempt to control the money supply through the institution
of the MTFS not only reinforced capital liquidation and mass unemployment but
provoked also industrial unrest and public disorder. In turn, social resistance forced
government to commit itself to subsidise industry, to maintain standards of public
services and to initiate one of the biggest state organised training programmes. The
social conflict in the early 1980's forced government to make material concessions
so as to contain class struggle. "Despite the government's anti-state rhetoric, it had
presided over a steady rise in the level of state expenditure, both absolutely and as a
proportion of the GNP" (Clarke 1988a, p. 165). The overall level of welfare
spending increased in the face of mass unemployment, while the government imposed
cuts wherever possible. Despite overshooting its monetary targets, the expansion of
the money supply was repressive in form, imposing hardship and economic
insecurity and diffusing social resistance in a way which fragmented the working
class: subsidies to maintain employment and wages associated with the reassertion of
the right to manage in production and the privatisation of a distinct workers' interest
(i.e. secure employment) and forced labour for others. The use of monetary
expansionism entailed a monetary decomposition of class relations and the
recomposition of class in terms of property owners (i.e. privatisation of interest)
and citizens (i.e the law and order campaign based on racist overtones and directed
against those at the bottom of the wage hierarchy). In the face of racist
discrimination and heavy policing, these repressive, individualising and
demobilising 'peacekeeping' costs caused recurrent overshoots of the monetary
targets proclaimed as necessary in order to resolve economic decline. Government
was not able to control the money supply within its predetermined margins, nor was
it able to secure economic recovery.
-Slump in productive activity and the presence of labour in and against capital
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With its MTFS, the government intervened in the financial solidity of productive
capital. As productive capital faced a monetary decomposition of its financial solidity,
the foundation of accumulation, i.e. speculative credit expansion, was turned into a
threat of insolvency. In the face of a deep recession, productive capital was shorn of
access to easy credit, contributing to an increase in the the rate of capital devaluation
and liquidation (see above). At the same time, high interest rates made it possible for
banks to absorb heavy losses without defaulting. Responding to the reimposition of
the limits of the market in the form of the power of money, employers slashed
investment and employment. The costs of the monetary squeeze on the productive
activity in the British national economy are now legendary. While the balance of
payments showed positive results in the early 1980's (Tomlinson 1986), the output
and growth rates of the British national economy declined sharply compared to other
OECD countries (ibid.). The sacrificing of production and labour on the altar of
money threatened to deepen the relative decline of the British national economy
vis-£-vis its main competitors on the world market. Despite deteriorating balance of
payments in manufacturing, the balance of payments improved. It improved because
of North Sea Oil (Keegan 1984;Gamble 1988), allowing the pound to remain grossly
overvalued. The appreciation of the pound squeezed profits sharply (see above).
The government's attempt to reimpose the power of money did not succeed in
eradicating the speculative dimension of accumulation. To take up S. Pollert's .
(1982) argument, the more innovative capitals were severely punished, if not on
the verge of bankruptcy, because of the high cost of outside financing and the long
amortisation periods of fixed capital that was difficult to realise as competitive
pressure was superimposed through monetary pressure. However, Pollert is wrong
to assume that productive capital was simply starved of necessary funds, as
companies borrowed heavily to survive the recession. While "domestic
manufacturing contracted, ... the financial business of the City boomed as did many
leading industrial companies whose operations were now international" (Gamble
1988, p. 126) and whose operations were increasingly integrated into the financial
sector. The high cost of credit led companies to slash investment and to increase
borrowing from international financial markets to maintain solvency and cash flow.
The maintenance of solvency through increased borrowing involved the containment
of labour's productive power on the basis of a renewed demand for recycling credit,
permitting an increasingly speculative dimension of productive accumulation.
Government had no power to contract the money supply as a "good proportion of the
monetary system is not effectively within the control of the state monetary
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authorities" (Sutcliffe 1983, p. 87). While government could force the domestic
supply of money, it had no such powers over the movement of world money. While
monetarists celebrated the deregulation of financial markets as a condition for the
unfettered operation of the market forces, the effect of deregulation contradicted the
practice of containing the money supply. High interest rates stimulated international
portfolio diversification and deregulation of financial markets enhanced capital
mobility as well as the venturing of speculative capital into new markets. In the face
of internationally unregulated money markets, the attempt to regain control over the
money supply turned thus into a discriminative reimposition of the power of money.
The policy of tight money reasserted the limits of the market over productive capital
unevenly, through scarce and costly credit. The more advanced capitals were able to
draw financial resources from international finance markets, escaping, to some
degree and under the penalty of the high cost of credit, the monetary squeeze on their
solvency. It was weaker capitals that were under threat of insolvency. Increased
borrowing from international finance markets contributed to an explosion of the
money supply, causing monetary targets to overshoot. The targeting of the money
supply was, to some extent, a 'presentational device' (Thompson 1986, p. 30),
without having to specify the likely employment and liquidation consequences, behind
which could be conducted a deflationary squeeze on less profitable producers who
lacked the means to acquire credit from international financial markets. However,
the overshooting of government's monetary targets "did not mean that the government
was preaching monetarism while practising profligacy, because a major cause of the
overshoots was the much larger than expected slump its tight money policies
produced" (Maclnnes 1987, p. 65). The explosive growth of the money supply,
rather than increasing productive investment rates, sustained the speculative
dimension of accumulation as enterprise borrowed in order to stay in business.
While the City reacted unfavourably to the explosive growth of the money supply
(Clarke 1988a), the simultaneous rise of interest rates neutralised adverse effects
on the City and maintained a grossly overvalued pound sterling. On the other hand,
the City itself contributed to the explosive growth of the money supply as industrial
and commercial companies raised £11 billion pounds from banks in 1981 alone. The
Bank of England lent over £2 billion to companies in 1980-1 and £4 billion in
1981-2 (D. Hall 1983, p. 36,42). Further, government itself contributed to the
overshooting of its monetary targets by providing subsidies to coal, steel and BL.
Public finance was channelled to industry, exceeding the amount of subsidies the NEB
was allowed under Labour during the 1970's (D. Hall 1983;Thompson 1986).
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Rather than regaining control over the money supply, the MTFS contributed to a
slump in productive activity while intensifying the speculative dimension of
accumulation in ever more fragile form. None of the so-called key economic
indicators (M3; PSBR; rate of inflation) showed any signs of improvement in the
face of a dramatic deterioration of productive activity. The overshooting of monetary
targets contributed to persisting inflationary pressure (Thompson 1986;Tomlinson
1986). The destruction of productive capacity intensified the financial crisis of the
state through the erosion of the fiscal basis and through increasing claims on national
reserves by nervous financial markets. In turn, the state and employers were forced
to borrow themselves out of financial difficulties, thus helping to generate an
explosion of the money supply. Persistent inflationary pressure reasserted the need
to tighten monetary policies which intensified the vicious circle of default in the face
of global depression.
Further, the improvement of the valorisation prospects of money capital through
high interest rate policies triggered also a potential collapse of international debt as
creditors in so-called third world countries found it increasingly difficult to service
debt through deflationary attacks on their working class. This development forced
Mexico to declare insolvency in 1982. High interest rates in, inter alia, the US and
the UK attracted speculative capital and restricted credit resources from entering
into debtor countries. Instead Eurodollars transformed from means of purchase into
means of payment, a claim on cash payment that, in turn, exists as a claim on cash
from the central banks in metropolitan countries. Because of the overexposure of the
big banks, there was a widespread fear that if a country defaulted, it might
precipitate an international banking collapse because of the interconnection between
banks. At the same time, there was no international lender of last resort, permitting
pressure on nation states to act as lender of last resort through their reserves. The
coordinated effort by central banks, including the Bank of England, to avoid a
break-down of international credit relations through short-term loans to defaulting
countries added pressure on reserves, undermining attempts to regain control over
the money supply and to fend off speculation on national currencies through larger
reserves. The deregulation of international financial markets of 1971/3 involved a
high price for capital in that marginal disturbances, i.e. social resistance to deflation
and law and order control in so-called debtor countries, imply major problems of
international stability. The sharpening of the debt crisis by 1982 threatened to
undermine the international composition of order. The fragility of the international
order of domination in the early 1980's expressed precisely labour's collective
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power as capital was forced much further into debt and as it became increasingly
clear that a rigorous imposition of money in command (i.e. debt enforcement) would
provoke a further deterioration of productive activity and intensified class
confrontation.
The attempt to rectify the crisis of accumulation by a policy of scarce money
reasserted the primacy of the substance of value, i.e. exploitation, in a negative way:
the devastation of productive accumulation. The sacrificing of labour and productive
capital did not resolve the crisis of accumulation but, rather, accentuated the crisis
from the monetary side of the one process of value. High interest rale policies
transformed the overliquidity of money capital into a shortage of loanable capital that
was getting scarce and expensive. While the banks were able to absorb heavy losses,
productive accumulation was severely depressed, precipitated by the reimposition of
the power of money and precipitating a possible collapse of the financial system
itself through credit default, domestically and internationally. The meaningless and
elementary form of capital exists only in and through exploitation. As monetarist
policies sacrificed production and labour on the altar of money, the international
credit relations started to crack, threatening to take with them the international
composition of order. Within the international adoption of monetarist policies, the
devastating impact of the MTFS threatened to undermine productive accumulation in a
way which precipitated a deep crisis of international credit through debt default.
This development expresses the constitutive power of labour: the presence of labour
in and against capital. Productive accumulation has to succeed in order for money
capital to be sustained, while the failure to turn credit into effective command over
labour reasserts, for productive capital, the market-limits of profitable capital
realisation: insolvency and bankruptcy are the forms that the presence of labour in
an against capital then takes. At the same time, the default of productive activity
threatens to bring about a collapse of credit relations, upon which social relations
themselves rest. In order to sustain the most elementary, and meaningless, form of
capital, labour and productive capital need to be sacrificed so as to make it possible
for banks to absorb heavy losses without default, while the sacrificing of surplus
value production to money destroys the basis in and through which the money power
of capital exists. This development was consequent upon the reassertion of the
primacy of the substance of value over the meaningless, but elementary, form of
money. The reimposition of the power of money sacrificed exploitation which alone
creates the value that constitutes the power of money as a commanding social
incarnation of wealth. The monetarist attempt to contain overaccumulation by making
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credit scarce and expensive threatened to bring about a collapse of the circuit of
social capital owing to the default of credit, that is, the default of the claim on future
surplus value upon which social relations rest. In order to avert the collapse of
credit, the sacrificing of productive activity involves, fundamentally, the
reimposition of the money power of capital over the working class. However, the
attempt to enforce debt over the working class through intensification of work and
deteriorating standards of living failed, as markedly expressed by the projected
massive collapse of international credit-relations. Credit exists as a claim on future
surplus value; the imposition of money in command entailed the attempt to eradicate
debt through effective command over labour so as to realise credit as means of
payment. The massive default of producers and the default of international credit
expresses the failure of this attempt. Within the international failure of monetarist
policies to contain the disruptive power of labour on the basis of debt enforcement,
the MTFS reproduced the contradictions of capital as the default of productive
activity implied a default of credit, despite the reassertion of managerial control
over labour in production.
-Drop in Public Revenue
Despite severe cuts in public spending by November 1979 and 1980 and the
imposition of cash limits over local authorities and the institution of the welfare
state, government was unable to control public expenditure. Rather than regaining
control over public expenditure, government presided over a rise in the PSBR (5).
The Thatcher government presided over a steady increase in public spending both
absolute and in proportion of the GNP (see Gamble 1988;Thompson 1986)(6).
Indeed, since the mid 1960's, the only time a large fall in the ratio of government
spending occurred was 1975-7 (see Burton 1985). Continuing public indebtedness
made it impossible for government to deliver incentives for capital in the form of
sustained tax cuts, as pledged in 1979 (see Gamble 1988). Cuts in taxation were
postponed as, in the face of economic decline and a deteriorating balance of trade,
public borrowing soared. Tax cuts were postponed because of the inflationary and
speculative pressure these cuts would have provoked, as, indeed, had been the case
when in 1979 tax cuts boosted inflationary pressures. In the first years of the
Thatcher government the tendency in both taxes and public expenditure was up
(Mullard 1987). "As the crisis persisted 1981 saw the largest increase in taxation
in British history, taking taxes as a proportion of the GDP to the highest level ever
recorded, as the government sought to relieve pressure on interest rates by bringing
down its borrowing" (Clarke 1988a, p. 163). Fiscal redistribution favoured
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overwhelmingly the better off as the richest 7% of the tax payers received 43% of
the tax cuts (see Maclnnes 1987, p. 84), while the tax burden as a proportion of
GDP rose from 39% in 1979-1980 to 47% in 1982-3 (ibid. p. 67). By "1984
only families earning more than £34,145 per year were paying less tax than in
1979" (Esam et.al. 1985, p. 125). In the face of high interest rates, public debt
increased the burden of debt service on public expenditure thus contributing to the
overall growth in public expenditure. "By 1983 the burden of both direct and
indirect tax were higher than under the previous Labour Government and public
expenditure as a percentage of GDP had also increased" (Gamble 1986, p. 194). The
more monetarist policies in the early 1980's preached and piaclised financial
restraint, the more they relied on credit; the more monetarist policies sacrificed
labour and production, the more fragile the international credit-relations; and the
more monetarist policies proposed the free market in opposition to the state, the
more they relied on traditional methods of finance (i.e. tax increases and credit). By
1983, the only economic measure that showed signs of improvement was the rate of
inflation which subsided to under 5 per cent (Gamble 1986, p. 194), achieved at a
high cost. The improvement as regards the rate of inflation needs to be seen in the
context of rising productivity. Productivity rose because of the liquidation of
unproductive producers and employment falling more than output.
In sum, government found it impossible to control the money supply and to reduce
the overall burden of public spending. Tax cuts were a 'realistic' option only if
public spending could have been reduced, thus making it possible to reduce the
overall burden of taxation without simultaneously provoking a rise in inflation. As
the UK had economic power neither to increase exports sufficiently nor to finance its
soaring public expenditure, public finances were in a complete mess, however much
this was smothered by North Sea Oil. The decline of the British economy expressed
itself in a deterioration of the balance of trade. The Thatcher government was faced
with the problem of how to regain control over public finances other than by raising
taxation without simultaneously triggering inflationary and speculative pressure.
-Defaults and shift in emphasis
Despite government's pledge to deliver tax cuts, it presided over an overall
increase in taxation. Despite its aim to deliver cuts in public expenditure, it
presided over an increase in real terms. Despite its claim to make the economy
leaner and fitter, it presided over one of the worst economic recessions as the
imposition of money in command reasserted the constituting power of labour in and
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through a massive default of credit as claim on future life. Despite its claim to
control the money supply, its targets were consistently exceeded. Despite its aim to
restore international confidence on the financial markets, international credit
relations were on the edge of collapse by 1982.
By 1981, Thatcher was the most unpopular Prime Minister since the start of such
records (Schwarz 1987). The survival of the Thatcher government depended on the
restoration of sustained accumulation domestically and internationally. Alongside the
Malvinas/Falklands war in 1982, the Thatcher government repealed, in its 1982
budget, the MTFS and adopted a more flexible fiscal and monetary policy (Gamble
1982). This shift in emphasis was made possible by Reagan's monetary
expansionism which helped to absorb the debt crisis of the 'third world' by
reconciling a pyramid of debt with a deficit financing of accumulation. The shift in
emphasis is indicated also by the adoption of privatisation as a means of reducing the
PSBR. Privatisation came to the fore as an explicit strategy in 1983 (Tomlinson
1986;Gamble 1988).
The 1982 budget relaxed monetary policies considerably. The monetary target M3
was practically abandoned - it was formally abandoned in 1986 (see Gamble 1988)
- as a wider range of complementary monetary targets were introduced (see
Thompson 1986). At the same time, fiscal intervention, in line with the remedies of
supply side economics (7), gained importance over monetary targets (see fiscal
reforms in 1986,1987,1988)(8). These redistributing exercises were made
possible by the relegation of tight monetary discipline in the US and the financing of
public expenditure by methods other than increasing debt. The abandonment of
monetarist macro-economic policies of sound money relaxed the inflexibility of the
MTFS. By 1987 there was nothing distinctively monetarist in the economic policy of
the Thatcher government (Gamble 1988). Instead, discretionary fiscal and monetary
intervention gathered momentum. "Such discretionary interventions have little to do
with the enthusiasm of monetarists for the rule of governed policy making" (Gamble
1982, p. 15). Confronted with its results, it was monetarism which went overboard.
Or rather, monetarist 'household economics' (cf. Keegan 1984) went overboard,
while the financial conservatism of monetarism remained. Credit-sustained
accumulation, while ridiculing monetarist economic ideology, was of fundamental
importance for the monetary de- and recomposition of the working class, i.e. the
reconstitution of social relations on the basis of abstract equality. After the disaster
of the MTFS, the government used Keynesian techniques to sustain accumulation.
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However, the aim was not to encourage high levels of employment and economic
growth but, rather, to restore financial stability. Such a priority involves the
tightening up of the hierarchical composition of domination so as to maintain "a
control strong enough to maintain formal exchange equality between economic agents"
(Gamble 1988, p. 33). The relaxation of monetarist policies involved the
reconstitution of the circuit of social capital on the basis of deficit financing. The
renewed debt financing of accumulation involved the acknowledgement that the only
consistent way to contain the productive and disruptive power of labour is sustained
accumulation. The attempt to integrate labour into the capital relation involved
pacification costs in the form of a global expansion of debt, integrating the productive
power of labour in the form of the fictitious dimension of capitalist reproduction.
By 1983 "the worst of the recession had passed as the world economy was moving
into a recovery phase of the cycle, under the impact of expansionary policies in the
US" (Clarke 1988a, p. 164). Profitability was restored at the cost of mass
unemployment, mass devaluation and liquidation of capital. Management had
succeeded in asserting new controls over labour and wages had been restrained. At the
same time, consumer expenditure increased, driven forward by a fall in personal
savings (Clarke 1988a) and a growth in consumer credit (Berthoud/Kempten
1990). At the same time, an overvalued dollar improved exports to the US.
Additionally, the deregulation of financial markets made it easier for enterprise to
sustain production through easy credit (The Guardian 2.8.1990). Finally, a strong
pound provided multinational companies ''with the opportunity to acquire overseas
assets on very favourable terms, more than making up for the devaluation of capital
through the liquidation of unprofitable domestic operations" (Clarke 1988a, p.
164). Lastly, the government provided fiscal incentives for investment and
subsidies to industry. As the overvalued dollar increased exports into the US, the
improvement in the terms of trade, higher productivity and reduced inflationary
pressure, indicated that the 'economy was moving in the right direction'. To this end,
government allowed "the pound to fall by 14 per cent, relieving the pressure on
profits and interest rates" (ibid.), while financial deregulation increased
competition within the banking sector, permitting advantageous loans to corporate,
and private, customers.
In 1983 and 1987, the Thatcher government secured re-election on the basis of a
Keynesian pre-election boom within a tight monetary framework (see Clarke
1988a)(9). With the relaxation of monetarist policies, domestically and
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internationally, the reimposition of the money power of capital shifted from an
indiscriminate imposition of tight money over capital, the state and the working
class to a discriminative one: i.e. expansionary credit and fiscal policies sustaining
capitalist reproduction and the enforcement of debt over the working class. This step
acknowledged the constitutive power of labour, but in a way which is oppressive: the
imposition of economic freedom over the conditions of life, subjecting the working
class to tight monetary control. The guarantee of formal exchange equality on the
world market involves the political attempt to guarantee the convertibility of credit
into means of payment. Such a guarantee entails the regaining of control over public
expenditure because the stability of international debt depends on the capacity of the
multiplicity of states to act as lender of last resort, a capacity which depends on the
eradication of balance of payments imbalances and financial stability (i.e. bigger
state revenues). However, in the UK, resistance to deflationary attack had caused
higher public spending, militating against financial stability. The imposition of
economic freedom (i.e. the lurid face of equality) over the conditions of life had to be
financed without triggering inflationary pressure and without increasing deficit
financing of repressive integration costs. The imposition of social passivity through
tight monetary control had to be financed without the state recommitting itself to the
transformation of protest into demand. The decomposition of labour's disruptive
power had to be invoked without putting pressure on the exchange rate and without
provoking costly and damaging strikes, deflecting popular dissatisfaction with the
government's attack on living standards by fragmenting and dividing popular unrest.
The stability of growing debt rests on the capacity of the state to decompose class
relations.
Alongside credit-expansion and fiscal explosion, the straitjacket of monetary
control was not lifted for the population at large. "The rationale of economic policy,
insofar as it had one, was now the more pragmatic rational expectations theory"
(Clarke 1988a, p. 163). This shift in emphasis involved the attempt to reassert
social control through the systematic eradication of institutional forms identified
with Keynesian class collaboration. With the failure of the MTFS, "inflation was no
longer the result of an excessive increase in the money supply, nor unemployment
the result of government policies. Inflation and unemployment were now both the
result of the excessive power of the trade unions, reinforced by the indiscriminate
generosity of the benefit system that subsidised strikes, reduced competition for jobs
and allowed three million people to chose unemployment rather than engaging in
productive work" (ibid.)(10). What matters about markets is not their outcomes
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but the fact of free and uncoerced exchange. Justice (i.e. the Keynesian ideology of
social reform) consists, now, not in outcomes but in non-coercion, and in markets
we find uncoerced exchanges. The accumulation of wealth arises out of individual
non-coerced exchanges, only these exchanges are morally legitimate and just. The
formidable challenge to the economic assumption of 'Keynesian planning' involved the
market-led attack on the ability of the working class to command a living standard
'incompatible' with the non-coerced exchanges. The non-existence of any decisive
economic policy made the trade unions, the form of the state itself and the
'unfettered' aspiration of the working class the scapegoat for the failure of
monetarist economic policies (see Schwarz 1907; Clarke 1988a). The pledge to 'kill
Socialism in Britain' (cf. Thatcher, Financial Times 14.11. 1985, as quoted in
Schwarz 1987, p. 145) replaced the MTFS with a policy designed to impose, "with a
ruthless impartiality, the rule of money and the law" (Clarke 1988a, p. 163),
recomposing class, in a polarising way, "on the basis of the categories of property
owner and citizen" (Clarke 1990b, ms. p. 31). Following Hayek, collectivity became
construed as thousands of individuals whose coordination was to be achieved through
the information given by the market. The pledge to kill Socialism depended on
sustained, albeit uneven, accumulation so as to undermine the collective existence of
class, i.e. to undermine the existence of class as, class. The decomposition of class
entailed the eradication of the Keynesian acknowledgement, in institutional form, of
the political strength of the working class and the recomposition of class not in the
form of a coporatist collective, as during the 1970's, but, rather, in form of the
market individual. The attempt to reconstitute the social on the basis of the market
could not attack the working class head on but needed to be based on the
disorganisation of the working class so as to reinforce and, thereby, to
(preemptively) undermine possible collective resistance. The disorganisation of the
working class required a monetary expansion of repressive domestication costs. The
failure to contain labour's disruptive and productive power through the institution of
the MTFS increased reliance on windfall revenues so as to control public spending
without provoking inflationary and speculative pressure and so as to decompose class
relations on the basis of the unfettered operation of the market forces.
These windfall revenues were discovered 'by accident' (cf. Gamble 1988) in the
privatisation programme. One of the principle means in the planning of the budgets
was privatisation (Veljanovski 1987). Privatisation served as a substitute for
cutting spending as a whole (Tomlinson 1986)(11) and provided government with
its populist ideology (Clarke 1988a). Privatisation permitted the recomposition of
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class in terms of property owner and citizen through the encouragement of small
shareholding. Privatisation fuelled the ideology of popular capitalism in which the
enterprising individual participates in the market, including its dangers of collapse.
Privatisation "enabled public expenditure levels to be maintained, and even
increased in 1986/7, while at the same time making tax cuts affordable" (Gamble
1988, p. 123). Privatisation fuelled the stock market boom and provided windfall
profits for subscribers and "promised to free management from restrictions on the
diversification and internationalisation of the enterprise imposed by legislative,
administrative and financial constraints" (Clarke 1988a, p. 165). The flotation of
public corporations did not provide a competitive edge to enterprise but fuelled the
monopolisation of markets.
Privatisation is widely regarded as part of the monetarist attempt to eradicate
Keynesian forms of economic planning. Following the neo-liberal prescription,
privatisation is seen as a simple mechanism that allows the "free choice and
competition within the rule of the market" to flourish as it "will not only produce an
efficient economy but guarantee better than any other system the greatest liberty for
the individual" (Veljanovski 1987, p. 46). While privatisation was a means to
destroy the remnants of the Keynesian welfare state, it allowed a cash flow into the
public purse, allowing the government to reconcile rising expenditure with its aim
of reducing both taxes and public borrowing (12). While privatisation helped to
finance public expenditure, it provided, at the same time, a means of recomposing
class in terms of the property owner, endowed with the right to participate in the
world of finance. At the same time, increased public spending did not involve the
loosening of the recomposition of the welfare state in terms of repression and
efficiency. Rather, increasing public expenditure was used as a means to control the
imposition of financial scarcity. Public expenditure was used as a means to break-up
the collective power of labour in favour of the individual market agent. The stability
of Keynesian policies in a monetarist framework of money as command depended on
the imposition of social passivity, on the intensification of work and deflationary
attack. In the face of mass unemployment, the credit-sustained boom made possible
the fragmenting and individualising imposition of the power of money over the
working class. While parts of the working class gained during the boom, the vast
majority of the population did not. While those the boom did not pass by experienced
relatively secure employment and rising wages, those the boom did pass by were
subjected to individualising and repressive forms of monetary and legal intervention.
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-Decomposition of Class and Privatisation
The increase in public spending during the 1980's was situated in a tight monetary
framework, permitting the undermining of the Keynesian attempt to transform
protest into demand in favour of the attempt to transform protest into poverty
supervised by an array of repression. The imposition of money in command involved
the selling of the family's silver ware, overturning the Keynesian ideology of
economic planning in favour of the planning of a divisive disorganisation of class
relations on the basis of the category of the property owner. In turn, the
disorganisation of class relations involved the refetishisation of social relations on
the basis of the market, undermining collective forms of provision in favour of the
enterprising and daring market individual. The stability of the market-led
destruction of class relations depended, in formal terms, on particular inputs, i.e.
employment and rising living standards for some sections of the working class. After
1982, the reconstitution of the circuit of social capital on the basis of debt and
speculation contributed to the integration of particular sections of the working class
into Thatcherite market individualism.
The privatisation measures originally undertaken to alleviate pressure on the
PSBR "came to be seen as a way of extending share ownership" (Gamble 1988, p.
138). Government offered public enterprise at levels below the market price and
encouraged, thereby, widespread participation in shareholding. Additionally,
government encouraged the growth of shareholding "through specific tax concession",
while it also "raised the thresholds on capital gains tax and capital transfer tax,
while reducing the upper tax bands on higher incomes and on investment income"
(ibid.). The number of individual sharehoders increased from three million in 1979
to nine million in 1987 (ibid.). Despite a growing number of small shareholders,
the overall proportion of shares held by individual shareholders declined in
comparison to institutional shareholders (see Gamble 1988;Bassett 1986;Kavanagh
1987). The absolute increase of small shareholders after each privatisation fell
shortly afterwards: from 2.3 million on the sale of British Telecom in 1984 to 1.6
million in October 1987, for example, from 4.5 million on the sale of British Gas in
1986 to 3 million (October 1987); and from 1 million on the sale of British
Airways in 1987 to 400,000 (October 1987) (Sturm 1989, p. 50). The creation
of an enterprise minded republic of property owners involved a responsibilisation of
the working class to the forces of the market, i.e. the free economy that is said to
ensure generous gains if the individual reacts positively to the impulses given by
money. Participation in 'casino capitalism' not only involved the subordination of
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small savers and investors to the fragile movement of world money; it involved also
the pacification of discontent through the privatising forces of the market whose
operation might involve real gains or disaster. Private property in the form of
shareholding defined the working class as a complex number of market individuals
who are subject to the monetary impulses. The pacification of the social through
individualising forms of benefits and values permitted a polarisation of the working
class into property owners on the one hand and the victims of credit-sustained
accumulation on the other.
The populist appeal of privatisation is in evidence also in the government's housing
policy. Under the Conservatives, expenditure for housing was reduced markedly
(Mullard 1987;Ball 1982,1985). Council house policy was assigned "to a 'welfare
net* role" (Ball 1982, p. 62), a development which speeded up existing trends.
Although the government announced increased spending for council house-building,
these increases had to be financed by extra revenue from council house sales. This
'exercise in political window-dressing' (cf. Ball 1982) contributed to an overall
increase in public expenditure on housing without, thereby, relieving the basic
poverty of provision (Ball 1982,1985). Additionally, the government introduced,
in the face of unemployment, low pay and local authority rent increases, several cuts
in the means tested provision of housing benefit (Esam et.al. 1985, p. 106), thus
encouraging, through tax and mortgage reliefs and the selling of council houses at
knock-down prices, the better off to buy their own council house. The government's
unspoken strategy was to force a shift from public to private provision by pushing
up public sector rents, by selling off public housing at low prices and by reducing
public housing subsidies. These savings were more than neutralised by increased
subsidies to private home ownership (Mullard 1987). Private sector housing was
subsidised more heavily than ever before, while capital spending on council houses
was cut back considerably (Murie 1987). Alongside rising subsidies, government
increased the discount rate of council house sales for sitting tenants from 50 to 60%
in 1984 and to 70% in 1986 (ibid.). Alongside the deregulation of financial markets
and of credit-controls as well as the venturing of speculative capital into new
markets, the relaxation of monetarist policies involved encouraging the supply and
demand of consumer credit, including mortgages. Additionally, the government
granted mortgage interest relief and "improvement grants, capital gains tax
exemptions and cheap public land sales to speculative builders amongst other items"
(Ball 1985, p. 17). These concessions go mainly to high-rate income tax payers and
discriminated against home occupiers at the lower end of the wage hierarchy who are
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faced with debt problems. After the election in 1983, the government increased the
maximum "mortgage qualifying for tax relief from £25,000 to £30,000, a policy of
benefit to only 9 per cent of borrowers, primarily those on higher income" (Esam
et.al. 1985, p. 107). Government justified higher public spending for private
housing as a subsidy that is required to instantiate economic freedom (13). In the
event, "council house sales over the past few years now mean that over 60% of
British households are owner occupiers" (Ball 1985, p. 15). The expansion of
private property ownership through council house sales "was the most successful
and symbolic of all the Government's policies" (Gamble 1988, p. 138). The
privatisation of home ownership coincided with an active erosion of remaining
council housing stock.
By putting emphasis on private ownership, housing inequalities increased as those
on low income, the unemployed or unwaged, or families that do not conform to the
small, nuclear family form, were excluded from ownership while the declining
provision for council housing implied deteriorating standards and living conditions.
On top of deteriorating standards, council house rents increased substantially (Murie
1987), as did debt arising from rent problems. By the end of the 1980's, about 16%
of tenants (about 1 million of the country's households) were having problems with
rent payments (Berthoud/Kempson 1990). On the other hand, those who bought
their council houses committed themselves to debt. The commitment to debt imposed
the necessity of not endangering employment and, as such, provoked a privatisation
of interest so as to preserve newly won property rights against the ultimate penalty
of eviction in case of debt default. The selling-off of council houses manifested a
recomposition of class in terms of property owner, overridden by the threat of
eviction in case of debt default. Privatisation of housing produced quite general
problems. In addition to rising problems with rent, 3% of people buying their home,
according to the findings of the Policy Studies Institute (Berthoud/Kempson 1990),
were experiencing mortgage repayment problems in 1989 - a figure that has
presumably increased with the subsequent rise in interest rates. Private debt
problems indicate that the monetarist attempt to reconstitute social relations on the
basis of the limits of the market has faced grave difficulties. Monetarism developed
two faces: an unregulated expansion of credit and the attempt to deflate the money
supply through an abrasive attack on the working class. In the face of financial
deregulation and an ever decreasing value of welfare benefits, credit was a way of
sustaining living standards. While the MTFS involved the enforcement of debt, the
relaxation- of monetarist economic policy within a tight monetary framework
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involved the encouragement of debt, which works as an individualising form of
oppression. The disruptive power of the working class to resist the imposition of
tight money is expressed in the enormous increase in private debt. Private
credit-expansion expresses the power of the labour to frustrate the enforcement of
debt, However, this power has manifested itself in a way which is oppressive. The
growing number of people now struggling with intractable debt difficulties is the
mirror image of the explosion in consumer lending which has taken place over the
past 10 years. Oustanding household debt (not counting mortgages) has more than
trebled since 1981. At £46.9 million, it now consumes 14% of disposable household
income (Berthoud/Kempson 1990). The use of law and order in the Conservative's
second term in office coincided with the recomposition of class in terms of the
property owner of debt.
Growing private debt is the mirror image of the government abdicating collective
responsibility for services, reducing the rates of provision and increasing taxes and
charges. The recomposition of welfare in terms of efficiency involved, in regards to
housing, a shift in emphasis between private and public housing, implying a new
relationship between the state and the private sector, in particular the role of
building societies in public housing (Murie 1987; Ball 1985). The abdication from
collective provision blurred the difference between public provision and private
enterprise. The transfer from public to private provision concerned not just
housing, but ranged from education, health care to travel (privatisation of bus
companies) and pensions. The encouragement of private provision implies "that
individuals (or families) participate in the new order through their autonomized
consumption of benefits and values" (Jessop et.al. 1988, p. 177) (14). While the
credit-sustained boom provided benefits, it did so in a way which discriminated
against those who could not participate either by buying their council house or by
acquiring status as shareholders. The tightening-up of the welfare state was in part
administered by the local authorities who are the main distributors of social
services. The selling-off of council houses had major implications for local
authorities as housing policy became more centralised as central government became
more interventionist (Murie 1987). However, in the face of deteriorating public
services, public opposition to, and effective political campaigns by local authorities
against, deteriorating public services in the areas of health and education proved to
be successful in forcing the government not to apply the same privatisation
measures. While the strategy of privatisation proved extremely successful in forcing
a shift from public to private housing, it was a failure in the areas of health and
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education. The government responded to resistance to its health and education policies
"by introducing financial and administrative reforms, ostensibly to increase
efficiency and democratic accountability, but in fact as an attempt to deflect popular
dissatisfaction with the government's parsimony, and to fragment and divide popular
unrest" (Clarke 1988a, p. 166). The government sought to confine welfare
provisions within the limits of centrally imposed financial and bureaucratic
constraints. At the same time, the government sought to decentralise the
administrative structure within the public sector. While it deregulated the
administrative structure of social services, and while it sought to orientate social
provisions on the basis of financial decentralisation, the government pursued a
policy of active erosion of services through a policy of systematic underspending. The
erosion of services involved a divisive orientation of health care in proximity to the
market. The emphasis on market effectiveness, involves an attempt to make health
care a tradeable commodity. Commodification involves performance indicators in the
NHS that are "often measures of activity not of outcomes. A workload measure like
'occupied bed day' shows improvements through the practice of 'hot bedding', the
rapid turnover of hospital bed occupancy" (Kaser 1988, p. 41). The emphasis on
commercialisation and effectiveness, legitimised as enhancing consumer choice,
reiterates, in repressive form, the discourse of individual rights and preference.
Government's 'value for money' approach rests on the ability to pay, i.e. on
privilege. Individual choice amounts to the segmentation of the 'social' on the basis of
financial ability, involving the subordination of the working class to the forces of the
market that equate the social and the power of money.
The attempt to reorientate health care towards to the market involves the state in
abdicating collective responsibility for services and provisions in favour of private
health care. The financial erosion of services coincided with the introduction of
mandatory competitive tendering in the NHS in 1983. Mandatory competitive
tendering affected mainly those workers who had been at the forefront of industrial
action during the winter of discontent and the health workers' strike in 1982
(catering, laundry, cleaning). "The 'winter of discontent' had brought chaos to local
authority and NHS services, and had convinced Conservative politicians at both local
and national levels of the need to find ways to prevent such disruptions in future. The
birth of contracting out, or more specifically the first use of it as a party political
weapon, was imminent" (Ascher 1987, p. 25). While continuing social pressure had
delayed the government's attempt to break up the homogeneity of the health workers,
continuing pressure on wages and work conditions and the prolonged strike in 1982
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had weakened resistance to the incursion of private contractors into the NHS. The
lesson of the 1982 strike did not disappear from memory easily. As one official noted
in mid-1984: the 1982 pay dispute '"knocked the stuffing out of us for the moment'"
(Ascher 1987, p. 126, in reference to Nursing Times 30.5.1984). Competitive
tendering resulted in a decline in trade union membership, job losses, reduction in
wages and intensification of work. The government's attempt to destroy the relation
between public expenditure and wages involved the deregulation of services which,
itself, needs to be seen as a means of fragmenting resistance to the imposition of
money in command. The government's strategy of creeping privatisation came to the
fore as an explicit programme in the Conservative's third term.
The Thatcher government addressed the tightening-up of the institutional form of
the state in terms of the market individual: i.e. consumer choice in opposition to
so-called high spending councils, consumer choice in health care and education in
contrast to collective provision. The treatment of class as consumer involves the
orientation of welfare provisions on the basis of the market and the reconstitution of
the social on the basis of the individual in contrast to the Keynesian acknowledgment
of the strength of the working class in the form of collective welfare provision. The
recomposition of the welfare state in terms of efficiency involved declining standards
of public services, encouraging individuals to take out private health insurance and
to move into private education. By aiming at orientating provisions on the basis of
the market, access to provisions is, by implication, dependent on the financial
ability of 'consumers' which, in turn, entails the supply of provisions on the basis of
privilege, i.e. value for money. The recomposition of the welfare state involved thus
a divisive attack on living standards. Under the Conservatives, the purpose of public
spending was not to recuperate hardship, but, rather, to reinforce the shattering
experience of unemployment through a financially restricted access to satisfactory
provisions. The market-led attack on living standards is identical with the
imposition of money in command, expressing the equality of market agents in
relation to the abstract power of money. The imposition of money in command is
identical also with the attempt to destroy the relation between public spending and
wages. The increase in public spending did not involve a softening of the attack on
living standards but figured, rather, as an expense which the decomposition of the
institutional guarantees of collective provisions demanded, including the law and
order supervision of possible cash control collapses. The safeguarding of the
monetary decomposition of class conflict involved, fundamentally, the fencing off of
possible resistance to the market-led restructuring of social relations and the
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imposition of the spirit of inequality so as to make feasible the recomposition of the
form of the state on the basis of the global money power of capital.
Following upon the attempt to decompose class relations on the basis of the market,
the Thatcher government's industrial policy contributed to a geographically uneven
recomposition of production. Monetarist policies that had followed the belief that
only a recession and rising unemployment could ensure the restoration of sound
economic growth had failed. The belief surviving this failure involved supporting
industry while intensifying the attack on the conditions of life. The last decade has
seen a substantial increase rather than a decrease in industrial support (Thompson
1986). During the MTFS, non-intervention was neither economically nor politically
feasible. Industrial support gathered momentum with the relaxation of monetary
policy. Government sought to stimulate 'entrepreneurship' through direct
communications with companies, attracting productive investment through subsidies
and fiscal sweeteners (15). Huge subsidies to Nissan supplied not only financial
resources, but indicated also the government's micro-economic view of desirability.
Japanese organisation of labour was seen as desirable for the restructuring of
production in the UK (see Dunning 1984;Oliver/Wilkinson 1988;Webster 1990).
Further, government became more interventionist through its urban development
policies which centralised regional development planning at the expense of local
authorities. After 1983, central government retained a dominant role in urban and
regional regeneration as part of its industrial policy. "The reduction of local
government's powers and resources is paralleled by the creation of new, ad hoc
agencies, tightly controlled from the centre, like Enterprise Zones and Urban
Development Corporations - the small-batch, flexible specialisation approach to the
inner cities" (Geddes 1988, p. 92;see also Lawless 1987;Goodwin/Duncan 1986;
Duncan/Goodwin/Halford 1987). As the Department of Environment set the lead,
local authorities could, at best, follow. The government's planning initiatives
involved fundamentally the destruction of a particular area of social life in favour of
a new enterprise culture of self-employment or small enterprises. In the face of
financial pressure and an increasingly interventionist government, local authorities
found their social space ever more defined by central government regulation upon
which local authorities have no influence, while their power to resist was
financially eroded through the imposition of tight money on local authorities'
spending powers, and disciplined through the costs that the management of the
poverty of the working class demanded.
245
However, industrial policy retained its financial conservatism as the government
concentrated resources on the new technology sector, while financial assistance to
the old heartland of heavy engineering remained low. The subsidising of new
technology grew in importance after 1983. The funding of the Micro-Electronic-
Support Programme, founded under Labour in 1978, increased to £120 million in
1984, after its revenue was initially reduced from £70 million to £55 million in
the early 1980's (Thompson 1986, p. 186). The Thatcher government pinned its
hopes for future prosperity on those sectors which were already internationally
competitive, on new technology and on parts of the service industry which could be
traded internationally. The remainder was placed at the mercy of the market. The
attempt to secure economic growth across industry was abandoned. Selective
industrial policy reinforced the deindustrialisation of the heartland of manufacturing
(see Esser 1986;Esser/Hirsch 1989 for a comparison with West-Germany). This
policy reinforced politically the decomposition of the working class; the
geographically uneven restructuring of production pushed the old heartland of
manufacturing to the margins, while the South-East moved into the centre of
industrial activity.
New manufacturing plants opened up in smaller centres of population, often in
greenfield sides. The geographical pattern of restructuring sought to exploit the
division within the working class by making redundant those sections whose
productive power could no longer be contained within the concept of profitability and
by imposing work on those hitherto largely marginalised from big industry. The
geographical pattern of restructuring is "directly related to industrial relations,
since almost all the trends in economic change seem to be awav from areas where
unions are fairly strongly organised to areas where they have been weak. Moreover,
when such restructuring is accompanied by an environment of high unemployment
and government hostility to union organisation this could be expected to worsen
problems faced by unions" (Maclnnes 1987, p. 73). Labour employed in these areas
was less familiar with trade union traditions. The workforces which trade unions
seek to recruit in new plants, mainly in the South, are those which were difficult to
unionise in the past either because of lack of employee interest or employer
opposition. The old integrated section of the working class in the areas of what has
become the rust belt of the British economy found itself marginalised through
unemployment while the countryside turned into the centre of the new productive
drive. The recomposition of productive activity hit the heartland of trade union
organisation. Devaluation and liquidation of capital and mass unemployment reduced
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trade union membership (Batstone 1986;Kastendiek 1988), and undermined
working class determination to resist restructuring as unemployment struck and
marginalisation loomed. The "destruction of a quarter of all jobs in manufacturing"
(Hyman 1985b, p. 115) caused widespread peripheralisation and impoverishment
in the old trade union strong-holds in contrast to the South where employment is
relatively high and trade union membership relatively low. However, despite the
absolute fall in union membership, union density is still higher (Batstone 1986)
than in the early 1970's (Batstone/Price 1983). The geographical recomposition of
production has had considerable repercussions for the disintegration of the working
* class. Upon the geographically uneven recomposition of productive activity, the
encouragement of shareholding and owner occupation superimposed individualising
forms of working class pacification, imposing the spirit of inequality through a
selective access to the benefits and values generated by the boom.
In the following sections, attention focuses on government's anti-trade union policy
and its contribution to the decomposition of class relations on the basis of a
market-led attempt to destroy the relation between public expenditure and wages.
There then follows an analysis of the decomposition of class relations through the
institution of the welfare state, including MSC training schemes and the
centralisation of financial control over local authorities.
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II Trade Union Policy
The government's approach to trade unions was one aspect of its policy which
displayed a systematic approach from the beginning. What government denounced,
after 1982, as 'excessive trade union power' was already severely bruised and
battered during the industrial conflict in the early 1980's. The trade unions were
under severe pressure in the face of mass unemployment, declining membership, the
devastation of the old heartland of trade union organisation, policies of exclusion, and
an intransigent public employer. Further, the recomposition of the system of
industrial relations continued trends of the 1970's as the trade union organisation
was largely by-passed in favour of shop-steward led bargaining (Batstone 1984,
1988;Terry 1986;Maclnnes 1987,1989). "The shift from the long-established
manufacturing habit, in most strongly unionised workplaces, of communicating with
employees only through the shop-steward structure, has proceeded further during
the 1980s" (Hyman 1989c, p. 190). In the face of diminution of rank-and-file
pressure, the trade unions were in full retreat long before the Thatcher government
picked them up as scapegoats for the failure of the MTFS (see Schwarz 1987;Clarke
1988a).
Upon policies of exclusion and confrontation, the government superimposed legal
constraints which buttressed the shift in the balance of class forces that materialised
during the defeats in the early 1980's. The general direction of these Acts was to
shift the meaning of 'consensus' from reaching compromise with government within
institutionalised patterns of negotiation of order to unguestioned obedience to
political domination. The Thatcher government had learnt the lesson that surrounded
the failure of the Industrial Relations Act in 1971 which had aimed at changing
industrial relations through legal intervention. The trade union policy of the 1980's
aimed first at shifting the balance of power and then at imposing new legislation' upon
trade unions (Soskice 1984). Labour laws on their own are not sufficient to tie the
unions down, as the Heath government had discovered. The lesson learnt was that the
law cannot force a shift in the balance of power but that such a shift had to be fought
for by weakening working class resistance through unemployment and policies of
confrontation. Further, the labour legislation of the 1980's did not codify particular
standards of workplace trade unionism. Instead, it restricted the range of lawful
conduct, openly encouraging employers to use legal means to reassert the right to
manage (S. Evans 1985). The reform of trade union laws provided legal support for
employers without thereby determining the precise form industrial relations should
take. It was the responsibility of the employers themselves to modify industrial
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relations as they saw desirable and appropriate (Kastendiek 1988). Although
employers remained largely rooted in an, albeit restricted, collective approach, and
used legal means only when negotiation had broken down, the reform of trade union
law "contributed to the climate, already created by mass unemployment, of trade
union demoralisation and retreat" (Gamble 1988, p. 116). While the ideological
attack on trade unions pointed to a greater role for the individual in opposition to the
bureaucratic machinery of the trade union organisation, the effect of the labour laws
was to tighten the grip of trade unions over their members. By implication, legal
restrictions on lawful conduct involve the subordination of collective interest
representation to the limits of the law. permitting law and order control to enforce
compliance with statutory requirement. The responsibilisation of trade unions to the
law reaffirms the denial of political involvement as trade unions are forced into
unquestioned compliance with penal law. The government's authoritarianism,
witnessed in its decision to deny trade unions broader political involvement, involved
the reassertion of the role of trade unions as managers of discontent within a tight
and legally constrained composition of order.
Since the Donovan Report, whose "central proposition ... was the existence of 'two
systems' [industry wide negotiation and workplace bargaining] of British industrial
relations" (Hyman 1979a, p. 56), governments have sought to formalise and tighten
collective bargaining. The social contract expressed in institutional form just such a
strategy. The labour legislation of the 1980's did not challenge the proposition of the
Donovan Report. The policies of the 1980's involved a change in strategy. The
government's trade union policy involved the reassertion of trade unions' policing
powers over their members through the coercive restrictions of immunities, ballot
requirements and punitive sanctions in form of financial liabilities. The labour law
of the 1980's involved a responsibilisation of the trade unions through legal reform
and monetary pressure, permitting a pacification of discontent through the
enactment of penal law. While the social contract rested on the recognition of the
.• strength of the working class in the institutional form of class collaboration, the
policies of the Thatcher government involved a definition of trade union organisation
as representing a particular group in industry, depending on the prerogative of the
individual employer. Alongside the government's labour laws, the strengthening of
the individual vis-ci-vis the trade union organisation, the use of penal law and heavy
policing of disputes reasserted government determination to eradicate trade union
representation beyond the direct relation between employer and employees. All these
restrictions entailed pressures on trade unions to develop into business
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organisations (Bassett 1986). Further, the government's anti-trade union policy
involved the monetary decomposition of the class relations as, alongside the exclusion
of trade unions from broader political involvement, the legal restriction of trade
union activities permitted the individualising reconstruction of social relations of
the basis of the market. The reconstruction of social relations on the basis of the
category of the property owner entailed the reinforcement of trade union
representation of a particular section of the working class, i.e. those whose
bargaining strength was not broken during the 1980's, precipitating a
systematisation of the working class into different sectional groups (i.e. employees
versus 'claimants'). Lastly, the government's anti-trade union policy involved the
attempt to decompose class relations on the basis of the strong and able, permitting
the state to abdicate collective responsibility for welfare services and to destroy the
relation between public expenditure and wages. The attack on trade unions involved,
fundamentally, an attack on the form of the state itself. After World War two, the
presence of labour in and against capital was recognised in institutional form by the
generalisation of industrial relations and corporatist forms of class collaboration on
the basis of the Keynesian attempt to transform protest into employment guarantees
and demand. The political strength of the working class was expressed in the
institutional advances of the trade union movement. The attempt to get the trade
unions out of the state and to enmesh them into a legal structure of penal law
exemplifies the attempt to enforce the rule of money through law. The government's
anti-trade union policy involved the attempt to close off oppositional space through
penal law, through the professionalising of industrial relations and the provocation
of strikes so as to undermine, preemptively, possible organisational strength. As the
bargaining strength of particular workers was not broken, the government's
anti-trade union policy contributed to the recomposition of class on the basis of the
category of the property owner. This decomposition of class relations permitted the
disorganisation of class conflict through the divisive imposition of the money power
of capital. Before analysing this point in more detail, attention focuses on the
government's labour legislation, the politics of the miners' strike and the
disintegration of the trade union movement (new realism).
In the face of an hostile Conservative government, the enactment of anti-trade
union legislation was met by a divided TUC. The conflict between trade unions and the
state was displaced into a conflict within the movement itself. Faced with anti-trade
union legislation and declining trade union membership, individual trade unions
sought to protect positions of influence and organisational strength by accommodating
250
to the political challenge. The division crystallised over the question of how to react
to government, "for example between those like the then General Secretary of the
TUC, Len Murray, who argued for a 'new realism' approach to the changing climate,
and others like Ken Gill, General Secretary of TASS, who argued that the movement
should exclude itself from all tripartite bodies such as NEDO, ACAS and the MSC" (A.
Brown 1988, p. 14). This development increased the divide within the TUC whose
involvement continued to be restricted by the Thatcher government (16).
-Labour Legislation
Despite offensive rhetoric, the EA 1980 was a rather modest measure. The EA
1982, in spite of a tougher line taken by Tebbit, was more cautious than widely
expected (A. Brown 1988). The Trade Union Act 1984 (TUA 1984) went
considerably further than any of the previous Acts. While some provisions were
overtly presentational in character, others intensified existing development trends
in aggressive form. For example, the provision of secret membership ballots shifted,
in the face of trade union retreat, from a voluntary (EA 1980) to a statutory
requirement (TUA 1984). The TUA 1984 sought to tie the unions down by imposing
ballots before strike action. The trade union legislation was "very much a
step-by-step approach, a classic example of incrementalism" (Kavanagh 1987b, p.
12).
Taken together, the Acts "hold union officials as individuals financially and legally
accountable for a wide range of unlawful activities, ...; severely restrict the
institution of the 'closed shop'; expand the ability of owners to dismiss strikers and
union officials; and remove legal immunity from unions ... who authorise otherwise
legal industrial action without meeting specified balloting procedures" (Krieger
1987, p. 179). The new legislation reinforced the shift from 'voluntarism' to legal
intervention, a shift which was at issue at least since the late 1960's. 'Voluntarism'
never existed as such because industrial relations have always oscillated between
state intervention and voluntarism (Wedderburn 1985). Trade unions never enjoyed
the right to strike. Instead, strikes were safeguarded by 'immunities' from civil law
with which the trade unions were endowed since the beginning of the century. The
laws of the 1980's restricted these immunities rather than abolished them (ibid.).
In the event, the Thatcher government not only sought to delegitimise and challenge
previously sanctioned working class demands (e.g. full employment, industrial
democracy, social policy) but, also, removed immunities and legal safeguards on
trade unions who are the crucial organisation for voicing and representing these
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demands. The labour laws expressed, in legal form, a denial of the political influence
of trade unions. With its labour legislation, the Conservative government shifted
radically from the policies of consensus during most of the past century (Hyman
1987;Coates/Topham 1986).
The Employment Act 1982 (EA 1982)
The EA 1982 was put through parliament at the same time as government relaxed
its monetary policies. The EA 1982 went considerably further than the EA 1980
(Hyman 1987;Strinati 1985). "The scope for lawful industrial action was narrowed
yet again, almost to the point of extinction; while ballot requirements were extended
to existing closed shops, and individual workers were enabled to obtain substantial
damages from unions if dismissed in 'illegal' closed shops" (Hyman 1987, p. 97).
Closed shops have to be re-approved every five years (Perrins 1983). Concerning
closed shops, employers seemed to operate pragmatically, with the notable exception
of the Stockport Messenger dispute in 1983 and the News International disputes in
1986-7. "Closed shops have for the most part survived unscathed" (Hyman 1989c,
p. 192).
The EA 1982 severely limited the right of trade unions to strike and to picket. The
Act declared that the employers involved in the dispute have to be the direct ones and
that disputes have to be wholly related to the conditions of employment
(Clark/Wedderburn 1983). This restriction strengthened the provision of the EA
1980 as it made it easier for employers not to appear as the direct object of the
dispute. Further, lawful strikes have to be genuinely "industrial rather than
political" (Perrins 1983, p. 290), making strikes against e.g. privatisation
unlawful even if the political issue is jobs (17). However, the EA 1982 did not
provide a conclusive distinction as between genuinely industrial and political
strikes. The decision of the Court of Appeal in 1982, concerning the strike by the
post office engineering union against the plan to privatise parts of British Telecom
when the licence for telephone serivces was to be sold to Mercury Communications
Ltd., put an end to this openness. The strike was judged to be primarily politically
motivated and for this reason unlawful (Clark 1985). Further, strikes to enforce
trade union recognition in other enterprises are outlawed, as are strikes aiming at
preserving work demarcations (ibid.). Additionally, participation in picketing was
restricted to the employees of a particular employer. Workers made redundant are
hence not allowed to participate in strike action, if the dispute is to be lawful, even if
the strike concerns their reinstatement. The 'punishing of the unemployed'
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(Clark/Wedderburn 1983) restricts the individual rights and protection offered by
the Labour legislation of the 1970's. Lastly, the EA 1982 makes it easier for an
employer to break a strike without attracting liability for unfair dismissal. An
employer "can issue an ultimatum that he will dismiss all strikers who remain out
on strike after such-and-such a date. He can now lawfully discriminate by allowing
back to work any strikers who wish to return before the ultimatum expires, and by
sacking only those who remain on strike after that date". In the face of financial
pressure and increasing private debt during the 1980's, this provision encourages
strike-breaking, putting the consistency of strikes in danger. Further, an employer
"can attempt to divide the workforce against itself by treating different
establishments differently: he can sack the strikers in one factory without giving the
workers at his other factories a right to complain of unfair dismissal. The
prohibition on discrimination lasts only three months. After that time, the employer
can reinstate whomsoever he wishes with impunity" (Perrins 1983, p. 294). This
provision makes it easier for an employer to weed out 'undesirable' elements of his
labour force, permitting a decomposition of working class organisation at the
shop-floor through the loss of key workers.
The restriction of lawful disputes was damaging because of the financial penalty
involved: unions were made financially responsible for damages if a strike is found to
be unlawful. This provision represents an enormous financial threat. The maximum
fine a union with more than 100,000 members faces is £250,000. However, the Act
allows more than one court action by employers affected by unlawful strikes.
Additionally, if trade unions are found guilty of contempt of court, they face further
fines and risk the seizure of their assets. The NGA, in its dispute with E. Shaw
(Stockport Messenger) in 1983, was fined about £500,000 for contempt of court,
followed by the seizure of over £1 million of its assets. The assets were returned to
the NGA after it had recalled its pickets and apologised to the court. In July 1984, the
court ruled that the NGA had to pay £125,000 plus interest, as well as court costs,
to Stockport Messenger (Clark 1985, p. 172;see also MclllrOy 1988). In the case of
an unlawful dispute, the union has either to persuade its members to go back to
work, or it has to distance itself from the dispute in such a way that there is no doubt
left about the union's sincerity. Violating these requirements would make trade
unions liable for damages. High Court injunctions have, in lots of cases, resulted in a
call back to work (Clark 1985). These legal and monetary restrictions accentuate
the role of trade unions as managers of discontent. At the same time, trade unions'
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compliance with the law may foster the alienation of trade unions from their
members.
The EA 1982 put trade unions into a precarious legal position. While trade unions
were denounced as coercive power groups that undermine individual freedom and
disregard the civil right of a worker not to belong to a trade union and not to
participate in its so-called restrictive practices, the removal of immunities and
legal safeguards involves the strengthening of trade unions as industrial watchdogs.
The EA 1982 involved the subordination of the trade unions to capitalist state power
as unions are forced, under the penalty of financial liabilities, to discipline unlawful
strike action (e.g. by recalling pickets). The imposition of law and order, i.e. the
imposition of unquestioned compliance with the law, involves the professionalising,
depoliticising, and strengthening of the disciplinary role of trade unions. While the
social contract manifested in institutional form the disciplinary role of trade unions
in exchange for income and employment guarantees, the government's labour
legislation articulates the attack on working class demands for full employment and
welfare, for example, through a repressive intervention that involves the imposition
of social passivity through trade union compliance with penal law. The
professionalising and formalisation of industrial relations concerns the requirement
of legally sound procedures and legal advice so as to make sure that strikes take place
within the limits of the law. This professionalising devolves to the shop floor as trade
unions need to manage discontent in a way which prevents a possible legal and
financial backlash. The trend to professionalisation and formalisation continues
trends of the 1970's in an environment defined by confrontation and unquestioned
obedience. Further, the restriction of lawful strikes to matters concerning the
immediate conditions of work denies almost any lawful coordination of discontent
whose purpose might be defined as political (i.e. denial of political involvement in
wider aspects of working class life). The restriction of immunities reinforces the
division within the working class as a lawful strike is confined to the direct
employment and direct work conditions. The fragmenting impact of this provision
involves the concentrating by trade union organisation on those directly employed by
the employer who faces strike action. The legal promotion of workplace trade
unionism involves the official definition of class conflict as a sectional dispute in
industry. The discourse of civil rights, which lay behind the enactment of the EA
1982, manifests a repressive disorganisation of the class struggle that had
undermined" the social contract.
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The Trade Union Act 1984 (TUA 1984)
The TUA 1984 was passed in a rapidly changing climate: a vigorous imposition of
law and order command over the miners, a call to defy the law by the TUC and a
growing conflict within the trade union movement over new realism. By 1982, the
trade union movement appeared to be united in its opposition to the law. A decision
was reached at the TUC's special conference at Wembley in April 1982 to ignore, and
hence to defy, the law. The conference "endorsed an eight-point programme which
provided in particular that unions should not take part in closed shops ballots or
accept public funds for balloting, and empowered the General Council to assist any
union sued under the new laws and to levy affiliates to finance this" (Hyman 1987,
p. 98). Whether or not the TUC itself should defy the law was left unclear (ibid.).
Unity and opposition to the labour law soon broke into pieces (Hyman 1987;
Mcllroy 1988). The Wembley resolutions proved to be hollow. "First the
electricians' union and subsequently the engineers - ... - announced their intention
to take the government subsidies" (Hyman 1987, p. 98). Prudence triumphed at the
Stockport Messenger dispute in 1983. When the NGA, in line with the Wembley
agreement, refused to obey the law, it was faced with a series of injunctions. The TUC
expressed sympathy with the NGA and refrained "from jeopardising its own funds by
endorsing the NGA's illegality" (ibid. p. 98). The development during the Wapping
dispute was similar. As News International "carefully exploited the new laws to
ensure that any union response would be unlawful", the "TUC offered its services as a
mediator but ... steered clear of illegality" (ibid. p. 98). The NUM found itself in a
similar position. The Wembley agreement failed completely. Though the rhetoric
remained deviant, trade union opposition was moderate and the trade union movement
overtly divided. The fragmentation of the trade union movement focused on the call to
accommodate to the changing climate of the 1980's. The shift to a more conciliatory
approach to government came to the fore at the 1983 Trade Union Congress (see
Bassett 1986). Conciliatory unions demanded co-operation with the government of
the day and obedience to the law. The conflict between the trade unions was
successfully exploited by the Thatcher governments as can be seen by the isolation of
the NUM during the miners' strike. Further, the TUA 1984 was situated in a climate
in which some sections of the left came to accept the populist appeal of the repressive
use of the democratic discourse, urging the trade unions, especially the NUM, not to
defy the law.
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The TUA 1984 "obliged unions to hold secret membership ballots in order to elect
their executives, call lawful strikes, and undertake political activities" (Hyman
1987, p. 97). These provisions challenged the relation between the Labour Party
and the trade unions (Grant 1987), and made disputes subject to democratic
approval (S. Evans 1985;Muckenberger 1985) (18).
By employing, in repressive form, the discourse of democracy, the government
presumed that individual workers might prove more moderate than trade union
activists (Undy/Martin 1984) and that ballots might undermine workers' sense of
collective identity and willingness to strike (Strinati 1985). However, behind the
repressive attempt to strengthen the individual lurked the formalisation of trade
union structures, their decision-making processes and the responsibilisation of
trade unions to democratic scrutiny. The 'democratisation' of the trade unions
manifested a one-sided intervention in the balance of power since it embroiled the
trade unions in time-absorbing balloting procedures. The labour laws did not impose
binding obligations on employers to honour bargaining agreements. The one-sided
imposition of procedural rules made ad hoc reactions towards employers' decisions
unlawful. The trade unions are legally obliged to engage in a lengthy process of
campaigning and balloting. Such a process, in turn, can absorb emotions while
employers gather time to prepare for disruption of production pro-actively through
forward planning of production (overproduction of commodities; shift of production
to other plants; stock-piling etc.). Non-compliance with balloting involves financial
liabilities, if the respective employer sues the trade union for unlawful conduct and
if the trade union is found guilty of misconduct. In the case of an unofficial strike,
and in the case of a trade union distancing itself from such a dispute, the TUA 1984
makes trade union members and shop stewards, rather than union officials at
national level, liable for damages (S. Evans 1985). If an employer reaches an
injunction, the possibility is that it is targeted against key personnel, thus
undermining the coherence of a strike (ibid.). Such a threat increases the
dependency of workplace representatives on the trade union organisation for legal
advice as well as financial and organisational resources for balloting.
The TUA 1984 encourages trade unions to control their members much more
stringently. In case of unlawful strike action trade unions would be liable for
financial damages although their control over their members might be disrupted. In
the face of High Court Orders, trade unions would be forced either to distance
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themselves from the strike, reinforcing their alienation from their members, or to
support the strike, inviting possible financial collapse. The attempt to force, by
means of penal law, unquestioned compliance of trade unions with the law entails the
trade unions in discipining industrial relations. On the other hand, in case of
widespread acceptance of a strike in a ballot, the strike will have a democratic
legitimacy that might well undermine the government's claim that it is the trade
unions that coerce otherwise responsible individuals into irresponsible action such
as strike. Further, ballot requirements put the preparation of strikes, as well as the
strike itself, into a political perspective, involving trade unions in a propaganda
campaign to gain popular support. Such a development might well frustrate
government's attempt to depoliticise strikes (Hyman 1987).
The TUA 1984 furthers the professionalising of the relation between trade unions
and their members as pressure grows to look to the union for both legal and practical
advice and help, permitting the subordination of the workplace to the disciplining
power of trade unions who are, in turn, anxious to avoid financial liabilities. The
requirement to hold secret membership bal- lots integrates the shop-floor much
more directly into the bureaucratic structure of trade unions. The populist appeal to
give the trade unions back to their members entails a tightening up of trade union
control over their members - all this in a framework which is defined by penal law
and exclusion from political involvement. Monetarist ideology of the free individual
coerced by trade union power is thus reversed as trade union power to manage
discontent is strengthened through a legal and monetary restriction of immunities,
permitting a decomposition of the ability of trade unions to use strikes as a means of
voicing and representing demands for social reforms. Strinati's (1985) argument,
according to which the new labour legislation was designed to give the trade unions
back to their members, picks up on the rhetoric of the law, without digging deeper
into its context. This is not to say that trade unions are not affected by the
'strengthening' of union members. In case of a call for strike in line with the legal
procedures, the pressure asserts itself in the opposite direction as the trade unions
have to ensure the agreement of their members if they want to avoid vindicating the
government's stigmatising discourse and if they are to avoid adverse effects on
existing positions of influence vis-&-vis management through its failure to
reinforce its demands by mobilising its members. Such a possibility might well turn
out make trade unions very cautious in using the stick of strike action. Both of the
pressures mentioned entail an undermining of collective organisation through the
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legal and monetary reinforcement of a bureaucratic relation between trade unions
and their members.
In the event, trade unions "have in the main revised their rules to comply. Ballots
before official strikes have become common since November 1984 when Austin
Rover [formerly BL] sued the unions involved in a dispute at its Cowley plant"
(Hyman 1987, p. 99). The Austin Rover dispute indicates the possible
disorganisation of social unrest the TUA 1984 might effect. All the nine unions
involved called for strike action without a secret membership ballot. After Austin
Rover had obtained a High Court Order, according to which unions were to instruct
their members to go back to work until a ballot had been held, the EEPTU emphasised
"its willingness to cooperate with the Court, ordered its members back to work and
balloted them on the pay offer" (Coates/Topham 1986, p. 97). All the other unions,
except the TGWU, succeeded in avoiding contempt of court by distancing themselves
from the strike. The TGWU was isolated in its defiance and was subsequently fined
£200,000 for contempt (ibid.). A further escalation was avoided by Austin Rover,
possibly because of the miners' strike at the time. Whether or not the strike
collapsed because of the court ruling or because of faltering support (ibid.) remains
open to question. However, the use of legal provisions was beyond doubt an important
device to divide the trade unions involved and to fragment the dispute (Mcllroy
1 988).
The TUA 1984 required unions also to hold ballots on their political levy to Labour.
This provision contained a considerable danger for the organised labour movement as
it challenged the financial solidity of the Labour Party and the political involvement
of trade unions in the Labour Party. About 85% of the political funds collected by
trade unions are paid to the Labour Party. Labour's financial position depends on
these levies to the extent of about 80% (Grant 1987;Crouch 1982). Trade union
involvement in the Labour Party is dependent on the political levy paid by individual
trade union members. The appeal to individual freedom and preference threatened to
reinforce the electoral defeat of Labour in 1983 through its financial collapse
(Grant 1987;Hain 1984), undermining the at times uneasy unity of the reformist
left in Britain. The ballot over the political levy involved the possible destruction of
the close relation between Labour and trade unions, entailing a narrowing of
oppositional space through the threat of a financial collapse of Labour.
All indicators signalled a dramatic reduction in the political levy. However, the
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result of the ballots was a major blow to the government. Not only did all affiliated
unions cast a positive vote for maintaining political levies to Labour, but also the
number of individual members paying these levies increased. Additionally, unions
hitherto not affiliated to Labour gained a vote to establish such links (Grant
1987;Mcllroy 1988). The reasons for this outcome are manifold: inconsistencies in
the law itself: inconsistencies in government's tactics; and a skillful campaign by
trade unions (Grant 1987). The successful campaign over political levies
strengthened the relationship between Labour and the trade union movement to a
degree unprecedented since the winter of discontent. Labour and the trade union
movement closed ranks on the basis of new realism. New realist thinking calls for
compliance with the labour laws and involves the channelling of discontent into the
ballot box.
Although the government's anti-trade union policy supported aggressive
management policies, management remained largely rooted in an, albeit more
restricted, collective approach. In spite of employers becoming accustomed to the use
of the law in industrial conflicts (Hyman 1987), the persisting pattern is to
negotiate first and to use the law after negotiations have failed (Fosh/Littler 1985;
Maclnnes 1989;Mcllroy 1988). Circumstances which encourage the use of
injunctions are the damages disputes might cause. However, there is a difference
between bigger, more advanced employers, and smaller ones. More advanced
employers have a far greater room for manoeuvre to accommodate their work-force
than smaller, hard pressed ones. Injunctions are only the last resort for bigger
employers while smaller ones took the risk of alienating their work-force and trade
unions more readily (S. Evans 1985). "The law was most likely to be used where the
strikers' lacked unity and were relatively isolated and uninfluential with union
officials. The aim was often to demoralise strikes and restore official union control
over a dispute. The law was increasingly considered as an option where industrial
action put financial pressure on employers, rather than gaining financial redress"
(Mcllroy 1988, p. 92). Equally, the state held back from using the new possibilities
provided by its own legislation, anxious not to provoke an escalation of disputes. This
fear informed the Thatcher government's decision not to enforce discipline through
the use the labour laws during the miners' strike. Rather, the government embarked
on the use of criminal laws (Clark 1985; Mclllroy 1985,1985b).
The government's trade union policy contributed to the tightening up of the
hierarchical composition of political domination. The form of the state that developed
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in and through the class conflict of the late 1970's and early 1980's was no longer
tainted with institutional forms of class collaboration. The reassertion of the right to
political domination constitutes the state as an agenda setting force that defines,
through legal means, the role trade unions are allowed to play. The paradigm of law
and order, which characterises the legal and monetary disciplining of trade unions,
involves the unquestioned compliance of the social with political domination. Trade
union compliance with political domination involved, in turn, the definition of trade
unions as a sectional interest group of a distinct workers' interest: those in certain
employments. Legal and monetary attack on the trade unions entails the pacification
and responsibilisation of a distinct workers' interest through the fragmenting
reassertion of the policing role of trade unions. The labour laws involve an attempt to
recompose class in terms of the law abiding citizen, the strengthening of which
reasserts, in turn, the contradictory role of trade unions: the power for and over
their members. In the face of demoralisation, retreat, a geographically uneven
recomposition of production and the recomposition of social relations on the basis of
the category of the property owner, the attack on trade unions reinforced the
divisions within the working class. Collective representation was confined to those in
employment, contributing to the disorganisation of the working class in terms of
those the boom did and did not pass by. Rather than implying an abdication of state
power, the reassertion of the right to political domination involved the systematic
use of state power so as to make certain the reimposition of the individualising power
of money that rested on the fragmentation of the collective organisation of class. This
development is expressed in a shift in emphasis of the meaning of consensus from
negotiation of order to the imposition of law and order: compliance, and no argument.
Such a control had not only to be strong enough to confront and to defeat public
disorder but, also, to provoke strikes so as to make possible the imposition of the
abstract equality of money by preemptively undermining possible resistance to this
imposition.
-Confrontation and Policing
The attempt to reconstitute social relations on the basis of strict compliance with
the form of the capitalist state power, i.e. a government subordinating political
discretion to the market, involved major confrontations with the organised labour
movement. After 1983, major disputes involved the miners in 1984-5, the
printers in 1986-7, the teachers in 1986-7 and the nursing unions in 1988. The
miners' strike appeared at the beginning of the boom which saw the organised labour
movement deeply divided over the issue of defiance and new realism. The miners'
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strike was provoked by government's announcement of drastic pit closures in early
1984 (19). The miners' strike lasted 11 months and was enormously costly for
government. During the strike, the government reinforced the division within the
trade union movement by awarding wage settlements to moderate unions (i.e. the
electricians and the water and rail workers) over and above government's wage
ceilings (Bassett 1986;Goodman 1985). The government bought off in particular the
rail workers' pay claim so as to prevent them from giving more support to the
miners (Goodman 1985). The strike ended with a complete defeat for the miners,
"once they had been split and been successfully isolated from the rest of the Labour
movement" (Gamble 1988, p. 116). Although the miners' strike slowed down the
forces of new realism, this slow-down was only a temporary one as the government
was able to isolate the miners and to inflict a heavy defeat. The success against the
miners reinforced to the climate created in the early 1980's according to which
defiance leads to inevitable defeat. The defeat of the miners brought home the message
that accommodation was a means of survival. However, government's victory
deprived it of its scapegoat because "trade union power had been so reduced that it
could not be plausibly blamed for anything. The defeat of the miners, that was
Thatcher's triumph, also deprived her of her alibi" (Clarke 1987, p. 423). The
defeat of the miners resulted in a vacuum for confrontation. The teachers' and nurses'
strikes filled this vacuum as, by 1987, it was the form of the state itself (education
and health) that moved into the centre of attack (Clarke 1988a).
The miners' strike in 1984/5, similar to that in 1972, brought to the fore new
policing practices. The strike was policed centrally through the National Reporting
Centre (NRC) (20) at Scotland Yard. The NRC receives its policing orders from the
Home Office and coordinates these orders to the local forces (Kettle 1985). The
centralisation of policing by-passed democratic forms of accountability,
precipitating what looks like a 'future national police force' (Gamble 1988), or a
'police army' (Morgan 1987;see also Kettle's (1985) more restrained comments).
During the miners' strike, police powers were extended and old, almost forgotten,
laws were brought into effect (Fine/Millar 1985). Policing powers were not
brought into effect as a means of crime prevention but, rather, as a means of
imposing government's view of desirability: social control, proclaiming the right to
work'over the right to picket. Legal means of law and order control were
predominantly based not on the new powers given to the NCB by the labour laws of
the 1980's but, rather, on criminal laws. The use of criminal laws stigmatised the
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miners' campaign for job and wage security as a criminal offence, an offence which
defined the right to strike as offensive violence (Mcllroy 1985b). The use of
criminal laws "confirms negatively the centrality of the direct policing strategy to
the state" (Mcllroy 1985, p. 49). The aim of provoking and eradicating social
disobedience to the government's view of necessity and desirability saw the Prime
Minister declaring the fight against the miners to be a fight against the enemy within
(Goodman 1985;Kastendiek 1985), thus stigmatising the right to hold, and to
campaign for, a different opinion as a threat to national security. The miners' strike
provided an opportunity for furthering the transfer of policing practices used in
Northern Ireland to mainland Britain. "In the place of influence from elected
representatives, we have seen a growing commitment to police autonomy, with the
police becoming increasingly dependent on their own hierarchical and secret
disciplinary structure and on bureaucratic control emanating from behind the closed
doors of the Home Office" (Fine/Millar 1985, p. 13). Centralised policing was
matched with phone tapping, interference with letters, plain clothes policing,
provocation of violence and community surveillance (see GLC 1984). Restrictive
policing practices eroded and by-passed the "independence of judiciary supervision
of democratic accountability at local and national level", involving the "systematic
violation of hard-won civil liberties and trade union rights" (Cousin/Fine/Millar
1985, p. 227). The coercive imposition of political domination implied tighter
control over the local authorities to which the police is constitutionally bound.
'Paramilitary policing' (Fine/Millar 1985;Krieger 1987) and improved police
equipment (i.e. riot gear and computerised supervision), together with the immense
cost of policing during the miners' strike, not only severed the already tight
financial position of local authorities; it also imposed policing directions on local
authorities (i.e. policing of the community) which they might not see as appropriate
and desirable. Increased influence over form, content and direction of policing is,
following the Law Lords' decision, constitutional if national security matters are at
stake, as allegedly they were in the case of the miners' strike. The Law Lords
declared that "the sole judge of whether national security is at issue is the
government of the day, which is to say of course the Cabinet, or to take the matters to
the very centre of the spider web, the Prime Minister herself" (Whitaker 1987, p.
17). The miners' strike provided a test case for the breaking of dissent through a
co-ordinated effort of intelligence operation and increasingly centralised and
paramilitary policing, all of which criminalised collective organisation as
constituting the enemy within who undermines the individual right to economic
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freedom.
Although the NCB hesitated to use the labour laws, they did not need to as working
miners did this job for them (Mcllroy 1985b;Goodman 1985). However, in the
early period of the strike, the use of the labour laws was limited and largely
defensive. However, the "legal tempo quickened as the back to work movement became
significant for the first time" (Mcllroy 1985b, p. 118). It was not before October
1984 that court rulings which declared the strike unlawful and/or unofficial
resulted in heavy fines and seizure of assets (see Goodman 1985;Mcllroy 1985b).
Alongside heavy fines and seizure of assets, Scargill personally and the MUM itelf
weie fined tor contempt of court. Following the dispersal of NUM assets, government
called in the receiver. By October 1984, the combination of fines, seizure of assets
and loss of organisational control threatened a financial and organisational collapse of
the NUM.
The miners' strike indicates the extent to which government is prepared to go to
disorganise collective organisation and to impose the discipline of the market through
monetary, legal and coercive means of law and order combat. The reimposition of the
rule of money over the conditions of life made necessary just such an imposition of
law and order command so as to make certain the individualising and fragmenting
imposition of unquestioned compliance with the limits of the market. The political
provocation of the miners comprised the preemptive use of force as a means of
undermining possible resistance to the monetary decomposition of the working class
and its recomposition in terms of the law-abiding individual endowed with the right
not to do certain things. The miners' strike brought to the fore the violence that the
reconstruction of social relations on the basis of the market and of rights demanded.
The contradictions of liberal trinity formula of 'democracy-rights-equality' were
displayed. While the miners campaigned for the right of employment and living
standards, the government's understanding of equality involved the imposition of the
right of individuals to be equal to each other on the market. While the miners
campaigned for the right to be able to work (i.e. secure employment), the
government insisted on the right of the state to impose the right of a quite general
interest: i.e. the right of property, that is, the right of non-coerced exchange on the
market. While the miners sought to preserve their right to strike, the government
sought to enforce the capitalist property, that is, the subordination of social
reproduction to the reproduction of capital, the incarnation of which is the abstract
263
equality of money. The political enforcement of this right involves the state in
imposing 'communal interest'. While the term 'communal interest' implies the
democratic legitimation of state action, the imposition of the communal interest
involved the by-passing of democratic accountability. The contrast between the right
to strike and the right of the state to maintain free, non-coerced equal exchange
entails the imposition of the peaceful, civilised and democratic form of bourgeois
society over the working class. In turn, the imposition of formal equality abnegates
democratic forms through which equality and rights subsist. The use of force is the
regulator between two opposing rights, the power of the working class to strike and
the power of capital to constitute social relations on the basis of equality, democracy
and rights. The interplay between different rights is the class struggle over the
recognition of rights, involving the state in imposing the formal existence of social
relations on the basis of the free and equal individual. The miners' strike involved
the class struggle over the monetarist attempt to decompose the Keynesian
recognition of the political strength of the working class to command the right to
secure employment.
The miners' campaign for jobs and employment was a defence of the Keynesian
relation between public expenditure and wages as well as employment guarantees.
The attempt to destroy the relation between public expenditure and wages involved
pacification costs that were not made available in the form of a selective monetary
expansion, as during the social contract in the 1970's (see the Plan for Coal).
Rather, these pacification costs were made available for the defeat of the political
strength of the working class through policing. The miners' strike forced government
to pay up for the containment of labour on the basis of a tight monetary regime. The
pacification costs were used to finance the imposition of tight monetary control over
the conditions of life through the use of force designed to break up collective forms of
class organisation. The cost of the coercive decomposition of solidarity was seen by
Lawson as a worthwhile investment for the good of the nation even in narrow
financial terms (Goodman 1985, p. 6). The destruction of the Keynesian relation
between public expenditure and wages involved overtly repressive pacification costs
with which to enforce the abstract equality of money in command over the working
class, i.e. with which to enforce the money power of capital as the incarnation of
equality. While the repressive pacification costs militated against government's
attempt to reduce the overall burden of public expenditure, the justification of these
costs (i.e. you have to spend a lot to give people their freedom) acknowledged labour's
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disruptive power, i.e. the ability of the working class to defend the Keynesian
constitution of the wage relation. By this I understand the Keynesian attempt to
transform protest into employment guarantees (see above on government's subsidies
to industry). In the view of the Conservatives, there is a categorical distinction
between being free to do something (i.e. the constitution of the contradictory unity of
surplus value in the form of the free and equal interaction of individuals on the
market, wage labour) and being able to do it (Plant 1988). It is the latter which
comprises the Keynesian attempt to transform protest into demand through the
institutional guarantee of social reform or, in other words, through collective
provision of resources and employment guarantees. The market based decomposition
of class relations involved, fundamentally, the rejection of the Keynesian concept of
'freedom'. The attack on the miners involved an attempt to undermine the Keynesian
constitution of social relations on the basis of a general expectation of rising living
standards. The rejection of the conception of the Keynesian interventionist state
involves the instantiation of economic freedom without the state's meddling in the
unfettered operation of the market forces. The attempt to impose the equal face of
economic freedom involves the state as a force that ensures that the individual
freedom is not limited by coercion whether it is by individuals or trade unions.
Freedom is valuable because it is a necessary condition of autonomy in the sense of
the autonomy of the market, a condition with presupposes the law and order combat
of dissent so as to protect people from coercion as well as to limit the coercive power
of collective resistance in opposition to the destruction of the Keynesian connection
between freedom and the political guarantee of resources. Whereas the stability of
the social contract depended on the mobilisation of control by the organised labour
movement, the 1980's saw a shift in emphasis from compromise between social
partners to individualising forms of unquestioned compliance with the political
power of the state. Instead of employment and income guarantees, however
illusionary they might have been during the 1970's, consensus shifted to
unquestioned acceptance of the reconstitution of social relations on the basis of the
unfettered operation of market forces. The reassertion of political authority through
repression and coercion confirms the change in the meaning of consensus. In the
name of economic freedom and social equality, strict obedience to the form of the
capitalist state involves the reconstitution of the social on the basis of the uncritical
acceptance of the abstract equality of money in command. The uncompromising use of
force which was forged in the ghettos of the cities and the miners manifested the
emergency measures of a paramilitary combat of dissent.
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The systematic extension of policing powers is in evidence also in the progressive
use of ail scientific advances which have "transformed the British police into one of
the most technically sophisticated forces in the world" (Manwaring-White 1983, p.
213). The centralisation and rationalisation of the British police force was initiated
by the review on the 1980's riots. The review had called for the introduction of
measures that all police forces would take to handle future public disorder (Gordon
1985). 'Paramilitary policing in Britain' (ibid.) furthered the tendency to create
something like a third force next to the police and army: a riot force (C.Lloyd 1985;
Fine/Millar 1985) which is accountable to, and whose policing directives generate
from, the Home Office. Behind all these developments, it was business as usual for
the MI5 surveillance "of the peace movement, the unions, and even the national
Council for Civil Liberties - along with the intriguing revelation in The Observer
that BBC employees have for many years been officially, if secretly, vetted to weed
out leftists and that the state broadcasting agency has a cosy working relationship
with both MI5 and the intelligence service" (Whitaker 1987, p. 17). The novelty of
policing in the 1980's lies in the explicit attempt to use it as a means of destroying
the remnants of Keynesian class collaboration and to use law and order combat as a
means of integrating the working class into the rule of the market. The coercive
imposition of unquestioned compliance with the rule of the market and the state
represents a fundamental shift in the role of the state from class collaboration to
class confrontation. Confrontation, preemptive use of force and unquestioned
obedience to the authority of the state involves a tightening up of the hierarchical
composition of order. In contrast to Keynesian class collaboration, the reassertion of
political authority is not based on formalised forms of negotiation and
implementation, but on the choice either to accommodate to the 'dictates' of the
market or to be confronted with a powerful display of force. In contrast to Keynesian
class collaboration, the use of public expenditure was overtly repressive in form.
The use of public expenditure involved the repressive display of state power in
crushing the existing relation between public expenditure and wages, including
employment guarantees.
Centralisation and extension of policing made the police a scapegoat for
non-existing economic and employment policies. The politicising of the police
continued long established trends (see E.P. Thompson 1980;Bunyan 1977) that came
to the fore in the 1980's as an explicit strategy for reimposing political domination
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over the working class. Most aspects of the centralisation and the militarisation of
law and order policing escaped public notice because these decisions were taken
within the inner circle of the Home Office and the Cabinet (Cousin/Fine/Millar
1985). The secrecy surrounding these decisions expresses the fragility of equality
itself, a fragility which was safeguarded through the violation of democratic
procedures. The extension of policing powers was matched with an obsessive use of
national security policies. Emergency precaution measures and secrecy gathered pace
as an all-purpose excuse for crushing opposition, denying political representation
and political accountability and covering up unlawful use of police surveillance, MI5
activities (see Whitaker 1987) and wrongful imprisonment. Alongside Northern
Ireland, the obsession with national security was most clearly expressed during the
miners' strike and in the decision to end trade unionism at Government's
Communication Headquarters in Cheltenham in February 1984.
The extension and deepening of coercive forms of social normalisation is indicated
by the planned increase in law and order spending and by the substantial increase in
police pay, manpower and equipment (Gamble 1988). Additionally, several law and
order Acts were passed through parliament which confirmed or, rather, legalised
belatedly, the heavy use of policing powers during the city riots and the miners'
strike. New law and order Acts gave the police more powers of stop and search,
entry, seizure, arrest and detention, interrogation and identification of subjects (see
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984;hereafter: PCEA 1984). Additionally, the
new powers legalised road blocks which had been systematically used during the
miners' strike (see the PCEA 1984 and the Public Order Act 1986;hereafter: POA
1986). Additionally, the Prosecution of Offences Act of 1985 implemented a national
prosecution service which uniformised and systematised prosecution procedures and
sought to increase consistency of prosecution procedures. Since consistency can only
be achieved by central guidelines, "it is too easy for such guidelines to be used for
secondary purposes", i.e. through specific directives that "the number of small
company fraud cases and cases under the employment and health and safety at work
legislation is too high and small business are being discouraged" (Grenyer 1986, p.
233).
The PCEA 1984 increased policing powers either by extending existing legislation
or by confirming existing practices. "But the Act does add a new element which is
that it makes it easier for the police to carry out practices which were previously
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not enshrined in statute" (Hansen 1986, p. 111). The PCEA 1984 does not codify
police powers entirely (Stone 1986) because the powers to stop and search, to
arrest and gain entry and to seize are based on reasonable grounds of suspicion. This
criterion cannot be properly supervised and ensured (D. Smith 1986;Hansen 1986)
and provides, as such, a loophole for dirty tricks policing. The criterion of
reasonable suspicion serves a role of putting "an acceptable face on practices we
prefer not to look at squarely" (D. Smith 1986, p. 93). Other rules are enshrined in
a code of practice that concerns safeguards against abuse of police power, allegedly
unlawful police conduct etc. Since it is the police itself which deals with such
investigations, the safeguards amount to a public relations exercise (Cox 1986;
Hansen 1986;D.Smith 1986). Safeguards concerning the extension of powers to
arrest (Stone 1986) and roadblocks (Hansen 1986) are non-existent. The POA
1986 gave statutory rights for crowd control and policing of demonstrations. These
statutory rights might well "impose conditions, not only to prevent 'serious public
disorder' but also 'serious disruption to the life of the community'" (Robilliard/
McEwan 1986, p. 259). The POA 1986 gave statutory legitimation to the aggressive
breaking up of picket lines and occupation of miners' villages, as the police put into
practice its riot training with their "helmets, shields, batons and cavalry, along
with their military formations, snatch squads and organised violence" (Fine/Millar
1985, p. 13) as well as the use of their plain clothes agent provocateurs (Geary
1985). The POA 1986 allows restrictive policing practices if the police holds a
reasonable belief, or if the police is given to understand that it has such a reasonable
belief, that the purpose of the demonstration is "'the intimidation of others with a
view to compelling them not to do any act they have a right to do, or to do an act they
have the right not to do'" (Public Order Bill, clause 13 (1) (3), as quoted in
Robilliard/McEwan 1986, p. 259). The wide discretion in the "interpretation of
laws of obstruction, threatening behaviour and breach of peace" and the display of
"great ingenuity in excavating old laws on watching and besetting riot" by the police
during the miners' strike (Fine/Millar 1985, p. 13) was formalised, codified and
legitimatised in the 1984 and 1986 Acts (Whitaker 1987).
The use of force was legitimated as a safeguard for the equal, free and democratic
decision taking processes of individuals. The attempt to safeguard the right of
property through the use of force involved the decomposition of the relation between
public spending and wages in favour of the imposition of the market forces,
permitting a recomposition of class in terms of citizen and property owner whose
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interest is safeguarded by law and order policing. As policing protects the law abiding
citizen, the systematic use of force towards enemies within not only stigmatised
particular areas of social life as violent. More fundamentally, the use of force
involved the coercive pacification of the social to the laws of equality, that is the
economic freedom to respond to the impulses given by money. This coercive
imposition of the face of equality entails the disorganisation and fragmentation of the
working class in and through the polarising impact of a boom sustained by credit.
Law and order emergency measures reinforced the division within the working class
as, in the face of mass unemployment, the boom vindicated the generosity of the
unfettered rule of market forces. Hownver, the preemptive use of force against the
enemy within involves not just those on the bottom of the wage hierarchy, although
heavy policing was mainly confined to these sections. Especially in the face of
popular capitalism's republic of debt, the extension of emergency precaution
measures signposts the uncertainty of the reconstitution of social reproduction on
the basis of debt. The extension of coercive means of law and order control entails the
impersonal disciplining of the working class, a control that, by implication, defines
social activity as possibly subversive arid criminal. The use of force, while
contributing to the fragmentation of the working class, treats every citizen as equal,
i.e. as equality in regards of the working class whose collective power exists as a
possible obstruction to debt and its enforcement.
-New Realism
The organised left in Britain saw the defeat of the miners in 1985 as reaffirming
the need to change the face of trade unionism so as to restore populist appeal and
electoral success (Lloyd 1986;Carter 1986;Hobsbawm 1989;Communist Party
1988;for critique Pelaez/Holloway 1990;Gunn 1988). New Realism involves,
fundamentally, the reformulation of the 'realism' of the 1970's. Instead of 'realist'
incorporation subaltern to national interest, new realism articulated the 'realist'
compliance with the power of the state. Defiance and the use of industrial muscle is
stigmatised as 'militant unionism' (cf. Lloyd 1986) which plays into the hands of the
Thatcher government and undermines the socialist alternative presented by Labour.
New realism accepts trade union organisation on the basis of workplace organisation.
Instead of opposing and defying government, as suggested by the TUC's Wembley
agreement, new realism accepts the reconstruction of the market as a means of
sustaining unfettered economic growth which a future Labour government would use
to redistribute wealth in a just and fair way. New realist thinking is part of the
imposition of new realism itself, as the organised left seeks to accommodate itself to,
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and urges the acceptance of, the monetarist "articulation of the limits of state
intervention" (Clarke 1987, p. 393). Heavy defeats in the early 1980's inflicted on
the trade union movement a "degree of defeatism and demoralization reminiscent of
the inter-war depression". The seeming "erosion of the will to struggle has been
effectively exploited by many employers ... in appealing over the heads of the
workplace union representatives to the employees as individuals. Fatalism in the face
of the employers' offensive is doubtless reinforced by the limited success - or in the
case of such groups as the steelworkers, the unqualified defeat - of those trade unions
who have proved willing to fight" (Hyman 1985b, p. 116). New Realism is the
result of defeat and an attempt to reconstruct forces by accepting the political
contours of the dictates of the market.
The accommodation of the trade unions is, in its extreme version, most strongly
connected with the EEPTU and the AUEW (see Bassett 1986;Longstreth 1988;
Kastendiek 1988). New realist thinking urges the need to change trade union politics
and to shift emphasis from representation to recruitment, a development that
reinforced inter-union rivalry, displacing the conflict between capital and labour to
one between unions (21). New realism can be described as "an explicit rejection of
class-based industrial enmity in favour of mutually beneficial co-operation,
pragmatically embracing social and technological change, resting (its) market based
vanguardism on the aggregated assent of the individual" (Bassett 1986, p. 1-2). New
realism contains three interrelated interests: to secure a safe working place for its
members, to secure as far as possible 'conflict-free' industrial relations and to
secure the interest of its own organisation (Kastendiek 1988). These aims are bound
up with lots of different principles: single union companies; non-strike agreements;
consent to flexible working; pendulum arbitration instead of strikes; removal of
status hierarchies; participation rights etc... .
Despite the apparently small number of new realist arrangements (see Bassett
1986), it is of considerable importance regarding the restructuring of the state and
the recomposition of production. Intensified competition between unions over
membership strengthened the employers' power to impose new working practices
and to choose which union to recognise. Recent examples concern Nissan in
Sunderland and the NCB. When the NCB announced that it would consider negotiating
with unions other than the NUM regarding the proposed superpit in South Wales, the
leadership of the TGWU and the EEPTU, as well as the UDM, were reported as offering
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to organise the plant's miners and to accept, contrary to the NUM, the working
conditions proposed by the NCB (see Financial Times, 24.6. 1987). The shift from
representation to recruitment indicates the pressure unions found themselves under
during the 1980's and the way in which they sought to accomodate.
New realism did not change government's approach to the trade unions. While new
realism is "in a sense, ... what the Conservative Government had been pushing for"
(Bassett 1986, p. 5), the government ridiculed conciliatory attitudes by banning
trade unions from its spy centre at Cheltenham (ibid;Coates/Topham 1986) and by
maintaining an intransigent policy towards the TUO, which campaigned for
recognition by government. Attempts by the TUC to soften government's outlawing of
trade unionism at its spy centre not only failed, but government responded the more
hostilely the more the TUC softened its attitude. "It was Mrs. Thatcher's insistence,
which seemed to grow firmer as the unions offered more and promised more, that the
union ban would stand" (Bassett 1986, p. 10). Len Murray, the then TUC General
Secretary, was forced to comment that "we have been trying hard to find out, albeit
in limited area, whether we can build with the government some relationship of
trust and confidence. All that has now been called into question" (as quoted in Bassett
1986, p. 60-1). As during the Heath government, the trade union movement and
Labour closed ranks.
The half hearted call to defy the labour laws was soon abandoned and trade unions
were urged to obey the law of the state (Hyman 1987;Mcllroy 1988). The TUC urged
that industrial power should not be used to challenge an elected government and that
it was the business of the TUC "to bargain as best it could with the government of the
day" (Hyman 1987, p. 99). The 'realist' option was not to defy the law but to change
it. Such a policy, however, required the election of a Labour government. The
reactivated Liaison Committee took steps to formulate proposals for a new formula.
As in the 1970's, the labour legislation was to be repealed and replaced by positive
legislation including the right to strike and to picket, the right to information,
consultation and representation in the decision-making process of management. "On
trade union ballots the statement insisted that unions as voluntary bodies should be
free to determine their own methods of internal democracy, and that the 1984 Act
should therefore be repealed; but added that 'the movement must convince the
electorate of the reason'" (ibid., p. 101-2). In the event, the organised left accepted
the recomposition of class on the basis of the market individual endowed with
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democratic rights.
The policy documents of the Liaison Committee (see TUC-Labour 1985,1986)
articulated the new vision of socialist reconstruction of political domination:
democratisation of trade unions and individual rights. In order to repeal the harsh
enterprise culture in Thatcher's Britain in favour of a society characterised by
fairness and partnership, mobilisation of dissent had to be abandoned so as to make
Labour's populist image succeed. Kinnock's moderate image articulated the contours
of monetarism by making it clear that the individual rights addressed by the labour
laws would be retained and that economic policy would be socialist but market based
(market sociaiism)(22). Market socialism requires 'people' who can exercise their
own initiative in awareness of their interconnection with others (Plant 1988).
Market socialism reiterates the subordination of political discipline to the market,
while the state supervises the 'distributive justice' (Carling 1986) of the market
forces. The concept of market socialism accepts that wages must remain the basic
means for income distribution with benefits, as a substitute for wages for the
unemployed or unemployable, as the central feature of any scheme for state support.
The "market needs a framework of civic responsibility", a framework that is
required so as to "adjust to distributive justice" (Plant 1988, p. 19). The concept of
market socialism rejects the Keynesian conception of the interventionist state since
the latter entails the coercion of economic freedom through centralised economic
planning. The concept of market socialism rejects also a policy based on appealing to
interest groups (e.g. trade unions) as it cannot hope to reconcile the differing aims of
interest groups without some overarching conception by which to judge competitive
aims. The concept of market socialism comprises a social organisation on the basis of
citizenship, i.e. the abdication of political responsibility for resources in favour of
the individual awareness of injustice. The upshot is a populist appeal to the effect
that the community should look after itself, a neighbourhood protection scheme on
the basis of the market and a state supervising the market's fair distribution of
resources.
However, new realist expectation did not^ adjust smoothly. The TUC leadership
urged delegates at its 1983 Congress to accommodate to the economic, political and
technological changes and challenges. The attempt to search for possible ways to
cooperate with government was supported by a large majority at congress. However,
the debate was openly hostile. The special TUC Conference in April 1986 revealed
sharp divisions within the trade union movement over the TUC proposal for positive
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legislation. The TUC proposal contended that the law "is in industrial relations and
cannot now be excluded - if it ever could" (Hyman 1987, p.103). Divisions
occurred between those unions that enthusiastically welcomed the proposals, those
which accepted the unavoidability of reform and those that reiterated traditional
insistence on free collective bargaining (23). The conclusion reached was that the
law could not be excluded from industrial relations, but that it could be given a
positive role protecting the rights of trade unions and their members (see
TUC-Labour 1986).
The section opposing state interference reiterated "the line of differentiation and
division within Hie working class: by industry, occupation, employer, by age, sex,
race, education, training. At times a potent method of defence and advance for the
relatively strong and secure all to often it has been ineffectual and irrelevant for the
weak, vulnerable or marginal" (Hyman 1987, p. 108-9). This position reinforces
the fragmentation of the working class. The section of the trade union movement
calling for positive legislation aimed at a new consensus between the state, trade
unions and employers, rejecting a class based conception of industrial relations in
favour of a market based approach. Both positions avoid "considering the connection
between the law and working class self-activity: in which circumstances they are
antagonistic, and in which circumstances complementary" (Hyman 1987, p. 109).
Both positions involve a specific organisation of interest which excludes wider
sections of the working class from trade union organisation. Both positions reject
class in favour of sectional interest. This sectionalism was of considerable
importance for the recomposition of the welfare state, in particular with regard to
the integration of social with employment policies.
The TUC found it difficult to resist government's training initiatives since it had
been the TUC itself in the 1970's that had urged the then Labour government to take
positive action against youth unemployment. This pressure materialised in the Youth
Opportunity Programme that was introduced in 1978 (Gray 1988). While the TUC
was initially outspoken in its criticism of the Conservatives' training initiatives,
the proposal to boycott the iob Training Scheme, which was seen as endorsing 'work
for benefit', was rejected. The TUC argued that the trade unions "were better able to
defend the interest of the workers and the unemployed by being involved in it" (Finn
1987, p. 4). A boycott of JTS would have undoubtedly resulted in political pressure
to exclude the TUC from participation in the MSC. The labour movement rejected
government's training schemes as creating cheap labour, effectively increasing
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unemployment due to the high rate of job substitution (see Finn 1987,b) and as
undermining collective bargaining for the young unemployed. Surprising, however,
was the remarkable degree of support for the Youth Training Scheme from Labour
and the TUC when it was launched in September 1983 (A. Brown 1988). Over the
YTS, the TUC was outmanoeuvred as government integrated the TUC's criticism of
YOP into YTS (Gray 1988;A. Brown 1988). In 1988, responding to strong criticism
on JTS by the TUC and individual unions, government reduced the role of trade unions
within the MSC "by bypassing the procedures for approval of individual JTS schemes
by local Area Manpower Boards" (Gray 1988, p. 127). This development made the
TUC's resistance to collapse, accepting the government's assurance that the new
unified training scheme would be voluntary. The TUC's response to MSC schemes has
been characterised by a weak and reactive political strategy. The resistance of the
TUC to training schemes concentrates on the exclusion of some workers from
collective bargaining and government's restrictive income policies. Resistance by
individual unions fell back on a policy of non-cooperation (Finn 1987). While this
resistance made it difficult to find placements for trainees, the bulk of training
opportunities materialised in non-unionised, smaller enterprise. In the event, the
policy of non-cooperation in industries where trade union resistance was strong
(e.g. printing and engineering: Gray 1988), reinforced the division within the
working class as the unemployed were, increasingly, pushed into peripheral areas of
work. In general, the trade union response was to cooperate with the government of
the day and to search for institutional solutions a future Labour government would
implement. These solutions included demands for a 'minimum wage' (see TUC-Labour
1986 and the debate between Gray 1988 and Alcock 1989). To the extent that
minimum wages come to function as maximum wages for low paid and the
unemployed, the demand for minimum wages entails the legitimation ot poverty
wages (Hyman 1987). As the concept of 'market socialism' entails the unfettered
distributive justice of the market combined with awareness of people's
interrelation, the TUC recommended that negotiators should start at £98 a week, a
figure below which low pay is defined (Coates/Topham 1986). This definition is
lower than that proposed by the Council of Europe (see Esam et.al. 1985).
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IV Decomposition of Class and Welfare State Policies
Demands for guaranteed minimum income responded to the individualising and
fragmenting imposition of the abstract equality of money in command through the
destruction of the relation between public expenditure and wages. In the face of
monetary expansionism, the Thatcher government used public expenditure as a
means of encouraging low pay and imposing the discipline of the market. In the face of
the desanctioning of working class demands for e.g. full employment and welfare
rights and the removal of sanctions, immunities and legal safeguards of trade unions,
the crucial social organisation to voice these demands, the discriminating and
repressive use of public expenditure involved a growing polarisation between
different sections of the working class as between the beneficiaries of
credit-sustained accumulation and those who were its victims.
The offensive against the working class entailed, fundamentally, the attempt to
decompose its strength to command a living standard that rested on the Keynesian
connection between public expenditure and wages. The monetarist attack on this
connection involved the reconstitution of social relations on the basis of the market,
permitting a segmentation of the working class in and through a disparate labour
market power as between different workers. An important aspect of this policy is the
growing integration of employment policies with social policies. While the welfare
state continued to be recomposed in terms of repression and efficiency, public
spending cuts and bureaucratic forms of control comprised aspects of supply side
economics that involved the creation of an increasingly politically supervised, cheap
and casual labour force. Although the government would have nothing to do with
incomes policies, the reassertion of political domination entailed the repressive
encouragement of low pay, i.e. the repressive instantiation of the economic freedom
to accept any kind of job at any wage. However, expectations did not adjust smoothly.
Between 1979 and June 1983, unemployment increased to 2.9 million (10.2%)
and peaked at 3.1 million (11.5%), and remained stagnant thereafter (Maclnnes
1987, pp. 70). Since 1979, youth unemployment (under 25s) increased from
524,000 to 1.3 million in 1985. Almost half of the registered unemployed (40%)
are younger than 25 (Durr 1989, p. 162). Unemployment is gender and race
divided (ibid.;Cockburn 1987;Miles/Phizeacklea 1984). As the method of counting
the 'unemployment' has changed 25 times during the 1980's (see The Observer
14.5.1989), some commentators suggest a real figure of unemployment between 4
and 5 million (Coates/Topham 1986, p. 5;Bassett 1986, p. 14).—'The credit-
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sustained boom did not absorb those made redundant during the depression,
permitting an exclusion of parts of the working class from the benefits generated by
the boom. Some commentators (see Agnoli 1986;Hirsch/Roth 1986;Negri 1987b)
suggest the impossiblity of reverting to full-employment growth and hence a
permanent peripheralisation and marginalisation of parts of the working class
within metropolitan countries.
Considering the selective registration of the unemployed, the government's claim
in its second term in office, of a rise in employment by about 570,000 jobs between
1983 and 1986 (Maclnnes 1987, p. 70) needs to be treated with caution. "About
144,000 were accounted for by an increase in the number of those who held second
jobs (for example a clerical worker working in a bar at weekends) and were thereby
counted twice. Gregory (1987) has calculated that 237,000 of the increase
represented people on special government programmes for the unemployed, ..., who
had contracts of employment and were therefore counted . inthe Census of
Employment" (Maclnnes 1987, p. 71). At the same time, 1.4 million jobs were lost
in manufacturing between 1980 and 1985. From 5.2 million full-time, mostly
male, jobs in 1975, employment dropped to 3.8 million in 1985 (Bassett 1986, p.
16)."The fall in the numbers employed has been almost entirely among men. Male
employment in 1980 stood at just over 13 million, or nearly 60 per cent of the
total. By 1985, this figure had fallen to just over 11.5 million, a decrease of almost
1.5. million jobs - more than 11 per cent" (ibid.). The increase in employment is
largely due to an increase in part-time female employment. Since "mid-1983, male
employment has continued to fall (by 164,000, to mid-1985) while female
employment has risen (by 413,000)" (ibid.). This recomposition in the structure
of employment is largely caused by the expansion of the service sector: "Between
1979 and 1986, 62 per cent of the rise in women's service jobs was in part time
work" (A. Polled 1988, p. 52). In manufacturing, the gender divide bends in the
opposite direction as female part-time work dropped by 40% between 1979 and
1986 (ibid., p. 53). In aggregate terms, the proportion of the total work-force who
worked part-time increased thus only by 14-16% between 1980 and 1984 (ibid.),
the highest proportion of which occurred in service industry. Bassett (1986, p. 16)
sees the rise in part-time work as accounting for 95% of the increase in
employment. The government's claim of an increase of 570,000 jobs indicates not
only a relatively minor recovery on the labour market, but an actual decline in
full-time employment between 1983 and 1986. The recovery of 1983 did not
absorb the jobs shed during the previous decade. Upon the recomposition of class
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relations in the form of property ownership, the recomposition of employment
structures reinforced the division within the working class. In the face of the
decreasing number of full-time employees relative to the previous cycle of
accumulation, marginalised work increased. In the context of a life of poor
employment, these sections of the working class saw guarantees for wage protection
removed, and were subjected to changes in taxation and social security that
intensified tax and poverty traps. The increase in low waged labour affected largely
women and the young unemployed.
-Deregulation of Wage Council Protection
In its attempt to instantiate the non-coerced freedom of equal exchange on the
market, the government abolished the Fair Wage Resolution, which dated back to
1891. This resolution "required employers completing work for Government to pay
their employees the collective bargained wages" and to provide "conditions of
employment prevailing for that industry" (A. Brown 1988, p. 22). The rescindment
came into force in September 1983, the same month that the government issued its
final directive on competitive tendering in the NHS. In the face of deregulation of
public services, this step made it possible for government departments, and local
authorities, to subcontract low paid and casual labour. In the face of the deregulation
of public services, the abolition of the Fair Wage Resolution involves a direct attack
on the trade unions as it undermines collective bargaining procedures, attacks
so-called restrictive trade union practices, and enforces wage pressure on public
employees. Alongside the casualisation of labour power, work conditions deteriorated
in some areas of public employment, while wages were squeezed and work intensified
(Esam et.al. 1985;Ascher 1987). At the same time, this removal of wage protection
was designed not only to increase competition and enhance the operation of the 'free
market' on the basis of a competitive price for labour power. It also increased
competition between subcontractors. The Resolution had simplified the evaluation of
tender and had acted "as an insulating device, proctecting contractors from entry by
'low-cost' firms" (Ascher 1987, p. 108). The Resolution had made it easier for
contractors to deal with trade unions and had shielded the industry from 'cowboy'
operators. The deregulation of wage protection impinged on contractors through
intensified competition, requiring them to force down wages as a means of staying in
business. The government repealed also schedule 11 of the Employment Protection
Act of 1975 "which allowed a union to make a claim at ACAS against employers who
did not observe agreed terms and conditions of employment required for the trade or
industry" (A. Brown 1988, p. 23;see also Esam et.al. 1985). This deregulation
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effectively removed wage protection for employees in non-unionised industry and
sanctioned deteriorating health and safety standards. Lastly, the Wage Act 1986
confines wage councils to setting a single minimum hourly rate of pay for adults
protected by it. The Act excludes workers under the age of 21 from wage council
orders (A. Brown 1988). This legislative decomposition of the working class
through age differentials is of particular importance in the government's
'work-for-benefit' schemes (cf. Finn 1987). The young workers on government's
training schemes are excluded from wage council orders and, as such, stripped of
protective rights. Additionally, the government encouraged low pay and moonshining
through its fiscal and social security reforms wh-ich increased tax and poverty traps
for a large number of workers (see Esam et.al. 1985). The attempt to force people
into a life of low wages and long periods of poor employment manifests a legal and
monetary decomposition of class relations through the recomposition of wage
hierarchies between those the boom did and did not pass by and among the low waged
and the wageless themselves.
In the face of a boom sustained by credit, persistent levels of mass unemployment
and a policy of state austerity implied a recomposition of class relations which
reinforced the hierarchical social order in the factory (as between different skills
and wages). This hierarchical social order was reinforced in a different form as
between those in regular employment and those capital found it difficult to regard as
a variable component of exploitation. Rather than undermining the division of the
working class within regular employment, this recomposition presupposes and has
as its result this division itself. However, the division of the working class no longer
pertained merely within production but extended beyond the social control entailed in
industrial relations. The much higher expulsion of labour than the credit-sustained
recovery of accumulation absorbed led to what some commentators see as a creation
of an underclass (see authors as diverse as Dahrendorf 1987;Leadbeater/Lloyd
1987;Jessop et.al. 1988;Negri 1987b). The recomposition of the division within
the working class involves the real possibility of the creation of a surplus population
that is largely disenfranchised form surplus value production because of its distance
from the control of the labour process; this seems to be the case with, particularly,
the long-term and the young unemployed. The control of these workers shifted from
the system of industrial relations and personnel management to the state as
institutionalised, for example, in the MSG.
The weakening of wage councils discriminates against those at the bottom of the
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wage hierarchy. The weakening of institutional guarantees of wage protection asserts
the rejection of the concept of the interventionist state in favour of the subordination
of political criteria to the limits of the market (24). The monetarist attempt to
reimpose the limits of the market is made explicit in the abolition of wage protection
as it imposes upon the 'disadvantaged' the repressive regime of natural
unemployment. The selective and discriminatory weakening of institutional forms of
wage protection comprises one aspect of the displacement of Keynesian guarantees of
full-employment growth and income in favour of the reimposition of the power of the
money: "poverty is not unfreedom" (K. Joseph/Sumption, Equality, as cited in Plant
1988, p. 4). Poverty is a condition of equality, i.e. the freedom to respond to the
development of market forces without the state's coercing their unfettered operation.
Fundamentally, the attempt to contain the disruptive and productive power of labour
on the basis of credit expansion in a tight monetary framework involved the
recomposition of the working class through a divisive redistribution of the benefits
generated by the boom. The recomposition of the working class on the basis of the
categories of citizen and property owner involved not only the intensification of
work, the imposition of new working practices, the encouragement of private
property through privatisation, the undermining of trade union power through legal
intervention and penal law and the geographically uneven recomposition of
production. The integration of labour into the wage relation involved also the divisive
reinforcement of wage differentials. While the trade unions were denied broader
political involvement and were legally restricted to representing predominately
those in full-time employment, those workers pushed to the margin of the labour
market were ever more subjected to the repressive reassertion of capitalist state
power that legitimised poverty as a condition of freedom. By repealing wage council
wage protection, government made clear that poverty needs to be seen as an
opportunity which encourages enterprise. The orientation of state provisions to
market criteria has "driven unknown numbers of workers into the underground
economy, claiming dole at the same time at which they are working" (Gray 1988, p.
• 122). Referring to data of the Inland Revenue, Leadbeater/Lloyd (1987) suggest
that the hidden economy accounts for 6 to 8% of GNP in Britain. According to figures
released by the Low Pay Unit, which defines low pay as a gross weekly wage before
tax and other reductions at £107, and low paid part-time work by a rate of £2.75
per hour, "there are currently 8.3 million low paid workers in Britain" (Esam
et.al. 1985, p. 46). Wage differentials between workers increased markedly because
of the strength of workplace collective bargaining, shortage of skilled labour and new
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management approaches to industrial relations (work with pride). The "unemployed
do little to stem the pay pressure that is coming from the well-paid, skilled workers
who have secure jobs with successful firms" (Leadbeater/Lloyd 1987, p. 53;see
also Maclnnes 1987;Gamble 1988; Spence 1985). When inflation fell to its lowest
between 1983 to 1987 (about 3%), real earnings for the stronger sections of the
working class were the highest ever on average (Maclnnes 1987;Esam et.al. 1985;
Gamble 1988). Although affected by rigorous cash limits, public sector wages
remained on average above those in the private sector (see Maclnnes 1987). During
the 1980's, government's attack on the relation between public expenditure and
wages did not, despite mass unemployment, result in a reduction of the overall level
of wages. Average wages increased during the 1980's, while the income for those at
the bottom of the wage hierarchy decreased substantially.
The pressure on wages manifested itself unevenly. Wages decreased in real terms
only when unemployment was rising in the early 1980's, while wages increased on
average after 1983 (Maclnnes 1987, p. 82). However, beneath the surface of an
average increase in real wages, wage differentials increased dramatically between
1979 and 1986. These differentials obtained between skilled workers who achieved
wage increases and semi- and unskilled workers faced with wage reduction (see the
data supplied by Maclnnes 1987, p. 82). The redistribution of wealth in favour of
the rich, popularised as a means of providing incentives for productive investment,
increased earnings of the top 10% by one-fifth in real terms, while the bottom 10%
faced virtually no increase (Maclnnes 1987, p. 82). The redistribution of wealth
favoured the top-earners at the expense of the lower margins of the wage scale
(Krieger 1987;Maclnnes 1987;Esam et.al. 1985). While the regular work-force
experienced, although unevenly but nevertheless on average, rising wages, the
'irregular work-force' (cf. Esser/Fach 1981) faced real reductions in income. "By
1986 the Low Pay Unity claimed that government figures showed that 10.5 million
people in Britain had incomes at supplementary benefit levels or less: over
two-thirds more than in 1979" (Maclnnes 1987, p. 84). By 1986, due to changes
in welfare regulation, the unemployed received £2.8 billion less in benefits than
they would have been entitled to in 1979 (Maclnnes 1987, p. 51). Government's
training schemes created a working population earning just above the scale of social
security entitlement (Benn/Fairley 1986). As changes in taxation and social
security increased the severity of poverty and tax traps, marginalised sections of the
working class were increasingly forced into the underground economy (e.g.
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homework; see Mitter 1986). Especially for Asian minority immigrant workers,
and here in particular women, underground labour is a necessity to avoid attention of
officialdom. "The very insecurity of these women in British society makes them
particularly attractive to employers, as they are able to pay workers very low
wages, often as low as ten pence per hour" (Mitter 1986, p. 41, in reference to
House of Common Select Committee on Employment, Homeworking). In spite of rising
low paid labour, real wages increased in the UK between 1979 and 1988 on average
by 28%, an increase that more than outstripped real wage increases in countries
that are the UK's main competitors on the world market (see Financial Times 14.10.
1989). This development implies, as indeed the Financial Times suggests, that
'Thatcherism' did not crush the trade unions. "As the dust settles after the initial
experience of Thatcherism, what is perhaps most striking is the persistence rather
than the eclipe of established industrial relations institutions" (Hyman 1989c, p.
192). Taking the development in wages and wage differentials as indicators of trade
union bargaining power, trade union representation of its constituents in the
working class seems to have reinforced the division within the working class as its
bargaining power is largely restricted to the integrated working class, particularly
the skilled sections of it.
This development is surprising as one should expect that management, given
conditions of mass unemployment, deregulation of wage protection and the legal
decomposition of the trade unions' might to strike, would increase the turn-over of
labour power so as to undermine the downward rigidity of wages and to reassert the
right to manage. However, empirical evidence suggests a hardening relation between
employed and unemployed (see A. Polled 1988). It appears also that those within
employment perceive their jobs as relatively secure in terms of job replacement.
"They are not threatened by the existence of a 'reserve army of labour': there is
instead a growing gulf between the profiles of the 'typical employed' and 'typical
unemployed' person, because the 'typical employed' person has a work-record, and
an accumulation of skills and experience, which an unemployed rival is unlikely to
match" (Spence 1985, p. 129)(25). The willingness of employers to concede wage
rises in face of possible strike action needs to be seen in the context of the
competitive advantage of 'good working-relations' with trade unions and/or with the
labour force.
'Macho management' as exercised by Edwardes at BL, MacGregor in Steel and Coal
and Murdoch in Fleet Street is, as yet, not typical in industrial relations at large. A
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devoted labour force provided a competitive advantage. Management sought to harness
the competitive advantage of 'good' working relations with trade unions, leaving
collective bargaining over wages largely intact (Maclnnes 1989;Batstone 1988).
However, Maclnnes's and Batstone's arguments need to be treated with caution (see
Fairbrother 1989;Pelciez/Holloway 1990;A. Pollert 1989) as they base their
argument on the institutional form of the wage contract thus ignoring the social
conflict that underpins such contracts. This criticism concerns also Crouch (1989),
who, in contrast to Maclnnes and Batstone, sees, despite some tendencies in the
opposite direction, an overall decline in trade unionism and in collective bargaining
during the 1980's. The weakness or sustained strength of trade unionism cannot be
discussed just in terms of membership development, collective bargaining
procedures and such like, abstracting from the social conflict which underpins these
developments. The productive and disruptive power of labour is expressed in the
sustaining of accumulation by credit; companies have not only to withstand
competitive pressure on the rate of profit but also to realise a rate of profit which is
high enough for servicing interest and for providing credit-worthiness. Further, the
productive and disruptive power of labour is expressed in the form of constant
capital whose productive consumption increases output levels; whose efficient use
demands a devoted work-force and whose operation commands particular skills.
'Good' working relations with trade unions, whether they operate defensively or
offensively, are vital as long as trade unions secure relatively stable industrial
relations by accommodating conflicting pressure arising from management's
objectives and shop-floor pressure - a task which is at times impossible. For
employers the ambivalent role of trade unions as representing the interests of their
members within a certain pattern of negotiation of order, needs to be channelled into
a moderating influence over the work-force. If trade unions want to secure their
existence as legitimate organisation vis-a-vis employers and membership, their
objective cannot be to jeopardise future relations with management but rather to try
to accommodate to management's objectives as much as is feasible (see Hyman
1989a;Watson 1988) (26). For capital, a frontal attack on trade unions would
undermine the advantage of collective control and would put into disrepute the
hoped-for control through consensus. The sustained strength of trade unionism,
although its industrial and political organisation of discontent was largely in retreat
in the mid 1980's (on the development of strikes during the 1980's: Kastendiek
1988), gives expression to the productive and disruptive power of labour.
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Management's attempt to command labour for exploitation through policies of
consensus was at odds with the micro-economic view of desirability articulated by
the Conservative government (i.e. macho management). The reason for management
not to use the powers of the labour laws to contain labour is based on the attempt to
harness labour's potential to work with motivation and devotion. "Sacking an
experienced workforce because cheaper labour from the dole is potentially available
is simply not an option" (Maclnnes 1987, p. 126). Further, when faced with the
possibility of prolonged strike action, management opted to pay up, seeking to
transform protest into wage concessions so as to retain motivation of their labour
forces. The increase in wage differentials suggests that the "dualism of the labour
market is increasing. This helps to explain why unemployment has not checked wages
growth, because it suggests that 'internal labour markets' have become relatively
more important for employers, and a major way of retaining the cooperation and
motivation of their labour force is high earnings" (Maclnnes 1987, p. 126). Lastly,
job control and other manifestations of shopfloor worker activity is not necessarily
opposed to managerial objectives as it involves an important element of
"self-discipline and collaboration with mangement" (Hyman/Elger 1981, p. 144).
Workers control may "come to constitute for management a less costly means of
securing the attainment of managerial goals than a strategy which seeks to undermine
'workers control' and replace it with managerial control", such as macho
management (Terry 1986b, p. 170). This is the basis for the claim of the Financial
Times (cited above) that Thatcherism has not crushed the trade unions.
Management's willingness to co-operate with trade unions, albeit in an environment
controlled and dictated by employers, contradicted government's attempt to reduce
inflationary wage pressure and to destroy the relation between wages and public
expenditure. At the same time, the boom entrusted real benefits and values to a
particular section of the working class, permitting a decomposition of class relations
on the basis of the 'generosity of the market'. The government contributed to the
decomposition of class relations by encouraging property ownership through council
house sales and the privatisation of nationalised industry. In turn, the revenue of
privatisation made it possible for the Thatcher government to finance public
expenditure without thereby provoking pressure on the pound through PBSR
problems. At the same time, the increase in public spending made it possible to
finance the repressive domestication costs which the imposition of rule of money
demanded. The past decade has seen a sustained offensive against the working class.
However, this offensive, rather than consisting in a frontal attack on the working
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class, involved, fundamentally, the reinforcement of the division within the working
class within a tight monetary framework.
The average wage rises intensified the attempt to control public spending by
tightening the financial position of local authorities and by invoking effective
managerial practices in the running of the welfare state so as to orientate provision
in proximity to market criteria, allowing the state to abdicate collective
responsibility for welfare. Tighter financial control over local authorities and the
institutions of the welfare state affected, in particular, those workers who were
pushed to the margins of the labour market. Further, average wage rises intensified
the attack on earnings as wages were seen as too high, causing inflation to deviate
from the zero option and undermining the international competitiveness of the
British national economy. With unit labour costs rising in Britain much faster than
in other countries (see Financial Times, 14.10. 1989), those at the bottom of the
wage hierarchy, whose skills were no longer needed, whose income was already
severely restrained and whose employment conditions were deteriorating
dramatically, were subjected to further wage pressure. The attempt to push down
wages has been at the expense of the low paid, the unemployed and the disorganised
(27). All this contributed to the polarisation of class, undermining the collective
identity of labour as the antithesis to money in command. While institutions
protecting low pay were progressively eroded, social and fiscal reforms and the
tripartite body of the MSC came to be used as a means of imposing work. The
government's attempt to use state budgeting as a means of imposing work entailed the
political enforcement of money as exchange commanded and organised for
exploitation. The subordination of social reproduction to the reproduction of capital
is organised by money, whose power is institutionalised in the law and enforced by
the state.
-Social labour power and the MSC
The Thatcher government, far from attacking, for fear of public revolt, the basic
institutions of the welfare state, sought to use the welfare state as an institution of
law and order command that imposed work under the penalty of benefit withdrawal.
Government legitimates its training schemes as providing employment opportunities
for the young unemployed. Government's opponents criticise training schemes as
imposing cheap, non-unionised, casual labour which is excluded from collective
bargaining. This claim is reinforced by the employer-led approach to training as
employers gained the prerogative over location, content, format of, and access to,
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training. While accepting this critique of training schemes, it is, nevertheless, short
sighted. Government's training schemes imposed not only control through
individualising forms of bureaucratic control on the basis of a repressive use of
public expenditure but, more fundamentally, a form of social control that involved
the political marketing of labour power. This political marketing entails the
disorganisation of the working class in and through forms of 'social engineering' in
regards to those whose labour power no longer presents a commodity for capital, i.e.
the variable component of capitalist command for exploitation. The political
marketing of labour power involves an attack on the homogeneity of social labour
through the systematisation of the working class into different sections and through
the political promotion of the imposition of necessary labour. The containment of
labour through 'training' militated against a policy of tight money. However, money
made available for 'training' did not involve a recommitment to the Keynesian
relation between public expenditure and wages but, rather, the imposition of
political control through forced labour.
During the 1980's, entry into employment for the young school-leavers was
increasingly controlled by the MSG. Upon the young unemployed government sought
to impose work and low wages through its Youth Work Scheme (later replaced by the
New Work Scheme (28)), which offered employers subsidies of £15 a week for
newly employed sixteen or seventeen year olds, if the wage was less then £50 for a
forty hours week. This allowed income to be less in some cases than the legal
minimum rate set by wage councils, from the orders of which those under 21s were
excluded. Moreover, low pay was imposed through the government's training
schemes. YTS pays £26.25 on top of benefits, while government threatened to
withdraw benefits from those refusing to take up training placements. In April
1986, about 350,000 young workers were enlisted in YTS. The Jobstart scheme,
introduced in 1986, offered £20 a week to unemployed persons who accepted a job
paying less than £80 a week (Gray 1988, p. 125). This programme has been phased
out because of trainees' resistance. The Jobstart scheme attracted only few takers
(ibid.). The introduction of JTS in 1986 tightened the screw further as JTS involved
working for supplementary benefit at private companies undercutting wages and
work conditions (see Finn 1987,b). This programme was phased out shortly after
its introduction because employers and claimants did not take up the changes
provided. After JTS proved impossible to impose, government sought to combine JTS
with the G.ommunity programme into a unified training scheme which involved
'training' for supplementary benefit plus a £10 top up. "The proposed 'Unified
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Training Scheme' brings the British system still closer to 'work-fare'; no less than
600,000 people per year will go through special work schemes receiving a benefit
rather than a wage. Together with the government's refusal to pay social security
benefit, from December 1988 onwards, to young people who refuse to join YTS, this
represents a serious move towards economic conscription" (Gray 1988, p. 126).
Under the threat of benefit withdrawal, training schemes work as a form of economic
conscription, involving individualising forms of bureaucratic control through
monitoring and screening procedures. A further move to economic conscription was
the introduction of Job Clubs. Job Clubs are "offered to long-term unemployed people
as a form of help with intensive job search. Attenders are required to apply for ten
jobs a day, and must attend for four hours a week, thus pressurising them to reduce
the wage they are willing to accept, and flooding the market with applications which
in turn may induce employers to offer low pay" (ibid.).
Additionally, government tightened up bureaucratic forms of control through
repressive availability for work tests. A repressive form of 'counselling' is
institutionalised in Restart which was introduced in 1986. Restart aimed at feeding
the unemployed into MSC schemes under the penalty of benefit withdrawal. Restart
forced the unemployed to attend interviews every six months, harassing them
through pressure to give an account of their activities. Upon encouragement to take
up casual and low paid work, Restart superimposed financial pressure by
supervising the behaviour and movement of the unemployed. As government saw its
efforts frustrated, partly because of claimants' resistance, partly because of
employers' unwillingness to subcontract cheap labour with low skills, the
government introduced a complementary measure in 1987: the Availability for
Work Test. This measure extends Restart by forcing claimants to take any kind of job
if they are unwilling to risk benefit withdrawal. This measure not only imposes low
pay, it also erodes the de facto still existing voluntary character of training since it
can be argued easily that an unemployed worker is only pretending to be available for
work. Although the British system still maintains its voluntary character, monetary
pressure, bureaucratic supervision and harassment are tightened up step by step,
leaving the unemployed in a cold climate of a notional choice that covers up
practically existing economic conscription.
During the 1980's, the young unemployed saw their legal rights redefined, their
collective bargaining power undermined, their employment expectations declining
and their work conditions scattered. While the government celebrated declining rates
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of unemployment, those on its make-to-work schemes were removed from the
unemployment register at the same time as the DHSS processes them as
non-employed, permitting the denial of industrial injury benefits (Esam et.al.
1985). As the government destroyed training boards, closed skill centres and
progressively eradicated apprenticeships (Benn/Fairley 1986), the MSG offered
skills that are not only poor but deficient in core and basic requirements (ibid.).
Instead of offering genuine training skills, the young unemployed were "policed for
thought as well as behaviour, backed by DHSS enforcement of benefit withdrawal"
(Benn/Fairley 1986, p. 7). The MSC reinforced poor educational standards and low
skills. At the age of 16, about 60% of students leave school without O-level
qualifications, while only one quarter of the young generation enters into an
apprenticeship or further education (Durr 1989, p. 162). Cheap, unskilled and
largely non-unionised 'trainees' make for a job substitution rate of at least 17%
(Finn 1987, p. 15, on the basis of a MSC sponsored research on YTS). The job
substitution rate suggests actual job destruction, creating frustration and suspicion
at the point of contact between semi- and/or unskilled regular employees and
trainees. Those on the margin of the labour market are put into competition against
regular employees who see them, for good reason, as a threat to their employment. At
the same time, the labour laws of the 1980's outlawed strikes over work and pay
conditions for trainees (29). All this helped to reinforce the separation of the young
unemployed from those in 'regular' employment. The MSC's control over entry into
employment involved the undermining of collective identity between trainees and the
organised labour movement.
The undermining of collective identity manifested itself also among those at the
bottom of the wage hierarchy through racial (Esam et.al. 1985) as well as sexual
discrimination (Cockburn 1987). Further, the recomposition of the welfare state in
terms of productivity, repression and economic conscription, involved the
reinforcement of individualising forms of competition between trainees, isolating
trainees from each other. The young unemployed were placed at the bottom of the
wage hierarchy and divided through pressure to show good behaviour if regular
employment was to be achieved as a result of training on work-places (Stafford
1981 ;Goldstein 1984). Upon the individualising pressure at work, the state
superimposed individualising and frustrating forms of bureaucratic control that
subjected those dependent on welfare to a tight machinery of bureaucratic rules.
These forms of control include bureaucratic hurdles which are associated with
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selective means-testing, screening and monitoring of claimants, and imposed
mobility. The domestication of the unemployed comprises, alongside tight monetary
control, a legally imposed and financially supervised mobility: from forced labour in
enterprise back to the dole queue and from the dole queue to the DHSS and. Restart
interviews, from Restart to unemployment offices (signing on until recently every
two weeks and since 1989 every week while claimants have to indicate their effort to
find employment), and from unemployment offices to the MSC and the DHSS and from
there to a different training placement in a different factory, with different workers
from whom they stand separated. "It is urgent for capital to fix this labour-power
within mobility and via mobility and segmentation of labour markets and its
marginalisation" (Negri 1987b, p. 54). This imposition of mobility involves a
preemptive undermining of collective forms of organisation through the denial of
social conditions upon which such consciousness could develop. Resistance to
economic conscription is made difficult through a sophisticated machinery of social
control.
On the other hand, tight bureaucratic supervision of behaviour and work
motivation fosters individualising forms of resistance. "To know what state
restructuring is really about, to be able to explain the anger, frustration and
resentment of the present generation of working-class youth, to know how new
forms are being imposed on them daily, and how disillusionment is channelled into •
individuating forms in practice all require a close understanding of what is
happening at the point of contact between young people and the state" (Stafford 1981,
p. 58, referring to YOP). The degree of anger, frustration and resentment is
expressed in the high drop-out rate of trainees. For example, during the period since
November 1986 while JTS has been running "the MSC has acknowledged that 33,124
people enrolled (up to August 21st) and 13,332 left. Only 458 of these leavers,
however, have successfully completed" (Unemployed Unit 1987, p. 3). Alongside
, trade union resistance calling for non-cooperation with the cheap labour schemes,
the high drop out rate fostered the reluctance of bigger employers to offer
placements for trainees (Finn 1987).
Organisations which could generate collective forms of support and resistance, i.e.
the trade unions and unemployed workers' centres are either largely indifferent, and
traditionally concentrating on the regular employed (trade unions) or restricted in
mobilising political support (unemployed workers' centres). Support by the MSC of
voluntary projects, like the unemployed workers' centres, is specifically designed to
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prevent them from carrying out political mobilisation of the unemployed (Gray
1988, p. 125). The unemployed are considered as a constituency neither in the
Labour Party nor in the trade union movement. The alienation of the 'victims' of the
credit-sustained boom from the organised labour movement was hardened by the
restructuring of the labour market through employment patterns that made
unionisation difficult: part-time work, workers in small establishments and
self-employed subcontractors as well as sweat shop work and those on training
schemes. All this reinforces the denial of collective representation for large parts of
the working class, whose aspirations, income and employment conditions are
circumscribed by tax and poverty traps, cheap labour schemes, the reductions of
welfare benefits and whose forms of resistance have been channelled, through the
punitive threat of law and bureaucratic harrasment, into isolated forms of deviance.
Instead of collective recognition, these sections of the working class find themselves
subject to the individualising and frustrating machinery of state supervision,
involving the use of the welfare state as the perpetuator of, and watchdog over, the
imposition of money in command. However, government's expectation of forcing
people into a life of poor unemployment and low wages involved problems.
Firstly, the taking up of trainees is uneven as the bigger employers are noticeably
reluctant while, on the other hand, small and medium size employers in the private
sector have taken on trainees in high proportion (Finn 1987). This unevenness can
be explained by trade union resistance in bigger enterprise, employers' readiness
not to provoke dissent on the shop-floor and employers' doubts about trainees
because of high drop-out rates. Secondly, rather than fragmenting internal labour
markets, employers seem to consider the consolidation of internal labour markets a
competitive advantage. The introduction of new methods of production strengthened
the productive and disruptive power of labour which capital sought to contain
through strategies of 'work-with-pride'. As a policy of hire and fire would have
undoubtedly led to adverse effects on competitiveness through disruption of
production, internal labour markets consolidated during the 1980's, rather than
being undermined by mass unemployment and the provision of cheap, flexible,
unprotected and casual labour. This is so because of the productive power of labour
that, in the form of constant capital, demands particular skills, and because of the
disruptive strength of labour which made impossible managerial strategies of hire
and fire and policies of severe wage restraint. Thirdly, the reason why bigger
employers have not simply substituted workers for those on training schemes
concerns also, alongside the competitive advantage of a motivated workforce, the
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character of 'training' itself. The government's training schemes are fraught with
contradiction because "neither is capital monolithic or homogeneous as the NTI
implies, nor are the state's interest and practices identical to those of capital"
(Goldstein 1984, p. 93)(30). Whereas capital depends on new skills that fit the
particular industry, the MSC eroded genuine training skills (Benn/Fairley 1986).
As the government's make-to-work schemes provided a broadly-based introduction
to work based on the lowest denominator of work discipline, "many companies and
some industries want labour with 'deeper' capabilities" than are provided by the MSC
"in order to adjust to technological change and to improve competitive position"
(Goldstein 1984, p. 101). As YTS was functionally useless because of the poor
definition of core and basic skills (Benn/Fairley 1986), the short-term horizon of
the 'free market policy' ignored the supply of long term skills (Fine/Harris 1985).
In short, a "'builder employer wants a bricklayer who is a bricklayer' and not a
generalist" (Goldstein 1984, p. 101, in reference to Pike (31)). The irony of
government's work-for-benefit schemes is that they reinforced skill shortages at a
time when government's anti-trade union policy intended to deregulate labour
markets (see the attack on closed shops). By reinforcing skill shortages,
government, rather than breaking up internal labour markets, helped to consolidate
these markets. Despite government's intention of breaking up restrictive trade union
control over internal labour markets, it presided over the consolidation of workplace
trade unionism. The discrimination of training for skill in favour of MSC training
for social control strengthened the bargaining position of the skilled sections of the
working class. On the other hand, government's policy consolidated the
disenfranchising of the unemployed as contrasted with those in regular employment,
contributing to the decomposition of class relations through the polarising
recomposition of the relation between public expenditure and wages.
As the credit-sustained boom did not absorb those made redundant during the
recession into regular employment, government's use of the 'Ministry of Social
Control', as Benn/Fairley (1986) termed the MSC, indicates the collective power of
labour that government sought to contain through 'training', that is through 'social
engineering of control' (cf. Benn/Fairley 1986). Not only did the new methods of
production involve particular skills which marginalised those with inadequate
skills, but also the productive power of labour forced capital, rather than to expand
accumulation, to monopolise markets through devaluation and centralisation of
capital, mediated through the stock market boom of the 1980's. In the face of market
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monopolisation, large sections of the working class found themselves excluded from
capitalist use for exploitation (32). Government's training schemes responded to the
surplus in social labour power by consolidating the exclusion of large sections from
productive use and from credit-sustained prosperity, containing the working class
by dividing it as between beneficiaries and victims of credit-sustained accumulation.
The monetary and legal decomposition of class relations involved pacification costs
that disorganised a collective response to the reconstruction of social relations on the
basis of money in command. These pacification costs involved the global deficit
demand management that sustained capital's command over labour's productive power
in ever more speculative form; wage concessions for those workers upon whose
discipline the productive potential of the new means of production depended; and the
expansion of domestication costs for those workers capital found difficult to regard as
a variable component for exploitation.
The disenfranchising of sections of the working class from direct command for
exploitation signals that capital has found it impossible to impose necessary labour,
the antithesis of surplus labour, on social labour power. The productive power of
labour made it difficult for capital to consider the social power of labour as a
commodity (i.e. as a variable component of capitalist command for exploitation) for
the purpose of expanded imposition of work. Additionally, the state has found it
impossible to control social labour power through employment and income
guarantees. Instead, public spending has been used as a means to divide and rule, and
to enforce social discipline through repressive forms of monetary expansion which
involve oppressive forms of social engineering under the punitive threat of law
(grant withdrawal). From the point of view of capitalist domination, the imposition
of the value form over social labour has necessitated forms of social discipline that
reassert the discipline of capitalist command in production through state induced
forms of command. Government's training schemes and the encouragement of low pay
signal just such a political control of labour power.
Government's policy towards those on the bottom of the wage hierarchy not only
involved the reinforcement of wage differentials, but, more importantly, the
segmentation of the labour market in and through the use of the welfare state as a
means of marginalising, repressing, and depressing living conditions for those the
boom passed by. In the face of credit-expansion within a tight monetary framework,
the political promotion of various forms of labour (i.e. forced labour; low paid
labour and casual labour versus regular and skilled labour) shifted large sections of
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the working class to the periphery of metropolitan areas, while the credit-sustained
boom enabled the state and capital to concede rising wages and job security for those
the boom did not pass by. As the intensive composition of capital turns marginal
disruption in production into competitive disadvantage, including adverse effects on
the stock market, management sought to contain labour through the consolidation of
internal labour markets while the boom enabled capital also to concede wage
increases as a quid pro quo for the introduction of new methods of production and
intensification of work. Alongside this integration of sections of the working class,
government's policies reinforced skill shortages. Moreover, the restrictive labour
legalisation involved a particular definition of a distinct workers' interest in and
through the reassertion of law and order command under the penalty of monetary
decomposition of the trade unions. The government enacted sanctions, penalties, fines
and heavy policing of industrial disputes; all of which involved the definition of the
integrated section of the working class as an isolated group of people. After 1983, the
boom entrusted to this section of the working class real gains in living standards,
permitting a privatisation of interest on the basis of the categories of citizen and
property owner. The Thatcher government used state budgeting as a means of
fragmenting the working class through legal and monetary intervention, including
the credit and fiscal explosion which sustained the boom. The isolation of large
sections of the working class from the 'integrated' working class helped to consolidate
political authority. The organisation of the unemployed on training schemes involved
pacification costs. However, state budgeting was not used as a means of recuperating
and neutralising the class struggle through integration costs designed to' create social
equality' but to reconstitute social relations on the basis of 'market equality', i.e. the
abstract equality of money in command. Further, state budgeting was not used as a
means of subordinating social labour directly to the wage relation because the
productive power of labour involved a disenfranchising of social labour from the
capitalist capacity to impose necessary labour.
Policies towards those at the bottom of the wage hierarchy involved the denial of
collective organisation, sanctions, threats to benefits, severe tax and poverty traps
as well as forced labour. The disciplining of this section entailed the political use of
public expenditure, not as a formalised guarantee for full employment and income,
but as a promotion of the disciplining force of poverty. This shift in emphasis
expresses, in institutional form, that the disciplining of those the boom passed by
was not possible through the institution of industrial relations alone. The imposition
of the value form over the conditions of life involved a reassertion of political power
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that took over the role of marketing the labour power of those who were not
reintegrated into the disciplining control of industrial relations. Budgetary
expansion involved the attempt to politically superimpose the wage relation without
subordinating the social directly to the wage relation. The wage relation needs to be
conceived of as involving the rule of the labour market. In turn, this rule is imposed
through the system of industrial relations: the bargaining over the price of labour
power and management's strategies to control the production process. The
government's economic conscription abnegates, through the institution of the welfare
state, the bargaining over the price of labour power. The state imposed 'employment
contract' obtains outside the system of industrial relations and is enforced through
social administration and law. At the same time, the willingness of management to
take up 'trainees' entails management's commitment to impose work without having
to negotiate over wages. 'Trainees' are thus integrated into the institution of the
industrial relations through the imposition of work alone, while they are excluded
from the institution of the industrial relation concerning the bargaining over wages.
'Trainees' enter into work on the basis of forced labour. While monetarism declares
that poverty is not unfreedom, the imposition of this freedom entails the use of
money as social command-to-work, enforced and supervised by the state.
The apparent paradox, i.e. the imposition of the wage relation beyond the
constraints of labour market, can be explained on the basis of constant capital as
subjective power which expresses, in inverted form, the disruptive and productive
power of labour (33). Labour's disruptive and productive power was contained in,
fundamentally, two different ways: the consolidation of internal labour markets
(work-with-pride) and a credit-sustained accumulation (the realisation of
appropriated labour on the basis of an accumulation of debt). This integration of
labour into the capital relation helped to polarise the working class on the basis of a
repressive reassertion of political authority through individualising means of legal
and monetary decomposition of class. The political marketing of labour power
involved those whom capital found difficult to regard as a variable component of its
command over labour for the purpose of exploitation. The specific application of the
welfare state as a means of control, i.e. of control effected through budgetary
policies, entailed the attempt to enforce debt through forced labour. Instead of simply
relying on welfare services, the unemployed are forced to work for their benefits.
The reassertion of a politically induced, supervised and defined wage relation
involves the imposition of work through the political marketing of labour power.
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Social spending was used as a means of controlling, politically, the relative
disenfranchising of social labour from capital's command for the purpose of
exploitation (34): i.e. the imposition of the wage relation for sections of the working
class through the reassertion of political domination that is premised on the lurid
face of equality: the abstract equality of money in command. The political attempt to
reconstitute social relations on the basis of the unfettered operation of the market
forces involves thus the application of the welfare state as a means of enforcing the
social power of money as command-to-work. The selective and repressive use of
public spending involved the imposition of the wage relation, an imposition that
rested on the systematic exercise of state power.
The government's use of budgetary policies involved the exclusion in a socially
controlled way of those who were no longer needed. The law and order imposition of
poverty and forced labour involved the marginalisation and isolation of these sections
of the working class from the rest of the labour movement, while the state imposed
the disciplining conditions of the production process: work, mobility, and income
restraint through the combination of employment and social policies. The
organisation of political command over the social rested on that form of the capitalist
state power which is characterised by its role as the harmonies' last refuge, i.e. the
last refuge of equality. Through the application of monetary and legal means of
decomposing class relations, the state is involved in imposing the wage relation in
terms of state-induced forms of individualisation, harassment, forced mobility and a
policy of scarce money. This development displaced the discipline of the labour
market by shifting the control of the market away from the trade unions to the state
(see Goldstein 1984). The polarisation of the working class (35) made possible
social passivity upon which, in turn, the restoration of the political power of the
state rested.
By bringing those marginalised from direct productive use much more directly
into the ambit of state control, notably through the use of the institutions of the
welfare state, the state contributed to the marketing of labour power in a way which
reasserted capitalist domination over labour in and through the imposition of the
abstract equality of money on the conditions of life. The organisation of command
extends to the political organisation of those excluded from the capitalist imposition
of necessary labour through the use of public spending as a means of repressing
social self-activity. At the same time, the state reasserts the imposition of necessary
labour over social life. While the introduction of new methods of production involved
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the capitalist tendency to limit necessary labour, the struggle over the social use of
labour's productive power (i.e. the struggle to limit the provision of labour power
through reductions in the working week) turns into the organisation of command: the
segmentation of labour markets, the privatisation of interest of those employed and
the political marketing of labour power in and through means of legal restrictions to
collective organisation that excluded sections of the working class from trade union
organisation in the labour market. Alongside the denial of the political representation
of the trade unions and the legal restriction of the organised labour movement as
representing a distinct workers' interest in production, the political organisation of
those pushed to the margin of the labour market (i.e. the labour markei of the
'irregular' working class) entails the imposition of necessary labour in and through
the monetary decomposition of class relations. All this involved the destruction of
working class demands for full employment and a socially fair distribution of labour.
Far from abstaining from state intervention, the reconstruction of the market
involved the systematic exercise of state power, including the sacrificing of
redundant labour power on the altar of money through the imposition of poverty. The
systematic exercise of state power involved the eradication of the Keynesian use of
money i.e. full employment guarantees, while using monetary expansionism,
alongside the imposition of law and order, as a means to impose necessary labour
through a socially controlled exclusion of those whose labour power was no longer
needed.
-Changes in Social Security and the Imposition of Tight Money
While the British left believed that the Thatcher government would use the genuine
failings of the welfare state as an excuse radically to dismantle it, government's
policies extended, rather than changed, the policies of the Callaghan government.
"While the policies that have been pursued have undoubtedly meant that state
services are much worse and that life for those who depend on them is much harder
than it was, few changes have been a radical departure from past practices" (Erskine
1986, p. 16-7). The central scheme of welfare policy in the 1980's has been to
recompose class in terms of the individual and to individualise the relations between
people. Central to the government's attempt to recompose social relations on the
basis of the discipline of the market is, alongside the political marketing of labour
power, the strengthening of the family. Government's policy reasserted the role of
the family as the primary source of income support (Esam et.al. 1985;Cockburn
1987), strengthening domestic forms of dependency. The strengthening of the family
is one aspect of the attempt to destroy the Keynesian relation between public
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expenditure and wages on the basis of an integration of social policies with
employment policies. "It is not surprising that the YTS system is predicated on
working-class families partially supporting their young economically for several
years after they leave school" (Cockburn 1987, p. 210). As these families are on
average not the high earning ones, but those at the bottom of the wage hierarchy,
government's emphasis on family values reasserted the pressure of economic
insecurity by pressing upon family life. Upon the family, government's repressive
use of public spending imposed the discipline of the market through unemployment,
benefit cuts, poverty wages, threat of homelessness and deprivation. Despite
government's emphasis on family values, families have been split up by the pressure
of unemployment, poverty and growing homelessness. During the 1980's, legal
intervention involved a growing gap in disposable income between all households and
one-parent families. This gap steadily increased in the past decade (see The Observer
14.5.1989). At the same time family pressure increased through the freezing of
child benefit, which has been held at £7.25 since 1986 (see The Guardian,
10.7.1990). During the 1980's, homelessness, a clear enough symptom of poverty,
has increased dramatically. "In 1970 the figure for homeless people was about
56,000 families; in 1985 the figure had grown to 100,000 and is likely to be far
more" (Plant 1988, p. 10). Homelessness resulted from mortgage defaults (see The
Guardian 18.4. 1989), unemployment and cuts in welfare provisions. The biggest
change in payments to the unemployed was the abolition of earning-related benefits
in 1982 - the same year that benefit became eligible for taxation. Unemployed
workers now lose unemployment benefit for six months if they are deemed to have
become intentionally unemployed.
The government's social policy involved the restriction of benefits to an 'enabling
role', officially designed to alleviate social hardship for those most in need. The way
in which those in need are subsidised sustained poverty. The market-led approach to
the welfare state entails that poverty is "linked to the expenditure of the rich rather
than to the needs of the poor" (Plant 1988, p. 6-7). Associated with fiscal reforms
discriminating against labour, government sought to impose money in command
through a tight application of the institution of means-testing. Means-tested
subsidies to low wages involve a poverty trap because, since subsidies are related to
income, they must be withdrawn as income rises, reducing the real advantage of any
rise. "When taken together with the taxes also paid on wage rises, the withdrawal of
benefits could lead to effective marginal tax rates on increased income of over 100%,
thus trapping recipients in poverty" (Alcock 1989, p. 118;see also Esam et.al.
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1985). While the overall level of social security spending increased, individual
benefits decreased (35). Cash benefits have been cut by six to seven per cent,
eroding the value of social security benefits. At the same time, contributions such as
sickness and unemployment benefit have been reduced (see Krieger 1987) while
government's targeting of resources to those most in need saw the increase in
prescription charges, charges for eye tests and dental check-ups, alongside increased
excise duties. These charges are, on the other hand, matched by strategies to
casualise labour in public services such as the NHS.
While pushing people into economic insecurity, the failure to make deep cuts in
public spending involved, in turn, ever more repressive attempts to regain central
budgetary control over local authorities. The government's preferred strategy in
relation to public expenditure was to force increased efficiency by imposing the
commanding power of money through the institution of cash limits and by provoking
privatisation and deregulation of services. The centralisation of budget control
involved, by implication, a tightening-up of the hierarchical composition of political
domination. Government's attempt to regain control over spending involved also an
attack on local authorities' power to determine scope, form and content of local
services. The government policies towards local authorities sped up long existing
trends to transform local authorities from distributors of wealth to administrators
of cuts.
The government's attack on the institutional form of the welfare state has been
marked by disparities in the pace with which the Conservative government has
attempted to restructure the public sector. The NHS has remained relatively
unscathed compared with market orientated reforms in housing, education and more
recently broadcasting and television (see Spence 1989;Barbrook 1989). While the
NHS was systematically underfunded, and brought to the edge of collapse (see Esam
et.al. 1985), its basic institution remained intact (see Clarke 1988a;Krause
1989). On the other hand, the Conservative government's approach to local
government displayed a systematic confrontation right from the beginning. The
financial position of local authorities was constantly tightened-up, permitting a
financial responsibilisation of local performance to central government's view of
desirability.
The control over public expenditure involved the breaking-up of resistance to the
transformation of local authorities into an institution that managed the poverty of the
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local working class in the framework of increasingly tight monetary control. In its
attack on local government, the Thatcher government continued Labour's policies of
imposing tight cash limits on local spending. However, the Conservatives included
current spending levels in the institution of cash limits. Government introduced
strict ceilings on what local authorities should be spending and encouraged individual
tax payers to resist high spending councils and to supervise efficient use of public
revenue. The ideological foundation of the attack employed the discourse of consumer
choice, i.e. greater accountability of local authorities to the electorate, involving the
responsibilisation of local authorities to effective use of tax payers' money. The
encouragement of consumer choice amounted to an exercise in 'window-dressing'
(Birkinshaw 1987). Behind the smokescreen of consumer choice lurked the
centralisation of the hierarchical composition of political domination through the
legal and monetary decomposition of the constitutional balance between central and
local government.
The government tightened local government's financial room for manoeuvre
through progressively more restrictive legal interventions: Local Government
Planning and Land Act (1980); Local Government Finance Act (1982); Rates Act
(1984); Community Charge Act (1988, implemented in 1989 in Scotland and in
1990 in England and Wales). During the 1980's, the Thatcher government
"succeeded in- pushing down the central government's contribution to local
authorities budgets from 63 to 49 per cent" (Gamble 1988, p. 132), without,
however, arresting the upward tendency in public spending. All these legal
interventions manifested, retrospectively, a step-by-step approach that culminated
in a major shift in the balance of the constitutional relation between central and local
government. Moreover, monetary and legal intervention coincided with the erosion of
corporatist bodies at local level as well as the introduction of monitoring procedures
over the performance of local authorities. Defiance of central government's
objectives involved not only lengthy litigation procedures, but also grant
withdrawal, disqualification of councillors and the abolition of local authorities, as
in the case of the GLC and the six metropolitan councils in 1986. The abolition of
these councils followed the deterioration of relations between central and local
government. The government's attempt to achieve control over local spending
provoked long struggles with many Labour-controlled councils who tried to avoid the
effects of monetary restraint on their budgets by refusing to set a legal rate or by
using methods of creative accountancy to raise additional money (37).
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The reimposition of the power of money over local authorities entails the denial of
oppositional space and demands, instead, unquestioned compliance with the rule of
tight money, safeguarded by law. In the face of financial restraint, and penal attack,
including increasing central discretion over the form, scope and content of service
provision, the GLC not only figured as one obstacle amongst others but, more
fundamentally, occupied an oppositional space of participatory democracy and a new
left proposal of decentralisation (see A. Clarke/Cochrane 1989). The GLC counted as
a symbol of 'municipal socialism' (see GLC 1982) in opposition to the subordination
of political discretion to the market, resisting the Thatcher government's attempt to
take "ever greater command of the state in order to crush dissent and opposition"
(Schwarz 1987, p. 144). The abolition of the GLC expressed the uncompromising
use of the capitalist state power to crush dissent, however much such dissent might
be democratically legitimated. Central control over form, content and scope of
services, mandatory competitive tendering, the selling of council houses and
educational and health reform could not be achieved simply by introducing some Acts
and sticking to them. Rather, the viability of a ruthless legal and monetary
intervention depended on a shift in the balance of class power that, in turn, made
possible the centralisation of budget control and the by-passing of local authorities.
The abolition of the GLC is one important aspect of the struggle over the balance of
class forces. Others include the arbitrary imposition of cash limits in favour of
Conservative councils and the geographically uneven recomposition of production
discriminating against mainly Labour controlled. councils in the North. All this
undermined concerted resistance in opposition to the institution of cash limits.
Further, the government's largely successful campaign of selling council houses
undermined support for local authorities' attempt to defend the institution of local
democracy which had long been tainted as being the manager of the poverty of the
local working class (see Cockburn 1977). The crushing of the GLC not only freed
government from constitutional checks (see Krieger 1987) but, also, made it easier
to control local authorities by making it clear that disobedience to financial restraint
and central government's view of efficiency would be dealt with by a harsh display of
state power.
Financial restraint affected particularly those councils in run down areas of social
life. The attempt by the Liverpool Labour council to defy central government
resulted, because of a lack of trade union support as well as harassment by the
national party (Ridley 1989), in the disqualification of the Council; it was held
responsible for accumulated debt incurred by misinterpreting government's slogan
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according to which the welfare state policy should target resources on those most in
need. It can be no coincidence that Labour councils found themselves on the losing side
since they represented, to some extent, a kind of social contract in the microcosm of
the local state and since they represented, no less, those areas of social life most
severely hit by unemployment and devastation. The attempt to enforce debt on the
working class is expressed in the Thatcher government's fight against those
'overspending' councils that were hit hard during and after the recession. Upon a
geographically uneven recomposition of production, the political exclusion of
sections of the working class from economic recovery manifested itself in the
selective and repressive allocation of grants.
Despite a ruthless monetary and legal intervention into the financial position of
local government through the block grant system, government's expectation of
controlling local government's spending performance through the block grant was
frustrated. Local governments in general were able, thanks to increasingly
managerial budgeting practices (A. Clarke/Cochrane 1989), i.e. creative forms of
budgeting, to reverse the falling trend of revenue in real terms (Travers 1987).
Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that local authorities' financial room for
manoeuvre had been severely restricted. Local authorities found it increasingly
difficult to replace, renew and refurbish (see H. Davies 1987). The enforcement of
debt (i.e. the regaining of control over public spending) involved thus the
deterioration of services to those hard hit by the unfettered operation of the market
forces. However, resistance to tight financial control led to deviations from planned
budget reductions. The government responded to these cash control collapses by the
introduction of rate-capping (Rates Act 1984) and the 1982 Local Government
Finance Act. This Act involved the attempt to make local authorities more accountable
to pressure from their constituents. The Thatcher government hushed-up the
tightening-up of supervisory monitoring and screening procedures on local
performances by increasing 'consumer choice' over the local state. Alongside the
introduction of central auditing procedures, local authorities were legally required
to consult commercial and industrial rate payers before setting their annual rates.
The 1982 Act confirmed also the right of any one individual to inspect local
authorities' accounts (38). The 1982 Act gave individuals their "right to challenge
and object to items of expenditure on which the auditor should seek a juridical
declaration that it was contrary to the law, or on which he might certify that it had
not been accounted for, or a loss had been incurred by wilful conduct" (Birkinshaw
1987, p. 158). Auditing implied increased central supervision over local
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government performance in respect of the implementation of government's view of
efficiency (Parkinson 1987a,b;Birkinshaw 1987;Travers 1987;Ascher 1987).
The opening-up of local government to the 'consumer' was "political
window-dressing by central government and resulted in pervasive tokenism by local
authorities" (Birkinshaw 1987, p. 155). Audits were not consumer watchdogs but,
rather, a political check on whether local government's performance was in line
with central government's view of desirability (ibid.;Parkinson 1987b). The irony
is that the supervisory screening bent, in lots of cases, in the opposite direction as
the government's watchdog criticised the way in which central government
distributed grants (Ascher 1987;Birkinshaw 1987). It was the use of the rights
provided by the 1982 Act which let to the disqualification of 47 Liverpool
councillors in 1987. The disqualification of the Liverpool council asserted the
tightening-up of the hierarchical composition of political domination: either
compliance with financial scarcity and government's view of desirability or
disqualification, if not destruction. Such a reassertion of political domination,
however, could be used only as a propagandistic, however repressive, device since
otherwise it would involve administrative chaos and damaging and costly struggle.
The Thatcher government saw the alternative to coercive undermining of
constitutional powers as lying in a further tightening- up of monetary restrictions,
while using the threat of disqualification or abolition as a potent weapon to make
clear that disobedience will be dealt with by a harsh and disciplinary display of state
power.
The government sought to tighten the screw by the introduction of rate-capping.
This imposition of money in command "involved the Government drawing up a list of
councils which it deemed to be overspending and placing a ceiling on the amount by
which they could legally increase their property taxes (rates)" (Gamble 1988, p.
115). Despite widespread resistance (see A.CIarke/Cochrane 1989 on the limits of
campaign), the government remained uncompromising and selected, by 1987-8,
forty local authorities for rate limitations (Travers 1987). The refusal by local
authorities, notably Labour controlled ones, to co-operate triggered a long struggle
in the course of which litigation "has become an accepted way of conducting the
relation between local authorities and central government" (ibid., p. 23).
Rate-capping asserted an attack on the way in which in particular Labour-controlled
councils saw fit to manage the poverty of the local working class, forcing local
authorities to financial manipulation, higher charges and cut backs in social services
(see A. Clarke/ Cochrane 1989). Rate-capping was the first real infringement of
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the constitutional relationship between local and central government inasmuch as it
intervened in the right of local authorities to set their rates independently. Alongside
the campaign to abolish the GLC and six metropolitan councils (1983 to 1986),
rate-capping manifested a culmination of various steps that amounted to a major
shift in the constitutional relation between the central and local government.
Rate-capping involved the attempt to provoke the contracting out of services. The
aim of injecting commercial criteri and competition, and of encouraging greater use
of casual labour in social services followed the lead given by Conservative councils in
the early 1980's. As a result of wide ranging contracting out arrangements, wages
declined in those councils that subcontracted cheap labour and in those councils that
exploited the threat of contracting out to achieve compliance from trade unions with
wage restraint (Ascher 1987). In turn, casualisation of labour power was
reinforced through the MSC's Community Programme, which mobilised the young
unemployed to undertake community work. Additionally, subcontracted labour was
largely low paid, part-time, non-unionised, unprotected by health and safety
legislation and removed from wage council orders, while work was generally
severely intensified (Ascher 1987). All this put pressure on wages, employment and
work-conditions for those remaining in public employment. The attempt to
deregulate council services through competitive tendering responded to the winter of
discontent. "Local authority manual workers were at the forefront of industrial
action and, for many, the sights and smells of the refuse collection strike are among
the clearest memories of that winter" (Ascher 1987, p. 33). In the face of growing
financial pressure, the inability of local authorities to control their workforces led
a growing interest in competitive tendering in the early 1980's. The clearest winner
in deregulation was the private sector (Parkinson 1987b). However, interest in
contracting out declined by 1983/4 (Ascher 1987). Since 1985, the trend of
contracting out was even reversed (ibid.) as some councils started to contract in
services that had been contracted out. This shift responded to deteriorating services,
the moderation of trade union wage demands (ibid.) and a successful trade union
campaign against contracting out. In the face of a real possibility of costly disputes
over deregulation as well as deteriorating labour relations, Labour was successful in
occupying town halls, contributing to a renewal of trade union-Labour co-operation
at the local level on the basis of financial professionalism and managerial local
budgeting. In the event, "it appears that the recent debate over contracting out in
local authorities has been something of a storm in a teacup" (Ascher 1987, p. 227).
Despite the continuing attempt to reduce local government's current spending, the
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reversal of contracting out involved higher current spending levels which, by 1986
and 1987, were 15% higher than government's targets (Travers 1987, p. 12).
Although the spell of contracting out was broken, the Thatcher government
reconfirmed its determination to make competitive tendering and opting out
mandatory for a wide range of areas of social life. While local authorities were able
to mount effectice political campaigns which forced the government to postpone
legislation on mandatory tendering, the government sought to use the growing public
disenchantment with existing provisions to change the direction of current spending
by enhancing consumer choice yet again through a further financial squeeze on local
budgets, the community charge (poll tax). Further, the government sought to exploit
the disenchantment with public services by shifting, in its third term in office, from
creeping deregulation to deregulation as a centrepiece of welfare policy.
As for the NHS, the opening-up of health care to the market did not manifest itself,
as an explicit and sustained policy, before the 1987 election. The government was
constantly forced to renew its pledge not to launch a market orientated attack on the
NHS. Prior to 1987, the government's approach to health incorporated ad hoc
initiatives to reorientate health care along commercial lines (Krause 1989). The
government put emphasis on efficiency as a means of legitimising systematic
underspending. Additionally, the government unleashed a series of initiatives
designed to contain costs. Mandatory competitive tendering was introduced for
ancillary services in the NHS by 1983. Government insisted that the lowest bidder
has to be accepted. This cost cutting exercise confronted in particular the lowest paid
in NHS employment (laundry, cleaning and catering), leaving the central institution
of the welfare state intact. All of these changes involved an attack on internal labour
markets (encouragement of casual labour) and the health workers unions. In the
NHS, the government's divisive cost cutting exercises were matched by other cost
containment exercises: manpower targets, income targets, and value for money
scrutinies. Lastly, government sought to inject managerial criteria by strengthening
the management function in the NHS. To this end, "general mangers were appointed in
the NHS and placed on performance related pay and short terms contracts, thus
instilling in them the need to meet centrally defined objectives" (Bach 1989, p. 9).
The government's attempt to deflect popular dissatisfaction and to fragment and
divide popular unrest over the deterioration of services by introducing financial and
administrative reforms, ostensibly designed to increase efficiency, was expressed in
the publication of the White Paper 'Working for Patients' in 1988. The White Paper
was introduced at a time of a developing crisis over the NHS, triggered by wage
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pressure, overtime work, bed closures and growing discontent within the NHS over
deteriorating standards of patient care. The discontent was not limited to those who
had been under immense pressure during the 1980's, but involved also consultants
who claimed that the NHS was under threat from underfunding culminating in a
severe financial crisis. The White Paper responded to this criticism by claiming that
the injection of competition and market discipline would ensure better and less
costly health care. The White Paper "proposes the commercialisation of the NHS,
with the establishment of trading relations between health authorities and the
nascent privatisation of hospitals through opting-out proposals" (Bach 1989, p. 8).
The incursion of private health care involves the state abdicating collective
responsibility for health provision, involving the orientation of health care in
proximity to the market, that is, on the basis of privilege ('value for money'). As
yet, no decision can be taken over the likely success of the government's attempt to
break up the main institution of the post-war consensus.
Alongside the attempts to reconstitute collective provision on the basis of
privilege, a major shift in the direction of arbitrary imposition of restrictive cash
limits and repressive principles of selectivity and means-testing was introduced in
the 1986 reform of social security, implemented in April 1988. A major innovation
was the replacement of supplementary benefits by 'income support'. The reform of
social security involved the rationalisation of the relation between different
means-tested benefits that "align the entitlement to benefits for the unemployed with
the levels of support for those on low wages" (Alcock 1989, p. 118). Income support
rests on personal allowances which are determined according to age and marital
status, with lower rate being paid to people under the age of 25 (£7 difference). The
only way to achieve adult recognition is to marry; only through dependence on a
sexual partner will the under 25s become adults in terms of full income support
entitlements. The decomposition of class in terms of age differentials not only
concerns those under or above 25. For those between 16 and 18 years of age, income
support and housing benefit was scrapped. The 16 to 18 year olds are forced out of
bed and breakfast accommodation and either back into pressures of family life or on
to the street. Lack of such benefits is one of the main reasons why the young homeless
become involved in prostitution, begging and small crime. On the other hand, those
eligible to income support are required to pay a just and equitable contribution to the
poll tax (Davidson 1989). The reform of social security reasserted government's
attempt to destroy the relation between public expenditure and wages on the basis of
an individualising monetary decomposition of class relations (means-tested
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benefits): benefit entitlements for housing benefit and income support are set at the
same level as the net wages of those in full-time low paid work. Low pay is thus used
as the yardstick against which to judge benefit rates. "For those at this level the
maximum subsidy is paid, for those above it the subsidy is gradually reduced"
(Alcock 1989, p. 118). In the event, the reform of social security assures that those
out of work are in a worse position than the lowest paid in work (Erskine
1986;Alcock 1989). For those out of work and under 25 years of age, the repressive
imposition of a means-tested wage subsidy accompanies effectively "the stick of
stricter availability for work testing", encouraging "people into low wage
employment" (Alcock 1989, p. 119), While age differentials in income support
intensifies family responsibilities, particularly for those under 18 years of age, the
under 25s find new financial support in the Unified Training Scheme that was
introduced in 1988. The introduction of discretionary income support entitlements
and severe cuts in benefits for the young involves financial pressure to accept
'training' on the government's benefit-plus programmes. The young unemployed are
put under pressure to accept any kind of employment so as to escape the
impoverishing innovation of income support, euphemistically legitimised by
government as enabling those most in need to stand on their own feet. Young peoples'
"bargaining power in the labour market is being made weaker than ever by cuts in
social security and additional bureaucratic hurdles which have to be faced in order to
receive them" (Gray 1988, p. 129). Government's declared aim of targeting
resources on those most in need effectively stretched resources to the utmost lowest
subsistence levels.
Alongside the replacement of supplementary benefit by income support,
government introduced a social fund in April 1988 (replacing Family Income
Support). The social fund provides addi- tional funds to people with special needs,
often in the form of an interest free loan repayable from income support payments.
Applications are subject to the discretion of the DHSS. Guidelines issued by
government called for greater vigilance which encouraged an assessment of claims
depending on the personal preference of the officer for the 'deserving' over the
'undeserving' 'claimant'. 'Claimants' have no right of appeal. At the same time, the
decision of the DHSS officer will be scrutinised by the DHSS management,
supervising the effective use of depressed resources (Erskine 1986). The shift in
emphasis from legally enshrined rights to arbitrary discretion within the system
deprived those in need of the most basic help (38). Moreover, payments are limited
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by local DHSS budgets which are assessed centrally. Since shortfalls in budgets can
be expected, applicants cannot be sure that there will be sufficient money available
when they apply. The availability of the social fund loan depends, alongside individual
assessments of entitlement, on the money that there is in the fund. Although
'claimants' might be eligible for entitlement, the imposition of arbitrary cash limits
on the fund imposes a certain limit to that which the local DHSS office can provide.
Those who applied successfully at a time at which money was still available are
expected to repay these loans from the mere subsistence level imposed by income
support. In the event, the social fund involves the imposition of debt as a controlling
requirement to take up any job so as to be able to clear the bill. Upon the frustrating
and intimidating means-testing procedures that reinforced financial self-discipline
on those 'most in need', the reform of social security imposed the repressive and
individualising force of debt and its enforcement. The cuts in welfare spending did not
involve the destruction of the welfare state but, rather its recomposition in terms of
repression. In the face of rising wage differentials and a divisive distribution of the
benefits generated by the boom, the recomposition of the welfare state imposed social
control through an impartiality of legal and monetary intervention.
Additionally, the reform of social security in 1986 limits the financial proportion
central government is prepared to contribute to local authorities' spending on
housing benefits. This tightening-up of local budgets involves a closer supervision
over maladministration and the screening of 'claimants', depressing the financial
position of the working class through cuts in housing benefits and higher rents. As a
consequence, one of the most significant areas of private debt concerns difficulties in
meeting the rent bill (Berthoud/Kempson 1990). While local authorities look like
the perpetuators of financial pressure and bureaucratic supervision, the government
increased its funding of voluntary organisations at the expense of local grants, a
development which by-passed local authorities and undermined their planning
powers (Wistow 1987). Further, during the 1980's, the government made
increasing use of special grants. Special grants totalled 16% of the overall grant in
1979; by 1987/8, the proportion had increased to almost 26% (Travers 1987, p.
20). Special grants include various areas of public spending: health, transport,
policing (Parkinson 1987b;Muchie 1987;Morgan 1987) and education. The
increasing proportion of special education grants, which are subject to the approval
of the Department of Education, restricted local authorities' education policy
severely while central government secured greater influence over the form and
content of services. This development is of particular importance regarding the
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extension of MSC training, especially vocational training (Kogan 1987). The
incursion of the MSC into education reduced local government's discretion over
education considerably: conform, or else grant-withdrawal. Further, the Education
Act 1986 strengthened the governing bodies of schools at the expense of local
authorities. By 1988, accompanying the passage of new education legislation through
Parliament, public debate on education has never been more stormy. For the
teachers', after several years, where life at school has been exceptionally difficult,
dissent spread over issues involving: overwork, underpay, deteriorating
work-conditions and ever increasing pressure to produce better results with less
resources. In the face of teachers leaving the profession in growing numbers, the
teachers' strike in 1988 highlighted the demoralisation over the financial squeeze
and constant performance pressure.
The 1988 teachers' strike was also a demonstration of dissent against government's
new Education Bill. The four main aspects of the Bill are: the implementation of a
national core-curriculum and the concomitant testing of all children at different ages
against national attainment targets, determined by government; delegation of
financial budgeting to individual schools and the possibility for larger schools to opt
out of local authority control, on a simple majority vote of parents, accept block
grants from central government and also to take charge, through their board of
governors, of their own budget; the setting up of City Technology Colleges for eleven
to eighteen years old with initial funding from industry; and, finally, the
introduction of open enrolment policies, giving parents more freedom to register
their children at the school of their choice (see Winck 1989). The education reform
involved the abdication of collective responsibility for education which was to be
reconstructed on the basis of financial accountability and privilege. Once schools
under central control have received their financial support, they are left to budget
their own account on a self-responsible basis. Budgeting rests with the managerial
qualities of the head teacher whose efficiency in administering the fund is measured
in terms of the effective use of resources in comparison with output, which is, in
turn, assessed centrally by the national curriculum. The education reform puts
emphasis on efficiency, financial viability and accountability. Instead of education
for knowledge, educational success is measured in terms of efficiency: the end
product education as a cost effective service. Increase in the so-called consumer
choice of parents over the running and administering of schools involves,
fundamentally, the centralisation of political control over form, content and
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financial resource of education. The opening-up of choice over which school to choose
might well involve the segregation of children according to race and privilege. The
proposed city technology college makes the link between education and the market
obvious. Not only are industrialists involved in funding; these schools have also to
have close links with local industry so as to supply the skills required. The objective
of teaching skills for particular jobs contributes to the segmentation of labour
markets. As those in specialised technology education are likely to achieve the skills
required for regular employment, those in mainstream education will be provided
for by the government's training schemes. Upon all these proposals, severe cash
limits will continue, precipitating a further deterioration of schools, as will the
encouragement of public schooling for those on the Oxbridge stream. Cash limits and
opting out provision involve the reconstruction of education on the basis of the
market. The market led approach to education involves an entry to education on the
basis of privilege: value for money. Following upon financial constraint, the
breaking up of a collective approach to education will make it ever the difficult for
local authorities to administer and plan education (40), permitting a drastic
deterioration of schooling in, particularly, the run down areas of bigger cities,
precipitating a segmentation of labour markets and a further polarisation of the
working class.
Alongside the attempt to impose the money power of capital through the institution
of cash limits and special grants, the government sought to tighten the screw on local
authorities even further. "By the 1987 election the Conservatives were becoming
still more hostile towards local government and were proposing a range of new
measures to limit the responsibilities and the power of local authorities" (Gamble
1988, p. 115). These new measures are the poll tax and the uniform business rate.
The uniform business rate involves the likelihood of undermining smaller business
that might not be able to cope with uniform rates determined indiscriminately by
central government. The poll tax abolishes the system of domestic rates and increases
the dependency of local authorities on central government finance (see Davidson
1989;Uppendahl 1989). The poll tax figure is determined not by local spending, but
by the distribution of revenue support grant and the pegging of business rates. In the
face of restrictive central grant, the only "remaining source of local authority will
be the poll tax - any increase in this, on a proportional basis, has severest effect on
those whom a Labour local authority would wish to support" (Davidson 1989, p.
32). About 80% of all local authority spending will be under central government
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control by 1990 (ibid.). At the same time, local authorities will be depoliticised
while they will, in turn, appear as the perpetrator of the new system. Alongside the
abolition of the fair rent system (see the Housing Act 1988; enacted 1989), the
impact of the poll tax will be higher rents. As each tenant will be responsible for
paying the tax, no legislation forces landlords to deduct the former rates from the
rent charged. Alongside rent payment problems, the poll tax will increase debt. Debt
and debt enforcement will hit hardest the lowest paid and will encourage them to take
poorly paid work or join the black economy, including crime. Contrary to the rates
system, everybody is required to contribute to the poll tax. The lurid face of equality
makes itself effective through the uniformity of the poll tax as it is, according to
government, only fair and just that those who consume services contribute to their
costs. People on income support, although rebates are introduced, have to contribute
to the tax from their income support payments. This development will hit hardest
single parents, especially single mothers, and those under 25s, "whose rebates when
available will be calculated on a lower needs allowance figure" (Davidson 1989, p.
32). Alongside currently increasing mortgage rates and rents, the controlling
element of the poll-tax lies in its repressive imposition of money in command: debt
and its enforcement (see CSE Edinburgh 1989; Hoiloway 1990c). The recomposition
of class on the basis of the generosity of the market involved the disorganisation of
class relations on the basis of a growing polarisation between winners and losers of
the boom. However, the polarisation exists only contradictorily: the speculative
sustaining of accumulation entails the speculative disorganisation of class relations
itself. The attempt to exploit the divisions within the working class contradicts its
results as the fragmenting attack on the working class involved the reconstitution of
class relations on the basis of debt.
By the late 1980's, it became increasingly clear that the attempt to recompose
labour on the basis of the categories of citizen and property owner contradicted its
result as the republic of individualised property owners turned into a republic of
debt. The generosity of the market recomposed the productive and disruptive power
of labour as the collective antithesis to money in command in the form of growing
public and private debt. After 1982, monetarism as a policy of state austerity and as
an abrasive attack against labour has been retained, but at the same time there has
been a massive expansion of credit throughout the 1980's. The imposition of the
abstract equality of money over the conditions of life involved the contradiction that
the deregulation of financial markets and credit-controls made the enforcement of
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debt (i.e. a policy of state austerity) difficult. The speculative dimension of
accumulation expresses the speculative integration of labour into the capital
relation. The unregulated expansion of credit and the abrasive attack on the working
class are closely interconnected. The more the state cut back on welfare spending, on
housing, health and social security, the more people were forced into debt in order to
maintain a tolerable standard of living. The use of credit as a means of sustaining
basic living conditions contradicted the government's policy of state austerity
designed to regain financial stability by enforcing debt over the working class
through the intensification of work and the imposition of tight money. The more
credit is committed, the more claims on not-yet existing surplus value accumulate,
while the central bank faces a growing mountain of claims on its national reserves in
the face of a falling rate of savings. The more the whole existence of capital is based
on credit, the more capital needs to push through changes in working practices,
changes in technology and intensification of work as well as reductions in state
expenditure in order to sustain the validity of credit. The more private debt was
stimulated during the 1980's, the more the state had to reduce its expenditure so as
to guarantee the pyramid of debt through bigger reserves (see chapter III). However,
the more the state sought to enforce debt through cuts in social expenditure, the more
private debt became a means either of securing the newly won property rights or of
sustaining basic subsistence levels, such as housing. Monetarism as a policy of state
austerity contradicted its result as the abrasive attack on living standards resulted
in an increase of debt which monetarism had pledged to eradicate. At the same time,
the inability of capital to control debt enforcement is oppressive: the individualising
form of private debt and its enforcement. The constitution of labour's strength as the
collective subject of debt is overtly oppressive in form. Mortgage default is the
fastet-growing cause of homelessness in Britain (see The Guardian 28.4. 1989), a
development which is getting worse since the increase in interest rates since
summer 1989. Recently, the Policy Studies Institute (Berthoud/Kempson 1990)
showed that, by 1989, one in nine households struggled to make ends meet and had
built up debts worth of £2.9 billion to a variety of creditors. With 2.4 million of the
21 million families in the UK in arrears, the unemployed and single parent families
are most at risk. Debt not only relates to consumer debt and mortgages, but also to
the increasing difficulties in meeting the rent and rate/poll tax bills. Moreover,
poverty and homelessness increased dramatically (see The Observer 14.5. 1989). In
the second half of 1989 alone, the rate of home loan arrears rose by 29% (for
households in arrears of between 6 and 12 months), while about 450,000 to
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600,000 families are said to be two months in arrears (see The Guardian, 5.3.
1990). These arrears are not confined to the poorer regions but include wealthy
areas in the south (ibid.).
The measure of social control involved in the imposition of the poll tax is not new:
restructuring of the welfare state in terms of efficieny and repression, including the
monetary disciplining of the low paid and unemployed, the centralisation of
budgetary control and the denial of oppositional space. However, the significance of
the poll tax is that, unlike campaigns against low pay, anti-trade union policies,
training schemes, unemployment etc., its character is that of an opposition to a quite
general mode of control: the indiscriminate imposition of the lurid face of equality in
and through the power of money. The indiscriminate imposition of money in command
renders problematic strategies of divide-and-rule although it does not exclude them.
The anti-poll tax campaign makes debt a political issue, resisting repressive and
individualising forms of domination imposed through private debt. The government's
attemp to use the genuine failure of local management of services, as a means of
provoking pressure from below on 'high' spending councils, failed. Councils set a poll
tax level above central targets while the protest against the poll tax has not focused
on high spending councils but, rather, on the imposition of the poll tax itself. As
government saw its efforts to exploit widespread disenchantment over local
government frustrated, the recent attempt to regain control over spending through
'poll-tax'-capping of councils involves, fundamentally, the attempt to undermine
resistance in opposition to oppressive forms of debt enforcement by reducing the
overall level of local taxation and by bringing the local state much more closely into
the ambit of the central state through a further squeeze on local budgets and a further
reduction of local independence from central government. The crucial element which
holds the system together is debt enforcement (see CSE Edinburgh 1989). The
international fragility of credit-relations manifests the fragility of control through
debt. Whether the Thatcher government will be able to impose a socially controlled
enforcement of debt through the institution of the poll tax, including
'poll-tax'-capping, is, as yet, open to question. However, the quite general
imposition of money in command through the poll-tax involves a possible focus for
resistance to debt enforcement and deteriorating living standards. Such a resistance
might well lead to a recomposition of the working class through collective antagonism
to money in command. Struggles which confront the imposition of capitalist command
through debt involve the question of legality, especially in the face of denial of
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political representation within the institutional form of the state.
IV Conclusion
The past decade has seen an attempt to impose fundamental changes in the form of
the state, and in particular to secure the systematic subordination of the state and the
social to the money form of capitalist domination over labour. The relative success of
the monetarist attempt to reconstitute social relations on the basis of the unfettered
operation of the market forces rested on the defeats of the organised working class in
the struggles of the late 1970's and early 1980's, precipitated by the crisis of the
Keynesianism, and the world boom of the mid 1980's, unleashed by global relaxation
of monetary policies and sustained by an explosion of international credit. The crash
of 1987 has made clear how fragile were the foundations of the boom, including the
reconstitution of social relations on the basis of the market. During the 1980's, the
development of the state can be systematised into three different phases of the class
struggle over domination: the indiscriminate attempt to reimpose the power of money
over capital, the working class and the state in the early 1980's, institutionalised in
the form of the MTFS; the attempt to reconstitute social relations on the basis of the
market and in terms of property owner and citizen, that rested on the fiscal and
credit explosion within a tight monetary framework; and, lastly, the crash in 1987
that reasserted the collective power of labour in oppressive form: debt.
The role of the state was to consolidate the reimposition of the power of money
through the repressive means of law and order control, involving the state as a
concentrated force of the global power of money. The political consequences of the
break down of Bretton Woods manifested themselves to the state on three fronts: the
need to regain control over public finances, the subordination of the working class to
the centrality of money and the political tutelage of capitalist restructuring,
including financial support for industry and the creation of a climate for the
reassertion of the right to manage. Despite a rigorous deflationary policy
discriminating in favour of capital, the social contract failed to achieve a socially
controlled imposition of the limits of accumulation. However, the social contract was
successful in demobilising class conflict and in demoralising resistance to
deflationary policies. With the break-down of the social contract, the Conservatives
were able to articulate the limits of state intervention and to define the contours of
political reality much more forcefully in terms of the subordination of political
discretion to the limits of the market, i.e. the power of world money. Monetarist
ideology manifests a pragmatic response to the uncertainties that govern
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international credit relations as it seeks to free the state from obligations towards
the working class by deregulating social responsibility to the market forces.
Monetarism is not just an ideology of 'household economics' (Keegan 1984), but the
ideological expression of capital's and the state's attempt to decompose the social
relations and to redefine the role of the state vis-a-vis capital and the working class.
The MTFS articulated the subordination of the state, capital, and the working class
to the money power of capital. The monetarist attempt to reimpose the power of
money involved a systematic exercise of state power strong enough to defeat and to
demobilise the class struggle. With its MTFS, the Conservative government sought to
resolve the crisis of capitalist accumulation by forcing employers to reassert their
right to manage, by undermining labour through mass unemployment and by
eradicating public debt through deflationary attack. By doing so, however, the
Conservatives reinforced and intensified the crisis-ridden tension between the
various value forms in the unity of the circuit of social capital. The attempt to effect
control through the targeting of the money supply was an unmitigated failure,
domestically and internationally. The debtor crisis in 1982 expressed the rupture of
capitalist reproduction through the (possible) collapse of international
credit-relations. The debtor crisis indicated that the formidable attack on the
working class through debt, high interest rates and debt enforcement had come into
conflict with its effects: i.e. the use of tight money as a means of imposing control had
broken down. The rupture was dominated by the (multiplicity) of state(s) through
the relaxation of monetarist macro-economic policies and renewed global deficit
financing based upon the political guarantee of debt by the US. The failure of the state
to resolve the contradictions of capital by reimposing the limits of the market in the
form of scarce and costly credit indicates that the state cannot resolve the
contradictions of 'capital', but that the state is a moment of these contradictions;
reproducing them in a political form. However, the MTFS proved to be of vital
importance in disorganising the collective power of labour through the disciplining
forces of unemployment, deprivation and economic destruction.
The relaxation of monetarist policies, internationally and domestically, involved,
fundamentally, the use of Keynesian macroeconomic instruments. During the 1980's
Keynesian policies continued to be used. However, the aim was to regain control over
public spending, to enforce law and order, to protect property and to encourage
property rights. Credit expansion, far from resolving the crisis of domination,
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expresses the collective power of labour. The relaxation of monetarist policies
acknowledged that the only consistent strategy of integrating labour into the capital
relation is sustained accumulation; Keynesian policies in a monetarist framework
sought to control through monetary expansion in a tight monetary framework. While
Labour in government "had pursued monetarist macro-economic policies within a
Keynesian ideological and political framework, the government of the New Right
increasingly adopted Keynesian macro-economic policies within a monetarist
ideological and political framework" (Clarke 1988a, p. 171). The relaxation of
money and credit policies made it possible to contain the class struggle on the basis of
the (generosity of the) market. The reconstitution of the circuit of social capital on
the basis of credit expansion and monetary attack on the working class did not
contain the tendency to the overaccumulation of capital. Rather, Keynesian policies in
a monetarist framework intensified the speculative dimension of accumulation,
permitting an intensification of overaccumulation by diverting surplus capital into
financing the growing mountain of public and consumer debt, domestically and
internationally. Credit-sustained accumulation reproduced the speculative dimension
of accumulation, while the rise in productivity rested on the scrapping of
unproductive plant, the shedding of labour, and the intensification of work. At the
same time, the credit-sustained accumulation made possible the fragmentation of the
working class on the basis of the divisive imposition of the wage relation: i.e. the
conceding of rising wages to some and the destruction of the relation between public
spending and (direct and indirect) wages for those pushed to the margins. "It is true
that monetarism does not represent a frontal assault on the welfare state, on which
expenditure has continued to rise, or on the working class, sections of which have
enjoyed an unprecedented growth in living standards, even if they have paid the price
in insecurity of employment and the intensification of labour" (Clarke 1988a, p.
173). The use of public expenditure focused on the disorganisation of class premised
on the divisive orientation of collective welfare provision to the market (i.e.
contracting out, privatisation, deregulation of wage protection, integration of
employment and social policies and encouragement of private health care for
example). In its second term, the Thatcher government built on its success in the
first term by tightening-up central budgeting control and labour laws, by defeating
the miners, by recomposing class in terms of property owner and citizen, by
abdicating collective responsibility for public services and by making the
unemployed work for their benefits. The political integration of labour involved the
use of Repressive means of political domination in the attempt to reimpose the
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capitaist tendency to limit necessary labour against the tendency of working class
struggle to limit the provision of labour power (i.e. reduction in the working week
and, more fundamentally, the subordination of social production to human needs and
aspirations). The monetary expansion that this reimposition required was overtly
repressive in form as it fragmented and isolated the working class on the basis of the
category of the property owner and as it imposed the discipline of the market
without, simultaneously, reinvoking the Keynesian guarantee of full employment.
The money expansion expresses the constituting power of labour in and against
capital. The containment of labour in the form of capital took on two different forms:
credit and fiscal expansion, permitting a containment of labour's productive power
in ever more speculative forms, and the expansion of domestication costs which were
designed to decompose class relations and to destroy the Keynesian nexus between
public expenditure and wages (i.e. the transformation of protest into demand). The
monetary decomposition of class relations involved a repressive use of public
expenditure, entrusting to those upon whose passivity the stability of a policy of
state austerity rested the generosity of the market (shareholders, owners
occupation), while imposing poverty and repressive bureaucratic supervision upon
those pushed to the margins of the labour market.
During the 1980's, the welfare state was progressively transformed from an
institution designed to maintain workers for capitalist use for exploitation into an
t
institution of social control over those pushed to the margins of social life. However,
this transformation of the welfare state was, firstly, expensive and proved,
secondly, difficult to implement (see the disparate development in the reconstruction
of the welfare state, NHS). The abrasive attack concentrated on those sections of the
working class which could be separated from the organised labour movement much
more easily than others (i.e. those on the bottom of the wage hierarchy, women,
young workers, the unemployed and 'racial' minorities). The attack on the welfare
state focused on those already marginalised from the organised labour movement and
hardest hit by the recession. On this score, welfare policies involved the injection
not only of commercial criteria (i.e. the recomposition of the welfare state in terms
of efficiency), but also the attempt to impose the spirit of inequality, i.e. the
inequality of the private market individual. The imposition of the abstract equality of
money involved the imposition of inequality because "the power which each
individual exercises over the activity of others or over social wealth exists in him as
the owner of exchange values, of money. The individual carries his social power, as
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well as his bond with society, in his pocket" (Marx 1973, p. 157). The reimposition
of the money power of capital abnegates an integration of labour on the basis of social
reform in favour of the rule of money: i.e. the reconstitution of social relations on
the basis of financial ability, the equality of the market individual to the power of
money. The reconstitution of the welfare state on the basis of the market entailed the
encouragement of the individualistic pillage of social co-operation (examples at hand
are the encouragement of owner occupation and MSC-training schemes). In the face
of credit-sustained accumulation, the abdication of public responsibility for private
provisions and the erosion of those provisions, remaining in public responsibility,
implied the market-led recomposition of the class on the basis of property owner:
i.e. the recomposition of class in terms of the strong and able on the one hand and on
the other those who are not. The reconstitution of social relations on the basis of the
market involved the imposition of inequality through a selective access to
hierarchical values (i.e. wage differentials and segmentation of social aspirations).
Ali this involved the reimposition of the lurid face of equality which characterises
the organisation of work on the basis of exchange relations. The containment of the
class struggle involved the monetary and legal decomposition of class relations. The
imposition of poverty, hierarchical values and individualistic pillages of social
cooperation were used as a means to counter any tendency to working class solidarity.
The individualising imposition of the power of money involved the attempt to
fragment social resistance to a policy of state austerity. The decomposition of class on
the basis of the categories of property owner and citizen was made possible by
sustained accumulation and an array of state violence, stretching from the
repressive use of the welfare state to the paramilitary combat of dissent and the legal
and monetary disciplining of trade unions to police their members without exchange
for even the semblance of political involvement. However, the monetary and legal
decomposition of class and the attempt to recompose social relations on the basis of
the individualising and fragmenting form of the wage relation commanded an
expansion of the money supply against which monetarism officially proclaimed. In
the face of pressure to regain control over public finances, the Thatcher government
financed the growing costs of the monetary decomposition of the working class
through the privatisation of nationalised industry. Privatisation, in turn,
contributed to the divisive recomposition of class in terms of the category of the
property owner.
The attempt to reconstitute social relations on the basis of the unfettered operation
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of market forces involved the use of public spending as a means not of recuperating
adverse effects of unemployment but, rather, of disciplining the social through
monetary and legal means of control. This attack was based on the ideology of the
market: the market provides best. Far from 'rolling back the boundaries of the state'
and introducing more individual freedom and choice through the market, the attack on
the working class involved a repressive use of public spending: the centralisation of
the hierarchical composition of political domination and a politically supervised
encouragement of market relations. The reimposition of the power of money rested on
a systematic exercise of state power that defined social activity in terms of the
market and that denied even the semblance of working class political influence. The
shift in emphasis of the meaning of consensus to unquestioned obedience and the
crushing of 'disobedience' through a repressive display of state power reaffirms
negatively the uncertainty and difficulty capital faced in securing the imposition of a
policy of state austerity.
In the wider context of the monetary decomposition of class relations, monetarism
has been far from dead after 1982. Monetarism's most popular face in Britain has
been mass unemployment, fencing off of political involvement, military policing of
oppositional activities, anti-trade union policies, centralisation of budgetary control
over the local state and the use of national interest as an all-purpose excuse for
secrecy and supervision of social behaviour. State intervention took the form of a
preemptive and coercive breaking of dissent. Monetarism expresses the reimposition
of the right of property through the subordination of political criteria to the rule of
money: the eradication of collective forms of working class integration into the state
in favour of the individualising subordination of the social subject to the abstract
equality of money. The fragmenting imposition of the rule of money and the treatment
of social activity as possibly subversive responded to the break-down of the
integration of class in the form of the 'corporatist collective' (social contract),
precipitated by the class struggle of the late 1970's. The break-down of class
collaboration involved a rupture of political domination through corporatist forms of
class organisation. This rupture indicated the recomposition of class as the social
subject in and against money in command, domestically and internationally. The
Thatcher government acknowledged the recomposition of class by articulating
resentment against the Keynesian concept of the interventionist state and by the
attempt to decompose class relations through legal, monetary and coercive means, all
of which were designed to fragment and systematise the working class in terms of the
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individualistic pillage of social co-operation and the imposition of hierarchical
access to the benefits generated by the boom. These interventions were legitimised by
the apparent economic success of the Thatcher government: the boom of the 1980's.
The recomposition of the working class on the basis of the categories of citizen and
property owner, in antagonism to Keynesian forms of collective integration,
involved, fundamentally, the reassertion of the form of the capitalist state power
through the reimposition of the rule of money. However, the monetary decomposition
of class relations is fraught with contradictions. The decomposition of class relations
demanded domestication costs, militating against the attempt to cut back on debt.
Further, the segmentation of labour markets strengthened the bargaining position of
sections of the working class, permitting managerial strategies of transforming
protest into wages concessions. Far from restraining wage pressure, the
segmentation of labour markets consolidated internal labour markets, permitting
wage concessions in exchange for intensification of work. The containment of labour's
productive power on the basis of credit-expansion is interconnected with rising
costs of containing the disruptive power of labour in the form of fiscal incentives for
private ownership and domestication costs for imposing necessary labour by
controlling social labour through training schemes and bureaucratic forms of
control. Further, the monetary decomposition of class relations involved pacification
costs in the form of subsidies to industry and law and order spending. The
determination to crush dissent and to subordinate social relations to the rule of
money involved not only the denial of even the semblance of political influence of
social organisations but, also, the use of secrecy and emergency measures as an
all-purpose excuse to guarantee and to maintain formal exchange equality. Instead of
achieving social normalisation through material concessions, the polarising
imposition of the rule of money involved the pacification and domestication of social
conflict through violence (i.e. the violence of equality, unemployment, benefit cuts,
bureaucratic supervision and paramilitary policing). On the basis of financial
deregulation, the violence of equality comprised the contradiction of forcing into debt
people seeking to maintain basic cash flows (e.g. rent, mortgage and consumer credit
difficulties). While the monetary decomposition of the relation between public
spending and wages involved the attempt to enforce debt, the imposition of tight
money encouraged debt. The monetarist state policy of austerity rejected the
Keynesian attempt to transform protest into demand in favour of the transformation
of protest into overtly repressive, and speculative, pacification costs. The
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availability of debt to the working class involves the individualising decomposition of
class relations, thus helping to stave off resistance. However, the speculative
character of control through debt obtains in the rejection of subordinating one's
conditions of life to deteriorating living standards, contradicting the monetarist
attempt to enforce debt. Despite monetarism's attempt to enforce debt, it has presided
over a pyramid of debt, the enforcement of which is open to the development of the
class struggle. The resistance to a quite general attempt to enforce debt (i.e. the poll
tax) might well lead to a much broader struggle over domination based on debt.
The monetarist attempt to reimpose the rule of money, that is to say, the
'international terrorism of money' (cf. Marazzi 1976) involved the systematic
rationalisation of the relations of power. The reconstitution of the social on the basis
of credit expansion rested on the systematic exercise of state power so as to control
the uncertainty involved in the fragility of debt and possible cash control collapses.
The systematic exercise of state power entails preemptive counterrevolution so as to
safeguard the paradigmatic right of property which, as credit, obtains in the form of
a claim on future surplus value. The systematic exercise of state power entails a
preemptive use of force to make certain the alienation of the present to the future,
i.e. the ultimate enforcement of debt. The disorganisation of class on the basis of the
market (citizen and property owner) involves an expansion of the money supply
which monetarism had originally pledged to control. Monetarism developed two faces:
an unregulated expansion of credit and an abrasive attack on the working class.
Instead of controlling labour's productive and disruptive power through debt
enforcement, as institutionalised in the MTFS, the relaxation of monetary policy
involved a control through credit expansion, including private debt. The price capital
and the state had to pay for the pacification of the class conflict is not only high but,
also, devastating. The control through debt reinforced the collective power of labour
in and through the speculative dimension of accumulation. "The crash in 1987
dramatically brought home how precarious were the foundations of the apparent
success of monetarism" (Clarke 1988a, p. 175). The crash signals the exhaustion of
command through credit expansion. It brought to the fore the collective power of
labour in and against capital, a collective power which monetarism had sought to
control through the divisive imposition of money in command. The failure to turn
credit into effective command over labour reasserts the limits of speculative
accumulation in the form of a chain collapse of credit: mass devaluation of money
capital is the form that the presence of labour in capital then takes. The formidable
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attack on the working class has come into conflict with its effects: the recomposition
of the social in terms of the republic of debt and its possible default. The republic of
debt contradicts the monetarist policy of state austerity, the recomposition of the
working class on the basis of the category of property owner being transformed to
the recomposition of labour as the collective antagonism to money in command. Since
the crash, the tightening-up of the hierarchical composition of political domination
no longer responds to the uncertainty of debt control but, rather, to the real
possibility of this control's collapse. The reassertion of crisis and overaccumulation
in the form of a crisis of world money undermined the recomposition of class in
terms of property owner as property ownership asserted itself in the form of the
republic of debt. With the post-crash rise in interest rates, and particularly the
poll tax, the abrasive attack on the working class turns into the systematic exercise
of state power to enforce debt. While capital was able to dominate the rupture in
1982, the relaxation of monetary policies in a tight monetary framework
reconstituted the movement of the contradictory unity of surplus value production on
the basis of debt and speculation. Far from undermining the strength of labour in and
through debt enforcement, monetary expansionism on the basis of debt reshuffling
and debt enforcement over conditions of life and over the state (e.g. privatisation)
came to the fore as a means of containing the power of labour. During the 1980's, the
class struggle reconstituted the social subject in overtly repressive form (private
debt and its enforcement, imposition of poverty, deteriorating standards of living
etc.).
The significance of monetarism is largely rhetorical, its practical results being
contradicted by its practice (41). The more monetarism pledged to roll back the
state and to reconstitute the social on the basis of the market, the more the state
became interventionist. The more monetarism pledged to reconstitute the social on
the basis of the individual, the more it expanded debt. The more monetarism
celebrated the apparent success of its policy, the more it relied on traditional
Keynesian methods (fiscal and credit expansion) and the more it relied on the
systematic use of state power to make certain what otherwise might have been
disruptive. Despite its attack on the relation between wages and public expenditure,
the central institutions of the welfare state have not been destroyed, nor has the level
of welfare expenditure been reduced. The more it attacked public ownership, the
more it monopolised markets through the effects of privatisation, a deregulation of
Keynesian forms of intervention whose revenue financed the repressive
transformation of the welfare state. Despite its rejection of support to industry, it
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has continued to pour in money. Despite its attack on wages, average wages increased
on average much faster than in the UK's main competitors on the world market.
While the trade unions were successfully restricted to representing a distinct
workers' interest in industry, the extension of the working class beyond the direct
capitalist command for exploitation forced the New Right to organise one of the
biggest employment programmes, using public expenditure as a means to segment the
working class through individualising forms of monetary and legal intervention.
Despite its rejection of the concept of the interventionist state, the state become
more and more interventionist in terms of centralised budget control, secrecy as an
all-purpose excuse to cfush resistance, centralised planning of economic
development (financial support and regional/urban development policies),
centralised control over health, education, policing, welfare provisions and
employment (MSC). Despite its rejection of Keynesianism, it used Keynesian
macro-economic policies to sustain accumulation. The more monetarism relied on
the expansion of public expenditure, the more it relied on undoing the way in which
social relations were constituted since the war: pushing trade unions out of the state,
restricting lawful strike action, restricting, through penal law, the trade union
representation of a wider social interest; cutting back on welfare expenditure by
limiting welfare to an enabling role, by making collective provision a tradable
commodity, by using public expenditure as a means of imposing poverty on the basis
of forced labour (MSC training schemes, low pay, black economy). The more
monetarism proclaimed in favour of the democratic constitution of society, "the
increasingly ruthless subordination of civil society and the state to the power of
money has ... led to the progressive erosion of the legitimacy of representative and
democratic bodies, which are reduced to the fora within which particular interests
press their partisan claims, and against which monetarism asserts the primacy of
the gneral interest embodied in the disinterested rule of money" (Clarke 1988a, p.
175). Despite the results contradicting monetarism's practice, the radicalisation of
existing developments (i.e. accumulation of debt, speculation, poverty,
unemployment, and coercive imposition of law and order) was overtly repressive,
individualising, isolating, and violent in form. The imposition of the abstract average
of equality entails the systematic use of state power as the concentrated force of
money in command. The attack on the working class displayed the impersonality of
money in the form of the overtly oppressive use of force.
The offensive against the working class "involves a fundamental restructuring of
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the relation between capital, the working class and the state, involving not simply a
shift in the balance of economic and political power, but a change in the form of the
state and class relations, in which some elements of the working class gain at the
expense for others" (Clarke 1988a, p. 3). The ruthless legal and monetary
intervention into the conditions of life involved the reconstitution of the social
relations on the basis of the market, the generosity of which was entrusted to fiscal
and credit expansion, notably the budget deficit financing of demand in the US, and to
the competence of penal law enforced through 'paramilitary policing'. The legal and
monetary intervention into the conditions of life denied Keynesian inspired forms of
corporatist recognition of a distinct workers' interest. Instead, it involved legal and
monetary forms of individualisation: instead of political representation, the
reassertion of state power involved the imposition of law and order command, i.e.
unquestioned obedience. The attempt to reconstitute the social on the basis of the
unfettered operation of the market forces involved more than just an abrasive attack
on the working class but, more fundamentally, a polarising legal and monetary
decomposition of its collective power. "Despite the political collapse of the Left,
monetarist policies have faced widespread opposition and determined resistance, both
in and against the state apparatus. Nevertheless monetarism has been able to prevail
politically, partly because of the fragmented character of the opposition, but
primarily because of the sustained world boom" (Clarke 1988a, p. 175). However,
the increase of debt is the most significant indicator for the collective power of the
working class: the inconvertibility of money capital into effective command over
labour and the containment of labour's productive power within the form of capital
through a speculative deferral of mass devaluation and liquidation of capital. There is
an overaccumulation of capital: more capital than can make a reasonable rate of
profit; the speculative accumulation of capital is not a sign of the strength of
capitalism, but an expression of its weakness. The key to the validity of credit is how
effectively capital can exploit labour. The speculative accumulation of capital is not
simply the result of the spirits of investors, but is rather a symptom of the
inconvertibility of money capital into a reasonable rate of profit from the
exploitation of labour. The crash indicates the political exhaustion of the attempt to
control the working class through the instantiation of the generosity of the market
through credit expansion and fiscal explosion. The reassertion of the face of equality
in the form of debt involves the political disciplining of the working class to the
power of money through the state: i.e. the political imposition of the generality of
social existence (value production) over the conditions of life in and through the
322
elementary form of value (i.e. money). The reassertion of money in command
involves the state as a force that attains generality as the 'harmonies' last refuge'
(Marx 1973, p. 886); harmonies of formal equality and formal freedom upon
which, in turn, the social constitution of the form of the state rests. The crisis of
global deficit financing of capitalist reproduction involves the state in becoming the
collective representative of money in command: the subordination of the working
class to tight money and the enforcement of debt by means of force.
Notes
1: M3 is defined as "notes and coins in circulation with the public plus all sterling deposits
(including certificates of deposits) held by UK residents, in both the public and private
sector, with the money sector" (Thompson 1986, p. 21).
2: Regarding BL, the contradiction between the reimposition of the power of money, i.e. the
reconstruction of the market, and a policy of monetary expansionism came to the fore: "Sir
Keith Joseph at the Department of Industry wrote an elaborate brief advocating the need
urgently to subsidise British Leyland to the cost of £990 million, and then retrieving his
monetarist principles spoke with eloquence in cabinet against his own paper; he - that is the
monetarist talking Joseph - was defeated" (Schwarz 1987, p. 137).
3: During a period of only five years major riots appeared at: St. Paul's (1980);Brixton
(4/1981); Toxteth and Moss Side (7/1981); St. Paul's (1/1982); Notting Hill Gate
(4/82); Toxteth (4/1982 and 7/1982); St. Paul's (6/1983); Handsworth Birmingham
(9/85); Brixton (9/85); Tottenham (10/1985). See Taylor 1987 and Kettle/Hodges 1982.
4: See S. Hall et.al. (1978), Miles/Phizacklea (1984), Davids (1989), and Kettle/Hodges
(1982) on the history of racist disorganisation of class and on the use of racist
discrimination under Thatcher.
5: The PSBR target in 1980/1 was £8.5 billion and the outturn was £12 billion; in 1982/3,
the target was £7.5 billion and the outturn was £9.2 billion. The same difference between
target and outturn can be reported for 1983-4 when the target was £8.2 billion and the
outturn £9.8 billion (Thompson 1986, p. 16).
6: Public Expenditure increased from £111.7 billion (or 39.5% of GDP) in 1979/80 to
£113.5 billion (or 42% of GDP) in 1980/1. In 1981/2 it increased to £116.5 billion (or
43.5% of GDP). By 1983/4 it had risen to £120.3 billion (or 42.3% of GDP) (fomlinson
1986, p. 18).
7: Supply siders do not dispute the importance of the money supply. However, they claim
that "far too much attention has been paid to the task of restoring financial stability,and not
enough to the problem of getting the economy going" (Gamble 1988, p. 46). While
monetarism is condemned for being too restrictive and for failing to break the vicious cycle
of decline, supply siders focus on revitalising productive accumulation through fiscal
incentives, reducing the state's share in earned profits by cutting taxation. At the same
time, monetary scarcity is to be maintained for reducing inflationary pressure. Supply
siders acknowledge the primacy of production, that is the creation of value, while the
importance of a policy of sound money is maintained over the conditions of life.
8: By 1988, the bottom earners' income tax was reduced to 25% while highest income tax
rate was reduced to 40%. During the 1980's VAT increased from 8 to 15%. Additionally,
small business were awarded huge tax concessions (Sturm 1989, p. 48).
9: Alongside monetary expansionism in the US and the engineering of a Keynesian
pre-election boom in 1983, the imperialist exercise of military discipline over the
Falklands proved to be a sucessful measure to restore the fortunes of the Conservatives.
This war, arousing old imperialist feelings to the full, made Thatcher something like a
cultfigure of imperialist sentiments.
10: In Jessop et.al. (1987,1988), this shift in emphasis is not conceptualised as a
movement of the class struggle that coerced the Thatcher government to abandon its MTFS
and to replace economic policy by an explicit attack on the trade union scapegoat. While
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Jessop et.al. describe the shift as comprising a 'highly flexible strategy' which articulates
politically an 'accumulation strategy of flexible accumulation', Jessop and his co-authors
take the failure to control the money supply and the subsequent institutionalisation of a
speculative dimension of accumulation to be a consolidation of state power. While this
argument seems to me to be correct in terms of statecraft, i.e. the consolidation of
political power in the face of failure, the argument is fundamentally wrong in terms of the
implied consolidation of the capitalist state power. The political promotion of a speculative
dimension of accumulation expresses the failure of monetarist policies to regain control
over labour's productive and disruptive power and the aggressive strength of monetarism
to use its own failure as a measure to control, through speculation, debt and mass
unemployment. The crash in 1987 has brought to life the collective power of the working
class whose repression is based on speculation and debt.
11: Additional revenues were discovered in North Sea Oil profits, as the Petroleum Tax
was increased under Thatcher (Gamble 1988).
12: On the earnings from privatisation see OECD: United Kingdom (Economic Surveys),
Paris 1987, p. 68
13: "Some ministers have justified the subsidies in terms reminiscent of those used for the
Malvinas/Falklands - if you have to spend a lot to give people their freedom, so be it" (Ball
1985, p. 17, with reference to Heseltine).
14: Jessop's (et.al. 1988) claims that the recomposition of class in terms of property
owners and citizen involves some kind of popular capitalism which consolidated the
'hegemonic project' of Thatcherism. Such a view conceptualises the development of
so-called 'popular capitalism' at face value. The crash in 1987 brought to the fore the
fragility of popular capitalism. For a conceptual critique of Jessop's concept of 'hegemonic
project' see Psychopedis (1990) and Clarke (1983).
15: See recent attempts to reformulate corporatist theory on the basis of 'bipartist'
negotiations between government and industry by W. Grant ed, (1985); Cawson (ed.
1985,1988); Scholten ed. (1987); and Streek/Schmitter (eds. 1985).
16: On the organisational structure of the TUC and its history see Kaiser 1989; R.M.
Martin 1980
17: A recent controversy over predominantly politically or industrially motivated strikes
concerns the dispute over the abolishing of the Dock Labour Scheme in 1989. In the face of
possible financial liabilities arising from unofficial strike action, the TGWU was forced to
discipline its members and call workers back to work so as to hold a secret ballot
(following the 1984 Act) and to gather legal advice for making the dispute look like a
genuinely industrial one.
18: A further labour law was introduced in 1988. with which the Conservatives sought to
close some gaps which became apparent during the miners' strike and the News
International dispute. The Act provides the possibility for unorganised employees and
individual trade union members to take the trade union to court. This provision undermined
a loophole of previous legislation in that courts can no longer reject court actions by
claiming that the individual is protected by trade union statutes. Government established an
independent body to give legal and financial advice for individual court actions. Further,
trade unions are no longer allowed to discipline scabs. Also, employers gained the right to
take to a trade union to court if it puts pressure on individual members to take part in
strike action. Finally, the law ruled out strike action whose aim it is to establish closed
shops; and declared the dismissal of individual employees who do not join a trade union
automatically unfair (see Schmidt 1989).
19: On the miners' strike see Goodman 1985 and the collection of papers edited by Beyon
(ed.) 1985.
20: After the miners' strike in 1974 the NRC was in operation on the following occasions:
October 1980 to February 1981 (full activation) during the prison officers' dispute;
summer 1981 during the inner city riots (full activation); early summer 1982 during the
papal visit (full activation). During the miners' strike in 1984-5, the NRC was first put into
its monitoring phase and became soon fully activated (see Kettle 1985). Additionally, the
NRC holds annual practice exercises.
21: See also the recent LINK-UP campaign of the TGWU and GMB's FLAIR campaign. Both
campaigns seek to organise the growing section of part-time and temporary workers (see
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Oliver/Wilkinson 1988).
22: For recent studies on market socialism and individual rights see Esping-Andersen
(1985); Plant 1988; Przeworski (1985,1986); for critique see Hubner/Stanger (1986)
and Muller (1988).
23: See Hyman (1987) for an assessment of the proposals put forward by McCarthy and
the TUC in 1986; and of the critique voiced by the different protagonists against each
other.
24: While it would be misguided to regard statuatory rights protecting the low waged as an
effective instrument in the past, the weakening of wage councils is, nevertheless,an
important moment of the legal decomposition of established working class advances.
25: Spence develops his argument in reference to Knight 'Investment profits and
unemployment; the prospects for capitalist recovery', in Cowling, K. et.al.: Out of Work:
Perspectives on Mass Unemployment. (University of Warwick) 1984
26: Hyman develops his argument in reference to Michels (1948) and C.W. Mills
(1 948/1 970)
27: "In August 1983, Norman Tebbit (then the Employment Secretary) wrote to the
catering industry wage council opposing an annual increase in workers' pay of 9p an hour to
£1.63 an hour; he said it would be 'harmful to business and jobs" (Esam et.al. 1985, p. 45).
28: These schemes are not administered by the MSC but by the Department of Employment
(see Goldstein 1984).
29: The labour legislation of the 1980's makes strike action against cheap labour unlawful
as it would violate the law in several aspects: no political strikes; strikes only against the
direct employer and direct working conditions.
30; 'NIT' stands for the government's New Training Initiative out of which YTS was born.
31: Pike, 'Construction Chief Warns MSC on Training Scheme', Financial Times, 11.3.
1983.
32: The integration of employment and social policy responds to the failure of the market to
bring down unemployment in the face of increasing wage differentials and economic boom.
According to monetarist prescription the reconstruction of the market would bring about an
accommodation of wages levels, allowing the problem of unemployment to be resolved
through the determination of prices by means of the interplay of demand and supply.
However, wages increased on average, in spite of a massive pool of cheap labour. The
Thatcher government regarded the boom as indicating the self-regulating power of the
market. Thus left monetarists struggling to explain why it is the case that in the UK
average wages are not responding to high levels of unemployment.
33: I laid the foundation of the terms 'subjective constitution of constant capital' in chapter
II. The foundation of the term is the presence of labour in and against capital. When speaking
about the subjective constitution of constant capital I emphasise the contradictory
constitution of constant capital: the revolutionising of social reproduction and the need for
capital to confine social reproduction within the limits of the reproduction of capital. The
contradictory character of capital's revolutionising of the means of production involved the
appropriation of the products of labour on the basis of an accumulation of debt and the
recomposition of labour's disruptive power which capital sought to contain through
managerial strategies such as work-with-pride.
34: These arguments are closely related to the work of Negri (1987b) and Agnoli (1986).
35: Jessop's fet.al. 1984) use of the term 'two-nation' strategy expresses the same
phenomena without, however, insisting on the class conflict in and through which the
Thatcher government was forced to segment the collective strength of labour. In Jessop,
the term is used in a merely descriptive way. Jessop et.al. use the term as a
presupposition, rather than as an analytical concept of social conflict.
36: The expansion of social security expenditure was due both to the jump in the numbers
of people claiming unemployment benefits, and to the sharp increase in the numbers of
pensioners (Krause 1989).
37: The Lothian Regional Council was forced to make cuts under the direct control of the
Scottish Secretary of State in 1981 (Krieger 197;D.Hall 1983). In contrast to local
authorities in England and Wales, the statuatory position in Scotland is much more
restraint, "since the Scottish Office has powers to reduce its grant to authorities which
are deemed to be spending unreasonably, and require either cuts or rate reductions to be
325
made to obtain the grant" (D.Hall 1983, p. 64).
38: The 1985 Access to Information Act gave legal right to access to documents of the
local authorities, including its meetings and sub-committees. Local authorities have fallen
short of the provision of the legislation (Travers 1987, p. 22).
39: The Social Fund was found unlawful by the High Court decision on February 21st, 1990.
The High Court ruling said the official guidance to local social fund officers that they should
be bound by cash limits was defective because it went beyond 'what could properly be
considered guidance' (see The Guardian 22.2. 1990).
40: Recently, a High Court decision reserved judgment on the Avon county council's
challenge to the decision of the Education Secretary to allow a school to opt out of its
control. The council claimed opting out would disrupt other childrens' education (see The
Guardian 22.2. 1990).




This chapter brings together the overall argument of the thesis.
The single most important historical event during the last two decades has been the
deregulation of the international money markets in 1971 and 1973. While the
policies of deregulation came to be identified in particular with Reagan and Thatcher,
the fundamental shift in the international composition of order to which their
policies responded was the disruption of the circuit of social capital. The rupture of
the system of Bretton Woods and the deregulation of the dollar from the gold standard
in the early 1970's did not come as a mere economic accident. By 1971, the crisis of
global overaccumulation had reached a point of no return. The crisis of containing the
productive and disruptive power of labour within the limits of accumulation
expressed itself in a tension between the credit-system and functioning capital, i.e.
between different value forms in the unity of the one process of social capital. The
supremacy of money capital is a direct expression of the overaccumulation of capital.
There was too much capital in the world, more capital than could make a reasonable
profit from the exploitation of labour. In turn, unemployed capital started to run all
over the world to yield profitable returns in speculative and unproductive
investment. The supremacy of monetary^expresses the productive and disruptive
power of labour as capital was made unemployed and as unemployed capital sought to
achieve profitable returns in a less risky investment on financial markets. The
supremacy of money capital constituted the contradictory unity of surplus value
production in the form of a conflict between functioning and money capital. The more
accumulation is sustained by credit, the more effectively capital needs to exploit
labour so as to increase profitability, which is the only way of keeping up with debt.
The key to capitalist reproduction is how effectively capital can exploit labour. The
speculative reproduction of capital involved an accumulation of claims on future
exploitation. The accumulation of debt expresses the contradictory character of the
capital relation, that is of the tendency of capital to the unfettered revolutionising of
the productive power of labour and the need to confine the productive power of labour
within the form of capital (profit). The speculative dimension of accumulation
signals the power of labour to resist an effective exploitation of its ability to work.
The power of labour is expressed in the inconvertibility of capital as command over
labour for the purpose of the expanded reproduction of surplus value production. The
power of labour to resist effective capitalist command over its productive power
expressed itself in the prolongation of the crisis of capitalist overaccumulation, thus
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permitting a more and more frenzied flow of capital around the world in pursuit of
profitable returns in speculative and unproductive investment.
In the most general terms, the form of the state is constituted through the global
character of accumulation. The subordination of the state to the power of money
implies that political stability has to be achieved on a national basis, which
presupposes the ability of the state to secure domestic accumulation, the limits of
which are presented by the overaccumulation of capital on a world scale. While the
state has influence over domestic accumulation, it has no such power over the global
accumulation of capital. The limits of the ability of the state to achieve the
integration of the working class and to secure domestic accumulation are defined by
the constitution of the contradictory unity of surplus value production on the world
market. Further, the limits of global accumulation impinge on the state in the form
of monetary pressure which imposes the need to tailor policies in such a way as to
avoid threats to the formal exchange equality of domestic accumulation on the world
market. Additionally, the nation state exists, fundamentally, in the form of the
international state system, and corresponding forms of international modes of
integration, of global accumulation. Nation state are a particular node within the
international flow of capital. During Bretton Woods, the nation states were closely
integrated into the international flow of capital on the basis of the subordination of
currencies to the dollar, and the convertibility of the dollar into gold. With the
failure of Bretton Woods, balance of payment problems impinged on states much
more directly as the insulating effect of Bretton Woods on currency speculation no
longer obtained. This meant that domestic attempts at managing economic growth
could no longer ignore the global limits of capitalist accumulation.
However, in the face of the unprecedented upsurge of class conflict in the late
1960's and early 1970's, management and political authorities were careful not to
provoke costly and damaging strikes. Originally, Keynesians viewed the deregulation
of international money as a liberation from the constraints on domestic management
imposed by Bretton Woods. "The floating of exchange-rates was celebrated as
successful in making Keynesian policy universally more elastic by removing the
restrictions of the international balance of payments" (Itoh 1978, p. 1). The
celebration of 'floating' expressed a pragmatic response to the class conflict which
had undermined Heath's deflationary policies in the early 1970's. The attempt to
normalise and pacify the class struggle gave rise to a corporatist strategy of class
328
collaboration, as institutionalised in the social contract between Labour and the trade
union movement. In the face of the the fundamental shift in the international
composition of order in the early 1970's, Keynesian policies of class collaboration
involved the sustaining of accumulation on the basis of rising inflation and growing
public expenditure problems. "The crisis of Keynesianism appeared as such mode of
integration confronted the limits of inflation and the fiscal crisis of the state"
(Clarke 1990a, ms. p. 19). Keynesian policies attempting to harness labour through
social reforms had lost their ability to contain the class struggle. The use of credit as
a means of deferring capital devaluation and liquidation implied a growing claim of
financial markets on reserve money, the guarantee of which depends on the ability of
the state to confine the working class within the limits of accumulation through
deflationary policies. In the mid-1970's, not only in Britain, but throughout the
world, governments said that they could no longer follow Keynesian policies so as to
maintain employment, welfare and living standards. When the Keynesian integration
of labour shifted from expansionary policies to deflationary attack, it became clear
that the attempt to transform protest into demand was to be replaced by a policy of
law and order control. How can one understand this development?
The break-down of Bretton Woods involved the (multiplicity of nation) state(s) in
acting as lender(s) of last resort. It was the central banks that guaranteed the
exchangeability of all money. The total supply of money could not be devalued by
simply destroying some money through inflation, credit default and collapse of banks
because of the threat to the international composition of order that rested on the
sustaining of credit. Money, as the supreme social power through which social
reproduction is subordinated to the reproduction of capital, is constituted, in the
form of credit, as the most abstract and fragile form of capital. The political
constitution of the presence of labour in and against capital in the form of the state
entails the compulsion to subordinate social reproduction to the production of
abstract wealth. Such a subordination, however, exists only in and through labour,
thus forcing the state to impose the limits of accumulation through the
disorganisation of class relations on the basis of the wage relation.
The integration of domestic accumulation on the world market rested on the
deflation of national money. The ability of the central banks to act as lender of last
resort depends on the acceptance by international money markets of the political
guarantee of debt and its enforcement. The acceptance of credit as a claim on tax
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revenue depends thus on sound monetary policies. The ability of the state to act as
lender of last resort depends on a socially controlled deflationary attack on the
working class. The attempt to regain control over the shop-floor through legal
intervention and to stimulate the reassertion of the right to manage in production
stems from the pressure on the exchange rates of national currencies through
speculative pressure by private capital responding to inadequate reserves,
precipitated by a drain on reserves. Such a drain questions the ability of the national
banks to guarantee credit, while the pressure on currency involves a threat to the
formal exchange equality of national wealth on the world market. In order to
guarantee the convertibility of currency, the state needed larger, not smaller,
reserves. The gaining of larger reserves implies the imposition of money in
command over the working class: i.e the subordination of the conditions of life to
tight money and the intensification of work so as to stabilise the reserves (earning of
foreign cash). The imposition of money in command involves the attempt to turn
credit into real value through a more effective exploitation of labour. The
reintegration of the multiplicity of nation states at the level of the international
terrorism of the money power of capital not only undermined national responses to
the crisis of accumulation. It also made the multiplicity of nation states much more
dependent on each other as the failure of one to contain the working class through
deflationary attack involved a disruptive development for all. The international
integration of nation states through unregulated world money markets imposed
uncertainty and volatility upon the national organisation of reproduction.
Uncertainty and volatility made itself felt by the state in the form of floating
exchange rates that asserted the limits of global accumulation over the state in the
form of monetary constraint. The global limits of accumulation imposed themselves
upon the state through speculative pressure on exchange rates, a drain on reserves,
interimperialist rivalry in the form of interest rates policies with which nation
states sought to secure the integration of domestic accumulation on the world market,
and, ultimately, the questioning of the ability of the central bank to act as lender of
last resort. The global character of accumulation implied that the domestic
organisation of money could not ignore the importance of maintaining the stability of
the formal exchange equality of currency on the world market so as to permit the
integration of national wealth into the global accumulation of capital. However, the
deflationary attack on the working class is not so much a question of the domestic
imposition of work but, more fundamentally, of the global stability of capitalist
accumulation. The central bank reserves are closely integrated with the global flow
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of money, making the achievement of higher domestic reserves a valued asset for the
guarantee of international credit-relations only insofar as the multiplicity of states
are able to contain the working class within the limits of accumulation (see, for
example, the global implications of a decline of the dollar and a sharp US contraction;
and see the implications of Mexico declaring insolvency in 1982).
The money power of capital needs to be conceived of at the most fundamental level of
the class struggle over the form of the capitalist state. This is so because, in money,
the abstract category of labour attains its most rational and at the same time
meaningless form of existence (M...M'), a mode of existence which is in contradiction
to productive activity and labour, while, at the same time, existing only in and
through the latter; and conversely. M...M' exists only in and through the ability of
capital to exploit labour effectively, i.e. to harness labour as the variable component
of capitalist command for exploitation. The money power of capital is the incarnation
of the capitalist ability to confine the abstract category of labour within the form of
capital, i.e. to turn labour's productive power against itself: the reification of the
form-giving fire of labour as thinglike (profit). It was through the reification of
labour in the form of money that the limits of capitalist reproduction asserted
themselves to productive capital (i.e. availability of credit, inflationary pressure on
profits, speculative deferral of insolvency). The reimposition of the limits of the
capitalist form of social reproduction involved class struggle over the intensification
of work (i.e. the recomposition of capitalist command over labour) and over the
recomposition of the way in which labour's disruptive power was channelled through
the state (i.e. the enforcement of debt in and through the destruction of the Keynesian
relation between public expenditure and wages, a relation which expressed the
political power of labour to command a living standard that involved the deficit
financing of demand).
With the break-down of Bretton Woods, domestic attempts to contain labour
through inflationary demand management were no longer insulated from short-term
speculation of capital on private money markets. The constitution of labour's
productive and disruptive power in the reified form of the global power of
unemployed capital put pressure on the domestic organisation of money. While this
pressure involved the power of money to command the intensification of labour so as
to guarantee the convertibility of credit into means of payment, the power of money
is contradictory. The intensification of labour entails the assertion of labour's
productive power which takes the form of a mass devaluation and liquidation of
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productive capital at the same time as the exploitation of labour requires a
commitment of further credit so as to finance the methods of production with which
to exploit labour. The reconstitution of the circuit of social capital on the basis of the
supremacy of the valorisation process over the labour process involves a threat to
the stability of credit-relations through the devaluation and liquidation of productive
capital, thus permitting a possible collapse of credit relations through the collapse of
accumulated claims on surplus value. During the 1970's capital sought to integrate
labour on the basis of controlled stagflation, during the early 1980's on the basis of
a vigorous enforcement of debt and after 1982 on the basis of deficit financing of
accumulation and a policy of state austerity over the conditions of life. The latter
phase corresponds to the monetarist policies of reconstituting the working class on
the basis of the market, i.e the instantiation of the economic freedom and non-coerced
equal exchange.
During the last two decades, the class struggle over the reimposition of capitalist
command over labour for exploitation intensified the speculative dimension of
accumulation, leading up to the debtor crisis in 1982 and the crash in 1987.
Productive accumulation has to succeed in order for money capital to be sustained,
while the failure to contain and to harness the productive and disruptive power of
labour reasserts, for productive capital, the limits of the market's capacity to
realise capital profitably in the form of monetary constraint leading to insolvency
and bankruptcy. At the same time, the default of productive capital threatens to bring
about a collapse of the credit-relations, upon which social relations rest. In order to
sustain the elementary form of capital, labour and productive capital need to be
sacrificed so as to make it possible for money capital to absorb heavy losses without
defaulting. At the same time, the sacrificing of surplus value production on the altar
of money destroys the basis through which the money power of capital subsists. The
constitution of class antagonism in the form of the supremacy of money capital over
productive activity and labour involves the state because of the state's responsibility
for national currency (state as central banker). The pressure on the financial
stability of the state indicates the reassertion of the contradictory unity of surplus
value production over the form of the capitalist state through the abstract equality of
the money power of capital. This power manifests itself to the state not in terms of
money as a measure of exploitation, or as a means of comparing and equalising
individual concrete labours with each other as private labour in a social context. The
power of money manifests itself through the power of money as capital. As I have
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argued in chapter II, the power of money as capital is collective and abstract because
it is the meaningless and, at the same time, the most elementary form of the abstract
category of labour, its incarnation and its (self-contradictory) negation. The
reassertion of the abstract equality of the money power of capital over the state
involves the state in reimposing upon the conditions of life the meaningless form of
capital. As I have also argued in chapter II, the state is a mode of existence of labour
in capitalism; the state mediates exploitation in and through the form of the rights of
property. This mediation involves the imposition of work through the commodity
form, the safeguarding of formally free and equal exchange as the precondition of
exploitation and the converse. Such mediation implies that the state exists as a
moment of the self-contradictory existence of capital: the tendency of capital to
develop the productive power of labour without limits and the need to confine
accumulation within the limits of capital. The key to this confinement is the ability
of capital to exploit labour effectively. As for the state, the key to the containment of
labour within the capitalist form of reproduction is the decomposition of class
relations on the basis of the value form, i.e. the imposition of market equality,
permitting a constitution of labour in the form of wage labour and decomposing class
relations on the basis of the fragmented property owner of labour power.
The class struggle over the confinement of labour within the limits of capital
involves the state in imposing the generality of social existence (value production)
over the social in and through the elementary form of capital (money). The state
attains existence as the collective representative of money in command: i.e. the
subordination of the conditions of life to monetary scarcity, involving law and order
control. The attempt to reimpose the abstract equality of value upon the conditions of
life involves the constitution of the class conflict over domination at the most
elementary, nevertheless self-contradictory, mode of existence of class antagonism.
The class struggle over the money power of capital involves the reconstitution of the
state as the political force of the harmonies' last refuge, i.e. the harmonies of formal
freedom and equality upon which the rule of value rests. This reconstitution of the
state does not involve the state in resolving the contradictions of capital. The state
reproduces them in political form.
Monetarist and Keynesian policies intervene into the circuit of social capital from
different extremes. While Keynesian credit policies intervene in the circuit of social
capital through the circuit of productive capital (demand management), accentuating
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the tension by discriminating against, and provoking a possible collapse of, money
capital, monetarism intervenes through the circuit of money capital. This
intervention accentuates the tension on the side of productive capital. In the face of
the deregulation of world money markets, the monetarist assertion that, if there is
inflation, then the money supply needs to be deflated, is basically correct. However,
it is correct only in the wider sense of monetarism, i.e. the monetary decomposition
of the class relations through the subordination of the working class to the abstract
equality of money in command. Keynesian policies sustained accumulation through a
speculative expansion of credit. Credit expansion sustains overaccumulation of
capital, precipitating a default of credit through the failure to turn credit into
effective command over labour, leading to the erosion of credit as a claim on surplus
value. The sustaining of accumulation through credit resulted in a deep recession by
the end of the 1970's, a recession that was the deeper the more accumulation was
sustained by credit. On the other hand, a monetarist credit policy sacrifices
production and labour on the altar of money to such an extent that it undermines the
basis of credit itself.
In the face of the reconstitution of the circuit of social capital on the basis of
credit, it is the financial system that determines the limits of the market and it is
the state that sets the general context of financial regulation by imposing a
restrictive money and credit policy. A restrictive credit policy was most vigorously
applied in the institutional form of the MTFS under the Conservative government in
the early 1980's. While attacking the working class through high interest rates and
mass unemployment, the presence of labour in and against capital manifested itself
through a massive collapse of productive capital and depressed international credit
relations. In the early 1980's, monetarist credit policy reasserted the crisis of
surplus value production through the collapse of productive accumulation. Moreover,
the rise in interest rates, domestically and internationally, pushed the margins into
the centre. The problem of international stability was threatened by the failure of
debtor countries to contain the class struggle over the imposition of money in
command. The imposition of the abstract indifference of money in command
threatened to destroy its own precondition (i.e. the harnessing of the productive
power of labour). Monetarism's abrasive attack on the working class through high
interest rates, mass bankruptcy and mass unemployment, brought to the fore the
self-destructive power of money. By 1982, it became clear that the deregulation of
international money and credit relations had come into conflict with its effects. The
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formidable attempt to contain labour through a policy of state austerity contradicted
its practice. The constituting presence of labour in and against capital asserted itself
in the form of a severe depression as a massive claim on surplus value defaulted. The
limits of accumulation asserted themselves in the form of a scarcity of the credit
with which labour's productive power had been contained on the basis of a
speculative deferral of overaccumulation. In the face of a looming collapse of
international credit-relations, monetarism as an ecorflmic policy was dropped,
domestically and internationally, and replaced by a policy of fiscal redistribution and
credit expansion, containing labour through renewed speculative deferral of
overaccumulation and crisis. The shift in emphasis implied the use of the Keynesian
policies which monetarist ideology had officially proclaimed against.
In the event, Keynesian and/or monetarist credit policies reproduce the tension
between the different value forms from different extremes, neither of which
resolves the movement of the contradiction. Both accentuate different moments of the
contradictory unity of surplus value production, stimulating a break-down of both
through the sacrificing of one moment of the contradiction in favour of the other. The
state can only reproduce the movement of the contradiction in a political form. The
dissociation of monetary from productive accumulation is real as it constitutes the
contradictory unity of surplus value production in the form of a crisis-ridden
disunity between functioning capital and the credit-system. Both of these poles of the
contradiction exist as different moments of the circuit of social capital, a crisis-
ridden contradiction which entails the crisis of domination over labour. While
reproducing the contradictions of capital, the class struggle over credit and money
policies involves the struggle over the reimposition of the value form upon the
conditions of life in and through unemployment, deflationary attack, imposition of
poverty, intensification of work and law and order control that the imposition of
tight money over the working class, and the monetary decomposition of class
relations, demands.
The massive attempt by monetarism to bring back the market rested on the failure
to control and to contain the class conflict through forms of Keynesian class
collaboration. The failure to confine the working class within the limits of
accumulation provoked political pressures to cut back on deficit financing of
integration costs, i.e. the destruction of social relations constituted on the basis of
social reform. This is expressed in a policy of state austerity, seeking to replace
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universal forms of working class integration in favour of the 'market'. The
pressures to recompose the role of the state did not arise from the success of the New
Right in simply taking over the political agenda. The emergence of the New Right is
the outcome of the failure of Keynesianism to control and to contain class struggle on
the basis of social reform within the limits of accumulation. The abandonment of full
employment guarantees in 1975 under Heafy and the abrasive attack on the welfare
state from 1976 onwards did not simply reflect ideological changes, nor are they
merely the result of economic crisis, but rather they are the result of the class
struggle over the reimposition of the value form upon the conditions of life. In
retrospect, the demise of Keynesianism and the rise of monetarism are a product of a
rupture that has been dominated by capital. The political significance of monetarism
concerns its ability to decompose class relations on the basis of the market, i.e. the
ability to impose work through the commodity form. Such imposition involves the
enforcement of law and money as the supreme social power through which social
reproduction is subordinated to the reproduction of capital.
During the period of the social contract, the imposition of money in command
rested on the ability of the trade unions to secure social discipline, i.e. to pacify
resistance to deflationary attack. Such normalisation of class conflict rested, in turn,
on the harnessing of a distinct workers' interest, involving a fragmenting (i.e.
discriminating) imposition of austerity measures. The class collaboration involved
the organisation of the working class in terms of the 'corporatist collective',
permitting the exclusion of, and a drastic deflationary attack on, those who are not
constituents of Labour and the organised trade union movement. On the other hand,
the harnessing of a distinct workers' interest involved a monetary expansion in
exchange for wage restraint (e.g. nationalisation of industry, subsidies for lame
ducks). The deflationary attack on the working class rested on the decline of
industrial militancy in the face of rising unemployment and the exhaustion of
working class energy through institutionalised forms of class collaboration. The
pacification of the class conflict during the 1970's rested on the fragmentating
integration of the working class. The tension between monetarist policies in a
Keynesian framework of class collaboration manifested itself most strongly over
income policies. Income policies depended on the passivity of those workers attacked
by it. The tension came into the open in 1977 when calls for a return to free
collective bargaining gathered momentum. The class conflict over incomes policies
involved those workers upon whom the stability of the social contract rested.
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Growing resentment over income restraint questioned the Keynesian concept of the
interventionist state and the diffusion of the state to the shop-floor through legal
intervention, formalised bargaining procedures and trade unions' policing of their
members. The failure to contain the class struggle implied also that the fragmenting
monetary and legal decomposition of class relations teetered on the edge of collapse.
Retrospectively, it can be seen that the normalisation of class conflict on the basis
of the global expansion of credit contributed to two major developments. Firstly, the
crisis of overaccumulation gave rise to a rapid globalisation of productive capital
from the late 1960's onwards. This globalisation was expressed through the merger
boom of the 1960's and the close integration between multinational companies and
international money markets during the 1970's. Multinational companies raised
funds on international financial markets and were on average the biggest creditors of
these markets. Growing cross-investment between productive capital and money
capital constituted a means, for the more advanced producers, of redeploying their
capital to more profitable areas. The changes in the relationship between different
moments of the one process of value manifested themselves through the circuit of
money capital, obliterating different value forms on the basis of financial capital.
The international reorganisation of exploitation involved the relocation of productive
investment into less cost-intensive areas and gave rise to trade union fears about job
losses and wage pressure at home. This fear, in turn, contributed to the, however
reluctant, acceptance of income and austerity policies by the trade unions. The
international orientation, and the diversification of investment interests, of the
more advanced producers made them less and less dependent on domestic markets at
the same time as they relied more heavily on predictable exchange rates and sound
monetary policies so as to maintain and improve conditions of formal exchange on the
world market.
Secondly, credit-sustained accumulation involved the extension of credit in the
form of recycling credit, a use of credit designed to prevent difficulties in servicing
interest from turning into insolvency. The accumulation of debt or, in other words,
the speculative supply of credit, gave accumulation an ever more speculative
dimension which reasserted the limits of accumulation in the form of ever more
fragile international credit relations and increasing rates of interest by the end of
the 1970's. The deregulation of international money markets in the early 1970's
accelerated the disruption of the capitalist cycle as credit came to the fore as a means
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of going beyond the limits of the market. Credit-expansion served to reimpose the
limits of capitalist reproduction much more forcefully not through the regulative
power of the market but, rather, through the power of money (scarce and expensive
cost for further credit). The use of credit committed in advance a share of profit not
yet created. At the same time, the (multiplicity) of state(s) guaranteed all money
through the reserves of central banks. The more that credit sustained accumulation,
the more claims on money on central reserves accumulated. In order to defend the
formal exchange equality of national currency on the world market against the effects
of speculative pressure on exchange rates, the state needed to regain control over
public expenditure and wages so as to secure the integration of domestic accumulation
into the world market.
The attempt to pacify the working class on the basis of the wage relation involved
the politicising of the wage. The political strength of the working class commanded,
in spite of deflationary attack, the deficit financing of living standards. Capital's
reaction to the downward rigidity of the wage involved speculative pressure on
currency,^threat to the integration of national wealth on the world market and the
policing of national government through the agency of the IMF. The latter's activities
did not involve a blackmail of national government but, rather, expressed in
different form the urgency of cutting back on credit so as to prevent a possible
collapse of international credit relations through the guarantee of credit as claim on
cash payment (payment of taxation).
Although the social contract proved to be successful in imposing a massive
redistribution of wealth and in achieving huge cuts in welfare spending, a much more
radical imposition of monetary policies was ruled out because of the political
adherence to the integration of the working class on the basis of social reform, upon
which, in turn, the class collaboration with the trade unions, and thus the
normalisation of the class conflict, rested. By the end of the 1970's ever more
fragile money markets coincided with an increasingly drastic attack on those
workers whose aspirations were in the main seemingly protected during the
monetary decomposition of class relations. With the adoption of a more vigorous
deflationary attack by 1977 (e.g. macho-management at BL and the proposal of
drastic income ceilings in 1978), the social contract gradually lost its ability to
contain the class struggle. The state's response to the looming recession, drastic
balance of payment problems and the crisis of the pound in 1976, undermined the
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stability of the social contract as the deflationary attack provoked renewed industrial
militancy. The synthesis between domination and its legitimising discourse started to
crack as it became obvious that 'Labour was not working'. Persistent 'economic'
pressure and a looming global reassertion of overaccumulation and crisis by the end
of the 1970's undermined the credibility of social planning, i.e. the planning of
deflation on the basis of class collaboration.
The rise of the New Right was precipitated by the crisis of Keynesianism. The
sacrificing of the institutional strategy of social reform on the altar of money
characterises monetarism's ideology and practice. The strength of monetarist
ideology lies in its simplicity. Fundamentally, monetarism provided a radical
response to the crisis of the state: as full employment growth guarantees could no
longer be made without endangering domestic accumulation, monetarism declared the
destruction of employment guarantees to be a condition for economic recovery; as
Keynesian integration costs triggered a financial crisis of the state, monetarism
declared the destruction of material concessions as a means of reimposing conditions
of unfettered economic growth; as a corporatist strategy of social integration failed to
secure social peace, monetarism declared trade unions to be undesirable labour
market rigidities which prevent the expansion of employment; as the collective
power of labour brought down the social contract, monetarism declared that the
political influence of trade unions over the state undermines the generosity of the
market as the basis of all democratic and economic freedom. Cutting back on state
deficit, i.e. cutting back on credit, means trying to undo the entirety of the way in
which social relations had been constituted since the war: pushing the trade unions
out of the state, cutting back on social welfare exoenditure, cutting back on local
government, and making the state more repressive through bureaucratic forms of
control with which to enforce the imposition of money in command. In order to make
certain the acceptance of the rule of money, monetarism, no less than Keynesianism,
relied on the expansion of money; only now this expansion was overtly repressive in
character. Monetarist use of public expenditure brushed away Keynesian forms of
integration in favour of the use of money as a means of subordinating social relations
to the impersonal power of money.
Under monetarism, monetary expansion is a means of undermining the ability of
the working class to command a living standard 'incompatible' with the limits of
accumulation. No less than Keynesianism, monetarism depended on sustained
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accumulation so as to polarise and fragment class relations. The legitimation of
money in command depends on inputs that affirm the generosity of economic freedom.
Any failure of monetarist policies reaffirms those same policies' aggressive
strength, as failures can be attributed to institutional and political barriers which
hinder the unfettered rule of money. Monetarism as an ideology draws strength from
its failures in practice (Clarke 1987). While the New Right sought to subordinate
the state and society alike to the unfettered rule of world money, it did not entail,
despite ideological references, the reimposition of the liberal form of the state
(laissez faire). The reimposition of the power of money over the social implied the
systematic exercise of state power: the harsh impartiality of money and legal
decomposition of the working class, penetrating the social in all its ramifications.
The monetarist rejection of the conception of the interventionist state in favour of
the subordination of political criteria to the unfettered rule of world money implied
the consolidation of capitalist state power as the concentrated force of money in
command, i.e. the repressive subordination of social relations to the elementary
form of equality, that is, the rule of money. The political attempt to use
unemployment as a means of reasserting domination through the destruction of the
Keynesian relation between state expenditure and wages involved the socialisation of
the role of the state on the basis of the emergency planning of a (potential) collapse
of monetary control. Struggle against money in command obtains as an immediate
struggle against the form of the capitalist state because it is through the state that
the power of money is mediated (erosion of deficit demand policies, discriminatory
credit and money policy, the use of the welfare state in terms of social control,
imposition of poverty, and economic conscription). The radicalisation of monetarist
policies under the incoming Conservative government was a response to the eruptive
potential of labour which had brought down the social contract and resisted the
recomposition of capitalist command over labour. The rupture of the social contract
did not involve a 'revolutionary situation' but, rather, the discrediting and
dismantling of the form of the capitalist state power. The New Right was able to
dominate the rupture by articulating monetarist policies oh the basis of the rejection
of the Keynesian concept of the interventionist state. On this score, the institutional
strategy of the New Right, rather than inaugurating fundamental changes, continued,
in more radical terms, long established trends. Monetarist policies were no longer to
be embedded in Keynesian forms of class collaboration. Instead, the New Right
proposed to 'roll back the boundaries of the state' so as to reinstate the freedom
required for individual self-determination on the market.
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The problem for the incoming Conservative government in 1979 was not the
brushing away of Keynesian class collaboration but, rather, the containment of the
social conflict that had brought down the social contract. In the face of stagflation
turning into depression, the Conservatives sought to contain labour by attacking the
organised working class through a restrictive money and credit policy. With its
restrictive money and credit policy, the Conservatives reinforced the limits imposed
by the market on the ambitions of producers in the form of scarce money to an extent
which is now legendary: mass unemployment, deprivation of whole areas of social
life and mass bankruptcy and liquidation of capital. The Conservatives responded to
the political strength of labour with the disciplining force of unemployment,
selective provocation of strikes, and the uncompromising suppression of strike
action. However, the job shedding of the early 1980's and the reassertion of the right
to manage by those employers who survived the onslaught turned the formidable
attack on labour through high interest rates into a problem: the sharpening of
resistance by those pushed to the margins of social life (e.g. the city riots of the
early 1980's); the damaging and costly strikes by various groups of workers, the
reassertion of the primacy of production over the meaningless, but elementary, form
of capital (i.e. money) in the form of a possible chain reaction of credit-default.
Moreover, the rise in interest rates, domestically and internationally, pushed the
margins into the centre: the problem of international stability was threatened
through the failure to enforce debt in so-called debtor countries. The attempt to
integrate labour into the capital relation through high interest rate policies,
unemployment and marginalisation of whole areas of social life, as well as heavy
policing, had failed.
The relaxation and subsequent abandonment of monetarist economic policies
acknowledged the presence of labour in and against capital, even at the moment of a
retreat on the part of the organised labour movement. Capital had to pay a price for
control through credit expansion. The intensification of work, the shedding of labour
and the microchip revolution did not involve a profitable reintegration of the labour
and valorisation processes. The class struggle over the money power of capital led to
the reconstitution of the circuit of social capital on the basis of a renewed speculative
deferral of overaccumulation and crisis, precipitated by renewed global deficit
financing of demand, thus integrating the labour and valorisation processes on the
basis of" debt. In 1982, the change in emphasis from monetarist to Keynesian
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economic policies responded to the class struggle over the money power of capital, a
struggle monetarism had sought to contain and to decompose through the control of
the money supply. However, while abandoning monetarism in the narrow sense, the
financial conservatism of monetarism was retained. After 1982, monetarist policies
involved the use of Keynesian economic policies within a tight monetary framework
(i.e. the divisive reimposition of money in command over social life). In this wider
context, monetarism asserted itself as representing the 'communal interest' of
private production in a social context: i.e. the attempt to stabilise accumulation
through credit and fiscal expansionism and to subordinate the working class to the
money power of capital. The inflation of credit coincided with tight monetary policies
designed to enforce debt over the working class. The political stability of monetarism
rested on sustained accumulation, domestically and internationally. The massive
devaluation and liquidation of capital between 1979 and 1982 had not removed the
tendency towards overaccumulation of capital, nor had it confined accumulation
within the limits of the market. The massive destruction of capital coincided with
renewed speculative accumulation of unemployed capital. During the 1980's, the
rise of the City and the financial markets throughout the world was not a sign of
strength, but the mirror image of the weakness of capitalist reproduction.
The speculative accumulation of the 1980's stretched the limits of the market
through credit and the ultimate barrier to accumulation appeared to be the
availability of credit. However, the availability of credit is the availability of money
capital that reasserts the limits to capitalist accumulation in the form of speculation
and (eventually, as in 1987) a financial crisis. The debt crisis in 1982 and the
crash in 1987 express the underlying crisis of capitalist domination over labour for
the purpose of exploitation. The monetarist attempt to contain the presence of labour
in and against capital involved a two-fold use of money: the instantiation of the
generosity of the market through fiscal and credit expansion, harnessing a distinct
workers' interest through wage concessions, secure employment and property
ownership (i.e. privatisation of interest): and the attempt to enforce debt through
the destruction of the relation between public expenditure and wages, thus imposing
poverty and low paid work. The individualising and repressive use of money entailed
a pacification of the working class on the basis of selective access to the benefits
generated by the boom, the imposition of the spirit of inequality and hierarchical
values. As the boom was sustained by an explosion of domestic and international debt,
governments were able to isolate working class resistance to tight monetary policies
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and intensification of work, at the same time as capital was able to concede
pacification costs in the form of rising wages for some sections of the working class.
In turn, privatisation came to the fore as a means both of financing the growing level
of public expenditure which the control of labour commanded and of exploiting the
divisions within the working class as between those who benefited from the boom and
the vast majority of the population who were its victims. The stability of
monetarism rested on the ability of the state to guarantee international money by
acting as lender of last resort, that is by enforcing debt over the working class. The
enforcement of debt took the form of a divisive monetary decomposition of class
relations. The attempt to disorganise the class struggle through the generosity of the
market involved a fiscal and credit explosion in a tight monetary framework. "The
fact that the New Right has presided over continuing increases in state expenditure,
has strengthened the power of the state and has expanded its repressive apparatuses,
appears to belie its liberal rhetoric" (Clarke 1990b, ms. p. 19-20). Originally,
the New Right had sought to impose the limits of accumulation upon the state, capital
and the working class by means of a restrictive intervention into the circuit of social
capital through the effects of high interest rates on the circuit of money capital (i.e.
MTFS). The unmitigated failure to contain the class struggle through a contraction of
the money supply led to the reintroduction of those policies the New Right officially
proclaimed against: the fiscal and credit expansionism of Keynesianism. However,
Keynesian economic policies were embedded in a monetarist framework of tight
monetary control. The 1980's recomposition of the role of the state involved a
centralisation of power in terms of centralised budget control, the fencing off of
possible space for oppositional activities, the demobilisation and demoralisation of
the working class through heavy policing, individualising forms of legal and
monetary intervention and the recomposition of the welfare state in terms of
efficiency and repression. State budgeting was no longer to be used as a means of
recuperating and neutralising the class struggle over exploitation but, rather, as a
means of subordinating the social to the reproduction of capital on the basis of a
divisive imposition of the wage relation.
The fencing off of oppositional space implied a rigorous imposition of obedience to
the centraiity of money. The systematic exercise of state power indicates the
uncertainty of containing the class struggle on the basis of tight money. Alongside the
polarising distribution of the benefits generated by the boom, the fencing off of
oppositional space involved the destruction of institutional networks of
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interest-intermediation (i.e. formalised forms of negotiation of policies with
government and their implementation at the shop-floor) and their replacement by a
policy of legal and monetary decomposition of the 'right' to strike. This attack was
made possible by the heavy defeats of the organised labour movement in the early
1980's, while the boom provided, in the face of mass unemployment, real gains that
cushioned resentment. The individualising imposition of exchange equality (i.e. the
equality of social relations on the basis of money) was based on debt and was
supervised by a state prepared to crush dissent through the use of force. The
instantiation of the generosity of economic freedom involved the use of force as a
means of imposing the abstract equality of money over the conditions of life, thus
securing capital's claim (credit) on future life.
The credit-sustained accumulation in the 1980's was one of the key means of
fragmenting, isolating and individualising the class conflict. In the face of the
Thatcher government's taking refuge in Keynesian instruments, the destruction of
the relation between wages and public spending involved the fragmenting attack on
trade unions, the deregulation of collective responsibility for the running of social
services, the imposition of poverty (legitimised euphemistically as targeting
resources on those most in need) and the extension of legitimate violence as a means
of enforcing the abstract equality of money in command through law and order
control. The attack on the Keynesian concept of the interventionist state involved the
use of force (i.e. paramilitary policing and emergency measures) so as to guarantee
and to maintain formal exchange equality. The destruction of collective forms of
integration implied a coercive integration of labour so as to prevent the possible
collapse of cash control.
Despite intensification of work, improved economic performance and a successful
management of international debt during the boom, the explosion of international and
domestic debt showed how fragile was the attempt to decompose class relations on the
basis of the 'market'. Credit expansion helped to defer the rupture of accumulation by
going beyond the limits of accumulation. However, to go beyond the limits of
accumulation in this way means to go beyond only ideally, precipitating a crisis
which is the deeper the more accumulation is sustained by credit. The crash in 1987
showed that the attempt to overcome the barriers to accumulation by the
reconstitution of the circuit of social capital on the basis of speculation was a mere
fiction, even in the moment of a boom. After 1987, the shakiness of speculative
accumulation demonstrates the exhaustion of the attempt to control class struggle
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through credit-expansion. The uncertainty of debt calls into question the monetarist
attempt to recompose class in terms of the categories of property owner and citizen.
The individualising monetary decomposition of class relations comes to the fore in its
most violent form: the exhaustion of the illusion of prosperity (private debt and
mortgage default). Credit has to become effective command over labour. Such an
effective command implies not just the intensification of work and the repressive
exclusion from production of those whom capital is forced to disregard as a variable
for exploitation but, rather, the reconstitution of the circuit of social capital on the
basis of a recomposed relation between necessary and surplus labour. Such a
reconstitution of the circuit of social capital does not just involve, as during the
1980's, the 'refetishisation' (Holloway 1990b) and decomposition of social
relations as thinglike, i.e. the divisive and fragmenting reconstitution of class in
terms of the abstract citizen and property owner. Rather, it involves the
'remediation' (Bonefeld 1987c;Psychopedis 1988;Gunn 1987c) of the class
antagonism through force. Such a remediation involves not just the intensification of
work but the scrapping of labour power, and the expropriation of collective forms of
class organisation through the destruction of social relations (Bonefeld 1988).
The monetarist attempt to reimpose the rule of money involves, as its precondition
and result, a 'state of emergency': i.e. the suppression of dissent to the commanding
power of money, to the control of legal and monetary decomposition of class
relations, to the well-ordered acceptance of the intensification of work and to the
imposition of an environment that is certain. Credit-sustained accumulation entails
the use of force with which the state seeks to ensure the maintenance of exchange
equality. The use of power involves an attempt to ensure the right of property in its
most abstract form: the enforcement of claims on not yet existing value, that is the
surplus value not yet produced by the workers. The shift in emphasis from an
emergency state of a booming economy to an emergency state of a looming reassertion
of overaccumulation and crisis brings to the fore the abrasive character of the
reconstitution of the social on the basis of the market. The class struggle over the
money power of capital entails that the state becomes constituted as the political
force which imposes the limits of capitalist reproduction over the social through the
elementary form of capital, that is the money power of capital which for its part
exists as claim on future life. In the face of a constitution of the social power of
money on the basis of debt, the state attains generality as the political form of money
in command: i.e. the organisation of labour power on the basis of the planning and
control of social conflict and of the anticipation of the political behaviour of the
working class whose constituting power asserts itself in the form of the fragility of
the pyramid of debt. Hence, a state of emergency, prepared to resort to provocation
and the use of force against the working class (Agnoli 1986). The post-1929
development of capitalism signals just this. The movement of the contradictions of
capitalist domination is determined by the outcome of class struggle.
The crash signalled the fragility of the individualising disorganisation of class
relations and has put the monetarist attempt to impose control through debt and its
enforcement to music. The composition of the music is precipitated by the crisis of
the monetarist institutional strategy for containing the crisis of Keynesianism. The
reification of labour in the form of money established a form of capitalist command
in which seemingly marginal disruption (e.g. Mexico's declaration of insolvency)
involves a risk of massive devaluation and collapse on a world scale. The 1987 crash
expressed the exhaustion of Keynesian economic policies in a monetarist framework,
i.e the inflation of credit and a policy of state austerity over the conditions of life.
However, why risk a collapse if the inconvertibility of money into effective command
over labour for exploitation can be channelled into a, however fragile, boom? This is
not to say that a repeat of 1929, however different in form, is a political
impossibility. What the argument contends is that, as yet, capital has been able to
dominate the outcome of the class struggle over the imposition of the money power of
capital. However, were there to be a renewed world recession, it would imply a
global collapse of credit. "In such an event Latin America gives us a foretaste of the
domestic politics of monetarism in a crisis, while its global politics do not bear
thinking about" (Clarke 1988a, p. 175).
Seen in this light, the shift from Labour to the Conservatives in 1979 comprises a
complex of discontinuous and continuous elements. In the 1970's, the state was
forced to integrate monetarist policies with Keynesian forms of class collaboration;
the incoming Thatcher government continued, in a more radical fashion, monetarist
economic policies in a monetarist framework. By 1982, the attempt to control and to
contain labour through high interest rates and debt service had broken down. The
subsequent relaxation of monetarist credit policies involved, fundamentally, the use
of Keynesian instruments to sustain accumulation. However, while Keynesian
economic policies continued to be used, the imposition of tight money over the social
conditions of life was retained. The crash in 1987 signalled how weak were the
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foundations of Keynesian policies in a monetarist framework. The picture is, thus,
one of a shift from monetarism (in the narrow sense of economic policy) in a
Keynesian framework, to monetarism in a monetarist framework, and from this to
Keynesianism in a monetarist framework. All of these shifts, I have argued, indicate
the uncertainty and the difficulty capital has encountered in containing labour for the
purpose of exploitation.
The break-down of Bretton Woods and the deregulation of international credit and
money markets proved to be the single most important event of the class struggle in
and against the form of the capitalist state. Behind the deregulation of international
money lies the strategy of austerity as a means of decomposing class relationships
through the ruthless impartiality of monetary and legal intervention and the
intensification of work. Behind the transformation of the 'state-of-liquidity' to the
'state-of-limited-liquidity' lies the violence of money in command. The
impersonality of this command is based upon the abstract equality of money, that is,
the emptiness of social reproduction as domination. However, the abstract equality of
command exists only through the reproduction of this command's precondition: the
harnessing of labour into expanded profitable reproduction. Keynesian and
monetarist policies depend on sustained accumulation so as to contain labour through
the fragmenting imposition of the wage relation and on the harnessing of labour's
productive power in the attempt to posit the precondition of value's most elementary
mode of existence, i.e. money. Neither Keynesianism nor monetarism succeeded in
containing labour's productive and disruptive power; both reproduced the
contradictory mode of existence of capital in political forms. The abrasive attack on
the working class during the 1980's radicalised established trends, a radicalisation
confined and precipitated by the crisis of Keynesianism. Monetarist policies
responded to the crisis of Keynesianism without overcoming the crisis of
Keynesianism. Keynesian economic policies continued to be used while the attack on
the welfare state involved higher public spending, allowing the destruction of the
relation between wages and public expenditure to be compensated for by those costs
which the containment of labour on the basis of poverty required. The results of
monetarism contradicted its practice as the reimposition of the power of money over
the working class involved an inflation of credit which monetarism had officially
declared against. The development of the class struggle over domination resulted in
the deepening of the crisis of Keynesian policies of state austerity. While there can
be no doubt of the oppressive character of debt, it, nevertheless, indicates the failure
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of the New Right to reconstitute social relations on the basis of the rule of money and
the concomitant attempt to recompose class relations on the basis of the individual
market agent responding to the incentives of the market.
In general, the inflation of credit is the most powerful expression of the fragility
of capital's domination over labour for the purpose of exploitation. The deregulation
of international money, the use of crisis as an instrument of control (deflationary
attack), and the failure of this control (speculation and accumulation of debt) shows
the strength of labour, even at the moment of defeat, to resist the recomposition
between necessary and surplus labour. The monetarist project of using money as a
means of disciplining labour power through debt and its enforcement, and through
unemployment and devaluation of capital on a mass scale in the early 1980's,
acknowledged the violence required to reimpose capitalist command over labour for
exploitation. However, it could do so only by threatening the stability of the
international composition of order through a collapse of international credit-
relations upon which existing social relations rest. The subsequent relaxation of




My aim has been to consider developments in the British state in relation to some
recent developments in Marxist thought. The present chapter looks at the way in
which the Marxist approaches introduced in chapter I pick up on different
phenomenal moments of the crisis-ridden development of the state. The presentation
is in the following order: ideological crisis (S.Hall), profit squeeze (Glyn/Sutcliffe;
O'Connor), capital confrontation (Ingham), regulation approach (Aglietta) and the
debate on the (post-)Fordist state (Hirsch/Jessop). There then follows an
affirmative, but nonetheless critical, evaluation of 'social form analysis' associated
with Clarke and Holloway. The chapter focuses on the latter two contributions to state
theory and on the debate on post-Fordism which proved to be influential for a
Marxist conceptualisation of the recent development of the state. The other
approaches will be summarised in brief terms. At the end of the chapter I shall
evaluate my own theoretical approach.
I Crisis, Fetishism and Marxist Approaches to 'Thatcherism'
I Ideological Crisis
According to this aproach the crisis of the Keynesian integration of labour involved
a crisis of the synthesis between domination and its legitimising discourse. The
political problem of the late 1970's was the problem of reconstituting such a
synthesis, i.e. of establishing consensus. However, to simply regard the development
of the state as resulting from ideological crisis is to misunderstand the dialectical
movement of class conflict as merely an act of will fostered by the conviction of a
particular party leadership which is able to articulate a particular ideological set of
binding values. This is not to say that the 'existence' of particular historical
characters (e.g. Thatcher) is of no importance. Their existence is neither a trivial
accident of the class conflict, nor are they creators of the process which, however,
might not have taken place with the same vigour without them (see Labriola 1974 on
the relation between people making history and the class struggle). The ideological
crisis approach essentialises a particular phenomenon of the crisis of Keynesianism.
The approach essentialises the crisis of the legitimising discourse of domination,
disarticulated from the crisis of capital's domination over labour. Such an
essentialisation reifies structures. It reifies structures because it reproduces the
dualism between structure and struggle. In turn, the dualism between structure and
struggle involves a dichotomy between determinism and voluntarism. The dichotomy
appears, for example, in S. Hall's (1985) emphasis on 'inescapable lines of
349
development'. These lines of development are juxtaposed to the ability of the party
leadership to provide a coherent set of binding values with which to articulate a
particular hegemonic project of capital. Voluntarism and determinism are
complementary. Whereas determinism emphasises the objective constitution of
social development, voluntarism emphasises the subjective action responding to
objective laws. The dichotomy between objective law and subjective influence
separates what, fundamentally, belongs together (i.e. structure and struggle).
II Profit Squeeze Approach
The profit squeeze approach sees the channelling of working class struggle into the
wage relation and the concomitant fiscal crisis of the state as the root of the crisis of
capital and the state. The crisis of surplus value production is equated with the
struggle over the way in which capital and the state sought to contain labour. On this
score, the profit squeeze adds another layer of fetishism (labour as defined through
the wage relation) to the enchanted world of capitalism. On the same score, O'Connor
sees the crisis of the state as one of fiscal difficulties and a concomitant crisis of
legitimation. The state is seen as being in fiscal difficulties because its revenue does
not rise in parallel with the cost of its growing expenditure consequent upon the
resistance by capital to taxation on profits. The imbalance between revenue and
expenditure merely expresses in descriptive terms the root of the crisis of the state.
The emphasis on the fiscal crisis of the state fetishises the crisis of the state because
its crisis derives from a lack of structural articluation between, on the one hand, the
capacity of the economy to finance state expenditure and, on the other, the inability
of the state to confine its expenditure within the limits imposed by the economy.
Alongside the emphasis on a structural relation between the economic and the
political, the class struggle over the political integration of the working class is
understood as a distribution conflict over a share in national wealth. This approach
disarticulates structure and struggle and reintegrates them on the basis of fetishised
(because purely structural) form. The other side of this structuralism is a
voluntarist conception of the class struggle: capital's resistance to higher taxation
and the political integration of the working class on the basis of fiscal redistribution
of wealth.
III Capital Confrontation
This approach picks up on the reassertion of the limits of the market in the form of
monetary constraint on productive capital (scarce credit and high interest rates).
These constraints appear as a competitive relation of productive and money capital.
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The limits to expansive profitable accumulation appear to be determined by the cost
and availability of credit, and so by the lending practices and powers of the banking
system. Unstable lending policies of bankers and erratic monetary policies of the
central bank and the state appear as the cause of the crisis. Additionally, the
sacrificing of productive accumulation on the altar of money in Britain is seen as
being caused by the incomplete organisation of capitalist rule (dissociation of the
interest of the City from domestic production in the UK). The approach disregards
the material form in and through which the money power of capital subsists. Instead
of seeing the conflict between different capitalist interests as a mode of existence of
the crisis of domination' over labour for exploitation, the approach merely
articulates the way in which the conflict appears: the sacrificing of productive
accumulation on the altar of money through restrictive credit practices, conditions
and policies. Additionally, the focus on the national organisation of capitalist
accumulation, i.e. on the incompleteness of capitalist organisation in Britain, does
not recognise the international orientation of 'British' capital. The focus on domestic
accumulation does not see that the rise of the City is the mirror-image of the global
weakness of capitalist production. The decline of the British economy is the
counterpart of a world boom based on a speculative deferral of overaccumulation and
crisis.
IV Regulation Approach
The Regulation Approach picks up on the disruption of the circuit of social capital
and its effects on institutional forms of political regulation. However, the Regulation
Approach overemphasises the functional pattern of the integration of different value
forms and disregards, thus, the social form through which these 'functions' obtain.
As a consequence, the Regulation Approach reifies the fetishistic appearance of
capitalist society and its crisis. The class struggle is constituted not at the level of
'social form' but, rather, at the level of the class conflict over wages. The Regulation
Approach avoids analysis of the wage relation as a mode of existence of class
antagonism. As a result, the class struggle appears as one mechanism amongst others,
subordinated to, and a component of, the imperatives of a regime of accumulation and
its disintegration and reintegration. By essentialising structural disintegration, the
tension between different phenomena as modes of existence of the presence of labour
in and against capital is systematised into a matrix of sociological features. The
systematisation is sociological because different phenomena are merely seen as
existing separately from each other and not in and through each other as modes of
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existence of class. In turn, the systematisation construes social existence as a matrix
of systemic features because the approach emphasises the complementary character
of a regime of accumulation and regulative forms (e.g. mass production - mass
consumption - Keynesian forms of demand management). The articulation between
the political and the economic is seen as being constituted, not by class struggle, but
by structural mechanisms of social reproduction. As a result, the systematic
character of social reproduction and its crisis is understood as a matrix of
conjunctural or disjunctural features whose relationships remain to be investigated.
V The debate on the (post-)Fordist state
The debate on (post-)Fordism picks up on phenomenal moments of the crisis of
social reproduction common to almost all the above mentioned approaches. Aspects of
the state derivation debate (i.e. formal analysis of the state in terms of a logically
derived concept; separation of the state from the economy as an accomplished result
of historical processes which predate capitalism) are combined with aspects of: the
Regulation Approach (i.e. systematic character of social reproduction, regulative
functions of the state, separation between the economy and the state and intermediate
concepts that allow an understanding of conjunctural articulations between them),
the conflict between different capital interests ('fractionalism')(i.e, hegemonic
projects of different capital 'logicians', equation of class struggle with capital's
strategies, reduction of the complex diversity of the value forms to different capital
'logics'); the ideological crisis approach (i.e. discourse of one or two nations as
seemingly inherent in different hegemonic strategies, ideology as providing
leadership, cementing hegemonic strategies); and various other approaches: aspects
of system theory (Luhmann: cf. Bonefeld 1990a); sociological model theory (Weber:
cf. Psychopedis 1990); realist theory (Bhaskar: cf. Gunn 1990); capital logic
approaches, i.e. the understanding of the state as providing regulative functions that
make it possible for capital to operate; and fundamentalist economic theory on crisis
(i.e. the emphasis of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall as the objective and
inevitably unfolding law of capitalist development). Additionally, the debate on
(post-)Fordism draws upon autonomist Marxist approaches (Negri) to stress the
importance of class which is merely discussed in a spontaneist fashion, subordinated
to the unfolding of objective laws of development (cf. Psychopedis 1990). Overriding
all this, the debate reformulates, firstly, Poulantzas's theory of the state as a
specific region, leading to a politicist understanding of social reproduction and,
secondly, the technological determinism of vulgar base-superstructure views (cf.
Pel&ez/Holloway 1990). The eclectic assimilation of most of contemporary Marxist
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crisis and state theory provides the debate on post-Fordism with a surface clarity.
Taken as a whole, the debate juxtaposes "features which refer to different problems
and different levels of analysis", the relationship between which remains confused
(Psychopedis 1990, ms. p. 7). Hostile to form analysis, while proclaiming in its
favour, the debate separates 'abstract description' from empirical data in its
misguided attempt to reduce the complexity of the historical development to
structural types of distinct conjunctures between the economic and political. By
attempting to grasp the complexity of discontinuous and continuous development in
this way, the debate merely proliferates structures which remain static and
fetishised (cf. Clarke 1990a). Additionally, the debate equates capital's projects
with their implementation in practice. In this respect, the descriptive insights
offered by the debate are reduced to a merely suggestive prognosis (cf. Bonefeld
1987b). The debate on (post-)Fordism does not ask why it is the case that this
content (social reproduction) takes this form (capitalist domination and its crisis).
The debate on (post-)Fordism interprets historical developments in terms of their
more or less close approximation to a model, whose pure form is allegedly
progressively disclosed by history. Such a conceptualisation of social development
implies the theoretical suppression of the constituting power of labour in and against
capital. Capital, by implication, becomes a one-sided abstraction (i.e. the unfolding
of objectives laws of capitalist development), thus permitting a teleologicai reading
of history. The debate is teleological because it posits a goal of structural
development and interprets, in turn, historical development as reaching towards its
goal. The suppression of 'labour' carries with it the danger that the post-Fordist
debate is in the end tautological: "first of all a model or norm is abstracted from
disparate historical tendencies, and then it is in the light of this model that the
significance of these same tendencies is assessed" (Bonefeld 1987b, p. 124). To be
sure, the tendencies identified by the debate are real ones. However, they are real
only relative to class struggle, and as such, in every sense open ended. As a
consequence, the problem of the contradictory mode of existence of capital, and the
movement of this contradiction, is conceived of as merely a contradiction between
structures.
The disarticulation of structure and struggle (Hirsch) separates what belongs
together as inner nature, or as actual and alive. To make a contrast between the
unfolding of objective laws and class struggle is to see the crisis of social
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reproduction (and its resolution) as an inevitable process of what is seen as a
structural disintegration or integration of a relation of correspondence between
economic and political subsystems. The understanding of struggle as an effect of the
unfolding of objective laws of development posits the inevitability of crisis and/or
recovery. Such reasoning is teleological because crisis is seen as a transitory period
in which the unfolding of the objective laws of capitalist development define the
emergence of a new mode of domination appropriate to a regime of accumulation. The
role of class struggle is strictly limited within this framework (Hirsch) or excluded
from it: 'new times' and technological determinism. As a consequence, Hirsch urges
that Marxist theorising needs to concentrate on the analysis of 'functional
interconnections in society' (Hirsch 1990b, p. 41, my translation). The (post-)
Fordist analysis seeks a causal explanation of the interrelation between different
moments of social existence, thus interpreting social develpment in terms of a
dualism between structure and process. Human relations are reduced to the status of
being merely attendant upon structural laws. The externalisation of 'labour' from
capital reifies structures qua fetishisation.
Conceptualising the capitalist state as a form of social relations, one has to reject
Jessop's and Hirsch's notion of the relation of structure and struggle. An
understanding of the state as a movement of social contradiction rejects a
structuralist conceptualisation of different phenomena in terms of 'structural
adequacy' (functional interconnections between different subsystems). Once the state
is no longer seen as the political form of class antagonism, complex historical
phenomena can indeed only be "analysed as a complex resultant of multiple
determinations" (Jessop et.al 1988, p. 53). Thus, social reality is constituted by
the "independent logics of political and ideological domains", forcing the scientific
mind to follow, in descriptive terms, the strategic line of capital in the face of
"various dilemmas, risks, uncertainties and complexities", emergent strategies,
trial and error techniques etc. (Jessop et.al. 1988, p. 8). Since class relations are
reduced to one (strategic) mechanism/cause amongst others (relations in
production), the material world of capitalism emerges as a systematic cause of the
struggle between different 'capital logicians' determined by (allocation) interests.
Hostile to form analysis, while proclaiming in its favour, Jessop acknowledges
merely structural contradictions. An understanding of social forms, as forms
assumed by the class antagonism, is thereby ruled out. An understanding of
'contradiction' as internal to domination is pushed into oblivion. Instead one has to
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embark on an individualistic analysis of effect and result, the ontological depth of
which is "the theoretical capacity to penetrate beneath the actual course of events to
more fundamental mechanisms and causal powers which generate these events in
specific circumstances" (Jessop et. al. 1988, p. 28;see also Bhaskar 1989, p. 2).
The question for a Marxist analysis is how to understand multiple determinations/
causes and effects in their interrelation as modes of existence of labour in
capitalism. To take the outward appearance of reality as the conceptual starting point
(multiple causes as in Jessop;disarticulation of structure and struggle as in Hirsch)
without insisting on the social relations that constitute social reality runs the danger
of finishing conceptually where the theorising of the critique of political economy
starts (1).
None of the above presented approaches undertakes a 'form-analysis' of social
development, nor, and as a consequence, do these approaches pose the problem of
contradiction and its movement. Hostile to the movement of contradiction, these
approaches reinforce and reproduce the fetishism which, officially, they proclaim
against. Fetishism is the construal (in theory) and the constitution (in practice) of
social relations as thinglike, perverting such relations into a comi/odified and
structural form. What, then, are the implications for form-analysis?
II Implications for Form-Analysis
Clarke
At the centre of Clarke's approach is the conceptualisation of the social forms
assumed by class antagonism. Clarke's emphasis is on the development of the form of
the state and the specific functions arrogated by the state to itself in the course of the
class struggle. On this score, the historical development of the state is seen as being
discontinuous, but it is discontinuous only in and through the unity of its form. For
Clarke, the crisis of Keynesianism and the rise of monetarism reflects "the
contradictory form of the capitalist state in the face of global crisis and
overaccumulation, the development of the contradiction being determined by the
outcome of pervasive class struggle" (Clarke 1988a, p. 173). The development of
the state under the Thatcher government is seen as being precipitated by the crisis of
Keynesianism. The development of the state in the 1980's is seen as being
characterised by the rigorous imposition of individualising forms of money and the
law, and by the recomposition of class on the basis of the categories of property
owner and citizen. Clarke sees the money power of capital as the most fundamental
level of the class struggle. He understands money as the most abstract form of
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capitalist property, i.e. the supreme power through which social reproduction is
subordinated to the reproduction of capital. However, in Clarke, the category of
money is not always taken to mean a mode of existence of the constituting power of
labour, i.e. money as a category in which subjectivity takes the form of objectivity
and vice versa (see Backhaus 1990).
Clarke understands 'money' implicitly as a one-sided abstraction (i.e. the money
power of 'capital'). He sees the fundamental contradiction of capital as one constituted
by the constant tendency to develop the productive forces without regard to the limit
of the market and the need to confine accumulation within the limits of its capitalist
form (Clarke 1990a, ms. p. 5). This contradiction underlies the "tendency to the
global overaccumulation of capital, as the development of social production confronts
the limits of its capitalist form as production for profit" (ibid.). Such a
conceptualisation of the contradictions of capital tends to neglect the constituting
power of labour inasmuch as the constitution of this contradiction, i.e. capital's
ability to exploit labour effectively, is displaced to one between the development of
the productive forces and the limits of the market. This displacement is real
inasmuch as it constitutes a mode of existence of labour in capitalism: the integration
of the abstract category of labour with the value form. However, this displacement is
real only in and through the constituting power of labour in and against capital: the
imposition of work (exploitation) through the commodity form (i.e. money as the
most abstract form of capital's subordination of social reproduction as reproduction
of capital). Clarke's conceptualisation of the contradiction of capital as one between
the development of the productive forces and the limits of the market to the
realisation of adequate rates of profit for capitalist reproduction downplays the
productive power of labour which capital needs to harness as substance of value and
which capital needs to confine within the limits of its form. Capital lives by turning
the productive power of labour against itself. The fundamental contradiction of
capital is its dependence on labour: the compulsion to increase surplus value
production by limiting necessary labour and the need to confine the revolutionising
of labour's productive power within the limits of capital. Within the form of money,
the constituting power of labour subsists in a mode of being denied while, at the same
time, money exists only in and through labour. The relations of exploitation exist in
the form of money as a social equivalent which mediates inequality as equality: i.e.
money denies a content which is that of social reproduction as domination. The
meaninglessness of money exists in contradiction to money as the elementary form of
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capital. Money exists as command to work. The supreme power of money to
subordinate social reproduction to the reproduction of capital exists only in and
through the exploitation of labour. The form-giving fire of labour constitutes the
category of money as a mode of existence of labour in capitalism.
Clarke's understanding of the contradictions of capital has implications for his
treatment of money. In Clarke, the limits of the capitalist form are imposed upon
individual producers through the money power of capital. However, since the
contradiction is internal to capital (i.e. the tendency of capital to develop the
productive forces without limits and the- need to confine production in the limits of
profitability), money tends to be understood not as a self-contradictory moment of
capitalist reproduction constituted by the presence of labour in and against capital,
but as a contradiction of 'capital'. Clarke contends that the development of the
contradiction is determined by the class struggle, as "pressure of competition leads
to an intensification of the class struggle" (Clarke 1990a, ms. p. 5). However, since
the constitution of the contradiction of capital is understood in terms of capital (i.e.
the limits of the market to the realisation of the unfettered development of the
productive forces with adequate rates of profit for the purpose of expanded
reproduction), the understanding of class struggle as determining the outcome of the
movement of capital's contradiction puts 'class', by implication, into a shadowy
position vis-^-vis capital. Clarke tends to differentiate between the movement of the
contradiction and the constitution of the contradiction. While the movement is seen as
one of class, the constitution of the contradiction (relations of exploitation) is one of
capital. Clarke tends to neglect the constituting power of labour that exists in the
form of money in a mode of being denied. As a consequence, 'contradiction' tends to be
understood in terms of a contradiction internal to 'capital' merely supplemented by
class struggle over the imposition of the limits of accumulation upon the working
class (intensification of work and unemployment and the erosion of the welfare
state). Consequently, the speculative accumulation of capital during the 1980's is
seen as deriving from the contradictions of capital and not from the presence of
labour in and against capital. This latter involves an understanding of the speculative
accumulation of capital as an expression of the power of labour in and against capital
(i.e. the containment of labour's productive power within the form of capital on the
basis of a speculative deferral of mass devaluation and collapse), thus permitting an
understanding of contradiction as internal to domination (i.e. the class struggle in
and against the forms of social existence, and capital's subordination of social
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reproduction to the reproduction of capital as existing qua contradiction in and
through labour).
Clarke's implied differentiation between the movement and constitution of social
contradictions has theoretical and political implications for the understanding of
class struggle. His treatment of the class struggle during the 1980's is two-fold: the
working class has been defeated in the early 1980's, while capital's attempt to
reconstitute the integration between the abstract category of labour and the value
form on the basis of the supremacy of the valorisation process has failed
(speculative dimension of accumulation which ruptured in 1987). While there can
be no doubt about the severity of the defeat of the working class in the early 1980's,
the shift in emphasis in 1982 (relaxation and the subsequent abandonment of
monetarist credit and money policy) did not respond to the defeat of the working class
but, rather, to the sharpening of the crisis of domination over labour. The failure to
impose control through high interest rates, and the reassertion of command over
labour in the form of mass unemployment and mass liquidation of productive
capacity, sacrificed labour and production to such an extent that the international
financial system was severely shaken. At the same time, the disruptive power of
labour made a deflation of the money supply through cuts in credit, or repayment of
debt, impossible, permitting an increase in public spending and precipitating the
world's debtor crisis. The shift in emphasis in 1982 responded to the constituting
power of labour in and through which the money power of capital exists in a
contradictory way. The transfer of debt to the US was a response not to the possible
collapse of international credit relations, but to the crisis of domination over the
productive and disruptive power of labour that made itself felt in the possible
collapse of international credit relations.
Clarke's neglect of the subjective constitution of the 'power of money' (i.e. the
reification of the constituting power of labour in an alien thing, money) puts the
working class into a role of an historical actor that is defeated, decomposed, and
recomposed. Thus, Clarke argued before the crash in 1987, that "monetarism is
beginning to outlive its historical moment. At the same time it has in turn created the
conditions for its own supersession. By destroying the power of the organised labour
movement it has created the conditions under which a more interventionist strategy
of political and economic restructuring becomes possible, within which
Keynesianism can be reborn" (as characterised by 'new realism')(Clarke 1987, p.
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424). In turn, the neglect of the subjective constitution of money finds a different
articulation after the crash in 1987. The crash is seen as a symptom of a deeper
crisis of overaccumulation. Consequently, "it is difficult to see the project of
neo-liberalism as that of constituting a form of 'post-Keynesian' or 'post-Fordist'
state. Nor is it any longer possible to see neo-liberalism as an aberration, to be
followed by a resumption of Keynesian normality, or as a transitional phase, to be
followed by some new 'post-modern' form of the state" (Clarke 1990a, ms. p. 21).
The different conclusions reflect Clarke's theoretical arbitrariness deriving from
his implicit differentiation between the constitution and the movement of
contradiction. This differentiation seems to derive from his emphasis on the working
class as a constant force and threat to be contained by capital. At the same time,
however, the working class remains a rather shadowy figure (Holloway 1989). The
presence of labour in and against capital remains a shadowy figure to the extent that
a glimpse of externality between structure and struggle seems to enter into Clarke's
conceptualisation. As Clarke (1988a, p. 359) puts his argument: "The necessity of
socialism has never been more urgent", especially in regard to a period in history in
which "the subjective conditions for socialism are also more fully developed than in
any other period". The externality between structure and struggle obtains in the
emphasis of 'more fully developed', an emphasis which contains a possible
deterministic fetishisation of objective laws whose development create subjective
conditions for action. The contingent relation between (a shadowy figure of) class and
historical conditions opens up the problem of how to understand the concept of
'contradiction internal to domination' (see Gunn 1990b,c). In my thesis, the attempt
has been made to conceptualise the category of money in terms of contradiction
(reification of human relations).
Holloway
Holloway insists on the primacy of class struggle for an understanding of capitalist
society. While he asserts that capital is class struggle, he fails to follow through the
implications of his approach, namely an understanding of form as a movement of
contradiction in and through class. For Holloway class struggle is understood in
terms of the "grinding, everyday, unspectacular class struggle, so unspectacular that
it is not even seen by bourgeois theory, so everyday that the simple assertion that
capital is class struggle seems inexplicable even to some in the Marxist tradition"
(Holloway 1990d, ms. p. 2). Explaining crisis in terms of class involves a
conceptualisation of the specific form in which surplus labour is pumped out of
direct producers. However, Holloway avoids the problem of form (i.e. movement of
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contradiction) by reverting to a populist essentialism. "Contained conflict appears as
harmony. And then there is a break: conflict becomes manifest, the 'normal' is
questioned, other views of this normality gain force, hidden interconnections appear,
established patterns of power are attacked. The dam bursts. Suppressed anger is
suppressed no longer" (Holloway 1990b, ms, p. 25). Such an understanding of the
class struggle involves a three-fold danger: the essentialisation of class struggle; the
externalisation of structure and struggle and a structuralist understanding of
capital, i.e. the understanding of capital as a one-sided abstraction. In Holloway, the
internal relation between form and materiality is reduced to a simple juxtaposition
of opposites. As a consequence, social form analysis dissolves into a fetishisation of
structures (the system, the apparatus) and into a fetishism of the subject
(creativity, the uncontainable burst of love and hate in the life-world). In order to
resist the destructive commands of the system, the class struggle (i.e. the defence
against, and the liberation from, the commanding power of the system) is posited
outside the system and needs to exploit the irrationality of the system: class struggle
needs to exploit the oppositional space that is constituted by the irrationality of the
system. Holloway's relapse into structuralism is evident in his treatment of the form
of the capitalist state.
The focus on class struggle leads Holloway to conceptualise the state in a two fold
manner: the form of the state and the state apparatus. The state apparatus is
identified with the bureaucratic structure of the state, as the terrain of daily contact
of people with the state and as a place of struggle (i.e. in and against the state). The
materialisation of state power in bureaucratic forms of control, individualisation
and repression is seen as expressing the social conflict inherent in a particular
historical development of the state apparatus (Holloway 1979/1990,1980).
Holloway discusses the state apparatus as manifesting a distinct level of existence
of political power, juxtaposed to the form of the state, while, at the same time, the
state apparatus is seen as being determined by the form of the state. Holloway's
argument is not at all clear on how to separate form and apparatus. Holloway insists
on two mutually exclusive understandings of the state: a dualism between the form
and the historically concrete development of the state, and the form of the state as
constant process of class struggle. While this latter notion seems to suggest that form
and structure (i.e. apparatus) can not be separated, the introduction of distinctive
levels of form and apparatus entails a juxtaposition of different things that belong
fundamentally together. Holloway seems to derive this distinction from Hirsch (i.e.
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the form of the state as an accomplished historical fact and the need for more
concrete analysis of the functioning of the state power), while his understanding of
the state apparatus derives from Blanke/Jurgens/Kastendiek (1978), who, in
contrast to Holloway, identify the 'functional form' of the state with the form of the
state itself (see Clarke 1990b). Holloway seems to suggest an existence of different
levels of the state as between abstract form and concrete apparatus. Does the struggle
in and against the state apparatus involve a struggle in and against the form of the
state and vice versa? If not, what is their distinction? If so, how to understand their
interrelation? The answers provided by Holloway are evasive. In his contribution to
the conceptualisation of the form of the state, Holloway insists that form and content
are inseparable. In his analysis of state power, on the other hand, he falls back on
discussing separate levels (form versus apparatus) of the existence of the state.
Such an understanding seems to imply an understanding of the state similar to the one
represented by Jessop who distinguishes between the form of the state (as abstract
level) and, separated from it, although existing through it, an intermediate
conceptualisation of the concrete development of the state (i.e. (post-)Fordism).
This intermediate level of the state seems to be identical to Holloway's use of the
term state apparatus. The confusing juxtaposition of different levels is "only
increased by Holloway's relapse into structuralism, in defining the state apparatus
as the 'institutional fossil of past struggles to reproduce bourgeois forms'" (Clarke
1990b, ms. p. 29). This view is structuralist because the state apparatus is, by
implication, seen as a neutral instrument whose specific character is determined by
the class struggle. Holloway "clearly distinguishes the state apparatus, defined as the
'institutional network of financial and administrative controls', from the state as a
'form of capitalist social relations', which would imply that the apparatus is not in
itself capitalist" (Clarke 1990b, p. 29). As Holloway would reject such a criticism,
his failure to clarify the confusing juxtaposition of form and apparatus runs no less
deep. Holloway's essentialisation of class struggle coincides with a structuralist
understanding of the state (apparatus) because of the implied contrast between class
(creativity and life) and the capitalist state (death and destruction) (see Holloway
1988b).
In Holloway, the jump from form analysis to an understanding of an apparent
intermediate level of the state (i.e. state apparatus) is in parallel with his shift in
emphasis from the social form of the movement of class antagonism to the immediacy
of the class struggle. While Holloway does not succeed in giving theoretical
clarification on the issue of intermediate levels, he puts his finger on a deep-rooted
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problem of form analysis, namely the formal aspect of derivation in contrast to the
actual historical process which form analysis claims to conceptualise. The problem
touched on by Holloway is that of how to understand the actual movement of class in
and through the forms in and against which the class struggle exists. How does one
understand the unity-in-difference of various workers' struggles and how can one
conceptualise them without falling into empiricism, functionalism and realism or
essentialism and romanticism? On this score, my thesis was based on the assumption
that when it comes down to the 'real struggle', the 'real resistance' and the ultimate
principle of the assertion that capital is struggle, matters of fact taken on their own
are wholly uninteresting. Looking at the facts will not help because facts are real
events that are always readily contestable on their own empirical terms. The theory
of class struggle needs to be located in form analysis as a way of thinking the relation
between critique and empirical evidence and vice versa. There is no alternative to the
problem of a Marxian exposition [Darstellung]. even if it does not provide a close
treatment of empirical evidence of struggle. In response to Holloway's distinction
between form and apparatus, I have tried to argue that the specific functions
arrogated by the state to itself in the course of the class struggle need to be
understood in terms of the historical development of the form of the state. The lesson
for form-analysis seems to be that the abstract categories need to be seen as existing
in the concrete and vice versa. The abstract categories need to be seen, thus, as open
to the historical development in and through which they subsist. Only in this way can
form analysis exist as a theory of the contradiction of domination, a contradiction of
which critique is itself a moment.
Holloway's relapse into an essentialist understanding of the class struggle needs to
be seen in the context of the apparent success of the New Right in containing class
struggle over the last decade. The school of Marxism which I have reworked in the
context of the contemporary development of the form of the state is constantly in
danger of essentialising its conceptual and practical assertion of the primacy of the
class struggle. The essentialisation of the class struggle is not confined to Holloway
but stretches across a wide range of authors working within this Marxist tradition,
in particular Negri (1989,1990) and Cleaver (1990). The shift from the primacy
of the class struggle to its essentialisation is generated from an understanding of
critique as arising out of a pre-given opposition. "The problems of relativism
entailed by seeing the opposition/critique relation this way round are formidable"
(Gunn 1989, p. 114, fn. 4 on Holloway 1988b). The primacy of opposition over
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critique dismisses, by implication, the 'unity of theory and practice' (see Gunn
1987a). The relapse into essentialism and the danger of falling into a hasty
conceptualisation of the class struggle have posed a constant danger in my thesis. The
charge of essentialism against the school of Marxism reworked in my thesis is, by
implication, directed against myself (see Psychopedis 1990 who criticises my
approach on this score).
Ill The Constituting Power of Labour j_n and against Capital
None of the above approaches, except those of Clarke and Holloway, pose the
question of the internal relation between materiality and form and, as a consequence,
they dismiss an analysis of the movement of the contradictory unity of surplus value
production. In Clarke and Holloway, the conceptualisation of the presence of labour in
and against capital bends either into the neglect of labour (the shadowy figure in
Clarke) or into the essentailisation of labour (the burst of anger and resentment in
Holloway). I have tried to overcome this problem by conceptualising the power of
labour as the form-giving fire of social existence, a form-giving power that exists,
and which asserts itself in practice, qua contradiction in and through the forms of
social reality. The thesis has asserted that the 'real' is perverted. At the same time,
the perversion of human relations as relations of things (i.e. money, state, capital)
exists as a mode of existence of social relations, social relations which exist qua
contradiction in and through the perverted forms of social reality. The terms
'perversion' has a two-fold meaning: deranged (verrucktl and de-ranged
(ver-rucktl: or mad and displaced (see Bonefeld 1990b;Backhaus 1990). I used the
term 'labour' as a concept which connotes the social constitution of social phenomena,
i.e. the self-contradictory constitution of social phenomena as perverted (in its
double meaning) forms of social existence. I used the term 'labour' as connoting the
constituting power of labour in and against capital. On the other hand, I referred to
the 'working class' as a mode of existence of labour based on the struggle over the
wage relation, that is, the struggle over the imposition of work through the
commodity form. The 'working class' was conceived of as social activity, an activity
constituted by the existence of labour in capitalism. Both, 'labour' and the 'working
class', were conceived of as existing in a dialectical continuum as between
constituting power and social activity. I understood this dialectical continuum to
mean an internal relation between the concept of labour (i.e. the abstract category of
labour in action) and the working class (i.e. the reification of labour in the form a
distinct workers' interest for secure employment, living standards and social
reform). I understood this dialectical continuum to mean also the de-ranged
363
existence of labour, involving an understanding of the working class as the social
subject of history. Construing the relation between labour and the working class in
this way seems to me to be fruitful to challenge the essentialism and functionalism
inherent in the Marxist school reworked in my thesis.
For example, seeing constant capital in the way just outlined made it possible to
speak about the subjective constitution of constant capital. This understanding of
constant capital permitted its conceptualisation as a self-contradictory phenomenon
which connotes the productive and disruptive power of labour in and against the
means of production, i.e. the reification of labour's productive power as productive
power of capital to set labour in motion and the reification of labour's disruptive
power in the form of constant capital (work-pacing and control of labour). In
respect to money, my conceptualisation of labour made possible an understanding of
money as a reification of labour's constituting power in a mode of being denied (i.e.
the perversion of social existence as a human relation). This made it possible to
speak about labour as the collective antagonism to the money power of capital,
without thereby simultaneously fetishising the collective power of labour as the
determining force (as is the case in Negri's conceptualisation of labour as existing
merely against capital). In turn, by conceptualising social phenomena as modes of
existence of the presence of labour in and against capital, the movement of the
contradictory existence of social phenomena is not construed as being determined
either by objective laws or by subjective action. Rather, the determination of the
movement of contradiction was kept open as regards class struggle. On the other
hand, the movement of the contradiction is determined by its social form (i.e.
reification of human relations).
Conceptualising capitalist domination in this way offers a fruitful contribution to a
perennial controversy in Marxism, namely, the controversy over the relation
between conceptual and historical analysis. The abstract category of labour pertains
in and through a de-ranged social reality, a reality which is real as a mode of
existence of the abstract category of labour. Such a view rejects an understanding of
'value' as the 'meta-form' of social reality to which more concrete concepts have to
be added (as in Jessop 1990). Instead value is understood as the mode of existence of
the constituting power of labour in and against capital, a constituting power which
does not exist in abstraction, but as the concrete historical process of the class
struggle (i.e. the dialectical continuum of deranged and de-ranged). On this score, the
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thesis offers neither a contribution to political science (e.g. Jessop), nor a
contribution to left Marxist system analysis (capital as an irrational system: e.g.
Negri). The thesis offers a contribution to the study of social constitution and form,
i.e. to the understanding of labour as existing in and against capital. However, such a
conceptualisation of class struggle involves one major difficulty, namely the 'heresy
of reality' (cf. Agnoli 1980;Bonefeld 1987b). By this, I understand the
circumstance that the concrete constantly challenges its abstract conceptualisation,
forcing a permanent reconsideration of the validity and the meaning of concepts. The
difficulty of conceptualising the heresy of reality necessitates, firstly, the openness
of the categories themselves and, secondly, an understanding of class struggle as
being unpredictable. These two elements exist in a contradictory way in that the
binding values of theory have to be constantly reasserted through the movement of
the class struggle whose unpredictability involves a possible crisis of theory
(Psychopedis 1990). For theory, the unpredictability of class struggle necessitates
a generalisation through abstraction so as to avoid the closure pertaining in a fixed
and given social reality. The contradiction between abstract conceptualisation and the
heresy of reality asserts, in theoretical terms, the contradictory existence of a
perverted world. This contradiction connotes the unpredictability of the movement of
class struggle itself. On this score, the thesis is very much part of the contradictory
existence of social reality as expressed, for example, in the tension between
conceptual and descriptive analysis.
All the above criticised approaches, with the exception of Clarke's and Holloway's,
put forward a one-dimensional analysis for the crisis of Keynesianism and the rise
of Monetarism rather than offering an analysis that grasps complex relationships
between different dimensions of class struggle over domination. Such an analysis can
be provided by 'form-analysis', the school of Marxist thought reworked in my thesis.
The power of money can not be properly understood unless it is conceived of as a
mode of existence of labour, thus permitting an analysis of money as the most
abstract form of capitalist property and so as the supreme power through which
social reproduction is subordinated to the production of capital. Further, the form of
the state can only be understood if one sees the state as the political form,
complementing the economic, of the fundamental class antagonism between capital
and labour. The forms of capitalist domination cannot be theorised in terms of
structural adequacy because the forms do not express a functional integration but,
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rather, the contradictory character of capitalist reproduction. The systematisation of
forms in terms of functional and structural adequacy can not grasp the movement of
forms in and through the class struggle; neither can it theorise their constitution.
The unity-in-difference of social forms can be articulated theoretically. However,
their development is the outcome of a history of class struggle in and against the
capitalist form of social reproduction. The historical resolution of class struggle is
always provisional, i.e. relative to the movement of the class struggle itself. The
so-called functional integration of different forms is always problematic not only for
the working class, but also for capital. An analysis which takes the forms for granted
and which seeks to trace their causal interconnections can not grasp their historical
development because it refuses to risk the methodic assertion of forms through
abstraction. A theory that looks at structural integration is a theory which seeks to
map concepts on to the objects of its theorising, thus taking these objects for granted
and running the risk of reifying what needs to be explained. Such an approach tends
to become complicit in the fetishisation of human relations to which it is officially
opposed. Secondly, such a theory runs the risk of conceptual collapse. This is so
because such theory can not justify its concepts. For example, the assumption of the
political as existing in a mode of structural adequacy involves the following
problems: firstly, what is the political adequate to; secondly, what determines the
adequacy of the political; thirdly, what is the criterion with which to define
adequacy. Only three solutions are possible: firstly, the adequacy of the political is
measured in terms of its output concerning the requirements of the economic. Such a
solution opens the way for an economistic Marxism, the political superstructure
arising from the economic base. Such a view concentrates on the economic as the
determining structure, thus making the political merely attendant upon the
inescapable lines of economic development. The second solution is to introduce a new
set of concepts with which to justify the first level of concepts. However, the new set
of concepts needs to be justified itself, leading to the introduction of new concepts and
so on. This solution reproduces the problem it claims to resolve through an infinite
regress of metatheories (see Gunn 1989). The third solution is to abnegate a
conceptual understanding in favour of a descriptive sociology of corresponding
features as between different subsystems. Such a solution sees the economic and the
political as 'autonomous' systems which generate causal interrelations through a sui
generis operation of their internal laws (see Jessop 1986a). As a consequence,
theory needs to identify reciprocal elements which exist in different subsystems
(e.g. mass production and demand mangement and the ideology of social consensus).
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No explanation can be given of how a reciprocal matrix of mutually supporting
elements develops. The only possible explanation is to declare such a matrix to be a
contingent articulation between different autonomous systems. This solution
interprets historical development in terms of its more or less close approximation
to a model whose elements are not conceptualised but, rather, presupposed. This
solution avoids the problem of justifying concepts only because the historical
development is understood to be contingent, thus allowing the concepts to be
contingent and arbitrary themselves. Further the concepts can be readily justified on
the basis of the 'real': it is what it is. Since, for example, the shift in emphasis in
economic policy in 1982 is a shift in emphasis and since the recovery phase of
accumulation in 1983 is a recovery phase, the articulation between the political and
the economic can be seen as a (flexible and contingent) articulation because it is real
in practice. In the event, the 'real' is explained by what exists, hence tautology. The
fundamental weakness of theories which aim at understanding the structural
adequacy of social forms is that they see contradictions only in terms of structural
contradictions, thus disarticulating structure and struggle. Such disarticulation does
not obtain if one understands the constitution of social forms as modes of
existence/motion of social relations, the presence of labour in and against capital.
The unity of structure and struggle and of concept and history stand or fall together.
The class struggle does not simply take place within the forms; the forms are
themselves a moment of the class struggle and are at issue in class struggle, as
capital and the working class confront them as barriers to social reproduction.
If one were to adopt a dualist understanding of structure and struggle, the analysis
would lead to a determinist understanding of social development as the analysis needs
to focus on "the inescapable lines of tendency and direction established by the real
world" (S. Hall 1985, p. 15). Such systematisation cannot grasp the complex
interrelations because the interrelation is, ultimately, understood only in terms of
causes and effects of structural laws. If this were the case, the social conflict would
be impossible to understand because of its distance from and unresolved relation to
objective laws. Unless one sees structures as modes of existence of human relation, it
would be impossible to understand the constitution of 'structures' and their
'development'. As a consequence, those approaches which focus on structures find it
difficult to explain how social conflict and structures interrelate. The separation
between class struggle and capital implies that social activity can be grasped only in
separation from the peculiar forms which class struggle assumes: voluntarism.
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Voluntarism and determinism are theoretically complementary because of the
dualism between class and capital (i.e. objective laws). The development of forms can
be understood only on the basis of an internal relation between structure and class
struggle, i.e. the presence of labour in and against capital. The key to such a
conceptualisation of social development is the notion of the 'abstract category of
labour in action', introduced in chapter II.
If one were to adopt Jessop's understanding of the state, nothing but a
base-superstructure analysis would be possible, however much one sees the state as
existing in a non-necessary relation to the economic. Such a view can not grasp the
complex relationships between different phenomena because it is ultimately the
determining power of the economic (itself one phenomenon amongst others) which is
taken as decisive. At the same time, such an approach can not provide an
understanding of the 'base' itself: is money part of the base or part of the
superstructure? If one were to adopt such an approach, how would one be able to
avoid a merely causal understanding of the relation between the political and the
economic, an understanding which takes for granted the existence of the causally
related terms? The economic/political relation, and indeed the distinction between
'the economy' and 'policies', can be understood only if one conceptualises the social
relations which constitute the political and the economic as complementary forms,
i.e. as, together, different modes of existence of the presence of labour in and against
capital. The role of the state in enforcing law is not just a matter of a
superstructural reflection of economic needs, but entails the enforcement of
capitalist reproduction which is the historical presupposition of the form of the state
itself. If one looks at the structural adequacy between supposedly different
subsystems, as in Jessop, Hirsch, Aglietta, then the contradictory character of social
reproduction can be understood, ultimately, only in terms of structural
contradictions, thus permitting the suppression of human relations which appear
only in attendance upon to structural laws. Further, if one looks at structural laws,
and contends that crisis is a dysfunction of the system, then only a determinist and
teleological analysis is possible because of the presupposition of inescapable lines of
development and the understanding of dysfunction as requiring to be transformed into
function in due course. Lastly, explaining the relation between different phenomena
in terms of structural adequacy implies explaining crisis in terms of structural
inadequacy. Dysfunction is explained by function and, by implication, function by
dysfunction, hence tautology. An analysis which suppresses class struggle can not
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provide a consistent understanding of social development; it provides a merely
descriptive analysis instead.
A conceptualisation of social form as a form assumed by class struggle makes it
possible to explain why it was the case that, despite overflowing markets and the
revolutionising of labour's productive power, social reproduction entered crisis. The
world entered crisis by the end of the 1960's not because of the overproduction of
commodities, but because of the overaccumulation of capital: the limits of social
reproduction as production of capital. 'Form-analysis' explains why it was the case
that the overaccumulation of capital expressed itself in the form of a financial crisis.
Form analysis conceives of 'money' as representing the most abstract form of
capital; the overaccumulation of capital is expressed in unemployed capital that
exists in the form of money. The abstract category of labour exists in the form of
money that can no longer be converted into productive command over labour, i.e. the
substance of value and as such the substance of money. Further, the ability of money
capital to extend beyond the direct capitalist imposition of work through speculative
financial investment signals not only the crisis of domination over labour (i.e. the
ability of capital to exploit labour; unemployed capital) but, also, a crisis of the
political integration of labour: the crisis of the integration of labour on the basis of
the transformation of protest into demand and the deficit financing of reproduction.
The crisis of the Keynesian integration of labour underlay the crisis of global deficit
financing of demand, institutionalised in Bretton Woods. The rupture of Bretton
Woods asserted the limits of Keynesian expansionism in the form of the barriers to
the sustained domestic accumulation presented by the overaccumulation of capital on
a world scale. This barrier asserted itself to the state in the form of the global rule
of money. Monetary pressure establishes the relation between the economic form of
the crisis and the crisis of the state. Monetary pressure sets limits to the way in
which the state integrates the working class through social reforms. The
subordination of the form of the state to money is a mode of existence of the
contradictory unity of surplus value production, a contradictory unity constituted by
the existence of labour in and against capitalism.
The understanding of the form of the state as a mode of existence of class antagonism
explains why the state attempted to decompose class relations on the basis of law and
money. No such explanation can be provided by the other debates, since law and
money are not seen as forms of class struggle but as superstructural expressions of
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structural forms. Were one not to understand the state as a form of class struggle,
one would not understand why it was the case that the state sought to decompose class
relations on the basis of the rule of money. Money treats everybody as equal, as all
proprietors are equal to money; an equality that characterises the right of property
as the paradigmatic form of exploitation. In turn, the imposition of equality,
discriminating against the despotic means of domination, involves the processing of
the working class as wage labour. This helps to explain why the state seeks to arrest
class struggle by imposing the wage relation.
The crisis-ridden imposition of the wage relation can be understood only if one
understands the mode of existence of labour in capitalism, i.e. the presence of labour
in and against capital. The substance of capital is the exploitation of labour which
exists in the form of monetary equivalents on the market: the integration of abstract
labour with the value form. The state enforces the right of property by decomposing
class relations on the basis of the wage relation, that is, on the basis of the
commodity form. If one adopts the school of Marxism reworked in my thesis, it is
possible to show why the Keynesian imposition of the wage relation, i.e. the
attempt to channel protest into demand, had come into conflict with the limits of
accumulation. One would be able to show that the expansive imposition of the wage
relation implied a barrier to the integration of national wealth into the world
market, mediated through the money power of capital. At the same time, the
imposition of the wage relation does not imply a crisis of social reproduction, but the
political attempt to impose work through the power of money, disciplining the
working class on the basis of the dictates of the market and channelling protest into
non-class forms, i.e into bourgeois relations of property. In turn, the deflationary
attack on wages involved the disorganisation of the working class on the basis of the
wage relation and the attempt to intensify work through pressure on living
standards, unemployment and wage pressure. Further, the imposition of the wage
relation and deflationary attack on wages entailed the break down of the synthesis
between domination and its legitimating discourse (i.e.* the Keynesian ideology of
social consensus). Simply to explain the ideological crisis of Keynesianism as a
crisis of the ideological discourse is to explain crisis through crisis, hence tautology.
Further, unless one understands the global character of capitalist accumulation,
one can not understand the integration of different nation states on the world market
through a synchronisation of balance of payment problems and currency difficulties.
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Although the state is constituted politically on a national basis, its class character is
defined by the social relations of production, the development of which is
international, accumulation and world money transcending national boundaries and
national currency. The subordination of the state to the rule of money confines the
state within limits imposed by the contradictory form of global capitalist
accumulation. Such an understanding explains the interrelation of nation states in
and through the global flow of money, the disruption of which imposes monetary
pressure on each nation state to secure expanded reproduction through deflationary
attack, including the intensification of work. To see the state in terms of the nation
state, and the organisation of capital in terms of its national organisation, would
make it impossible to understand why, for example, the decline of Britain is matched
with the rise of the City and globally prosperous 'British' capital. The contradictory
unity of surplus value production impinges on the state through the
overaccumulation of capital on a world scale. This explains the global crisis of
Keynesianism and the global rise of monetarist policies, the reassertion of monetary
pressure over the domestic organisation of money through the pressure on the
formal exchange equality of national currency and the interrelation between a default
in one country and its chain effects on other countries. A conceptualisation of capital
in terms of its national organisation makes it impossible to understand the monetary
constraints on nation states. Unless one adopts a form-analysis, pressure on
currency, exchange rate fluctuations, balance of payment problems, and debtor
crisis can only be understood as impinging on the individual state through the
shadowy figure of external forces.
The debate within Marxism reworked in my thesis conceptualises the presence of
labour in and against capital as the primary relation, thus permitting an
understanding of the economic and the political as complementary forms of the
relation which suffuses them. In turn, the economic and the political are seen as
existing in a relation of determined negation: neither can exist without the other,
while both exist in and through each other. (Thus: the political and the economic as
existing in a relation of separation-in-unity. The state does not stand above the class
struggle, but is a form of the class struggle.) The state enforces the right of property
through the imposition of law; the state regulates the reproduction of the working
class through social administration; the state maintains the rule of money and the
convertibility of currency through the decomposition of class relations on the basis
of th~e~~market: the imposition of work through the commodity form. Such an
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understanding of social existence explains why the state cannot reconcile the
contradictions of capital but is, rather, forced to reproduce these contradictions
through money and credit policies. The state imposes the force of law and money. In
general terms, the crisis of domination over the confinement of labour's productive
power within the form of capital impinges on the state in the form of the barriers to
the sustained accumulation presented by the overaccumulation of capital on a world
scale. The state can contain the political impact of the crisis-ridden development of
accumulation through law, money and force. However, the use of these means are
limited by the global character of accumulation and the political constraints of the
class struggle. The enforcement of law and money involves the decomposition of class
relations. However, the power of law and money recognises the working class only so
far as property ownership is concerned, i.e. the imposition of market equality, thus
permitting the role of law and money-as-command to work. However in money the
relation to its own substance, i.e. exploitation, is seemingly eliminated (property
relations), while money is, at the same time, the incarnation of value (abstract
labour). To approach the relation of money to labour in this way explains why the
state reproduces the contradictions of capital, rather than resolving them. By
imposing the limits of capital through the power of money, the state sacrifices
productive activity and labour, i.e. the basis upon which money as representative of
abstract labour exists. On the other hand, the attempt to reconcile production and
circulation on the basis of credit-expansion implies the speculative deferral of
devaluation and liquidation of capital, as too much credit accumulates relative to the
ability of capital to guarantee credit as a claim on surplus value through the effective
exploitation of labour. The state's attempt to enforce debt: through a monetary and
legal decomposition of class relations indicates that the development of the state is
not determined by the functional imperatives of economic requirements (as in the
Regulation Approach and the debate on Fordism), but by the development of the class
struggle over deflationary attack. Such deflationary attack, in turn, does not relate
directly to the crisis of surplus value production, but to the constitution of this same
crisis in the form of global monetary pressure of unemployed capital which
accumulates independently of the exploitation of labour, while, at the same time,
existing only in and through it. Unless this were the case it would be impossible to
understand why the state did not succeed in implementing regulative forms to resolve
the crisis of capitalist overaccumulation.
The understanding of abstract labour as constituting social activity makes it
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possible to explain why it was the case that monetarist economic policies were
abandoned in favour of a speculative sustaining of accumulation. This shift did not
follow a change in the ideological battle. Neither did the shift follow the inescapable
lines of development. The ideological legitimation of the capitalist state power did not
change; monetarist ideology remained. The change in emphasis did not emerge because
of the unfolding of objective laws, the 'inescapable lines of development' of a crash
course. The shift in emphasis came about because of the crisis-ridden dissociation of
monetary from productive accumulation on a world scale. However, this dissociation
cannot be explained in terms of a confrontation between different capital interests
(cf. Ingham), because unless one sees the relation between money and productive
capital as a relation constituted by the class antagonism between capital and labour,
no explanation can be given of how there can be a crisis-ridden dissociation between
monetary and productive accumulation. Unless one understands the social form of
class relations, the only possible answer to such dissociation is to systematise
different income sources, without, however, providing a consistent understanding of
the interrelation between different 'incomes'. The 'value' of money is not the interest
it can achieve, but the share of surplus value it can command. The stability of credit
depends on the productive imposition of work: the guarantee of credit as a claim on
surplus value. This helps to explain why the events of 1982 triggered a shift from
monetarist to Keynesian economic policies. This shift was not a response to the
economic slump, or to the debtor crisis as such. The shift responded to the possible
collapse of the capacity of capital to subordinate social reproduction to. the
reproduction of capital through money. However, the power of money exists only as
command to work: the substance of money is labour; credit exists as a claim on
not-yet produced surplus value. Thus one needs to descend from the crisis of debt to
the crisis of money as the most abstract property of capital; and from money to the
crisis of surplus value production, and thus to the class struggle over the imposition
of money as command to work: i.e. the class struggle over the relation between
necessary and surplus labour - the constitutive parts of the working day and the
class relation which constitutes it. The fragility of international debt expressed a
failure to exploit labour effectively, undermining the guarantee of credit as a claim
on surplus value and, concomitantly, the guarantee of credit as a claim on taxation. It
was the productive power of labour which capital failed to confine within its form on
the basis of the supremacy of the valorisation over the labour process. Instead the
productive power of labour was confined within the form of capital on the basis of a
speculative deferral of mass devaluation of productive capital. Unless this were the
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case, it would be impossible to understand the interrelation of the 1980's boom and
the crash in 1987. Unless one sees labour as the other side of the crisis of capitalist
reproduction, it would be imposible to understand why the self-contradictory
'autonomistion' of monetary accumulation involves a crisis of the form of the state.
Unless one sees the form of the state as the concentrated power of the property of
capital to enforce law and money, it would be impossible to understand the
interrelation between class struggle over the reassertion of the right to manage and
the conflict over deflationary attack. The political imposition of the abstract equality
of money involves class struggle over the form of the state as the struggle over
capitalist domination involves the state in imposing the limits of capital through
money, law and force. Surplus value production exists only contradictorily, and thus
money exists only contradictorily as. money, as each of the world's debtor crises
makes plain. These contradictions can not be understood if one takes the nation state,
or the wage relation, or the separation of the state from the economic, or the
dissociation of financial from productive investement, or ideological discourses as
the starting point. Indeed, a Marxism of structures and discourses is forced either to
trail behind events, extrapolating from existing 'structures' and 'discourses' a
merely descriptive analysis of unexplained events, or to rush in front of events
seeking to construe, in teleogical fashion, the reintegration of structures. The
theoretical suppression of struggle in favour of a description of real events and
enduring tendencies forecloses upon the conceptual understanding, and historical
lessons, of the dangers and opportunities inherent in social development.
The political consequences of the theoretical suppression of the constituting power
of labour in and against capital are formidable. The 'enduring tendencies' of
speculative accumulation and the fragility of controlled devaluation of superfluous
capital (see chapter III) show the real possibility of a collapse. In the case of such a
collapse, a taste of a domestic reassertion of domination is provided by the example of
a monetarism in crisis in so-called debtor countries. Unless capital were class
struggle, it would be impossible to understand why there has not been a much more
vigorous reassertion of political domination in the UK, and other metropolitan
capitalist countries. Unless one understands that capital is class struggle, there will
be no alternative to the 'inescapable lines' of declining living standards,
intensification of work, loss of jobs and the erosion of the welfare state. It is not the
inescapable lines of development which determine the oppression of the working
class, but the ability of capital to contain the working class within the limits of
374
social reproduction as reproduction of capital. The tragedy of Marxist approaches
which separate class struggle from capital is that the suppression of class struggle is
complicit in the rejection of historical responsibilities.
Notes
1: Parts of this argument have been published in Bonefeld 1990a
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